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Abstract. 
For some time, academics, politicians and officials within the European Union 
have been debating the Union's legitimacy. Broadly speaking, legitimacy 
concerns the (lack of) esteem in which citizens of the Union hold the Union's 
laws, policies and institutions. In order to legitimate the Union, 'to bring Europe 
closer to its citizens', and to democratise the Union's law- and policy-making 
processes, so that ordinary Europeans will more willingly agree to further 
integration and more readily obey Union laws, transparency has been called for. 
This thesis first seeks to define transparency. If legitimacy is to be achieved by 
means of an increase in transparency, the concept of transparency must be 
multidimensional, including a right of the public to scrutinise and to participate in 
decision-making processes. Various claims concerning transparency-related issues 
are considered, including the claim that the right of public access to government-
held documents is a fundamental human right. The thesis then asks whether the 
institutions and Member States are actively seeking to provide an appropriate level 
of transparency, and, if not, whether transparency as officially defined by the 
institutions and Member States - i.e. transparency as a right of public access to 
documents held by the institutions - is capable of providing legitimacy. The 
substantive rules governing public access to such documents are examined, and the 
thesis evaluates the effectiveness of the remedies available to persons to whom 
such access is denied. The creation of a new institution is recommended, to ensure 
the effectiveness of the Union's transparency policy, with a view to legitimating 
and democratising the Union. This new institution could facilitate a change in the 
Union's culture, from a culture of secrecy to a culture of openness and willingness 
to permit public scrutiny of, and public participation within, the Union's decision-
making processes. 
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http:/ /www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/980713 .htm 
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INTRODUCTION. 
Transparency: the historical background. 
Prior to the establishment of the European Union, questions had been asked 
regarding the democratic legitimacy 1 of the Communities. The concept of a 
'democratic deficit' in Community law-making had arisen. As will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter Two infra, nobody seems to have precisely defined the 
democratic deficit or to have identified its exact cause. However, the following 
basic facts appear to have contributed most to the development of this concept. 
Firstly, the Member States were, and remain, sovereign liberal democratic states. 
Secondly, the Communities had not been established according to the traditional 
model of a liberal democratic state: decisions were adopted by the secretive 
Council of Ministers, representing the governments of the Member States. 
Thirdly, the only directly elected institution representing ordinary citizens, the 
European Parliament, had a weak consultative role in the development of 
Community legislation. Nevertheless, fourthly, it was by this time well 
established that Community legislation took precedence over national law. At the 
time of the establishment of the EU, a critical question was that of whether the 
institutions and procedures of the new Union had sufficient democratic legitimacy 
to confer upon the institutions the right to legislate, given that, inter alia, the TEU 
increased the scope of Community law-making.2 
During the Maastricht Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), the Member States 
apparently sought to respond to the existing concerns regarding the Union's 
legitimacy, by ensuring that the text of the TEU included provisions concerning 
1 The concept of legitimacy will be defined and discussed further in Chapter Two infra. 
2 For example, new titles IX (Culture), X (Public Health), XI (Consumer Protection), XII (Trans-
European Networks), and XIII (Industry) were added to the amended Part Three of the EC 
Treaty. 
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citizenship,3 democratisation,4 subsidiarity,5 and transparency. 6 Writing before the 
adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, Gniinne de Burca explained that these four 
"overlapping and interrelated" concepts are almost universally deemed to be 
crucial to the legitimacy of the Union, although "the particular conceptions of each 
diverge widely. Closer examination of their usage reveals the very different and 
disputed meanings being attributed to the same terms under discussion". 7 Perhaps 
because these four concepts are poorly defined, the Member States' efforts to 
enhance the legitimacy of the Union by referring to them in the new and amended 
Treaties did not seem to have the desired effect. De Burca also observes that "it is 
largely since the Maastricht process that the debate on the European Union has 
been cast in terms of a 'crisis' of legitimacy".8 The TEU itself was unexpectedly 
opposed within Denmark and only narrowly ratified by France, which "focused 
attention sharply on the existence of a substantial level of public opposition"9 to 
further European integration and/or to the continuing governance of the 
institutions. 
During the Amsterdam IGC, the Member States adhered to the "four themes" 10 of 
citizenship, democracy, subsidiarity and transparency in a further bid to overcome 
this perceived legitimacy crisis. They clarified the meaning of Union citizenship 
in response to the concerns of Denmark, 11 extended the power of the European 
3 A new Part Two of the EC Treaty established Citizenship of the Union (Articles 8-8e (now 17-22) 
EC). 
4 Articles 189b and 189c (now 251 and 252) EC enhanced the role of the European Parliament in 
decision-making, particularly Article 189b. 
5 Article 3b, paragraph 2 (now Article 5, paragraph 2) EC. 
6 Declaration No. 17, annexed to the Final Act of Maastricht: "The Conference considers that 
transparency of the decision-making process strengthens the democratic nature of the 
institutions and the public's confidence in the administration. The Conference accordingly 
recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on 
measures designed to improve public access to the information available to the institutions." 
7 
'The Quest for Legitimacy in the European Union' (1996) 59 MLR 349, at 350. 
8 Ibid., at 349 (emphasis added). 
9 Ibid., at 350. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Article 8(1) (now 17(1 )) EC was amended to emphasise the fact that Union citizenship 
complements and does not replace national citizenship. 
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Parliament to act as eo-legislator, 12 adopted a new Protocol concernmg the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, and made two 
important Treaty amendments concerning transparency. Article 1 (ex A) TEU was 
amended to emphasise the need for decisions to be taken 'as openly as possible', 
and Article 191a (now 255) EC was introduced, according to which the Council 
and European Parliament were to develop a right of public access to documents 
held by the Commission, Council and European Parliament. Meanwhile, in 1993, 
the Commission and Council had adopted a Code of Conduct governing public 
access to documents in their possession. 13 As will be seen in Part One of this 
thesis, the right of public access to official documents is an important component 
of the concept of transparency: in fact, the Member States and institutions seem to 
have equated transparency with this right. This Code of Conduct has now been 
superseded by legislation based upon Article 255 EC, as will be discussed further 
in Chapter Five infra. However, it has recently emerged that the Union's 
perceived legitimacy crisis has, if anything, intensified. 14 
Structure and aims of this thesis. 
Having regard to this historical background, this thesis sets out to discuss one of 
de Burca's four interrelated themes discussed above in more depth: that of 
transparency. Part One is concerned with the meaning and importance of this 
concept, initially in the abstract. Chapter One argues that transparency in the 
abstract is a complex, multidimensional concept, of which the concept of a right of 
public access to official documents is only one facet, or dimension. Also in 
Chapter One, the claim that public access to documents is a 'fundamental human 
right', 15 absolutely essential to democracy, will be evaluated. Chapter Two places 
multidimensional transparency in the context of the European Union, and seeks to 
12 E.g. Article 175 (ex 130s) EC now involves the use of the Article 251 (ex 189b) EC 'eo-decision' 
procedure instead of the Article 189c (now 252) EC 'co-operation' procedure. 
13 Decision 93/730/EC; OJ 1993 L 340/41. 
14 See the Commission's White Paper on European Governance, COM(200l) 428,25 July 2001, at 
p.3, discussed in Chapter Two infra at note I. 
15 A concept that will also be discussed in more detail in Chapter One, section 1.3 infra. 
25 
explore further the question of whether multidimensional transparency might 
legitimate the Union. Chapter Three asks whether, by focussing upon the concept 
of transparency as public access to documents, the Member States and EU 
institutions are taking the multidimensional concept of transparency seriously: is a 
right of public access to documents alone sufficient to help to legitimate the 
Union? 
In Part Two, the fact that the Member States and institutions have apparently 
elected to focus upon transparency as a right of public access to documents, as 
seen from Declaration No. 17, 16 inspires a critical examination of the applicable 
mles governing this right. If transparency as public access to documents is being 
taken seriously, and if the Member States and institutions genuinely aim to 
enhance the democracy of the Union by the provision of such a right, then, for 
reasons that will be discussed during Part One, those mles should be aimed at 
encouraging the widest possible public access to information held by the 
institutions. Chapter Four briefly examines the right of access to the file, which is 
not intended to improve the Union's democracy or legitimacy but which is 
necessary in order to maintain the mle of law. The narrow, 'specialised' right of 
access to information concerning the environment and the right of the public to 
participate in the making of decisions affecting the environment is also considered 
in Chapter Four. This discussion, for comparative purposes, will facilitate the 
critical discussion, in Chapter Five, of the EU's provisions governing public access 
to all types of information: it will also facilitate a critical discussion in Chapter Six 
of the approach of the Community Courts to the right of public access to 
documents. 
Chapter Five, as indicated, examines the substantive law governing public access 
to documents held by the institutions. It will be argued that these mles are not as 
liberal as they might be: they certainly fall short of the standard to be expected of a 
regime committed to multidimensional transparency in governance. This, in turn, 
16 Note 6 supra. 
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inspires an examination of the remedies available for natural and legal persons to 
whom access to a given document has been refused. One of the questions that 
must be addressed before deciding whether the Member States and institutions are 
taking transparency seriously concerns the extent to which they have made 
provision for ordinary people to challenge decisions refusing public access to 
documents, and the extent to which it is possible to challenge the implementation 
of any less-than-liberal public access rules by at least insisting that these be 
interpreted in a liberal manner: that is to say, applied with a view to granting 
access as opposed to maintaining secrecy. 
Part Three of this thesis is devoted to an examination of the available remedies. 
As also indicated above, Part Three opens with a discussion of judicial review by 
the Community Courts in Chapter Six. The role of the European Ombudsman is 
critically examined in Chapter Seven. In the final Chapter, an alternative and far 
more powerful remedy is considered, that would also be far more than just a 
remedy for citizens aggrieved by an institution's refusal to grant access to 
documents in its possession: it might be capable of effecting a change to the whole 
culture of the EU and its institutions. This thesis argues that the adoption of the 
multidimensional concept of transparency in governance has potential to alleviate 
the Union's ongoing legitimacy crisis. Enforcing a change in the approach to the 
implementation of the rules governing public access to documents held by the 
institutions, and encouraging a change in the approach to the very adoption of such 
rules in the first place, might help to make the institutions and the Member States 
more receptive to the idea of adopting a multidimensionally-transparent system of 
governance for the EU. 
This thesis is based upon the law as at 31 December 2001. Unless otherwise 
stated, all Internet sites to which reference is made in the text were available as at 
03 February 2002. 
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PART ONE: THE CONCEPT OF TRANSPARENCY. 
CHAPTER ONE. 
Transparency in the abstract. 
1.1. Introduction. 
This Chapter considers the meaning of transparency, which, as illustrated in 
section 1.2, is a multidimensional concept. Chapter One also explores two 
claims concerning transparency. Section 1.3 evaluates the claim that the right 
of public access to government-held documents, a component dimension of 
multidimensional transparency, is a 'fundamental human right'. Transparency 
is also described as essential to democracy: this claim is evaluated in section 
1.4. Section 1.5 considers the potential importance of the theory of noted 
German philosopher Jtirgen Habermas in understanding the connection 
between multidimensional transparency and the particular model(s) of 
democracy in which transparency is, indeed, essential. 
A third claim, that transparency is essential to the legitimacy of government, is 
at least partially based upon the two claims analysed in this Chapter. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to discuss this third claim in Chapter Two, in 
which the relationship between transparency and the legitimacy of the 
European Union will also be explored. 
1.2. Multidimensional Transparency. 
Transparency, as indicated, encompasses several concepts. Janet Mather has 
identified three conceptually distinct dimensions of transparency: 1 
I) the comprehensibility and availability of information; 
2) access to the thinking behind decisions; and 
3) opening-up the decision-making process to non-governmental participation. 
1 
'Transparency in the European Union - an open and shut case', 'Commentary', European 
Access(I997) no. I, atp.9. 
28 
The European Ombudsman ('the Ombudsman'), Mr Jacob Soderman, has also 
identified three dimensions:2 
1) the processes through which public bodies make decisions should be 
understandable and open; 
2) the decisions themselves should be reasoned; and 
3) as far as possible, the information on which the decisions are based should 
be available to the public. 
Edouard Chiti has isolated four elements:3 
1) the simplifying and consolidation of legislation; 
2) openness (as in the visibility of the activities ofthe institutions); 
3) access to information; and 
4) subsidiaritl and proportionality. 
Multidimensional transparency is, evidently, neither simply freedom of 
information (FOI), nor open government, nor even the ability of citizens and 
civil society5 to participate in government. It exists when there is not only 
freedom to access government-held information as of right, but also when 
legislative and policy-making processes, in which well-informed citizens and 
representatives of civil society may also participate, are open to public scrutiny. 
Decision-makers, on Chiti's analysis, should also respect the principles of 
proportionalit/ and subsidiarity.7 Carol Harlow justifiably describes 
2 
'Transparency as a Fundamental Principle of the European Union', Berlin, 19 June 2001, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/200 I-06-19.htm. See further Chapter 
Seven infra, section 7.2, regarding the Ombudsman and multidimensional transparency. 
3 
'The Right of Access to Community Information under the Code of Practice: the implications 
for Administrative Development' (1996) 2 European Public Law 363, at 370. Chiti's 
inclusion of subsidiarity and proportionality as elements of transparency will be further 
considered in Chapter Two. (N.B. the four elements are not listed here in the same order 
in which Chiti lists them). 
4 On subsidiarity, see e.g. A. Toth, 'The Principle of Subsidiarity in the Maastricht Treaty' 
(1992) 29 CMLRev 1079. 
5 See further Chapter Three, infra, section 3.2.1. 
6 Various formulations of this principle exist: see, e.g. P. Craig and G. de Burca, EU Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials 2"d Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998, at p.350. 
7 See further Chapter Two, irifra, sub-section 2.2.3.2. 
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transparency as "a complex concept, encapsulating several different kinds of 
. h ,8 ng t ... 
Non-governmental 'watchdog' organisations, especially Statewatch, 9 in calling 
for greater transparency at EU level, are implicitly calling for multidimensional 
transparency. They are not only requesting a right of public access to 
documents, but also a right to participate in decision-making processes: at the 
very least, the right to be consulted regarding proposed laws and policies. 10 It 
will shortly be argued that public participation in government decision-making 
is the most important dimension of multidimensional transparency, although its 
importance is rarely unequivocally stated or emphasised: of the commentators 
quoted above, for example, only Mather expressly identified public 
participation as a dimension oftransparency. 
Although multidimensional transparency raises questions concerning the cost 
of providing information, the maintenance of archives, and the adequacy of 
human and financial resources devoted to the retrieval and supply of 
information, such non-legal concerns might be addressed by the application of 
suitable technologies, and/or by the employment of extra personnel, and/or by 
the provision of additional funding. Basically, any regime desiring 
transparency must allocate sufficient resources to the provision thereof. The 
major components of multidimensional transparency, with which this thesis is 
concerned, may be summarised as follows: 
government-held information must be comprehensible: it must, inter alia, 
include an explanation of the government's decision-making processes (cf 
Mather, item 1, Soderman, item I, Chiti, items I and 3 ); 
8 
'Freedom of Information and Transparency as Administrative and Constitutional Rights' 
( 1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 285, at 285. 
9 http://www.statewatch.org./ 
10 Sec, e.g., Statewatch editor T. Bunyan, 'Access to Documents 'could fuel public discussion" 
in 'Essays for An Open Europe', http://www.statewatch.org./secret/cssays2.htm. The 
right of public access to documents "would allow EU citizens and those outside the EU 
who are affected by its policies and practices ... to take part in decision-making and to 
monitor ongoing practices." With respect, the right of public access to documents could 
not secure a right for ordinary people to participate in decision-making: decision-making 
processes must also be designed to incorporate such participation. Otherwise, the right of 
public access to documents will not be particularly useful: see further section 1.3 infra. 
30 
government-held information must be available (and, presumably, there 
must be an adequate quantity of information, i.e. the whole truth, as 
opposed to half-truths) (cf Mather, item 1, Soderman, item 3, Chiti, item 
3); 
government-held information must refer to the reasoning behind decisions 
as well as to the decisions themselves (cf Mather, item 2, Soderman, items 
2 and 3, Chiti, item 2); 
governmental decision-making processes must be open to public scrutiny 
(cf Mather, item 3, Soderman, item 1, Chiti, item 2); 
wherever possible, governmental decision-making processes must also be 
open to public participation (cf Mather, item 3, Chiti, item 2); 
governmental decisions, especially decisions to withhold information, must 
be amenable to judicial review (cf Chiti, item 4 11 ): this concerns access to 
. . 12 
JUStiCe. 
Mather acknowledges that public participation in governmental decision-
making is more accurately described as a function of transparency, but 
observes that it nevertheless seems appropriate "to regard popular 
empowerment as an integral part of a transparency package": 13 Bunyan might 
well agree. 14 Public participation in government may be regarded as the most 
important dimension of multidimensional transparency, because there is 
something resembling a logical 'hierarchy of norms' among the dimensions 
listed above. The idea that information should be comprehensible does not 
imply that there should also be public participation in government. However, a 
call for public participation in government implies that the public should have 
access to adequate quantities of comprehensible information, in order to 
facilitate such participation. A regime intending to provide comprehensible 
public information need not provide as many other dimensions of 
multidimensional transparency as one intending to offer a range of 
opportunities for public participation in decision-making. Therefore, the 
11 Judicial review being a means of determining that a decision is proportionate. 
12 Access to justice as a component of multidimensional transparency frequently seems to be 
overlooked, or taken for granted: see further Chapter Two, infi'a, sub-section 2.2.3.3. 
13 Note I supra, at p.9. 
14 Note I 0 supra. 
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'public participation dimension' is more nearly equivalent to multidimensional 
transparency in its entirety than the 'comprehensible information dimension'. 
Comprehensible decision-making processes, public scrutiny thereof, and public 
participation therein, could be described as dimensions of 'openness', a term 
occasionally used instead of transparency. To equate openness with 
multidimensional transparency, however, is erroneous: openness/open 
government is an aspect of multidimensional transparency. 
Furthermore, if people were granted a right of public access to government-
held information (hereinafter, 'public access'), that right would not, by itself, 
impose any duty upon the government to also allow the public to participate in 
governmental decision-making, nor would it require the government's 
decision-making processes to be open to public scrutiny. A right of access to 
justice would be required, as a means of enforcing the right of public access, 
but it would be wrong to equate multidimensional transparency with the latter 
right: the grant of a right of public access would not logically entail a need to 
provide as many other dimensions of multidimensional transparency as would 
the grant of a right to participate in government decision-making. 
It must also be remembered, in light of the above analysis, that not all 
academic, NGO or EU publications actually refer to multidimensional 
transparency: it remains necessary to examine references to 'transparency' 
carefully. The concept might not be regarded as multidimensional by a given 
author, but might be equated with the one-dimensional provision of 
information, or with the right of public access. For that reason, Mather 
describes transparency as a 'Humpty-Dumpty word', meaning whatever its 
user intends it to mean. 15 This caveat particularly applies to official EU 
publications, as will be seen in Chapter Three, infra. 
Other major issues concernmg multidimensional transparency include the 
critical question of the extent to which government-held information may 
legitimately be withheld from the public, which generates the equally important 
15 Note I supra (from Lewis Carroll's children's story, Through the Looking Glass). 
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question of who should determine, and on what grounds, the legitimacy of any 
refusal to supply such information. 16 There is also a question of whether 
transparency is intrinsically or instrumentally valuable, which has arisen in 
connection with one particular dimension of multidimensional transparency: 
the right of public access, controversially described as a fundamental human 
right. 
1.3. Public access to government-held documents: a fundamental human 
right? 
1.3.1. An "emergingfundamental right ... " 
Most Member States 17 and EU institutions/bodies 18 have adopted internal 
measures providing for public access. Meanwhile, Article 255 (ex 191A) EC 
provides the legal basis for a right of public access to European Parliament, 
Council and Commission documents, 19 and the inclusion of that right in the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Article 46) suggests 
that public access to the documents of the three main legislative institutions is, 
perhaps, becoming a general principle of Community law.20 At least, in light 
of these recent developments, the Ombudsman has spoken of "an emerging 
16 See further Chapters Five and Eight, infra. 
17 Public access to information is a constitutional right in: Belgium, Finland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. It is a legislative right, with a constitutional 
basis, in Austria and Greece. It is a legislative right in Denmark, France, Ireland and the 
UK. Arguably, the UK legislation is of a constitutional nature (N.B: the UK Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 has not yet been fully implemented). On the terms 'constitutional 
right' and 'legislative right', see further section I .3.2 infra. 
18 The Ombudsman's own-initiative inquiry into public access to documents within the EU 
(http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/317764.htm) indicates that most 
institutions had adopted rules on public access to documents by October I 996. 
19 This right, and other issues arising therefrom, will be considered in detail in Chapters Five, 
Six and Seven infra. 
20 With regard to the legal status of the Charter (2000 OJ C 364/0 I), K. Lenaerts and E. de 
Smijter ('A "Bill of Rights" tor the European Union' (2001) 38 CMLRev 273, at 290, 
298-9) conclude that it is a solemn declaration of the rights currently protected by the 
Community Courts (ECJ and CFI) as general principles of Community law: however, 
because those rights are so protected, the Charter is nevertheless an effective part of the 
acquis communautaire. This conclusion is strongly supported by the Opinion of 
Advocate General Tizzano in Case C-173/99, Broadcasting, Entertainment, 
Cinematographic and Theatre Union (BECTU) v Secretary of State for Trade and 
lndustty, Opinion of 8 February 2001 (paragraphs 27-28), [200I] 3 CMLR 7. The 
apparent status of public access, as a general principle of Community law, is further 
discussed in Chapter Five infra, section 5.2. 
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fundamental right of public access [to documents held by EU institutions] as a 
general principle of Community law."21 
1.3.2. A problem of terminology. 
That there is a right of public access cannot be doubted. Furthermore, within 
this thesis, it will not be argued that public access is unimportant. Public 
access has, however, become controversial, at least partly because of the 
terminology used to describe the right. Of various terms used in connection 
with rights, a citizen's right is understood, in this thesis, to mean a human right 
that may only be exercised, within any state, by citizens of that state. A 
constitutional right is, not surprisingly, a right conferred by a state's 
constitution: such rights need not necessarily be widely accepted as human 
rights by the international community.22 Likewise, a legislative right will have 
been conferred by legislation. In the UK, which has no codified constitutional 
document, legislative rights might be regarded as constitutional, human or 
fundamental. 23 It remains to clearly establish the definition of a human right, 
for the purposes of further discussion, and to consider the possible meaning of 
the term 'fundamental human right'. 
A human right is, or should be, available to all humans simply because they are 
human?4 This definition distinguishes citizens' rights from other human 
rights: citizens' rights are counted among human rights on the grounds that all 
states should guarantee them for their own citizens, yet no state is obliged to 
21 Speech cited at note 2 supra. This contrasts with an earlier speech following the 
Ombudsman's receipt of approximately eleven complaints concerning public access, in 
which J. Soderman observed that he had received only two or three complaints 
concerning 'human rights issues' ('The European Ombudsman and Human Rights', 
Vienna, 9 October 1998, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/viennal.htm). 
22 E.g. the constitutional right of citizens of the United States of America to bear arms 
(Amendment 11). 
23 E.g. the right to legal advice upon arrest and detention: s.58, Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. Harlow (note 8 supra) employs additional terms, such as 'administrative law 
right' (ibid., at 286-291, esp. at 287). Rights associated with openness and access to 
information are 'collective constitutional rights' (ibid., at 294) and 'democratic rights' 
(ibid., at 295). 
24 A. Gewirth, Human Rights: Essays on Justification and Applications, University of Chicago 
Press, Chicago and London, 1982, at p.l. The terms 'human right' and 'fundamental 
right' are used interchangeably in Community law: see, e.g. Craig and de Burca, note 6 
supra, at p.33 and p.II46. 
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guarantee citizens' rights for non-citizens. 25 Having regard to the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, as indicated,26 this is a non-
binding, solemn declaration of certain rights which are protected as general 
principles of Community law. Not all such rights are widely accepted human 
rights, such as the general principle of good administration, which, 
interestingly, is also presented in the Charter as a citizens' right.27 Moreover, 
the right of public access in both the EC Treaty28 and the Charter29 may be 
exercised by EU citizens and any natural/legal person residing or having its 
registered office in a Member State. The fact that non-citizens may exercise 
the right argues against it being a true citizens' right, but if it is to be 
characterised as a human right instead, it should be exercisable by everyone, 
everywhere.30 In light of this, notwithstanding the positivist view that any state 
can declare a right to be a human right if it so desires, with or without giving 
reasons, it is useful to have some philosophical justification for describing a 
right as a human right.31 Possible reasons for so describing public access will 
be explored in section 1.3.3. irifra. 
Having regard to the de~nition of a fundamental human right, per Joseph Raz, 
a right may be regarded as 'morally fundamental' 
25 Veit Michael Bader, 'Citizenship of the Union: Human Rights, Rights of Citizens of the 
Union and of Member States' ( 1999) 12 Ratio Juris 153, at 161. 
26 Note 20 supra. 
27 Article 4 I. 
28 Article 255 (ex 191 a) EC. 
29 Article 46. 
3
° Cf the form of words used in Article 2 of the EU Charter: "Everyone has the right to life ... " 
The fact that the right of public access in the Treaty and the Charter is not likewise 
available to 'everyone' was commented upon in paragraph 60, Sixteenth Report of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 1999-2000, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld 199900/ldselect/ldeucom/1 02/1 0204.htm. 
Their Lordships noted that "[i]n practice there may be little, if any, practical significance 
in the omission of [citizens and residents of the applicant States and parties outside who 
trade in the Union] because an applicant does not have to give reasons when applying for 
a document. Moreover, as the Ombudsman says, requirements of good administration 
may demand non-citizens/other persons to be treated equally with EU citizens ... ", but 
maintained that the right ought to be characterised as a right for all. That insistence, 
interestingly enough, does not appear to be an insistence upon treating the right as a 
human right because it is a human right, but upon the belief that providing a right of 
public access to documents for all would make the institutions act more openly, and the 
further belief that "the [Community's] objectives could be better achieved by the 
institutions acting more openly" (ibid.). 
31 R. Davis, 'Public access to community documents: a fundamental human right?' European 
Integration online Papers vol. 3 (1999) no. 8, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-008a.htm. 
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"if it is justified on the ground that it serves the right-holder's interest in having that 
right inasmuch as that interest is considered to be of ultimate value, i.e. inasmuch as 
the value of that interest does not derive from some other interest of the right-holder 
or of other persons."32 
Applying this reasoning to human rights, if the value of a person's interest in 
having a particular human right does not derive from any of his/her other 
interests or from the interests of others, that particular human right will also be 
morally fundamental. 33 To Raz, however, "the protection of many of the most 
cherished ... rights in liberal democracies is justified by the fact that they serve 
the common or general good."34 The human right to freedom of expression 
"serves the interest of all those who have an interest in acquiring information 
from others."35 Public access, of course, also serves this interest. Raz 
describes FOI as one of the "foundation-stones of all political democracies."36 
Nevertheless, to Raz, the value of the right to freedom of expression derives 
from its "contribution to a common liberal culture ... [which] serves the 
interests of members of the community,"37 and not simply from its value to the 
individual right-holder, to whom freedom of expression per se may actually be 
of comparatively little worth.38 Freedom of expression is regarded as being 
instrumentally valuable to the development of a morally worthy political 
culture, not as being intrinsically valuable to the individual right-holder. 
Therefore, although Raz maintains that freedom of expression is valuable and 
important, it does not appear to be a morally fundamental human right, 
according to his definition of that term. 
32 The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1988, at p.192. 
33 That which is 'of ultimate value' is 'intrinsically valuable', independent of its instrumental 
value, although Raz does not regard all intrinsically valuable interests as ultimately 
valuable (ibid., at p.l77). It would appear, however, that a person's well-being is an 
interest of ultimate value (ibid., at p.178). Arguably, a person's interest in his/her own 
well-being does not derive from the interests of other persons. Being tortured is 
obviously not conducive to well-being, therefore that interest would be served by a right 
to freedom from torture. The right to freedom from torture would therefore seem to 
qualify as a morally fundamental right. 
34 J. Raz, 'Rights and Individual Well-Being' in Ethics in the Public Domain: Essays in the 
Morality of Lmv and Politics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, at p.3 7. 
35 ibid., at p.39. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., at p.40. 
38 See further J. Raz, 'Free Expression and Personal Identification' in Ethics in the Public 
Domain, cited at note 34 supra, at pp. 13 1-2. 
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Similarly, if it is in the interest of the community to have an open government 
that may be held to public account and/or influenced with the assistance of 
government-held information, the value of public access would not only derive 
from the fact that it serves the interests of the individual right-holder. 
Furthermore, if the value of an individual's interest in government-held 
information actually derives from his/her interest in using that information to 
hold the government to account, or from his/her interest in using the 
information in order to try to influence government decision-making, then 
public access would also not, on Raz's reasoning, be regarded as morally 
fundamental, notwithstanding the fact that it, too, would remain a valuable 
right. 
Alternatively, in terms of positive international law, a fundamental human right 
could be regarded as one from which no derogations are permitted even in 
times of emergency. Fundamental human rights, on this understanding, could 
be regarded as a special sub-set of human rights. 39 Public access does not fall 
into the category of rights from which there can be no derogations: as with the 
right to freedom of expression itself, circumstances exist in which public 
access may be denied. These will be further discussed in Chapter Five infra. 
Section 1.3.3. will further explore the controversy surrounding the status of 
public access, however: certain arguments used to justify the claim that public 
access merits the status of a fundamental human right remain to be addressed. 
39 E.g. Articles 6, 7, 8( I), 8(2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) might be the ICCPR's fundamental human rights: per Article 4(2) 
ICCPR, the rights to life, freedom from torture, freedom from slavery, freedom from 
imprisonment for breach of contract, nulla poena sine lege, and the right to recognition 
everywhere as a person before the law, may not be derogated from. Likewise, the 
fundamental human rights of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) would be, per Article 15(2), Articles 2, 3, 
4(1) and 7: the right to life, to freedom from torture, to freedom from slavery, and nulla 
poena sine lege have been described as ''the most fundamental rights in the Convention" 
(B. Dickson, Human Rights and the European Convention: the effects of the Convention 
on the United Kingdom and Ireland, ed. B. Dickson, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 1997, 
at p.49). Perhaps only the fundamental rights common to both instruments, including the 
right to freedom from torture and the right to freedom from slavery, might be truly 
fundamental human rights, however: they are evidently the most universal, and they are 
intrinsically valuable to human beings. 
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1.3.3. The controver!ly surrounding the status of public access. 
Certain commentators, notably Bunyan40 and Ulf Oberg,41 apparently take the 
status of public access for granted. According to their arguments, that which is 
often described as 'the people's right to know' is obviously, unquestionably, a 
fundamental human right: absolutely crucial to democracy and essential to the 
legitimacy of any regime. 
When challenged to justify the claim that public access should be protected as a 
fundamental human right,42 Oberg responded by reiterating his initial 
argument, dubiously based upon the philosophy of Sir Karl Popper. 
"Amongst other philosophical justifications [NB.: none were mentioned], Sir Karl 
Popper has provided a theoretical framework ... He has raised the question as to 
whether we should prepare for the worst leaders, and hope for the best...[this] forces 
us to replace the ... question "Who should rule" by the new question: "How can we so 
organise political institutions that bad or incompetent rulers can be prevented from 
doing too much damage?"[43] Popper's idea is that we are all, to a certain degree, 
responsible [for] our government, even if we do not participate in the exercise of 
power. The exercise of this responsibility requires freedom of expression [and} 
freedom of access to information ... "44 
With respect, it remains legitimate to ask why people require public access in 
order to organise their political institutions so as to minimise the possibility of 
'bad government'. The organisation of political institutions must be addressed 
by the authors of a regime's constitution, and, once such institutions are 
established, their output in terms of information and documents might not 
necessarily indicate the way(s) in which they might be re-organised so as to 
40 Note I 0 supra. 
41 
'Public Access to Documents after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty: 
Much Ado About Nothing?' European Integration online Papers Vol. 2 (1998) No 8, 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/tcxtc/ 1998-00Sa.htm. 
42 Davis, note 31 supra. 
43 K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1966, 
atp.121. 
44 
'EU Citizens' Right to Know: The Improbable Adoption of a European Freedom of 
Information Act' ( 1999) 2 The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 303, at 
303-4 (emphasis added). 
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function more effectively, or more democratically,45 depending on the meaning 
of the rather vague 'bad government' to which Oberg implicitly refers. 
Moreover, Popper was primarily concerned with proving that human beings are 
the makers of their own fates, 46 not specifically with proving that freedom of 
expression and information alone can produce 'good government'. He does 
indeed say that: 
" ... 1 think that it is reasonable to adopt, in politics, the principle of preparing for the 
worst, as well as we can, though we should, of course, at the same time try to obtain 
the best."47 
but he is clearly concerned with the inconsistencies of democracy at this point. 
Any but the majority rule should be opposed, therefore, if the majority 
demands a tyrant, the tyranny should be rejected, but at the same time, any 
decision adopted by the majority should be accepted. This is clearly 
paradoxical. In Popper's view, all sovereignty theories are paradoxical. He 
invites us to imagine that the chosen ruler is either 'the wisest', or 'the best'. 
The wisest may find that not he but the best should rule, whilst the best may 
find that not he but the majority should rule. According to Popper, the theory 
of sovereignty should not be adopted without careful consideration of other 
possibilities.48 He reasons as follows (emphasis added): 
"[We should] create, develop and protect political institutions for the avoidance of 
tyranny ... [This does not imply] that we can ever develop institutions which are 
45 Effective government cannot be equated automatically with democratic government: see, 
e.g., S. Andersen and K. Eliassen, 'Dilemmas, Contradictions and the Future of European 
Democracy' in The European Union: How Democratic Is It?, eds. S. Andersen and K. 
Eliassen, Sage Publications, London, 1996, at p.10. A government might be 'bad' if it is 
undemocratic, but it might be equally 'bad' if it is ineffective. See also M. Anderson, 
'Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview' in Human Rights 
Approaches to Environmental Protection, eds. A. Boyle and M. Anderson, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1998, at p.9: even citizens of "a participatory and accountable polity" may 
think only of their "short-term affluence", with potentially dire consequences in the long-
term, implying that all governments must occasionally impose certain measures upon an 
initially wary, or even unwilling, public, in order to secure long-term benefits that may 
not appear obvious to the average citizen. 
46 Note 43 supra, at pp.1-5 (introduction). 
47 Ibid., at p.122. 
48 Ibid., at p.l24. 
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faultless or foolproof, or which ensure that the policies adopted by a democratic 
government will be right or good or wise- or even necessarily better or wiser than the 
policies adopted by a benevolent tyrant49 ... What may be said, however, to be implied 
in the adoption of the democratic principle is the conviction that the acceptance of 
even a bad policy in a democracy (as long as we can work tor a peaceful change) is 
preferable to the submission to a tyranny, however wise or benevolent. Seen in this 
light, the theory of democracy is not based upon the principle that the majority should 
rule; rather, the various equalitarian [sic] methods of democratic control, such as 
general elections and representative government, are to be considered as no more than 
well-tried and, in the presence of a widespread traditional distrust of tyranny, 
reasonably effective safeguards against tyranny, always open to improvement, and 
"d" I d fi h . . .,so even prov1 mg met 10 s or t e1r own Improvement.· 
Popper has been quoted at some length here because he casts doubt upon the 
validity of Oberg's argument, in several respects. First, again, this passage 
demonstrates that Popper's concern is the avoidance of tyranny, referring back 
to the contention that people should be free to make their own destinies: under 
a tyrant, they would not necessarily be able to do so. More importantly, 
however, Popper clearly acknowledges the concept of a benevolent tyrant, 
whose rule may be good and wise: if such a tyranny is conceivable, this does 
not help to prove that democracy is necessary for good government, to say 
nothing of public access. Admittedly, Popper deplores the idea of a benevolent 
tyranny, but he clearly states that even bad democracy is preferable to 
benevolent tyranny. This does not help to prove that his aim is to avoid bad 
government: bad democracy may not be good government. 
Popper supports the idea of people managing their own destinies: even if 
people produce bad policies, at least they will have been free to do so, which 
freedom they would lack under a benevolent tyranny. Freedom of expression 
certainly fits into this matrix, as people must be able to express their political 
opinions within a democracy, yet it is not immediately apparent from Sir Karl 
Popper's opinion that public access is expressly required in order to allow 
people to exercise their freedom of expression. 
49 lt is the avoidance of such assertions that avoids the paradox of democracy, in Popper's 
view. 
50 Note 43 supra, at p. 125. 
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Other commentators besides this author have doubted the status of public 
access as a fundamental and/or human right. 51 Verhoeven believes that it is 
fundamental, as in 'important', within the specific context of the EU, largely 
because it contributes to democracy (see section 1.4, infra) and is a citizens' 
right in the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 46). Nevertheless, he 
doubts its status as a fundamental human right, "i.e. a right for all humans, 
wherever in the world",52 because "the drafters of the ECHR would have 
actively resisted attempts by the Swedes to link public access to the right of 
expression [Article 10 ECHR ]"; moreover, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has explicitly ruled that a refusal to grant access to a file did 
not contravene Article 1 0;53 and "international law instruments do not, in 
[Verhoeven's] knowledge, recognise a specific right of access to documents 
detained by the government." Verhoeven acknowledges that such a right may 
possibly emerge in future, within the EU.54 However, even if public access 
were to be granted the status of a human right by an act of international law on 
the part of European Council member states, this would not guarantee its 
universal recognition as a human right, and would not, moreover, prove that it 
should be recognised as such. 
Another way for public access to be recognised as a human right would be 
through judicial interpretation of an existing human rights instrument. At least 
some justification for claiming public access as a human right would then be 
forthcoming, in the judgment 'discovering', on the basis of what could be quite 
a creative interpretation of an existing right, that public access is required by 
that existing right. There is one caveat, however. If public access were to be 
derived from an existing human right, it would remain difficult to regard the 
51 As also noted by A. Verhoeven, 'The Right to Information: A Fundamental Right?', lecture, 
EIPA (Maastricht), May 29, 2000, http://eipa-nl.com/public/public publications/current-
books/WorkingPapers/ConferenceProceedings/ Amaryllis.pdt: at p.7: "For some time, 
European academic opinion has been divided over the question whether or not 
transparency and in particular access to public documents [sic] constitutes a fundamental 
right." 
52 Note 5 I supra, at p.ll. 
53 Reference to Leander v Sweden, Series A no.ll6, [1987] 9 EHRR 433 and to Gaskin v UK, 
Series A no. 160, [ 1990] 12 EHRR 36. Both cases are discussed infra. 
54 Note 51 supra, at pp.ll-12. 
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derived right of public access as the fundamental human right. The 
fundamental human right in that instance, using an ordinary meaning of 
'fundamental', would be the right from which public access had been derived. 
Eric Barendt accepts freedom of expression (Article I 0 ECHR) as a 
fundamental right, but asks how FOI, which includes public access, relates to 
this: 
"The paradox of the argument that [FOI] is implicit in, or an essential condition for, 
freedom of speech, is that recognition might compel government or some other 
institution to speak, when it does not want to ... [this] could be ... an interference with 
that body's right of silence ... "55 
This argument is, apparently, ignored by organisations such as Article 19.56 
Article 19's reasoning implies that the freedom to receive information that 
governments wish to keep secret unquestionably follows from granting either 
the freedom to seek information or the freedom to receive information. 
However, the existence of a positive duty, on the part of a state, to disclose any 
information that is sought, may be doubted. To refrain from interfering with a 
person's right to request information held by the state would protect his/her 
freedom to seek such information, notwithstanding the possibility that the 
request might not be granted. Meanwhile, the ECtHR was invited to derive a 
right to public access from the freedom to receive information, as protected by 
Article 10 ECHR, in Leander and Gaskin. 57 
Leander v Sweden concerned the Swedish authorities' refusal to grant Mr 
Leander access to the secret service file concerning him, following his failure 
55 
'Fundamental Freedoms', in Information Law Towards the 21"1 Century, eds. W. Korthals 
Altes, E. Dommering, P.B. Hugenholtz and J. Kabel, Kluwer, Deventer, Boston, 1992, at 
p.21. 
56 An NGO concerned with the promotion of freedom of expression: http://www.article 19.org/. 
Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights presents the right to seek 
information as an inherent component of the right to freedom of expression, as does 
Article 19 of the ICCPR. A reference to the right to seek information is, however, 
missing from the otherwise corresponding Article 10 ECHR. Article 19 insists that the 
right to freedom of expression within the Universal Declaration and ICCPR includes a 
right of access to government-held information (see, e.g. 'The Public's Right to Know: 
Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation', ISBN I 902598 10 5, Article 19, 
London, 1999, available online via http://www.article 19.org0. 
57 Both cases op. cit., note 53 supra. 
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to obtain a job in the Naval Museum on the grounds that he was, allegedly, a 
security risk. He submitted, inter alia, that this refusal constituted a breach of 
Article 1 0 ECHR. The ECtHR noted that: 58 
" ... the right to freedom to receive information ... prohibits a Government from 
restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to 
impart ... Article 10 does not, in circumstances such as those of the present case, confer 
on the individual a right of access to a register containing information on his personal 
position, nor does it embody an obligation on the Government to impart such 
information to the individual." 
Gaskin v UK concerned the failure of Liverpool City Council to disclose 
documents to a young man who claimed to have been mistreated whilst in the 
care of foster parents, this care having being arranged by the City Council. 
When Mr Gaskin challenged the council's refusal to disclose all relevant 
documentation, submitting that this constituted a breach of Article 10 ECHR, 
the ECtHR merely reiterated its findings in the Leander case. 59 
Barendt, having concluded that Leander and Gaskin show that the Article 10 
right to receive information applies only to information willingly imparted, 
also suggests that the interpretation of Article 10 to include a right to acquire 
information from a government reluctant to provide it could increase the scope 
of that Article far beyond its authors' intentions.60 As Verhoeven notes, the 
potential for Article 10 ECHR to include public access "remains ... hotly 
debated". 61 The possibility that the right of public access to documents might 
not be regarded as part of Article 10 is further suggested by two documents, 
cited by the Ombudsman: 
58 Paragraph 74, at 456. 
59 Paragraph 52, at p.51. 
60 Note 55 supra. 
61 Note 51 supra., at p.ll. 
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"There are ... Council of Europe recommendations on the subject [of public access to 
official information] and a working group of specialists on access to official 
information is currently drafting a further instrument."62 
The recommendations in question are over twenty years old, although the 
reference to a current working group indicates that the inclusion of a right to 
public access within the ECHR remains possible. However, it remains unclear, 
given the reference to a 'further instrument', that such a right would be 
protected under Article I 0. Both previous Council of Europe recommendations 
imply that the right of access to government information should be 
independently formulated within a new protocol to the ECHR, not incorporated 
within Article I 0. Barendt's aforementioned comment concerning the 
countervailing right to silence would not provide an obstacle to the granting of 
such a right, since there are already conflicting human rights which must 
occasionally be balanced against each other: most notably Article 8 ECHR (the 
right to privacy) and Ar1icle I 0 (freedom of expression). 
Perhaps ironically, in view of the last-mentioned observation, Barendt also 
examined the potential of Article 8 ECHR as the source of a right of public 
access, but concluded that Article 8 might only provide a limited right for 
individuals to ensure that any government-held information concerning them 
personally was accurate.63 Such an interest could not justify a general public 
right to access all government-held files: moreover, the limited right in 
question does not concern FOI per se, but data protection. Ton Beers's 
analysis of access to information implies that Mr Leander should have invoked 
Article 8 ECHR, not Article I 0, as his grievance related to the accuracy of 
government-held information concerning him personally.64 
62 Speech cited at note 2 supra: reference to Recommendation No. 854 ( 1979) of the Assembly 
(I February 1979) and Recommendation No. R (81) 19 of the Committee of Ministers (25 
November 1981 ), on access to information held by public authorities. 
63 Note 55 supra, at pp.21-2. 
64 
'Public Access to Government Information Towards the 21'1 Century' in Information Law 
Towards the 21'' Centwy (cited above, note 55 supra), at p.178. Beers' analysis will be 
further discussed in Chapter Four infra. 
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With regard to the desirability, or the necessity, of claiming public access as a 
human right, on the grounds that it is instrumentally valuable in securing 'good 
government', pro-transparency academics making that argument do not appear 
to be adequately addressing the concerns of their opponents in the public 
access debate, and vice versa. For example, Patrick Birkinshaw has suggested 
that FOI raises "the spectre of the file behind the file, the meeting behind the 
meeting, the state behind the state".65 In other words, a dislike, mistrust or 
fear of public scrutiny might encourage decision-makers in a hitherto secretive 
regime to adopt decisions in corridors, or over the telephone. Therefore, the 
outcome of any debates, if debates must be held in public under FOI 
legislation, might have been pre-arranged. The contents of a file or document 
disclosed to a member of the public under FOI legislation might also have been 
censored by an official prior to its disclosure: moreover, the person granted 
access to it might be, and might remain, completely unaware of that fact. 
Evidence to suggest that such problems are likely to arise in an FOI regime is, 
however, lacking.66 Pro-transparency supporters, in response to these 
concerns, maintain that open government is better and more effective67 than the 
democratic system of governance that operated in, for example, the post-war 
United Kingdom, which lacked any legislative right of public access prior to 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000.68 That response, however, seems to be 
based upon a mere assumption that government officials accustomed to high 
levels of secrecy will readily adopt a culture of openness, and will neither 
65 Freedom of Information - The Law, the Practice and the Ideal, 2nd Edition, Butterworths, 
London, 1996, at p.49. 
66 Some support for the proposition that information may unjustifiably be withheld even in a 
liberal FOI regime might be derived from events following Leander v Sweden (note 53 
supra). In 1996, Sweden's public access laws were amended, and the government's 
decision to classify Mr Leander as a security risk was seen to have been unjustified 
(article in The Guardian newspaper, 30 December 1997, at p.9). This suggests that there 
had also been no national security issue(s) at stake that could have justified the 
government's original refusal to disclose his file. 
67 See, e.g., D. Eliasson, "Openness and Transparency: The Experiences of a New Member 
State" in Openness and Transparency: Meaningful or Meaningless? - Access to 
information on the European Union, European Information Association Conference 
Papers, 1997, at p.34; Oberg (note 41 supra, at p.6); Verhoeven (note 51 supra, at pp.l-
2); and J. Soderman, 'Access to documents of the EU institutions: the key to a more 
democratic and efficient Union' Brussels, 18 September 2000, http://www.euro-
ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/crc 180900.htm and 'The struggle for openness in the 
European Union', 21 March 200 I, http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/spccches/cn/200 l-
03-21.htm. 
68 The 2000 Act was preceded by a voluntary code of conduct concerning public access. 
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attempt to avoid public scrutiny by conducting secret meetings nor seek to 
withhold information from the public. Evidence demonstrating that such 
problems are actually highly unlikely to arise under FOI legislation is also 
I k. 69 ac mg. There appears, therefore, to be a stalemate, involving some 
speculation on both sides regarding the possible effects of FOI legislation upon 
decision-makers who are accustomed to secrecy. 
Within a democratic polity, the public interest in obtaining access to 
information concerning the government's deliberations is the interest, common 
to all members of such a polity, in securing and maintaining the democratic 
accountability of their government. 70 This 'collective public interest analysis' 
of Curtin and Meijers71 clearly emphasises the importance of public access to 
governmental deliberations in a democracy, but, interestingly, that analysis also 
suggests that the importance of public access may be understated if public 
access is conceptualised as a human right, in the sense of 'a right of individual 
human beings', instead of being conceptualised as 'a right, the value of which 
derives from a collective public interest'. Conceptualising public access as a 
right of individuals could encourage the framing of exceptions to that right in 
order to protect a given set of collective public interests. Such interests might 
always outweigh the individual interest inherent in an individual right, but they 
would not necessarily always outweigh another collective public interest.72 
69 Some support for the proposition that increased public scrutiny of the ideas and comments of 
UK ministers and civil servants did not actually undermine the effectiveness of the UK's 
government is provided by l. Leigh and L. Lustgarten, 'Five Volumes in Search of 
Accountability: The Scott Report' (1996) 59 MLR 695, at 714-5. 
70 D. Cu11in and H. Meijers, 'The Principle of Open Government in Schengen and the 
European Union: Democratic Retrogression?' ( 1995) 35 CMLRev 390, at 392: cf Raz's 
appraisal of the value of the right to freedom of expression (notes 37-38 supra and text). 
Verhoeven (note 51 supra, pp.l-5) suggests that there are in fact three potential interests 
in exercising the right of public access: the public interest in the prevention of corruption 
in government; the public interest in securing rational, effective policies; and the public 
interest in maintaining democracy. 
71 Note 70 supra. 
72 This argument is also based upon Harlow, note 8 supra, at 291-5, and upon the manner in 
which exceptions to human rights protected by the ECHR are framed: Article I 0(2), for 
example, permits the restriction of the individual right to freedom of expression to the 
extent that this is 'necessary in a democratic society' and in order to protect specified 
collective public interests, e.g. 'the protection of health or morals'. The need to protect 
public morality within a democratic society, however, might not, perhaps, outweigh the 
need to protect public health, or the need to preserve the very nature of the society itself, 
as a democracy. The public interest in public access will be discussed further in 
connection with the public interest in secrecy, in Chapter Five infra. 
46 
Finally, even if public access were to be explicitly protected by the ECHR, it 
would be unlike many existing human rights currently protected thereby. 
International human rights instruments may oblige states to respect and/or 
protect and/or fulfil human rights. 73 A well-established human right, e.g. the 
right to freedom of expression, may be respected, if a state does not interfere 
with the exercise thereof. It may be protected, if the state ensures that other 
individuals do not interfere with a person's exercise thereof. Finally, it may be 
fulfilled, if the state actively facilitates the exercise thereof by, e.g., allocating 
radio/television frequencies for public use. Clearly, the lowest level of 
obligation upon a state is the obligation to respect a right: in order to fulfil this, 
a state need not do anything. The obligations to protect and to fulfil a right, 
however, impose positive duties upon the state, requiring action. 
Public access, however, cannot be respected by the state simply taking no 
action. The right of public access cannot actually be exercised unless the state 
also acts in order to fulfil it, by granting access to the document(s) requested. 
Furthermore, public access can only be effectively protected if the state 
provides a means of policing/addressing the actions of its own officials, 
thereby ensuring that exceptions to the right are not abused by the only entity 
capable of directly interfering with the exercise thereof: the state itself. In 
short, it is not immediately obvious that public access can be regarded as 
conceptually similar to, for example, the right to freedom of expression, or the 
right to privacy.74 The latter rights do not necessarily require action on the part 
of the state in order to be respected by the state. Furthermore, both require 
protection against interference from private citizens as well as state officials. 
73 See, e.g., Implementing the Convention of the Rights of the Child: Resource Mobilisation in 
Low-Income Countries, ed. J. Himes, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague/London/Boston, 1995, at p.l5. 
74 See further C. Warbrick, 'The Structure of Article 8' [1998] EHRLR 32, at 34-35: the 
obligation upon a state to respect the subject-matter of the right laid down by Article 8 
ECHR, namely a person's private and family life, home and correspondence, can be either 
positive or negative in character. By contrast, as indicated, public access imposes a 
positive obligation. 
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1.3.4. Conclusions. 
Public access as a right is now recognised and protected within the European 
Union: it is conferred by legislation based upon a Treaty Article (255 (ex l91a) 
EC) and, as will be discussed further in Chapter Five, section 5.2 infra, public 
access to Commission, Council and Parliament documents could be regarded 
as a general principle of Community law. Public access may in the near future 
achieve explicit formal recognition as a human right in international law: it is 
already a right common to all but two Member States.75 Even so, it is not, and 
is unlikely ever to become, a (morally) fundamental human right. The term 
'fundamental human right' should not be used to describe every single right 
that might be regarded as important76 in a certain type of democratic society. 
The importance attached to such rights might not be justified by their intrinsic 
value, but by the fact that they are instrumentally valuable. 77 It is to the claim 
that public access is instrumentally valuable within a democracy that attention 
will now turn. 
1.4. Transparency: essential to democracy? 
1. 4.1. What is 'democracy'? 
1.4.1.1. Democracy and human rights. 
Before considering the possible meaning of democracy, it is worth noting that, 
regardless of the definition adopted, 78 Susan Marks has unequivocally 
suggested a negative definition: democracy is not and should not be claimed as 
the subject-matter of a human right. In her view, 
"[there is a] danger that a right to democratic governance might ... serve to reduce the 
scope of [other] universally recognised rights, by reinforcing pressures to detach, on 
75 Germany and Luxembourg. 
76 Cf. E. Mackaay, 'The Public's Right to Information', in Information Lml' Towards the 2 t'' 
Centwy (cited above, note 55 supra), at p.I75: "Rights should not be claimed 
gratuitously." 
77 Cf Raz, note 34 supra, at pp.37-38. 
78 See further sub-section 1.4.1.2. infra. 
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the one hand, civil and political rights from economic, social, cultural and group-
based rights and, on the other, legal relationships within nation-states from legal 
relationships which stretch across national boundaries ... synthetic rights carry a 
serious risk of diminishing, rather than enhancing, their constituent elements. Rights 
to rights seem best avoided."79 
This conclusion is apparently based upon the danger of identifying democracy 
"with the holding of multiparty elections, the protection of civil rights and the 
establishment of the rule of law."80 
Recognising such a norm of democratic governance might "countervail moves 
to secure the development of social and pluralist democracy", whereas the 
endorsement of '"actually existing democracy' ... tends to eclipse awareness of 
the enduring - and in some respects increasing - deficits of liberal states": 
furthermore, this approach will not encourage the development of global, 
participatory democracy as a means of holding international institutions to 
account. 81 
In other words, the proposed human right to democratic governance might be 
satisfied by the provision of a formal, but basic, model of democracy, which 
would almost certainly in Marks' view perpetuate a non-self-critical 
government, incapable of developing a more effective model of democracy, 
and which might also ignore social inequalities and social exclusion.82 Such a 
model of minimal democracy, moreover, would neither require 
multidimensional transparency nor public access in order to ensure regular 
multiparty elections, to establish the rule of law, and to protect rights 
recognised within the ECHR. For proof of the capacity of a regime to 
accomplish those three tasks reasonably well without public access, one need 
only consider the post-war United Kingdom. 
79 The Riddle of All Constitutions, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000, at p.ll 0 (emphasis 
in original). 
80 !bid, at pp.74-5. 
81 !bid 
82 Such problems are extant in all the liberal democratic EU Member States: see, e.g. H. Cullen, 
'The Subsidiary Woman' [1994] Journal of social welfare and family law, 407. 
49 
Marks' warnings about the dangers of conflating and confusing liberalism and 
the rule of law with democracy,83 which warn in turn of the need to exercise 
caution in defining democracy if claiming a right to democratic govemance,84 
are important in I ight of the implicit suggestion, in the writings of Oberg et al., 
that public access is a fundamental human right, because it is deemed 
indispensable to democracy. It certainly cannot be argued that democracy is not 
important, particularly to the Member States of the EU. Article 6( I) TEU as 
amended (ex Article F) provides as follows: 
"The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to 
the Member States." 
It must be emphasised, however, that the government of the UK would have 
met all the criteria of a democracy according to the proposed international 
norm critiqued by Marks, although there was no hint whatsoever of a right of 
public access within the UK for many years. This did not preclude the UK's 
accession to the Union 'founded on the principle of democracy.' Therefore, if 
public access, and indeed multidimensional transparency, is deemed to be 
indispensable to democracy, this can only be because a particular model of 
democracy is contemplated by the person making such a claim, which model 
clearly cannot correspond to that of the post-war UK. In every claim to the 
effect that public access and/or multidimensional transparency is essential to 
any hitherto secretive lawmaking regime, there seems to be an implicit desire 
to alter that regime's legislative processes, in order to create the conditions in 
which public access/multidimensional transparency would, indeed, be 
theoretically indispensable to those processes. 85 
83 See H. Cullen and K. Morrow, 'International civil society in international law: The growth of 
NGO participation' (2001) I Non-state Actors and International Lmv 7, at 11-12, and 
footnote no. 30. 
84 Cf Birkinshaw, note 65 supra, at 24: "The claims for ... a right to know, a democratic 
right. .. are easily made, but more difficult to justify if one has not established what theory 
of democracy one accepts." 
85 Harlow (note 8 supra, at 292) notes that in D. Curtin, 'Democracy, Transparency and 
Political Participation' (in Openness and Transparency in the European Union, eds. V. 
Deckmyn and I. Thomson, EIPA, Maastricht, 1998), at p.ll 0, active participation in 
government, which requires multidimensional transparency, is expressly linked to a 
deliberative model of democracy, as opposed to the traditional liberal democratic model 
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Two questions arise from the above line of reasoning. Firstly, to which 
model(s) of democracy is public access/multidimensional transparency 
theoretically indispensable? Secondly, in light of the fact that improved public 
access and greater transparency are being demanded within the EU, is this sui 
generis legal regime actually adaptable to such (a) model(s) of democracy? 
The latter question is considered further in Chapter Two, infra. The former is 
considered in the following sub-section. 
1.4.1.2. Models of Democracy. 
David Held has identified several models of democracy. 86 As well as 
examining the characteristics of various democratic regimes, ranging from 
ancient Greek democracy to (so-called) Soviet democracy and the more liberal 
democracies of the present, Held discusses purely theoretical models, such as 
Weber's 'competitive elitist democracy'. 87 The latter cannot be the model 
contemplated by proponents of multidimensional transparency: it functions 
when the electorate is "poorly informed and/or emotional."88 
Multidimensional transparency is supposed to create a well-informed 
electorate, composed of electors who are, moreover, sufficiently rational to 
participate in the legislative process, presumably by some means other than by 
obtaining within the Member States: such active participation is explicitly contrasted to 
the "intermittent and passive ... participation of voting in elections" that forms "the key to 
democratic decision-making processes" within such States. This not only "emphasises 
the constitutional value of openness" within "deliberative theories of democracy" 
(Harlow, note 8 supra, at 292): it also suggests that reform of those familiar democratic 
processes is necessary in order to secure greater transparency. 
86 Aiode/s of Democracy, 2"d Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1996. 
87 Ibid., summarised at p.l97: competitive elitism seeks to provide a mechanism for selecting a 
political elite to govern and a means of preventing political leadership fi·om becoming 
excessive. It features a parliamentary government with a strong executive, dominated by 
party politics; competing political elites; central political leadership; an independent 
bureaucratic administration; and constitutional/practical limits upon the government's 
decision-making capacity. Conceived of as applicable to a tolerant, industrial society 
with a badly-informed and/or emotional electorate, competitive elitist democracy is 
heavily criticised for being in fact more like an oligopoly, led by an elite selected from a 
small choice of competing elite political groups, none of whom will respond as readily to 
the demands of the electors (seen as consumers in a political market-place) as they would 
have to in a truly free market: moreover, the competing political elites are able to 
influence and to some extent create demand for their policies among the badly-
informed/emotional electorate (ibid., pp.l97-198). 
88 !bid, at p.197. 
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the periodic casting of a vote.89 Such an electorate would undoubtedly be 
dissatisfied with a competitive elitist democracy, which democracy would not 
produce such an electorate. 
Held identifies two models of liberal democracy. 'Protective democracy' 90 
calls for "the development of a politically autonomous civil society", whereas 
'developmental democracy' 91 requires greater citizen involvement m 
government: at least, at local level. This account certainly suggests that some 
dimension(s) oftransparency is/are integral to a liberal democracy, particularly 
to the latter model, as participation in government is one of the dimensions of 
multidimensional transparency. Nevertheless, upon closer inspection, fully 
developed multidimensional transparency is not seen to be integral to liberal 
democracy. It would be sufficient, in a protective liberal democracy, to supply 
only the first two components of multidimensional transparency: adequate 
quantities of comprehensible information, sufficient to enable citizens to make 
a meaningful choice between alternative governments at election time. In a 
developmental liberal democracy, although it is acknowledged that citizens 
must be informed, the need for public access is not mentioned: moreover, the 
necessity for a right to participate in government above the local level, by some 
means other than via the ballot-box, is not made sufficiently clear. It could 
certainly be argued that multidimensional transparency would not be 
89 Implicit in the calls for a participatory civil society/citizenry and decision-making procedures 
open to public participation, seems to be the idea that citizens will be able (and willing) to 
participate in legislative/policy-making procedures on an ongoing basis, in between 
elections as well as at election time itself. 
90 Ibid., summarised at p.99. In the protective liberal democracy, citizens require protection 
from the government as well as each other. The features of the model are familiar: 
popular sovereignty, vested in representatives who are regularly elected by secret ballot; 
majority rule; separation of powers; constitutionally-guaranteed civil and political rights; 
competing political parties and interest groups. The model does not, however, call for a 
universal franchise: cf note 91 infra. 
91 Ibid., summarised at p.ll6. Developmental liberal democracy is similar to protective liberal 
democracy (note 90 supra) but calls for more citizen participation in political life than the 
latter, and specifies that there must be a universal franchise and proportional 
representation. Both the developmental and protective liberal democracies are apparently 
criticised by Held as being insufficiently clear regarding the definition of a legitimate 
citizen and of his/her role within the democracy. Furthermore, it seems that protective 
democracy in particular allows women to be subordinated to men (its major fault), 
whereas developmental democracy does not necessarily do enough to ensure equality 
between men and women (ibid., p.Il9). The overall implication is that developmental 
democracy is insufficiently self-critical, adaptable and forward-thinking to cope with 
socio-economic changes: Held's summary indicates that although it emancipates women, 
it nevertheless preserves the traditional domestic division of labour (ibid, p.ll6). 
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incompatible with a developmental liberal democracy, but it could not be said 
with equal certainty that such a democracy absolutely could not function 
without a right of public access, and a means of making use of information 
gained via the exercise of that right in order to influence decision-making at the 
national level. 
The model of democracy labelled 'democratic autonomy' ,92 however, 
expressly requires access to government-held information in order to facilitate 
informed decision-making, and the participation of citizens in the government: 
participation being a citizens' right, not a duty. Another model, 'cosmopolitan 
democracy', 93 is an attempt to entrench the principle of democratic autonomy, 
which is applicable to a nation-state, on the international plane. One condition 
for cosmopolitan democracy is the "enhanced entrenchment of democratic 
rights and obligations in the making and enforcement of national, regional and 
international law."94 Held's principle of democratic autonomy and the model 
of cosmopolitan democracy demand close attention. Multidimensional 
transparency, as noted, contains the right of citizens to participate in decision-
making. Bearing in mind that this will only be possible when decision-making 
processes actually accommodate such participation, it seems that 
multidimensional transparency is essential only to an appropriate model of 
democracy. Therefore, a call to adopt a model of democracy closely 
resembling Held's cosmopolitan democracy appears to be implicit in every call 
for greater transparency at EU level.95 
1.4.1.3. The principle of democratic autonomy and its international application: 
cosmopolitan democracy. 
Held's primary concern is that traditional liberal democracy does not permit 
individual Member States to control globalised economic and transnational 
problems such as the environment. A further concern is the need to secure 
democratic values in a post-Cold War world tending towards right-wing 
92 !bid, pp.324, 325-6. 
93 Ibid., pp.353, 358-9. 
94 Ibid., pp.358-9. 
95 See note 85 supra and text. 
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violence, racism and ethno-political separation. In light of the "rapid growth of 
complex interconnections and interrelations between states and societies -
often referred to as the process of globalisation," nation-states cannot remain at 
the centre of democratic thinking.96 Democracy remains important because it 
"bestows an aura of legitimacy on modern political life: laws, rules and policies 
appear justifiable when they are 'democratic'".97 
However, in the European Union, the securing of popular consent via the 
ballot-box, as a source of legitimacy, becomes problematic: in a sense, 
individual Member States no longer govern themselves and determine their 
own future. The globalisation of various issues only makes this problem more 
acute. 98 Supranationalisation and globalisation therefore have considerable 
implications for democracy and legitimacy, which Held sets out to address by 
're-thinking' democracy. 
Autonomy is "the capacity of human beings to reason self-consciously, to be 
self-reflective and ... self-determining."99 According to the principle of 
autonomy, 
" ... [P)ersons should enjoy equal rights and ... obligations in the specification of the 
political framework which generates and limits the opportunities available to 
them ... they should be free and equal in the determination of the conditions of their 
own lives, so long as they do not deploy this framework to negate the rights of 
others." 100 
Held describes this principle as "the core of the modern liberal democratic 
project" 101 and "a principle of political legitimacy."102 Rights and obligations 
are required by the principle of autonomy in order to protect equality: the 
requirement that people should be free and equal to determine the conditions of 
96 Preface to D. Held, Democracy and the Global Order, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 
California, 1995, at pp.viii-ix. 
97 !bid, at p.l. 
98 /bid, at pp.l7-18. 
99 !bid, at p.146. 
100 !bid, at p.147. 
101 !bid, at p.149. 
102 Ibid., at p.l53. 
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their own lives demands that they should be freely and equally able to 
deliberate on matters of public concern. A legitimate decision regarding 
matters of public concern does not result 
" ... from the 'will of all', but rather ... from 'the deliberation of all' ... The process of 
deliberation is, accordingly, compatible with voting at the decisive stage of collective 
decision-making and with the procedures and mechanisms of majority rule.',l 03 
Held's model is one of deliberative democracy: 104 it is the deliberative process 
which calls for multidimensional transparency at national level, since the 
citizens actively deliberating matters of public concern require a) knowledge of 
those matters (as obtainable via public access) and b) a right to participate in 
collective decision-making. Held next asks whether the rights inherent in a 
deliberative model of democracy, such as the model of democratic autonomy, 
can be conceptualised as universal, human rights: 
"The acceleration of globalisation has led to pressures to entrench significant 
'citizenship rights' [in Held's terms, the rights demanded by the principle of 
democratic autonomy] within frameworks of international law. However, this process 
is very far from complete. In addition, the notion that 'rights' advance universal 
values and are, accordingly, human rights- intrinsically applicable to all- is open to 
doubt. It is clear, for example, that many nations and peoples do not necessarily 
choose or endorse the rights that are proclaimed often as universal ... " 105 
103 Ibid., at p.l55. 
104 For further details of the pure deliberative theory of democracy, see J. Black, 
'Proceduralising Regulation: Part I' (2000) 20 OJLS 597, and 'Proceduralising 
Regulation: Part 11' (2001) 21 OJLS 33. There are, basically, a 'thin' concept of 
regulation, based upon liberal democracy, and a 'thick' concept, based upon deliberative 
democracy. Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy is not explicitly described as being 
based upon deliberative democracy, but it emphasises popular participation in decision-
making to such an extent that Marks (note 79 supra, at pp.l 09-110), approves of this 
model as exemplifying her 'principle of democratic inclusion', which "refers to the notion 
that democratic politics is less a matter of forms and events than an affair of relationships 
and processes, an open-ended and continually recontextualised agenda of enhancing 
control by citizens of decision-making which affects them and overcoming disparities in 
the distribution of citizenship rights and opportunities." That seems compatible with the 
deliberative theory as considered by Black, which requires 'thick' democracy to involve 
"the mediation of deliberation: the mapping of differences and conflicts between 
deliberants, acting as translator, making deliberants aware of the inclusionary and 
exclusionary effects of problem definition, modes of discourse, discursive hegemony, and 
the adoption of strategies of dispute resolution" (Part 11, op. cit, at 57). See also note 85 
supra. 
105 Note 96 supra, at p.223 (emphasis in original). 
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This conclusion supports the viewpoint espoused in section 1.3.3. supra. 
Held's solution to the problem of the non-universalisation of public access and 
other associated rights of multidimensional transparency is to advance the 
cause for cosmopolitan democracy: 
"Empowering rights ... are intrinsic to the democratic process ... if one chooses to be a 
democrat, one must choose to enact these rights ... [which] can be justified directly in 
relationship to democracy. And they can be invoked independently of claims to 
. ,. ,106 
umversa lfy. 
Held thus provides a theory of democracy which calls for multidimensional 
transparency at level of the EU and yet does not call for the associated rights to 
be labelled human rights, which designation implies, as stated, that they should 
be universally recognised. This theory shows that it is perfectly possible to call 
for democracy and transparency, and yet to reject the idea that public access is 
a fundamental and/or human right. Because of globalisation, 
"[Democracy] within a political community requires democratic law in the 
international sphere. Democratic ... law needs to be buttressed ... by ... ' cosmopolitan 
democratic law' ... democratic public law entrenched within and across borders."1 07 
In answer to the question posed by section 1.4.1., therefore, the 'democracy' of 
which pro-transparency commentators speak must be a model resembling 
cosmopolitan democracy, which has the following characteristics: 108 
There is a global order of multiple, overlapping networks of power. 
All organisations, groups and associations have capacity for self-
determination and can commit themselves to the principle of democratic 
autonomy. 
Legal principles set the standards for the treatment of all organisations, 
groups and associations, which no regime or organisation may violate. 
106 Ibid., at pp.223-4 (emphasis added). 
107 Ibid., at p.227. 
108 From Held's summary, ibid., at pp.271-272. 
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l) 
Law-making and law enforcement occur at various locations and levels, 
monitored by courts. 
Democratic autonomy focuses upon the creation of conditions for equal 
membership in the public sphere. 
Social justice demands the democratic exploitation of resources and a 
common structure of political action. 
The use of force is reserved as a last resort m order to protect the 
cosmopolitan democratic order. 
People may participate, in various ways, m deliberations within those 
networks of power/political communities whose decisions affect them most 
significantly. 
In principle, citizenship is extended to all political communities, from local 
to global level. 
As indicated, in order to facilitate the holding of decision-makers to account, 
and in order to facilitate effective public participation in deliberative decision-
making, multidimensional transparency is essential to Held's model of 
democratic autonomy, 109 and is therefore also required by the cosmopolitan 
model of democracy which seeks to secure the principle of democratic 
autonomy on the international plane. 
1.4.2. Conclusions. 
The need for a minimum level of transparency in a liberal democracy may be 
readily conceded: this is supported by Held's accounts of liberal democracy. 110 
However, because multidimensional transparency is also maximum 
transparency, it is not at all clear that multidimensional transparency is 
essential to democracy per se. Rather, any call for multidimensional 
transparency, involving the provision of rights, which have not always been 
provided within the United Kingdom, should be regarded as a call for the 
adoption of a model of democracy different to that of the UK. Held's model of 
democratic autonomy is a likely candidate, although at EU level, a slightly 
109 Note 86 supra, at p.324. 
110 See notes 90-91 supra. 
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modified model of cosmopolitan democracy would clearly be called for: 
modified to take account of the fact that the EU is not a global order. The 
adoption of such a model of democracy is not inconsistent with the rejection of 
the notion that public access and the other associated rights of 
multidimensional transparency are human rights simply because they are 
essential to that model: Held proceeds from the notion that, if deliberative 
democracy is required, so are public access and a right to participate in 
decision-making: it is not even necessary to conceptualise these rights as 
human rights. 
Moreover, although it is conceded that liberal democracy requires some 
transparency, this conclusion makes it unnecessary to attempt to determine 
precisely the level of transparency required. If multidimensional transparency 
is deemed absolutely essential to democracy, this is because the advocate of 
multidimensional transparency is simultaneously advocating a specific model 
of democracy that requires multidimensional transparency in order to function 
properly. There is only one problem with this conclusion, however, which is 
that it suggests circular reasoning: 'transparency is essential to the functioning 
of the desired model of democracy, because the desired model of democracy 
cannot function without transparency.' 
1.5. Habermas and the avoidance of circular reasoning. 
Habermas provides an alternative perspective from which to consider the 
relationship between transparency and democracy, without resorting to circular 
reasoning as illustrated in section 1.4.2. supra. Habermas avoids such circular 
reasoning by simply suggesting that rights and democracy are eo-original 
concepts. 111 Having stated that democracy may only be found at the centre of a 
system of rights, 112 and that this system is generated through the democratic 
111 J. Habermas, Bel\Veen Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theoty of Lmv and 
Democracy, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996, at p.l22. 
112 /bid., at p.l21. 
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process, 113 he concludes that popular sovereignty and human rights mutually 
presuppose each other. 114 
"The addressees of law would not be able to understand themselves as its authors if 
the legislator were to discover human rights as pregiven [sic] moral facts that merely 
needed to be enacted as positive law. At the same time, this legislator, regardless of 
his autonomy, should not be able to adopt anything that violates human rights." 115 
The idea that democracy and human rights are eo-original, each presupposing 
the other, is compelling. Posit democracy, and simultaneously, the right to 
vote is, necessarily, also posited. Also, the right to a certain minimum level of 
transparency - not multidimensional - must also be posited, given that 
democracy cannot be meaningful unless electors are able to make an informed 
choice at the ballot-box. 
This simplified account of Habermas' theory suggests that all rights are 
products of the democratic process, and that, at the same time, rights restrict 
the democratic process, so that no product of this process may violate extant 
rights. However, the democratic process is in fact derived from Habermas' 
discourse principle, 116 as discussed by Antje Gimmler: 117 
"One of the most famous phrases of the discourse ethics of JUrgen Habermas is: in 
discourse the unforced force of the better argument prevails ... [the discourse principle 
involves] equal participation of all who are affected; the postulate of unlimitedness, 
i.e., the fundamental unboundedness and openness concerning time and persons; the 
postulate offi"eedomfrom constraint [Zwangslosigkeit], i.e., the freedom, in principle, 
of discourse from accidental and structural forms of power; and the postulate of 
seriousness or authenticity [Ernsthciftigkeit], i.e., the absence of deception and even 
illusion in expressing intentions and in performing speech acts." 
113 Ibid., at p.l22. 
114 Ibid., at p.44 7 (see also pp.88-9: rights are said to presuppose collaboration between citizens 
who recognise each other as free and equal citizens: subjective individual rights are said 
to be eo-original with objective law.) 
115 Ibid., at p.457. 
116 Ibid., at p.l21. 
117 
'The Discourse Ethics of JUrgen Habermas', 
http://caae.phi l.cmu.edu/Caval ier/F orum/meta/background/agimm !er .html (emphasis in 
the original). 
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The discourse principle, essentially, enables people to exercise their political 
autonomy in order to reach a consensus. 118 To elaborate on the relationship 
between the discourse principle and democracy, and between democracy and 
rights, Habermas notes that the category of (human) rights resulting 
" ... from the politically autonomous elaboration of the right to the greatest possible 
measure of equal liberties 119 ... require the following as necessary corollaries: [b]asic 
rights that result from the politically autonomous elaboration of the status of a 
member in a voluntary association of consociates under law; [and] [b ]asic rights that 
result immediately from the actionability of rights and from the politically 
autonomous elaboration of individual legal protection. These three categories of 
. h 120 
ng ts result simply from the application of the discourse principle 
to ... law ... [T]hey ... regulate the relationships among freely associated citizens prior to 
any legally organised state authority from whose encroachments citizens would have 
to protect themselves. In fact. .. [these] basic rights guarantee ... the private autonomy 
of legal subjects only in the sense that these subjects reciprocally recognise each other 
in their role as addressees of laws and therewith grant one another a status on the basis 
of which they can claim rights and bring them to bear against one another. Only with 
the next step do legal subjects also become authors of their legal 
order ... through ... [b ]asic rights 121 to equal opportunities to participate in the 
processes of opinion- and will-formation in which citizens exercise their political 
autonomy and through which they generate legitimate law." 122 
Admittedly, as Habermas agrees, this approach implies that the "genesis of 
h . I . . I , 123 t ese ng 1ts compnses a c1rcu ar process. Citizens cannot elaborate the 
first (Rawlsian) category of rights in a politically autonomous manner unless 
and until they are able to exercise the fourth category of (democratic) rights, 
which enable them to actually exercise their political autonomy. Nevertheless, 
118 This is, admittedly, a simplistic view of the discourse principle. However, it suffices to note 
that 1-Iabermas is essentially concerned with consensus. 
119 This is a Rawlsian model of rights: see further J. Rawls, A Theoty of Justice 2"d Edition, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, at p.266: Rawls' first principle ofjustice is that 
"[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic 
libet1ies compatible with a similar system of liberty for all." 
120 I.e., the Rawlsian rights ensuring the greatest possible measure of equal liberties (category 
I); and the two categories of basic rights which Habermas describes as necessary 
corollaries to those Rawlsian rights. 
121 Habermas' fourth category of rights. These may be described as 'democratic rights', being 
those rights essential for the operation of any democracy. 
122 1-Iabermas, note Ill supra, pp.l22-3, emphasis omitted. 
123 Ibid., p.l22, emphasis added. 
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Habermas' theory still avoids circular reasoning, because it not only assumes, 
as stated, that both democracy and rights are eo-original concepts, but also 
because it regards these concepts as mutually reinforcing. Posit a democracy, 
allowing discourse to take place, and posit the need to develop human rights in 
order to ensure "the greatest possible measure of equal liberties." Democracy 
may be used in order to develop human rights for that purpose. The exercise of 
the rights developed thereby, however, may in turn reinforce democracy, by 
ensuring that all the participants in the democratic process remain equal. 
Applying Habermas' approach to multidimensional transparency: firstly, 
multidimensional transparency might be characterised as a bundle of rights. 
These would be: the right to comprehensible information; the right to an 
explanation of governmental decision-making processes; the right of public 
access; the right to scrutinise governmental decision-making; the right to 
participate in such decision-making; and the right to obtain judicial review, 
both of government decisions (to ensure compliance with the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality) and of refusals to grant public access. 
Secondly, citizens would only become the authors of these rights if they were, 
indeed, able "to participate in the processes of opinion- and will-
formation ... [f]or political rights ground the status of free and equal active 
citizens. This status is self-referential insofar as it enables citizens to change 
and expand their various rights and duties .. . " 124 Thirdly, active citizens, 
seeking to expand their rights and duties, might well seek to adopt an 
appropriate model of democracy that would enable them to make full use of the 
expansive set of rights inherent in multidimensional transparency. Fourthly, 
such a model would require multidimensional (maximum) transparency ab 
initio. Both the rights of multidimensional transparency and the appropriate 
model of democracy, incorporating the discourse processes by which 
consensus may be achieved, which processes require multidimensional 
transparency, would necessarily be eo-original concepts. Finally, the exercise 
of the rights inherent in multidimensional transparency would enhance the 
operation of such a model of democracy, whilst the establishment of such a 
124 Ibid., at p.l23, emphasis added. 
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model of democracy could in turn encourage the usage and further 
development of the rights of multidimensional transparency. 
1.6. Conclusion. 
Transparency is multidimensional, and consists of a bundle of 'democratic 
rights' necessary to the functioning of a specific model of democracy, 
including a right of public access. However, the latter right does not merit the 
status of a fundamental human right. It is not a fundamental human right, on 
Raz's terms, given that it has instrumental value only: nor is it a fundamental 
human right in the sense of being vitally important among human rights, or 
even because it is essential to a particular model of democracy. Although a 
right of public access might soon be protected as a human right by the ECHR, 
it has been shown to be conceptually different from other, well-established 
human rights, insofar as it cannot be exercised unless it is actually fulfilled, and 
because it requires protection against interference by the state itself. 
The call for multidimensional transparency at EU level actually seems to be a 
call for the EU to adopt a model of democracy allowing citizens to fully 
exercise the democratic rights comprising multidimensional transparency. 
Such a model might resemble Held's cosmopolitan democracy. Following 
Habermas' approach, it can even be argued that any call for multidimensional 
transparency must necessarily be regarded as a simultaneous call for the 
adoption of a model of democracy requiring multidimensional transparency. 
This approach avoids the appearance of the circular reasoning which otherwise 
seems to be present whenever it is claimed that multidimensional transparency, 
including public access/public participation in decision-making, is 'necessary 
to democracy'. 
In particular, it has been argued, with reference to Marks, that the public 
access/public participation 111 decision-making components of 
multidimensional transparency are not necessary in order to establish a 
formally democratic regime per se. Any call for greater democracy and 
transparency at EU level must therefore be regarded as a call to transform 
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European governance. It remains to be seen, in Chapter Two infra, whether the 
constitutional structure of the European Union actually could, or should, be 
revised in order to ensure that the Union conforms to the specifications of a 
model of democracy requiring multidimensional transparency. 
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CHAPTJER TWO. 
Transparency, legitimacy and! the JEU. 
2.1. Kntroductionn. 
Having considered multidimensional transparency in the abstract, it is 
necessary to discuss the theoretical compatibility of multidimensional 
transparency with the constitutional structure ofthe European Union. Also, as 
indicated in Chapter One supra, the third claim of pro-transparency 
commentators is that a high degree of transparency is essential to legitimacy. 
The perceived lack of legitimacy within the EU certainly remains an official 
cause for concern.' This Chapter will therefore also discuss the questions of 
whether, and to what extent, multidimensional transparency is capable of 
legitimating the Union. 
Consideration will first be given to the meaning of legitimacy (section 2.2.1.) 
and to the nature of the EU's perceived legitimacy crisis (section 2.2.2.). The 
relationship between subsidiarity, proportionality and transparency will then be 
further discussed, in the search for connection(s) between the concepts of 
legitimacy and transparency (section 2.2.3.) Having argued in Chapter One 
supra that multidimensional transparency presupposes (a) particular model(s) 
of democracy, most likely a suitably modified version of David Held's 
cosmopolitan democracy (see further section 2.3.1), it is also important to 
determine the extent to which the EU conforms to such a model of democracy. 
If it does not, the extent to which it could, or should, be reconstituted in order 
to conform with such a model of democracy must also be determined (section 
2.3.2.). The theoretical value of multidimensional transparency as a 
legitimating factor may then be finally assessed (section 2.4). 
1 Per the Commission's White Paper on European Governance, COM(2001) 428,25 July 2001, 
at p.3. 
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2.2. Legitimacy and the EU. 
2.2.1. What is legitimacy? 
Joseph Weiler2 and Seymour Lipsee indicate that legitimacy is a two-
dimensional concept: it may be formal or social. Formal legitimacy exists, per 
Weiler, whenever the constitution of any state establishes a basic liberal 
democratic government, having regular governmental elections held by secret 
ballot; a free press; a universal adult franchise; opposition parties; and the 
freedom of speech. Social legitimacy exists whenever the citizens of a given 
state freely accept that their government has the right to enact binding laws, 
which they as citizens have a duty to obey.4 For example, the fact that most 
citizens of an EU Member State are willing to comply with national laws, even 
if they do not personally support the political party/parties responsible for 
enacting those laws, may be attributed to the social legitimacy of their 
government. 
Formal legitimacy is the easiest dimension of legitimacy to describe. The 
precise factor(s) that generate social legitimacy, however, is/are at least partly 
subjective, and, unfmtunately, indeterminate. Daniela Obradovic regards 
legitimacy as people's "political and moral conviction that the ... constitutional 
establishment [of their government] is right."5 This supports Weiler's 
definition of social legitimacy, but does not explain exactly what factor(s) 
induce people to believe that their government has a right to govern, and that 
they have a corresponding duty to obey its laws. Furthermore, there often 
seems to be an equally indeterminate degree of overlap between the concepts 
of formal and social legitimacy, at least within the Member States and other 
similar democracies. Held, for example, suggests that most people accustomed 
to a liberal democratic regime will only be prepared to accept an equally 
formally legitimate government as socially legitimate: 
2 
'The Transformation of Europe' [1991] Yale Lmv Journal 2043, esp. at 2469-73. 
3 
'Social Conflict, Legitimacy and Democracy' in W. Connolly, ed., Legitimacy and the State, 
Blackwell Ltd., Oxford, 1994, at pp.91-2. 
4 Note 2 supra. 
5 
'Policy Legitimacy and the European Union' (1996) 34 JCMS 191, at 199-200 (emphasis in 
original). 
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"The principle of [democratic] autonomy seeks to atticulate the basis on which public 
power can bejustified ... "6 
The exercise of public, i.e. governmental, power is justified by the democratic 
nature of the government. The term 'political legitimacy' indicates that it is the 
exercise of public power, at least in the Member States, which demands a 
combination of formal and social legitimacy in order to be regarded as 
legitimate: people must accept the laws promulgated by their government as 
valid laws to be obeyed, even if they personally oppose the government's 
policies. The legitimacy of any democratic government is sometimes referred 
to as 'democratic legitimacy', although that terminology might conceivably 
overlook the need for a regime to have both social and formal legitimacy. 
Ultimately, per both Weiler and Lipset, social legitimacy is more important 
than formal legitimacy.7 This conclusion has a certain intuitive appeal, having 
regard to two actual regimes. Present-day Kuwait was quite recently re-
established as a monarchy, reserving a great deal of power to the Emir, 
notwithstanding the fact that the restoration of Kuwait's independence at the 
end of the Gulf War might have presented Kuwaitis with an opportunity to 
adopt a more formally legitimate constitution. Kuwait's generous welfare 
provisions and food/petroleum subsidies might explain the largely autocratic 
pre-war regime's enduring post-war social legitimacy. Pro-democracy 
politicians have recently gained a majority in Kuwait's National Assembly, 
however, indicating that the relative lack of formal legitimacy may not be 
tolerated for much longer after all. 8 The example of the former Weimar 
Republic might offer more compelling support for Weiler's and Lipset's 
conclusion. Hitler's rise to the dictatorship ofthe Third Reich might have been 
6 Chapter One supra, note 96, at p.153. 
7 References at notes 2 and 3 supra, respectively. See also G. Britz and M. Schmidt, 'The 
Institutionalised Participation of Management and Labour in the Legislative Activities of 
the European Community: A Challenge to the Principle of Democracy under Community 
law' (2000) 6 European Lm!' Journal 45, at 67. There, social legitimacy, described as 
'substantive' legitimacy, is a "necessmy supplement to the democratic legitimation which 
must be attached to the exercise of state power", said to require "that state measures 
realise the 'real' will of the people, in the sense that citizens recognise their own interests 
within legislative measures. 
8 Source: http://www.arab.neUkuwait/kuwait contents.html. 
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assisted by a lack of social legitimacy in the democratic Weimar Republic, 
which regime undoubtedly had formallegitimacy.9 
In conclusion, a polity's legitimacy apparently depends both upon the extent to 
which it provides formal, democratic mechanisms in order to secure popular 
consent for laws and policies, and upon the extent to which ordinary people 
believe that its government has a moral right to make laws and policies. In the 
absence of social legitimacy, it seems that even a formally legitimate regime is 
unlikely to endure in the short term, but, as the example of Kuwait suggests, 
even a regime which appears to be socially legitimate may lose legitimacy in 
the long term unless its formal legitimacy is adequate. 
2.2.2. The legitimacy crisis within the EU. 
2.2.2.1. An historical perspective. 
It was originally hoped that the European Communities would be legitimated 
by results. The peoples of Europe, reaping the considerable social and 
economic benefits expected to result from membership of the Communities, 
would in return support the Communities wholeheartedly. The relatively weak 
parliamentary Assembly established to supervise the High Authority of the 
ECSC, first of the European Communities, may have been proposed as a 
concession by the ECSC's 'founding father', Jean Monnet: Monnet apparently 
desired to entrust the achievement of a European Community entirely to an 
elite group of 'technocrats', being as free as possible from interference from 
politicians or the public. 10 This suggests that social legitimacy was indeed 
9 The fall of the Weimar Republic has been attributed to a complex mixture of external and 
economic factors as well as inherent flaws in the Weimar Constitution (see, e.g., G. 
Rempel, 'Collapse of the Weimar Republic', 
http:/ /mars.acnet. wnec.ed u/-grempel/ courses/ germany/1 ectures/23 wei mar co llapse.htm I. 
Intimidation of the German electorate would have made it difficult to determine the extent 
to which popular loyalty to the Third Reich was genuine, and not inspired by fear. 
However, it has been suggested that the Weimar Republic never enjoyed wholehearted 
popular support: M. Saji, 'The Fall of the Weimar Republic', 
http://yosh.gimp.org/-saj i/wei mar.html. 
1° K. Featherstone, 'Jean M on net and the 'Democratic Deficit' in the European Union' ( 1994) 
32 JCMS 149, at pp.l60-162. Featherstone suggests, however, that at the time, the idea of 
achieving democratic control of the High Authority by the establishment of anything 
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originally believed to be sufficient to legitimate a regime in the relative 
absence of formal legitimacy, since formal legitimacy is seen to derive from a 
Member State-like democratic constitution. The constitutional arrangement of 
the Communities was, of course, quite different from that of the Member 
States, particularly prior to the strengthening of the European Parliament's 
position. 11 
However, the relative absence of formal legitimacy within the Communities 
did not pass unnoticed. General de Gaulle criticised the legitimacy of the EEC 
during the 1960's, 12 and, following the signing of the TEU, the 'democratic 
deficit' of the newly established EU was even more extensively debated than 
that of the former EEC. 13 Interestingly, however, there is little evidence of any 
consensus, within this debate, concerning the precise nature of the democratic 
deficit. 
One commentator simply refused to acknowledge any democratic deficit. 14 
Another welcomed the TEU's attempts to introduce more democracy, but 
remotely resembling a federal government might have been politically unacceptable to the 
Member States, and that leaving national governments to control the ECSC might have 
delayed the quest for European unity (ibid.). 
11 Cf 'Justus Lipsius' (a pseudonym), 'The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference' (I 995) 20 
ELRev 235, esp. at 255: 'Lipsius' does not accept that the Communities ever lacked 
formal legitimacy and regards the Council, comprising domestically-elected 
representatives of the Member States, as "obviously democratic". However, cf also 
Raworth, who concludes that the Council lacks legitimacy, having regard to its lack of 
accountability to the European electorate as a whole, and, importantly, to its lack of 
transparency (P. Raworth, 'A Timid Step Forwards: Maastricht and the Democratisation 
ofthe European Community' (1994) 19 ELRev 16, at 33). 
12 W. Wallace and J. Smith, 'Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the 
Problem of Popular Consent' ( 1995) 18 (no. 3, Special Issue) West European Politics 
137, at 140. The 'empty chair crisis' of 1965 reflected de Gaulle's belief that majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers was not legitimate: only the unanimous agreement of 
the elected governments of the Member States could legitimate EEC law. This position, 
of course, led to the adoption of the 1966 'Luxembourg Compromise', by which 
agreement unanimous voting in the Council was resumed notwithstanding its illegality 
under the EEC Treaty (following the end of the original transitional period during which 
unanimous voting was permitted). 
13 Per J. Lodge ('Transparency and Democratic Legitimacy' (1994) 32 JCMS 343) the signing 
of the Single European Act apparently prompted discussions concerning the lack of 
formal legitimacy within the EEC. The democratic deficit was debated by the European 
Parliament (e.g. PE Doe A2-276/87) as well as academics. Lodge also observes (op. cif., 
at 343) that during the ratification of the TEU, the "crisis of EC governance" was 
attributed to "a more pervasive democratic deficit than had hitherto been assumed." 
14 
'Lipsius', note 11 supra. Britz and Schmidt agree that the Council provides democratic 
accountability (note 7 supra, at 63). 
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remained concerned about the continuing lack of transparency, especially in the 
legislative processes. 15 Others stressed a link between transparency and 
democracy, citing the lack of transparency as the principal cause of the 
democratic deficit. 16 Still others implied that too much transparency might 
undermine the effectiveness of the EU, 17 which would be highly undesirable: a 
lack of effective governance might in turn undermine democracy. 18 Finally, 
there seems to have been no consensus regarding which of the major EU 
institutions were most lacking in formal legitimacy: 19 this makes the nature and 
scope of the alleged democratic deficit difficult to determine and hinders 
efforts to suggest a solution. Weiler's principal concern, meanwhile, in 
contrast to the debate about democracy, was the EU's apparent lack of social 
legitimacy. 20 
Only one point is clear. By the start of the 1996 IGC, the EU was undoubtedly 
believed, by the majority of interested commentators, to lack either formal or 
social legitimacy, or both. Wallace and Smith suggested that the Union might 
lack social legitimacy because its future remains uncertain: the EU having been 
"deliberately negotiated as a journey to an unknown destination."21 The 
clearest independent proof of the fact that the Union was indeed experiencing a 
legitimacy crisis would appear to have been the result of the first Danish 
15 J.-C. Piris, 'After Maastricht, are the Community Institutions More Efficacious, More 
Democratic and More Transparent?' ( 1994) 19 EL Rev 449. 
16 E.g. Lodge, note 13 supra; E. Noel, 'A New Institutional Balance?' in R. Dehousse (ed.) 
Europe after Maastricht- An Ever Closer Union?, Law Books in Europe, Munich, 1994; 
and Curtin and Meijers, Chapter One supra, note 70. 
17 E.g. Raworth (note 11 supra, at 23), who observed that secrecy facilitates the work of the 
Council, thereby implying that transparency would obstruct the Council. Lodge, 
meanwhile, suggested that problems could arise if the Commission were required to invite 
too high a level of public participation: the most important dimension of multidimensional 
transparency (note 13 supra, at 364-5). 
18 Andersen and Eliassen, Chapter One supra, note 45. 
19 In addition to the conflicting opinions of 'Lipsius' and Raworth regarding the Council (note 
11 supra), Featherstone was particularly concerned about the Commission's 
accountability (note 10 supra, at 150, 165-166) whereas Raworth suggested that this had 
improved (note 11 supra, at 33) and Lodge suggested that the Commission was, in any 
event, merely a scapegoat for the democratic deficit (note 13 supra, at 346). 
20 Note 2 supra. 
21 Note 12 supra, at 140. Further support for the notion that ordinary people are still concerned 
about the direction that the EU is taking was provided on July 16 200 I by the UK Foreign 
Secretary, Jack Straw, quoted as saying that "We have to provide much better reassurance 
about where this European Union project is going ... We have not yet achieved [a balance 
between change and stability] inside the European Union and that leads to uncertainty and 
insecurity and a sense of detachment" (The Daily Telegraph newspaper, 17 July 2001, 
p.13, column 1). 
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referendum concerning the TEU. According to the then Commission 
President, Jacques Delors, the result was surprising: the idea that the ordinary 
people of Europe might reject the TEU had apparently not occurred to the 
Commission.22 
However, some suggestion that a legitimacy crisis had been perceived by the 
Member States could be implicit in Declaration No. 17, annexed to the Final 
Act of Maastricht. This non-binding, political Declaration does not explicitly 
acknowledge the existence of any crisis, because it speaks of strengthening 
democracy and public confidence in the administration. It is possible to 
enhance and improve that which is already reasonably strong. Nevertheless, 
the Declaration could be regarded as showing awareness, on the part of the 
Member States, of a lack of legitimacy and public confidence in the newly 
established European Union: 
"The Conference considers that openness of the decision-making process strengthens 
the democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the 
administration. The Conference accordingly recommends that the Commission 
submit to the Council no later than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve 
public access to information available to the institutions." 
As there was no right of public access to information that was not already 
intended for publication within the EU, however, it would be more accurate to 
read 'provide' for 'improve' in Declaration No. 17. The use of 'improve' and 
the call for an inquiry by the Commission creates the impression that, although 
the Member States considered the democratic credentials of the European 
Communities to be perfectly acceptable, it was prudent for them to be seen to 
be taking an interest, at least, in enhancing the institutions' formal legitimacy: 
particularly, perhaps, in light of the new titles added to the newly re-named EC 
Treaty, which extended the scope of Community law.23 
22 Speech of 9 March 1994 to the inaugural meeting of the Committee of the Regions, reported 
in the 'Commentary', European Access ( 1994) no. 3, at p.7. 
23 Including culture (Article 128 (now 151) EC), public health (Article 129 (now 152) EC) and 
consumer protection (Article 129a (now 153) EC. 
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Whether or not the existence of a legitimacy crisis was suspected prior to the 
first Danish referendum on the TEU, it was clear that afterwards, neither the 
institutions nor the Member States could deny that the EU's regime was, 
indeed, not always regarded as 'right' by all the ordinary people subject to 
Community law?4 The question of how the institutions and the Member States 
should respond to this crisis has, as indicated earlier, largely been approached 
with a view to suggesting somewhat piecemeal institutional reforms of the 
Council and/or the Commission, instead of a root-and-branch reform of the 
entire institutional structure. Given the lack of consensus regarding exactly 
which institution(s) are most in need of reform, however, to say nothing of the 
lack of consensus regarding the exact nature and extent of the shortcomings of 
the present institutional arrangements, the most effective way to address the 
EU's legitimacy crisis could well be that suggested by Declaration No. 17. It 
seems desirable to consider (a) way(s) in which to maximise democracy, 
accountability and public confidence in the administration as a whole, 
focussing not upon the individual shortcomings of individual institutions, but 
upon the entire constitutional arrangement of the European Union, in order to 
make the Union as legitimate as possible. 
In other words, given that the legitimacy crisis has been blamed upon a lack of 
transparency, it may be that the adoption of multidimensionally-transparent 
law- and policy-making processes at EU level would resolve the present crisis: 
the Council should not be singled out as the only institution in need of greater 
transparency, because the Council is not the only institution that has been 
criticised. Furthermore, as stated, the EU's crisis is one of both formal and 
social legitimacy. It is not entirely clear that democratising the Union by 
further Treaty amendments, in order to enhance only its formal legitimacy, will 
be sufficient to legitimate the polity. If Weiler, Lipset and Obradovic are 
correct, the concurrent need for social legitimacy cannot be overlooked. This 
24 The recent rejection of the Treaty of Nice by the Irish in a referendum seems to indicate that 
the EU's legitimacy crisis is still ongoing (see p.3, 3'd paragraph, of the Commission 
White Paper, note I supra), although it is believed that the issue of Eire's neutrality 
figured prominently in that referendum, since Nice concerns the creation of a European 
armed force. Therefore, it is not entirely clear to what extent the Irish were expressing 
disapproval of the EU itself, as opposed to disapproval of the prospect of compromising 
Irish neutrality. 
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leads to the question of whether there is a logical connection between 
multidimensional transparency and two-dimensional legitimacy. Obviously, 
the adoption of a multidimensionally-transparent regime could not help to 
resolve the legitimacy crisis unless both formal and social legitimacy could, at 
least, be strengthened by the adoption of such a regime. However, the first 
question to address is that of whether the EU's legitimacy crisis has indeed 
been correctly analysed. 
2.2.2.2. An alternative perspective: legitimacy and the European 'myth'. 
Lene Hansen and Michael Williams criticise the current academic debate 
concerning the Union's legitimacy.Z5 First, they are sceptical about the nature 
of the legitimacy crisis: citing the 'remarkable progress' made by the EU in the 
1990's, they suggest that ordinary Europeans are objecting to the rapid pace of 
integration, as opposed to institutional shortcomings.26 Although the Autumn 
2000 Eurobarometer survey suggested that most people surveyed actually want 
integration to proceed at a faster pace,27 and although the Commission's White 
Paper indicates that there definitely is an EU legitimacy crisis,28 Hansen and 
Williams strongly challenge the widely-held view that the EU is in crisis 
because it is insufficiently democratic, insufficiently representative of its 
citizens and insufficiently transparent. It is necessary to address their concerns 
because, as indicated in Chapter One supra, the call for multidimensional 
transparency is a call for greatly increased citizen participation in the Union's 
decision-making processes, and because, as suggested above, it may be that the 
adoption of a multidimensionally-transparent system, being a cosmopolitan-
like model of democracy, might resolve the Union's legitimacy crisis, provided 
that there is a clear idea of the nature of that crisis upon which to base the 
necessary arguments. 
25 
'The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 'Crisis' ofthe EU' (1999) 37 JCMS 
233. 
26 /bid., at 234. 
27 54'h Eurobarometer report for November-December 2000, released April 200 I, s.4.3, pp.52-
3. The caveat attached to the statistics is that pro-EU Europeans do indeed support faster 
integration, but not all Europeans are pro-EU: active support for EU membership still 
stands at 50% (s.4.1, p.33). 
28 Note I supra. 
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Hansen and Williams rightly observe that it is frequently asserted that ordinary 
citizens are demanding "to exert democratic leverage" in the Union. The 
Autumn 2000 Eurobarometer registered public satisfaction with democracy in 
the Union at 40%,29 indicating that most Union citizens would like the Union 
to be more democratic: however, does this necessarily mean that ordinary 
people desperately wish to take a more active part in EU-level decision-
making? That particular concern can be accommodated by proceeding from 
the basis that Union citizens might, through the adoption of cosmopolitan 
democracy, be empowered to participate more extensively in EU decision-
making should they wish to do so: they can also be encouraged to participate, 
but they would not be obliged to do so. Hansen's and William's principal 
concern, however, is that unless the cause of the EU's legitimacy crisis has 
been correctly diagnosed, it will not be possible to propose a credible remedy 
for that crisis. They have identified two completely different accounts of the 
legitimacy crisis from the current debate, and are satisfied with neither. 
Firstly, Hansen and Williams note that one account of the legitimacy crisis 
holds that the Union's laws and policies are simply not legitimated in the same 
way as are the laws and policies of a liberal democratic Member State. The 
solution is perceived to be the continuing democratisation of the Union and the 
introduction of 'Community-building' policies such as Union citizenship, a 
uniform passport, etc.30 This account may be referred to as the 'no-democracy 
analysis'. The other account of the crisis, hereinafter designated the 'no-myth 
analysis', holds that there is no European demos, therefore the Union cannot 
actually be democratised per se: attempts to strengthen the European 
Parliament, for example, could meet with increasing nationalist resistance 
within the Member States which could ultimately tear the Union apart. The 
solution is perceived to be the finding of an existing common identity uniting 
the various peoples of Europe, and the identification of existing common aims 
and values which the Union can then legitimately pursue and uphold.31 The 
29 Note 27 supra, s.2.5, p.l6. 
30 Note 25 supra, at 236-7. 
31 !bid, at 237-8. 
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problem, from Hansen's and Williams' perspective, is that neither account of 
the crisis takes cognisance of the EU's unique 'myth': "modernity as 
rationalisation". 32 
The 'myth', in this context, is the raison d'etre of a polity. The social, 
political, cultural, historic, linguistic, economic and geographic factors that 
have combined to create, for example, modern France, also comprise the 
French myth, which seems to inspire a sense of patriotism in most French 
citizens.33 A polity having a less successful myth could contain regions which 
are more or less determined to gain independence, e.g. the Basque region of 
Spain, and Scotland in the UK. In the no-democracy analysis, the EU has the 
capacity to generate a myth as integration proceeds, accompanied by 
democratisation.34 In the no-myth analysis, however, the EU must identify an 
existing myth, because any attempt to generate a myth as integration proceeds 
might provoke an undesirable nationalist backlash.35 
Hansen and Williams argue that, from the outset, the idea underlying the 
project of European integration relied upon certain myths - utilitarian, liberal 
and economic- all of which aimed to rationalise the project of integration and 
to present it as a non-political, functional venture. Such rationalisation of 
government is, they say, a modern myth. In contrast to national myths and the 
socio-political structures of the Member States, which represent the past, the 
EU represents the future: an open, creative process in which government can be 
reconstructed along rational lines, "as the natural extension of the processes of 
social and political rationalisation already well advanced in the historical 
evolution of modern states ... ".36 The EU myth is already there: the Union's 
32 /bid, at 235,239-244. 
33 See further E. Renan, 'What is a nation?' (translated by M Thorn) in Nation and Narration, 
ed. H. Bhabha, Routledge, London & New York, 1990, eh. 2, esp. p.19: "A nation is a 
soul, a spiritual principle" defined by "the possession in common of a rich legacy of 
memories" and "the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage 
that one has received in an undivided form." Renan also suggests, however, at pp.! 0-12, 
that France is also united today because the conflicts and violence of her past have been 
forgotten: the collective forgetting of, e.g., the Midi massacres of the thirteenth century, 
must also therefore contribute to the French myth. 
34 Note 25 supra, at 243. 
35 Ibid., at 238. 
36 /bid, at 243. 
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future is open, because that future can be constructed rationally. 37 The real 
problem is that the attempt to de-politicise integration failed: political 
legitimacy did not follow in the footsteps of integration as anticipated. 
Debating the need for public access to information about the EU, the need to 
bring the Union closer to the people and the need for a mythical European 
identity has overshadowed the real issue, which in Hansen's and Williams' 
opinion seems to be that of trust: there is a legitimacy crisis because people do 
not trust the European Union to provide rational governance, and/or regard it as 
a rational project. Hansen and Williams perceive a need to debate, as 
politically contentious issues, the scope, content and desirability of the 
Union.38 The critical question is whether the Union can be trusted, not 
whether it is more-or-less formally legitimate, or whether there is an 
identifiable European demos. 
2.2.2.3. Some conclusions. 
Interestingly, Hansen and Williams do not conclude their re-analysis of the 
EU's legitimacy crisis ('the Hansen-Williams analysis') with a confident 
prediction of its successful resolution. Instead, they say that the success of the 
Member States' collective decision to proceed with further integration remains 
to be seen, because if the no-myth analysis is correct, further integration could 
produce a counterproductive nationalist backlash, as discussed above.39 This 
implies that the myth of modernity-as-rationalisation could not compete against 
national mythologies in the event that a combination of further democratisation 
and Community-building policies, together with heightened awareness of the 
EU myth of modernity-as-rationalisation, does not resolve the EU's legitimacy 
crisis. The myth that Hansen and Williams have identified is not, therefore, 
presented as a powerful and convincing source of legitimacy: moreover, they 
have arguably failed to rebut entirely either the no-democracy analysis or the 
no-myth analysis, despite their criticism of the legitimacy crisis debate. 
37 /bid, at 243-4. 
38 Ibid., at 245-7. 
39 Ibid., at 247. 
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Nevertheless, the Hansen-Williams analysis is interesting, because it suggests 
that multidimensional transparency might help to resolve the legitimacy crisis. 
The no-democracy analysis focuses upon the Union's lack of formal 
legitimacy, implicitly acknowledging, perhaps, that social legitimacy depends 
to at least some extent upon formal legitimacy, in the minds of people 
accustomed to living in a liberal democratic Member State. The no-myth 
analysis emphasises the Union's lack of social legitimacy: the Union is seen as 
an 'unnatural', artificial construction, unlike the Member States, in which 
people mostly share a common identity. Perhaps there is an implicit 
acknowledgement of the need for formal legitimacy before Europeans, steeped 
as they are in liberal democratic tradition, will believe that a government is 
'right'. The overall conclusion, however, seems to be that the legitimacy crisis 
has arisen from a lack of popular trust in the European Union. 
The call for multidimensional transparency, meanwhile, suggests that decision-
makers cannot actually be trusted unless decision-making processes are open to 
public scrutiny. Multidimensional transparency requires continual public 
scrutiny of EU-Ievel decision-making: decision-makers must be accountable to 
the public; civil society participation is necessary in order to ensure that 
important decisions are thoroughly and effectively debated; and public access 
to documents available to the institutions is required in order to ensure that the 
facts upon which decisions are based are available for public scrutiny. 
Adopting multidimensionally-transparent decision-making processes as a 
means of injecting public trust into the outcome of those processes might 
therefore resolve the Union's legitimacy crisis, if the lack of popular trust in 
the Union is indeed the key issue. As Hansen and Williams are so cautious in 
their analysis, however, it remains necessary to seek further connections 
between formal and social legitimacy and multidimensional transparency, in 
case the legitimacy crisis is, after all, not due to a lack of trust, but due to a lack 
of formal and/or social legitimacy. 
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2.2.3. Multidimensional transparency and two-dimensional legitimacy. 
2.2.3.1. Transparency, legitimacy and democracy. 
A link between transparency and legitimacy has apparently been taken for 
granted by commentators, including Lodge.40 Apparently, transparency is 
regarded as so obviously necessary for democracy, and democracy is regarded 
as so obviously necessary for legitimacy, that no further explanation of the link 
between those three completely distinct concepts is required. Transparency, 
democracy and legitimacy may even have been conflated, just as there seems to 
have been a tendency to conflate legitimacy with the rule of law,41 and a 
tendency to conflate liberalism and the rule of law with democracy.42 Such 
conflation is not defensible, however. As argued in Chapter One supra, both 
multidimensional transparency and a model of democracy requiring such 
transparency should be regarded as eo-original concepts, but they remain 
distinct. Formal legitimacy arises within the basic model of democracy 
criticised by Marks,43 but this will not necessarily be socially legitimate, as 
discussed above. More importantly, not all models of democracy will 
necessarily be multidimensionally-transparent, as also concluded in Chapter 
One supra. 
It may not be possible to logically connect both dimensions of legitimacy to 
each dimension of multidimensional transparency, but a link would 
nevertheless exist if only one dimension from each concept could be 
connected. The need for government-held information to be comprehensible 
could be linked to formal legitimacy on the grounds, noted in Chapter One 
supra, that liberal democracy requires a minimum level of transparency in 
order to function. If the electorate could not understand the information 
available to them, this would be as bad as, if not worse than, having no 
information at all. Clearly, there is also a need for adequate information to be 
40 Note 13 supra. 
41 Obradovic, note 5 supra, at 197: adherence to the rule of law, itself a complex and 
multidimensional concept, is not, in her view, sufficient to convince people that their 
constitution is 'right'. 
42 Chapter One supra, notes 80-81 and text. 
43 Chapter One supra, notes 80-81 and text. 
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available, the second dimension of multidimensional transparency. Regular 
free and secret ballots would be pointless unless the voters could make an 
informed choice. A link, albeit limited, between multidimensional 
transparency and legitimacy is therefore established. 
Access to the reasoning behind government decisions would enable people to 
decide whether those decisions were entirely based upon relevant 
considerations, and whether due attention had been paid to all possible relevant 
considerations. If such access were granted only after a decision had been 
adopted, people might be able to satisfy themselves that the decision was 
appropriate, which might increase their confidence in the government, which 
might help to improve the government's social legitimacy. However, this 
would not necessarily suffice to demonstrate that the government had the right 
to adopt such a decision in the first place. If, however, access to the reasoning 
behind a government proposal were granted prior to the formal adoption of a 
decision, and citizens were empowered to comment upon that proposal, this 
might enhance the government's social legitimacy to a greater extent. 
Ordinary citizens might be convinced of their government's desire to listen to 
them and to take account of their needs and opinions.44 
Opening up governmental decision-making processes to public scrutiny and 
input could also enhance the democratic nature of those processes, thereby 
enhancing the government's formal legitimacy and providing a further 
potential link between transparency and legitimacy, which link appears to be 
quite strong so long as public participation in decision-making is permitted. A 
call for public participation in government also implicitly calls for almost all 
the other dimensions of multidimensional transparency.45 However, the link 
between transparency and formal legitimacy remains quite weak if the 
reasoning behind decisions is only made available after those decisions have 
been adopted. 
44 The Commission now seems to believe that it is essential to listen to ordinary people and to 
take heed of their needs and opinions: see further Chapter Three infra. See also Britz and 
Schmidt, note 7 supra, at 67, recalling the need for legislative measures to reflect people's 
interests and concerns. 
45 Section 1.2, Chapter One, supra. 
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2.2.3.2. Transparency, legitimacy, subsidiarity and proportionality. 
As Charles Timmermans46 observes, subsidiarity and transparency "are entirely 
different concepts": the former being a constitutional principle protecting the 
powers of the Member States, and the latter being described as "more 
diffuse",47 possibly because it is multidimensional. 
concepts 
Nevertheless, both 
"are twins in the continuing quest of the Framers of European integration to increase 
the legitimacy of Community decision-making vis-a-vis the citizens."48 
Overall, however, Timmermans does not regard the concepts as related: rather, 
he sees them as intertwined. In the course of trying to make Community 
legislation more comprehensible, the Commission is having regard to, inter 
alia, subsidiarity and proportionality. In the course of trying to ensure 
compliance with subsidiarity and proportionality, the Commission is having 
regard to transparency. 49 At least this implies that subsidiarity, proportionality, 
transparency, and legitimacy might be connected. 
It must be remembered that observance of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality is intended to justify EU legislation and policies. The need for 
EU-level action in the first place is justified by observation of the principle of 
subsidiarity: that action taken at Member State level will not be sufficiently 
effective to achieve a desired aim. Broadly speaking, the principle of 
proportionality ensures that the only action taken is that which is absolutely 
necessary to achieve that aim. Theoretically, since both principles are general 
principles of Community law relating to the application of the Treaties, any 
failure to comply with either principle might be challenged by way of an 
46 Deputy Director-General of the Commission's Legal Services. 
47 
'Subsidiarity and Transparency' (1999) 22 Ford ham International Law Journal I 06, at 106. 
48 !bid 
49 !bid, at 127. 
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application for the annulment of the Community act in question, 5° subject to 
two caveats, which will shortly be discussed. 
The argument that transparency enhances the quality of decision-making, 
because decision-maker(s) will take greater care in order to avoid the prospect 
of their decisions being challenged by way of an application for judicial 
review, will also be recalled. 51 The counter-argument is that exposure to 
scrutiny encourages timidity in decision-making, and increases the tendency on 
the part of the public to challenge decisions, with both factors resulting in less 
efficient decision-making.52 Neither argument seems to be supported by 
empirical evidence: however, the Protocol on Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality,53 annexed to the EC Treaty by the ToA, supports the former 
argument to some extent. It expresses the Member States' desire for care to be 
taken to ensure the compliance of all proposed legislation with subsidiarity and 
• )' 54 proport10na 1ty. 
A regime, knowing that its legislation was vulnerable to annulment for non-
compliance with the principles of proportionality and/or subsidiarity, might 
desire to publicise its compliance with both principles, by making both its 
legislation and the reasoning underlying that legislation as transparent as 
possible. Transparency could show that the legislation had been drafted strictly 
according to both constitutional principles. Public awareness of the need for 
EU-level action, and of the fact that the action taken did not exceed that which 
was necessary in order to achieve a desirable goal, might enhance public 
confidence in the Union: this, in turn, might enhance the Union's social 
legitimacy. The Commission's White Paper on European Governance refers 
explicitly to the need for EU-level decision-making to be seen to be compliant 
50 Article 230 (ex 173 ) EC, paragraph 2. 
51 E.g. Eliasson, Chapter One supra, note 67, at 34. 
52 E.g. Birkinshaw, Chapter One supra, note 65, at p.49. 
53 OJ 1997 C 340/105. 
54 Paragraph 4 of the Protocol indicates that all proposed Community legislation shall justify 
the compliance of the proposal with both principles, qualitatively, and quantitatively if 
possible. 
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with proportionality and subsidiarity. 55 The Protocol, in Timmermans's 
opinion, strengthens the possibilities for legal review by the ECJ of the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity 
" ... particularly as to the procedural requirements imposed by the Protocol. It should 
be noted, however, that the ... Protocol does not impose a specific obligation ... to 
justify a Community act in terms of its compliance with ... subsidiarity and 
proportionality. The requirements to state reasons are related to the proposed 
legislation, not to the final act." 56 
The second observation in the above-quoted passage, however, leads 
Timmermans to examine the justiciability of subsidiarity. With reference to 
two cases,57 he concludes that the ECJ is reluctant to substantively review 
compliance with this principle;58 and that the ECJ tends to consider the duty to 
give reasons (Article 253 (ex 190) EC) in order to quickly dispose of any plea 
alleging a breach of subsidiarity, by noting that the legislation incorporates 
some explanation of the necessity for EU-Ievel action, even if only by 
implication. 59 Therefore, one caveat, relating to the possibility of obtaining the 
annulment of Community legislation for non-compliance with subsidiarity, is 
that Council-approved legislation might be virtually immune from such a 
challenge. That knowledge would not have the desired effect of encouraging 
transparency in legislation as a means of reducing the risk of that legislation 
being challenged via judicial review. The second caveat is that ordinary 
citizens and civil society groups are unlikely to have locus standi to challenge 
Community legislation in the first place: see further sub-section 2.2.3.3. infra. 
55 Note I supra., esp. at p.l 0 (the principles of good governance reinforce those of 
proportionality and subsidiarity) and p.29 (an annual report, detailing the Union's 
compliance with proportionality and subsidiarity, is to be made from 2002). 
56 Timmermans, note 4 7 supra, at 113-4. 
57 Case C-84/94, United Kingdom v Council [1996] ECR 1-5793; Case C-233/94, Germany v 
Parliament and Council [1997] ECR 1-2441. 
58 Note 47 supra, at 115. 
59 Ibid., at 117. This is strongly supported by paragraph 33 of Case C-377/98, Netherlands v 
Parliament and Council [2001] 3 CMLR 49: "Compliance with the principle of 
subsidiarity is necessarily implicit in the fifth, sixth and seventh recitals of the preamble 
to the [contested] Directive ... It thus appears that the Directive states sufficient reasons on 
that point." (emphasis added). 
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In order to adopt decisions as closely as possible to the citizen, in accordance 
with Article I (ex A) TEU, it seems reasonable to reserve as many issues as 
possible for regional and local governments. That interpretation of subsidiarity 
could have two transparency-related effects: local and regional governments 
may be more visible to citizens than even their national government, and so, in 
that sense, may be more open; furthermore, it may be relatively easier for 
ordinary citizens to participate directly in their local or regional government, 
by attending meetings and/or lobbying local/regional government members 
directly, than it would be for those same citizens to participate directly in 
meetings of the Council of Ministers.60 The possibility of adopting decisions at 
a local/regional level, addressing a strong, shared local/regional interest on the 
basis of a local/regional consensus, might also confer greater legitimacy upon 
the resulting decisions than would the adoption of decisions in which non-
members of the local/regional community had participated, or the adoption of 
decisions in which no members of the local/regional community had 
participated. 
It is not evident from the Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality that the 
Member States had local and regional governments in mind.61 Paragraph 9 
states that any burden falling upon local authorities as a result of Community 
action should be minimised, but the Protocol does not oblige the Member 
States themselves to observe the principle of subsidiarity in apportioning 
responsibility for implementing Community law. Nevertheless, if well 
publicised, the fact of compliance with subsidiarity by both the Union and its 
Member States could enhance the legitimacy ofEU decision-making processes, 
as the Commission's White Paper on Governance implicitly acknowledges, at 
p. 12: 
6
° Cf G. Chanan, Active Citizenship and Community Involvement: Getting to the Roots, 
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Office for 
Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1997, pp.6-7: "[p ]eople 
cannot take part directly in large and centralised systems ... [they] can participate in party 
politics or social movements, and they can support independent public campaigns, and 
give effort and money to national and international charities and non-governmental 
organisations. However, to see the opportunities tor direct and continuous participation 
by the mass ofthe population one must look to the local setting ... " 
61 However, by Declaration No. 54 annexed to the Final Act of the ToA, Germany, Austria and 
Belgium indicated that subsidiarity, within those Member States, is assumed to involve 
sub-national governments having legislative powers under the national constitution. 
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"' ... [T]he way in which the Union currently works does not allow for adequate 
interaction in a multi-level partnership ... in which national governments involve their 
regions and cities fully in European policy-making ... The process of EU policy-
making, in particular its timing, should allow Member States to listen to and learn 
from regional and local experiences." 
The idea of making more use of subsidiarity to legitimate EU decision-making 
would be strengthened, however, if subsidiarity were a more clearly justiciable 
principle, non-compliance with which would be more likely than it is at present 
to result in the annulment of EU legislation. 
2.2.3.3. Transparency, legitimacy and access to justice. 
If multidimensional transparency is conceptualised as a bundle of rights, 
including the right of public access, then it entails a further right of access to 
justice, as a means of enforcing those rights. Access to the reasoning behind a 
decision is also necessary for that decision to be judicially reviewed: therefore 
access to justice, via judicial review, is easily seen to require the minimum 
level of transparency provided by the statement of reasons accompanying a 
decision. As indicated in sub-section 2.2.3.2. supra, and as will be discussed 
further in Chapter Six infra, both Community Courts consistently enforce the 
duty to give reasons, in order to enable them to exercise their function of 
judicial review. Furthermore, as indicated in Chapter One supra, the need for 
decisions to be amenable to judicial review, and for access to justice, is implicit 
in Chiti's account of transparency,62 in order to enable decisions that do not 
appear to comply with the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity to be 
challenged before the courts. 
However, as mentioned in sub-section 2.2.3.2. supra, irrespective of the 
difficulties surrounding the justiciability of subsidiarity, obtaining access to 
62 Chapter One supra, note 3. In Chiti's actual words (ibid., at 370), " ... the principle of 
transparency operates at the level of repartition of competences between Community and 
Member States and at the level of the 'intensity' of Community action, that is to say it 
involves the subsidiarity and proportionality principles." This does not clearly explain the 
relationship between subsidiarity, proportionality and transparency, however. 
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judicial review depends upon locus standi, which is notoriously difficult for 
non-privileged applicants such as citizens and civil society organisations to 
obtain unless a decision is addressed to them, or is of direct and individual 
concern to them.63 Increasing access to justice, by exposing EU legislation to 
public interest challenges, might improve the legitimacy of EU decision-
making. Decision-makers could be encouraged to consult with any public 
interest groups likely to challenge their decisions, and the public might regard 
those decisions as legitimate if they meet with the approval of groups that 
claim to represent the public interest. 
2.2.4. Conclusions. 
The links between multidimensional transparency and legitimacy are not 
straightforward: also, the many 'ifs', 'coulds' and 'maybes' in the foregoing 
arguments make the overall connection appear rather tenuous. Nevertheless, a 
link between transparency as participation in government, requiring 
transparency as access to documents, and the concept of formal legitimacy, 
seems plausible: as noted, transparency as participation might also enhance 
social legitimacy, because people may be less likely to resent decisions in the 
adoption of which they, or their fellow ordinary citizens, have played a part. 
The link between transparency and legitimacy could be further strengthened by 
reference to Deirdre Curtin's argument that legitimacy stems from the rule of 
law and the protection of individual rights.64 The rule of law, in any event, has 
63 From Article 230 (ex 173) EC, paragraph 4: see, e.g. Craig and de Burca, Chapter One 
supra, note 6, pp.461-494, for a detailed treatment of locus standi in EU law. Gormley 
has argued for the addition of a further paragraph to Article 230 (ex 173) EC, in order to 
confer standing upon certain 'approved' public interest groups, as would be listed in a 
public register maintained by the ECJ, to bring actions for the annulment of Community 
measures (L. Gormley, 'Public Interest Litigation in Community Law' (200 I) 7 European 
Public Lmv 51, at 58-9). 
64 
'The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces' ( 1993) 30 CMLRev 
17, at 65 (cf., however, Obradovic, note 5 supra, at 197). Fuller's account of how to 
make good law also indicates that there is a bare minimum level of transparency required 
in any regime which claims to respect the rule of law (cf. Article 6(1) TEU): that the law 
itself should be adequately publicised, i.e. comprehensible and available (L. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law Revised Edition, Yale University Press Ltd., London, 1969, at p.39). A 
regime that fails to provide this bare minimum level of transparency would, arguably, not 
be legitimate, in that it would not respect this vital rule of law. See also P. Craig, 
'Democracy and rulemaking within the EU: An empirical and normative assessment" in 
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been said to include appropriate protection of both individual and collective 
rights. 65 It undoubtedly requires legal rights to be protected. As noted in 
Chapter One supra, the state itself is the only entity capable of directly 
interfering with the exercise of the right of public access to State-held 
information. Therefore, if a state provides an individual legal right to 
transparency as public access, the rule of law must also require the state to 
protect that right against interference from government officials. Whenever 
such officials withhold access to a given document, it is obvious that the right 
of access to that document cannot be exercised. If the officials cannot 
adequately justify withholding the document, also in accordance with the rule 
of law, by reference to at least one applicable exception to the right of public 
access, the legitimacy of the government they serve must be called into 
question: state officials must respect the rule of law if the state is to be 
perceived as legitimate. 
Moreover, even if the state provides a remedy for the unjustifiable non-
disclosure of a document, such as judicial review, and the original decision to 
withhold the document is annulled, resulting in the document's eventual 
disclosure to the applicant for public access, it will nevertheless be true to say 
that the government unlawfully withheld that document, causing the applicant 
to instigate legal proceedings, when s/he had been legally entitled to public 
access all along. That fact is hardly likely to encourage the individual 
applicant in question to have confidence in the government, or its officials, 
which suggests that the government's social legitimacy will diminish, at least 
in the perception of that particular individual. 
Having established a connection between multidimensional transparency and 
two-dimensional legitimacy, even if the actual indispensability of 
multidimensional transparency to legitimacy has not been firmly established,66 
Lml'rtiGking in the European Union, eds. P. Craig and C. Harlow, Kluwer Law 
International, London, 1998, at p.52: unless people understand the norms affecting their 
actions, the legitimacy of any political regime is called into question. 
65 See, e.g. D. Walker, The Oxford Companion to Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980, at 
p.1093. 
66 Given that the formally legitimate United Kingdom seems to have been regarded as socially 
legitimate by the majority of its citizens, circa 1950, notwithstanding the fact that, at that 
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it is now necessary to examine the question of whether the EU conforms with, 
or whether it could or should be adapted so as to conform with, a model of 
democracy requiring multidimensional transparency, before finally returning to 
the overarching question with which this Chapter is concerned: namely that of 
whether, and to what extent, the application of multidimensional transparency 
is capable of enhancing the legitimacy of the European Union. 
2.3. Multidimensional transparency and the EU: how compatible are they? 
2. 3.1. Modified cosmopolitan democracy: a multidimensionally-transparent 
regime for the EU? 
As noted in Chapter One supra, a multidimensionally-transparent regime 
would have the characteristics of Held's model of democratic autonomy.67 It 
will be recalled that the general conditions for this model are clearly related to 
multidimensional transparency: access to information, necessary for informed 
decision-making; new democratic mechanisms, to facilitate citizen 
participation in government; investment priorities to be set by the government 
"in discussion with public and private agencies"; the reduction to a minimum 
of unaccountable power-centres; and the maintenance of an institutional 
framework "receptive to experiments with organisational forms."68 At the 
international level, democratic autonomy is provided by Held's model of 
cosmopolitan democracy: 
" ... the entrenchment of democratic autonomy on a cosmopolitan basis [provides] 
'cosmopolitan democracy' ... At issue would be strengthening the administrative 
capacity and accountability of regional[69] institutions like the EU ... also the 
time, the idea of a right of public access was neither entertained by the UK government 
nor conspicuously sought after by UK citizens, it remains difticult to see how 
multidimensional transparency can be regarded as indispensable to two-dimensional 
legitimacy per se. 
67 Chapter One supra, note 86, at 325-6. 
68 Ibid. This requirement for flexibility is particularly important in light of Marks's belief that 
democracy should be self-critical and open to the possibility of change in order to 
increase its effectiveness and to eliminate social inequalities (see Chapter One supra, 
notes 81, 82 and text). 
69 From a global perspective, Europe is of course a region. 
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construction, in principle, of broad avenues of civic participation in decision-making 
at regional [e.g. at EU] and global level."70 
By substituting 'Europe' and 'European' for 'region' and 'regional', and 
substituting 'supranational' for 'global', in Held's account of cosmopolitan 
democracy, cosmopolitan democracy might be adapted in order to fit within the 
territory of the EU. This scaled-down model of cosmopolitan democracy 
might be referred to as 'supranational democracy'. 
2.3.2. Multidimensional transparency and the adaptability of the EU to 
conform to the model of supranational democracy. 
2.3.2.1. Could the Union be adapted to conform to the model of supranational 
democracy? 
Held suggests that the Union could be adapted to provide multidimensional 
transparency via the introduction of supranational democracy. Supranational 
democracy would require the enhancement of the European Parliament's role; 
the holding of general referendums "with constituencies defined according to 
the nature and scope of controversial transnational issues"; the opening-up of 
the EU institutions' decision-making processes to public scrutiny; and possibly 
the creation of supervisory panels, partly elected and partly statistically 
representative ofthe population, to democratise other EU bodies. It would also 
call for rights, including economic and social rights, to be enshrined at Treaty 
level, "in order to provide shape and limits to democratic decision-making."71 
The legislature in a cosmopolitan democracy, and therefore in the supranational 
model, is "conceived above all as a 'standard-setting' institution": Held 
explicitly has in mind the EU's current practice of issuing Directives requiring 
detailed implementation at Member State level.72 Law could be enforced either 
by seconding State police to the supranational organisation, or by creating a 
permanent volunteer force at supranationalleve1.73 
7
° Chapter One supra, note 86, at 353-4. 
71 /bid, at 354-5. 
72 Ibid., at 356: footnote no. 8 refers to the EU's range of legal instruments. 
73 /bid: footnote no. 9 refers to the possibility of creating a permanent volunteer force. 
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Moreover, the long-term aims of cosmopolitan democracy, and therefore of the 
supranational model, do not appear incompatible with the aim of establishing 
'an ever-closer union' (Article I TEU). Per Held, cosmopolitan democracy 
aims to establish: a new charter of rights and obligations; a global parliament 
with revenue-raising powers, connected to regions, nations and localities; the 
separation of political and economic interests; public funding of deliberative 
assemblies and electoral processes; an interconnected legal system 
incorporating elements of both civil and criminal law; and the permanent shift 
of national coercive capacity to regional and global institutions. 74 After 
substituting 'European' for 'global', it can be seen that the EU has its new 
Charter of Fundamental Rights/5 a Parliament which could be modified into a 
bicameral legislature,76 which could be given revenue-raising powers/7 and 
which is already 'connected' to the regions and nations of Europe through co-
operation and consultation with national parliaments78 and the Committee of 
the Regions; political and economic interests were separately discussed at 
Maastricht; a move in the direction of an interconnected legal system IS 
represented by the Corpus Juris; 79 and a shifting of coercive capacity from 
74 Ibid., at 358. 
75 Although it is not legally binding, the Charter is nevertheless an effective part of the acquis 
communautaire insofar as the rights therein are protected as general principles of 
Community law by the Courts (see Lenaerts and de Smijter, Chapter One supra, note 20). 
76 Presumably the Council of Ministers would become the upper chamber, representing the 
Member States. 
77 It already has quite a high degree of theoretical control over the Community budget: Article 
272(4) (ex 203(4}} EC gives it the power to amend the draft budget and Article 272(8) (ex 
203(8)) EC gives it the power to reject the draft budget. 
78 See the Protocol on the role of national parliaments within the European Union, annexed to 
the TEU and EC Treaties by the ToA, part II, paragraphs 5 and 6: the Conference of 
European Affairs Committees may contribute to the legislative activities of the European 
Union. 
79 See, e.g. p.34, COM (200 1) 715 final, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/anti fraud/livre vert/document/green paper en.pdf: the 
authors of the Corpus Juris proposed a high level of harmonisation in criminal law, but 
the Commission considers that any such harmonisation must be both proportionate to the 
aim of preventing fraud in the Communities and variable in intensity, depending on the 
area of the Union concerned. 
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individual Member States to the EU could be represented by both the Europol80 
organisation and the European Rapid Reaction Force. 81 
Furthermore, Held implies that government should be based upon subsidiarity 
'from the bottom-up': only such decisions as could not effectively be adopted 
at local, regional or national level should be adopted at a higher level. The 
aforementioned Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity 
and Proportionality makes it clear that Community action can only be justified 
if the proposed action cannot be adequately achieved by the Member States 
(paragraph 5), having regard to the transnational aspects of the issue concerned, 
and/or the requirements of the Treaty, and/or the fact that Community action 
would produce better results. In light of these considerations, it appears that 
the EU is theoretically compatible with a suitably modified, supranational 
model of cosmopolitan democracy. 
2.3.2.2. Should the Union be adapted to conform to the model of supranational 
democracy? 
It will be recalled that Held's basic justification for cosmopolitan democracy is 
that, in the modern world, the control of certain issues is increasingly becoming 
a matter for states, as opposed to any one state. Issues which "escape the 
control of a nation state" include "aspects of monetary management, 
environmental questions, elements of security, [and] new forms of 
communication:"82 issues with which the European Union is currently 
concerned.83 In order to deal effectively with such transnational issues, the 
principle of democratic autonomy should be entrenched at international level, 
8° Council Act of 26 July 1995 drawing up the Convention on the establishment of a European 
Police Office (Europol) OJ 1995 C 316, (see 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/114005b.htm). 
81 Council Regulation (EC) No. 381/2001 of 26 February 2001 creating a rapid-reaction 
mechanism, OJ 2001 L 57/5. 
82 Chapter One supra, note 86, at 354. 
83 The ordinary people of Europe are, apparently, currently most concerned with peace and 
security (88%); unemployment (88%); organised crime (87%); poverty and social 
exclusion (87%); the environment (86%); and consumer protection (81 %) (541h 
Eurobarometer Report, s.5.2, p.68). These responses appear to have been influenced by 
the questions put to the people surveyed: the provision of information (70%) and EU 
enlargement (26%) also feature on the list of public concerns. 
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m Held's opinion, in a manner that would not only ensure that this highly-
developed democratic system, designed with individual states in mind, would 
not be undermined by the presence of any supranational governance, whilst 
also ensuring that the existence of individual nation-states would be preserved. 
This also suggests, of course, that it is possible to adopt supranational 
democracy, because the Member States, which appear keen to preserve their 
individual identities, would be able to do so: in fact, supranational democracy 
might even be essential to preserve the nation-state within the larger Union, 
given that the transition from European Union to federal state is one 
conceivable end result of further integration. 84 
As noted in sub-section 2.3 .2.1. supra, the aims of supranational democracy do 
not seem to be incompatible with the present aims of the EU. That 
observation, however, does not suggest that the EU should become a 
supranational democracy, but only that it could. The argument that no 
individual Member State can control all the issues faced by governments in the 
modern world demands some form of at least supranational governance, in the 
interests of taking effective action regarding issues of concern to ordinary 
people, such as the protection of the environment. If it is accepted, in light of 
the Hansen-Williams analysis ofthe EU's legitimacy crisis, that some form of 
supranational governance is both a necessary and a rational response to the 
globalisation of such issues, the logical conclusion is that the EU is here to 
stay: there can be no returning to government by individual Member States 
acting alone. If the EU is here to stay, and if the Hansen-Williams analysis is 
correct, the injection of multidimensional transparency in order to promote 
public trust in the Union would help to resolve that legitimacy crisis, which 
provides a powerful argument in favour of adopting multidimensional 
transparency. Even ifthe Hansen-Williams analysis is not correct, the fact that 
multidimensional transparency might enhance both the formal and social 
legitimacy ofthe Union suggests that multidimensional transparency should at 
least be tried: if the no-democracy analysis of the legitimacy crisis is correct, 
supranational democracy seems to be a perfectly acceptable solution; whilst if 
84 See further section 2.4 infra. 
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the no-myth analysis is correct, it could be that increased public confidence in 
transparent EU-level decision-making, coupled with the knowledge that the EU 
is, in light of globalisation, here to stay, could boost the myth of modernity-as-
rationalisation sufficiently in order to overcome any potential nationalist 
'backlash' against the EU. 
Rationality is a key concept: the fact that the EU set out to build upon the 
processes of social and political rationalisation already taking place within the 
Member States, as Hansen and Williams noted,85 means that it would neither 
be rational nor logical to accept that the supranational governance called for by 
increasing globalisation should not be at least as committed to the principle of 
democratic autonomy, which is drawn from the liberal democratic traditions 
common to all Member States, as possible. If the EU is necessary, and 
democracy is desired, then supranational democracy should at least be tried. 
2.4. Would multidimensional transparency generate legitimacy in the 
European Union? 
From section 2.3.1. supra, it appears that both the formal and social legitimacy 
of the EU might be enhanced by maximising transparency within the Union's 
decision-making processes. A major problem for the EU, highlighted by 
Hansen and Williams' account ofthe no-myth analysis of the legitimacy crisis, 
is that nationalism within the Member States generates powerful anti-
integrationist sentiment: sometimes, as with the UK general election of June 7, 
200 I, such sentiments are expressed by a mainstream political party, as with 
the Conservatives' 'Keep The Pound' campaign, and the well-publicised 
intention to ensure that the UK was 'in Europe, but not run by Europe'. Any 
idea that makes the EU seem ridiculous or petty, 86 and/or overbearing, 87 or a 
threat to civil liberties,88 or corrupt,89 potentially undermines the social 
85 Note 36 supra and text. 
86 The UK media delights in noting, for example, that EC law regulates the size/shape of fruit 
intended for sale (report at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hilenglish/uk/scotland/newsid 1418000/1418949 .stm). 
87 E.g. the fact that it is now a criminal offence to sell goods using imperial weights. 
88 Corpus Juris is said to seriously undermine the presumption of innocence: see, e.g., the 
commentary by R. Maddocks, http://www.quebecoislibre.org/990612-6.htm: "Police will 
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legitimacy of the Union, both in terms of its popularity, and its citizens' belief 
in its right to govern. 
Although the changes required to establish a supranational version of Held's 
model of cosmopolitan democracy within the EU, as discussed in section 2.3.2. 
supra, would preserve the identity of the Member States, they may initially 
require a degree of further European integration: the transfer of more powers 
from the Member States to the EU and to European regions, and some further 
harmonisation ofnationallegal systems. The question is, how, ifthe very idea 
of further European integration is unpopular, i.e. socially illegitimate, could 
such changes be implemented in order to enhance the Union's social 
legitimacy? 
If 'Euro-scepticism' results from a public perception of the EU as an unelected, 
illegitimate bureaucracy, cheerfully dictating its own future irrespective of the 
wishes of ordinary people, then the adoption of supranational democracy would 
seem to be an appropriate response. Marks describes cosmopolitan democracy 
as embracing "an ideal of popular self-rule and political equality ... enhancing 
control by citizens of decision-making which affects them"9° Furthermore, as 
indicated in sub-section 2.3.2.2. supra, 
"Held refutes the notion that global democracy must await the demise of the states 
system ... there exists ample scope for democratisation within the current structures of 
global politics ... Democracy within nation-states and democracy in international 
affairs are mutually supportive developments, which must be pursued in tandem."91 
The notion of 'popular self-rule' suggests that people would gain control over 
their own destinies under a model of supranational democracy,92 whilst the idea 
be allowed to make arrests without evidence (a heavenly state of affairs for some) and the 
accused will be assumed to be guilty instead of innocent." 
89 Even vague references by UK politicians to the 'unelected bureaucrats of Brussels' convey 
an unwholesome image of sinister, potentially corrupt individuals (see, e.g. 
http://ge97 .co.uk/news archive/mar 24/stmyl 07076s.html). 
90 Chapter One supra, note 79, at pp.l 09-1 10. 
91 Ibid., at p.84. 
92 As seen, one's control of one's own destiny is Popper's principal concern (Chapter One 
supra, text at note 46). 
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that national and supranational democracy are mutually supportive could 
perhaps satisfy all but the most extreme anti-integrationist nationalists that the 
Member States would not simply disappear. Indeed, the very essence of Held's 
model of cosmopolitan democracy is that it operates above the level of nation-
states, without replacing them. 
In light of this, as indicated, a possible solution to the EU's legitimacy crisis 
could be the adoption of a scaled-down model of cosmopolitan democracy. 
Provided that people could be satisfied of the need to adopt certain decisions 
and set certain standards at the supranational level, the adoption of a system 
under which they would have the greatest possible say in such decisions might 
be welcomed. Popular support, as expressed via democratic processes, would 
legitimate any decisions concerning the EU's future development, including 
decisions to proceed with further integration. 
2.5. Conclusion. 
This Chapter has explored the possible logical connections between 
multidimensional transparency and two-dimensional legitimacy. 
Multidimensional transparency could enhance both the formal and social 
legitimacy of the European Union. A scaled-down, supranational model of 
Held's cosmopolitan democracy would provide multidimensional transparency 
within the Union. In such a model, due regard should, and would, be had to the 
principle of subsidiarity in particular: decisions should always be taken at the 
lowest possible level of governance, so as to be closer to the ordinary citizen 
and more likely to be regarded as socially legitimate. 
In order to provide supranational democracy, the EU would require quite 
radical restructuring. That conclusion can hardly be surprising. Nevertheless, it 
does seem somewhat paradoxical to offer a solution to the problem of the 
perceived social illegitimacy of European integration that actually has further 
European integration as its long-term aim, as supranational democracy would 
have. The only way to avoid this apparent paradox would be to ensure that 
ordinary people were given a genuine opportunity to decide upon the future 
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direction of the Union, once a suitably modified cosmopolitan democracy had 
been established. There would be a world of difference, in terms of social 
legitimacy, between an elitist, 'Eurocratic' decision to proceed with further 
integration, as adopted by government leaders at an IGC, and a decision to 
proceed with further integration that has the support of a majority of ordinary 
Europeans, as expressed, perhaps, via a referendum conducted simultaneously 
in all the Member States. 
Should the Member States seek to establish supranational democracy at EU 
level today,93 with a view to realising those long-term aims of cosmopolitan 
democracy which seem to correspond quite closely to the present long-term 
aims of the Union,94 it would be essential for them to convince the ordinary 
peoples of Europe of the desirability of doing so. The further development and 
strengthening of supranational democracy, once established, would depend 
upon the support of ordinary people, who, according to the Commission,95 
would almost certainly oppose any further integration if given an opportunity 
to express their views today. In order to overcome this problem, people would 
have to be persuaded that supranational government by the EU is the necessary, 
rational response to globalisation; that supranational democracy would not lead 
to the demise of the Member States in the long term; and that supranational 
democracy is as transparent and as democratic a system as it is possible to 
install. In short, unless the social legitimacy of supranational democracy itself 
were to be secured within the Member States, once and for all, the introduction 
of multidimensionally-transparent democracy might not secure the desired 
result of enhancing the social and political legitimacy of the European Union 
after all. 
93 The initial adoption of cosmopolitan democracy would of course be dependent upon the 
Member States qua authors of the Treaties, and upon the ratification of the amended 
Treaties, by referendums as required by the constitutions of individual Member States. 
94 Insofar as the latter aims can be identified: see text at note 21 supra. 
95 Note I supra. 
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CHAPTER THREE. 
The EU and its Member States: Taking Transparency Seriously? 
3.1. Introduction. 
This Chapter concludes Part One of this thesis by examining the Member 
States' and EU institutions' concept of transparency, particularly in light of 
Declaration No. 17 annexed to the Final Act of Maastricht, which, as seen, 
charged the Commission to improve "public access to the information available 
to the institutions." Are the Member States, qua authors of the Treaties, in 
asking the Commission to concentrate upon public access to information, 
taking transparency sufficiently seriously? Moreover, has the Commission 
been taking the task imposed upon it by Declaration No. 17 sufficiently 
. 
seriously? One approach to these questions is to consider the extent, if any, to 
which the Member States and Commission appear to be conceptualising 
transparency as multidimensional. 
It will be recalled from Chapter One supra that the call for transparency in the 
EU, particularly by organisations such as Statewatch UK, but also by academic 
commentators insisting that the right of public access is essential to democracy, 
is a call for multidimensional transparency, requiring the participation of 
citizens and civil society in EU-Ievel decision-making processes. Bearing this 
in mind, after briefly examining the concept and role of civil society in a 
democratic polity (section 3.2), this Chapter will ask (section 3.3) whether the 
Commission is seeking to enhance the transparency of EU decision-making 
processes in order to permit, facilitate and encourage the further participation 
therein of ordinary citizens and civil society, or whether it is exclusively 
focussing upon public access to information. 
As also noted in Chapter One supra, public participation in decision-making is 
the most important dimension of multidimensional transparency. The right to 
participate in decision-making empowers citizens and civil society to actually 
make use of any information gained via the right of public access. Without a 
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right to participate in decision-making processes, the full potential utility of the 
right of public access cannot be realised. In Chapter Two supra, it was 
established that a scaled-down model of cosmopolitan democracy would 
provide multidimensional transparency; that the EU seems to be theoretically 
adaptable to such a model of 'supranational democracy'; and that introducing 
supranational democracy might at least alleviate the Union's legitimacy crisis. 
With this in mind, a further question arises from Declaration No. 17. Does the 
mere provision of a right of public access have any capacity to enhance the 
legitimacy of the Union? That issue will also be further considered in section 
3.3. 
Section 3.4 not only concludes this Chapter and Part One of this thesis, but also 
seeks to explain the seemingly disproportionate emphasis within this thesis 
upon the one-dimensional concept of transparency as public access to 
documents. In addition, this concluding section will outline the further 
questions requiring consideration in the remaining Chapters, concerning the 
extent to which the EU's approach towards the right of public access is 
genuinely compatible with the approach to be expected of a regime seeking to 
legitimate itself, to the greatest possible extent, through the provision of 
transparency. 
3.2. Multidimensional Transparency, Civil Society and Politically-Active 
Citizens. 
3.2. I. The concept of civil society. 
Civil society consists of "public organisations which are not state 
organisations", including "the media, education institutions, religious bodies 
and voluntary associations."' 
1 Cullen and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 8. 
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Civil society and a democratic state are distinct concepts: 
" .. .'[S]eparation' of the state from civil society must be a central feature of any 
democratic political order. Models of democracy that depend on the assumption that 
'state' could ever replace 'civil society' or vice versa must be treated with the utmost 
caution."2 
Civil society and democracy can be regarded as mutually reinforcing concepts: 
more precisely, on Philip Allott's analysis, as summarised by Cullen and 
Morrow, democratisation within a state follows from the development of civil 
society, but the process of democratisation reinforces civil society within that 
state. 3 First, national societies began to conceive of themselves as structural 
unities, dependent upon an 
"ultimate source of social self-ordering, the source of law in society. The idea of 
sovereignty was structurally necessary to turn amorphous national [civil] societies into 
more and more complex self-organising systems."4 
However, 
"The new philosophy, of democratic constitutionalism ... proved to be an excellent 
means of organising democratic power but it proved incapable by itself of determining 
social purpose, of deciding how the great power of the state-society would be used."5 
Civil society therefore developed "as a system for generating value", 
particularly in the nineteenth century.6 At the international level, civil society 
includes "international non-governmental organisations (NGOs),"7 being: 
" ... more-or-less ... independent: ... economic groups, like labour unions, consumer 
unions or industrial associations; racial, gender and religious groups; issue-oriented 
2 Held, Chapter One supra, note 86, at p.314. 
3 Ibid., based upon P. Allott, International Lmt' and International Revolution: Reconceiving the 
World, 1989 Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture, Hull University, Hull University Press, 
1989, p.8 and P. Allott, Eunomia, Oxtord University Press, Oxford, 1990, chapter 13. 
4 Allott ( 1989 lecture) note 3 supra, at p.8. 
5 Ibid., at p.9 (emphasis in original). 
6 Ibid., at pp.9-l 0. 
7 Chapter One supra, note 83, at 9. 
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groups like education, environmental or animal welfare organisations; groups 
representing those with disabilities or the elderly or the young; public interest groups 
that are anti-corruption or pro-universal healthcare ... "8 
For example, Statewatch, 9 Article 19, 10 Greenpeace 11 , and the World Wide 
Fund for Nature 12 may be regarded as members of international civil society. 
Such NGOs, to which ordinary citizens may often subscribe, may either 
actively seek to participate in EU-level decision-making or to be consulted, 
usually by the Commission, regarding proposed legislation. 
3.2.2. The importance of civil society. 
Per John Keane, a "pluralistic and self-organising civil society independent of 
the state is an indispensable condition of democracy". 13 Civil society is, on 
this analysis, a social obstacle to the development of despotism within a 
polity. 14 However, the importance of civil society to democracy depends upon 
the model of democracy that is contemplated. Held emphasises the importance 
of civil society to the model of democratic autonomy, 15 but observes that the 
Marxist model of democracy does not even recognise any distinction between 
civil society and the state. 16 
The model of cosmopolitan democracy depends not only upon the separation of 
the concepts of state and civil society, but also, in the long term, upon the 
"[ c ]reation of a diversity of self-regulating associations and groups in civil 
society." 17 Since cosmopolitan democracy also depends upon 
multidimensional transparency and, suitably modified, has some potential to 
legitimate the EU, as noted in Chapter Two supra, it follows that both national 
8 Ibid., footnote no. 18. 
9 Chapter One supra, note 9. 
1
° Chapter One supra, note 56. 
11 http://www.greenpeace.org/. 
12 http://www.wwf.org. 
13 
'Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of the Distinction Between Civil 
Society and the State 1750- 1850' in Civil Society and the State, ed. J. Keane, Verso, 
London and New York, 1988, at pp.61-2. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Note 2 supra and text. 
16 Chapter One supra, note 86, at pp.130-l. 
17 Ibid., at 358. 
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and international civil society would have an important role to play in the re-
development of the EU as a multidimensionally-transparent, legitimate polity 
conforming as closely as possible to the cosmopolitan model of democracy: 
this will be discussed further in section 3.2.5 infra. Furthermore, per Cullen 
and Morrow: 
"A serious problem in contemporary international regulation ... is that many impmiant 
decisions are taken in conclave rather than in public fora. International NGOs form 
part, although only a part, of a necessary move towards transparency and 
accountability of these bodies ... " 18 
As will be recalled from Chapter Two supra, the EU's legitimacy crisis has 
been at least partly blamed upon a lack of transparency in the Council, and the 
Council's lack of accountability to the European Parliament and national 
parliaments. International civil society NGOs could help to hold the Council to 
public account, complementing the efforts of MEPs and members of national 
parliaments to do likewise. 19 
3.2. 3. The transparency of civil society. 
If civil society NGOs are to play a role in making the EU multidimensionally-
transparent and legitimate, however, they must themselves be transparent: 
adequately accountable to and representative of their ordinary citizen 
members.20 This conclusion accords with that ofthe Commission in its White 
Paper on Governance.21 The principles of good governance are discussed 
further in section 3.3 infra. 
Cullen and Morrow suggest that adequately transparent international civil 
society NGOs can derive accountability and/or legitimacy via their expertise; 
18 Chapter One supra, note 83, at 38. 
19 This is certainly the aim of Statewatch UK, which is particularly concerned with the 
Council's activities under Title VI TEU, an area in which the European Parliament 
remains weak and over which no single national parliament can have control, although 
decisions made by the Council in the area of police and judicial co-operation can in 
theory profoundly affect civil liberties within the Member States. 
2° Cull en and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 37, discussed further infra. 
21 Chapter Two supra, note 1, p.16. 
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their independence from the state and partisan politics; their contacts and 
networks at grassroots level; their ability to publicise the activities of 
international organisations and thereby to hold those organisations to public 
account; from their recognition by international state-related actors, e.g. the 
United Nations, and, in general, by their credibility.22 The mooting of 
alternative models of accountability reflects the fact that, although international 
civil society NGOs require legitimacy, and can be criticised in terms of their 
democratic representativity, 23 the "[p ]articipation of NGOs introduces new 
voices into international law, apart from those of states and international 
organisations established by states", which "voices are to be welcomed."24 
Cullen and Morrow agree that "legitimate concerns about accountability should 
be addressed"25 in connection with civil society NGOs, concluding, however, 
that NGOs should still participate "in the development and implementation of 
international instruments".26 The legitimate concerns in question include the 
fact that an NGO might be internally dominated by an elite that does not fully 
share the values of its ordinary members, or externally handicapped by a lack 
of general education, which facilitates public participation. 27 
3.2.4. The current role of civil society in EU decision-making. 
From the Commission's White Paper on Governance: 
"Civil society increasingly sees Europe as offering a good platform to change policy 
orientations and society. This offers a real potential to broaden the debate on 
Europe's role. It is a chance to get citizens more actively involved in achieving the 
Union's objectives and to offer them a structured channel for feedback, criticism and 
protest. This already happens in fields such as trade and development, and has 
recently been proposed for fisheries ... The Commission intends to establish, before 
22 Chapter One supra, note 83, at 32-7, and 39. 
23 Ibid., at 29-31. 
24 Ibid., at 31. Cf also Britz and Schmidt, Chapter Two supra, note 7, at 71, in connection with 
the participation of labour and management in the making of Community social policy 
legislation. 
25 Chapter One supra, note 83, at 31. 
26 Ibid., at 37. 
27 !bid, with reference to Held, Chapter One supra, note 96, at pp.I81-2. 
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the end of this year, a comprehensive on-line database with details of civil society 
organisations active at European level ... "28 
Civil society NGOs are evidently active at EU level. The methods by which 
international civil society NGOs might influence EU decision-making 
processes are: 
via active lobbying, of the Commission, Council and European 
Parliament; 
via consultation, chiefly by the Commission; and, at least theoretically, 
as litigants.29 
Certain civil society NGOs might actually determine Community legislation 
when acting as social partners.30 A concern has been raised in connection with 
the Community's concept of social partnership, however, which could also 
apply to the consultation of civil society by the Commission: this will be 
discussed further in section 3.3 infra. 
3.2.5. The potential role of civil society in a supranational (modified 
cosmopolitan) democracy. 
It has been established that international civil society NGOs are important in 
the model of cosmopolitan democracy, both as channels for the communication 
of public interests and concerns to international decision-makers (states) and as 
an additional means of holding international decision-makers to public account, 
particularly when traditional representative democracy is 'diluted', as will 
shortly be discussed, and when the most direct form of democracy - the 
28 Chapter Two supra, note 1, at p.l5. 
29 If Gormley's proposed reform of Article 230 (ex 173) EC were adopted (Chapter Two supra, 
note 63), certain civil society organisations would be able to seek, more easily than at 
present, the annulment of decisions adversely affecting their interests, but not actually 
addressed to them. 
30 Articles 13 8 and 139 (ex 118a and 118b) EC. The social partners are representatives of 
management (e.g. UNJCE, the Union des Confederations de I'Jndustrie et des Employeurs 
d"Europe) and labour (e.g. ETUC, the European Trade Union Confederation, and CEEP, 
the European Centre of Public Enterprises), who, by virtue of Articles 138 and 139, may 
participate directly in the adoption of Community social policy law. See further Britz 
and Schmidt, Chapter Two supra, note 7, and section 3.3.4. infra. 
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referendum- is impractical, given the size of the population and the volume of 
legislative/policy proposals originating at the internationallevel.31 
Within the EU, representative democracy is 'diluted' by the following 
factors: 32 
although the Council of Ministers provides indirect representative 
democracy, as its members represent elected governments, no 
government m any multi-party democracy represents the political 
opinions of its entire electorate;33 
qualified majority voting is increasingly becoming the rule for the 
adoption of EC legislation,34 undermining the ability of the Member 
States to present EC legislation as the product of a unanimous 
agreement between them, which level of agreement constituted an 
important potential source of social legitimacy;35 
the European Parliament's capacity to represent Union citizens is 
limited by its weak potential to influence 'Second' and 'Third Pillar' 
issues (Titles V and VI TEU): also, the number of MEPs is limited, 
suggesting that, particularly in an enlarged EU, individual MEPs will 
31 Cf J. Lodge, 'EC Policymaking: institutional considerations' in The European Community 
and the Challenge of the Future, ed. J. Lodge, Pinter Publishers Ltd, London, 1989, at 
p.31. See also Britz and Schmidt, Chapter Two supra, note 7, at 60. 
32 This list of the factors weakening representative democracy within the EU is not exhaustive: 
other problems, however, arise in all representative democracies, such as the fact that 
final policy outcomes might not reflect the policy desires of individual electors (see, e.g., 
S. Hix, 'Parties at the European Level and the Legitimacy of EU Socio-Economic Policy' 
( 1995) 33 JCMS 527, at 528). 
33 Cf J. Lodge, 'EC Policymaking: institutional dynamics' in The European Community and 
the Challenge of the Future 2"d Edition, ed. J. Lodge, Pinter Publishers Ltd, London, 
1993, at p.l. 
34 See, e.g. S. Boyron, 'Current Developments in European Community Law: Constitutional 
Aspects' (200 I) 50 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 683, at 687: although 
the Treaty of Nice seems to be moribund in the wake of the recent Irish referendum 
rejecting it, any replacement Treaty is likely to extend qualified majority voting in the 
interests of keeping decision-making practicable in an enlarged EU. 
35 Recalling, e.g., General de Gaulle's reaction to the introduction of majority voting in the 
Council for the first time, which precipitated the 'Empty Chair Crisis' and the 
Luxembourg Compromise, restoring unanimous voting whenever issues of particular 
concern to individual Member States were perceived to be at stake. 
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have larger constituencies, making their task of representation 
inherently more difficult.36 
The Committee of the Regions, compnsmg representatives of local/regional 
governments, the majority of whom were directly elected to those 
governments, was supposed to have supplemented representative democracy, 
as a channel of communication between the EU and local/regional 
governments, enabling ordinary people to voice their concerns more easily at 
EU level and communicating to them the benefits of EU membership.37 The 
latest Eurobarometer survey38 indicates that only 29% of Europeans surveyed 
are aware ofthe Committee's existence,39 indicating that it is not fulfilling that 
task. 
In Held's model of cosmopolitan democracy, the European Parliament would 
have to be reinvented as "a 'standard-setting' institution":40 moreover, there 
would have to be some possibility of arranging EU-wide referendums.41 
Certain factors currently weakening representative democracy within the Union 
would have to be addressed by institutional reforms, as required by the 
adoption of a 'supranational' model of democracy: the directly-elected 
Parliament would be required to set policies instead of the Council, which 
remains, as a body, unaccountable, as only individual members may be 
replaced following national elections. However, as noted, cosmopolitan 
democracy also calls for a well-developed international civil society. In 
addition to the role that civil society NGOs might play in holding EU-Ievel 
decision-makers to public account, they could also have a supervisory function. 
Held anticipates that: 
36 However, Boyron observes that the new limit of 732 MEPs that would have been introduced 
by the Treaty of Nice has already been recognised as insufficient (note 34 supra, at 686). 
37 Former Commission President Jacques Delors, addressing the inaugural meeting of the 
Committee of the Regions (Articles 263-265 (ex 198a-198c) EC) on March 9, 1994, told 
the Committee that it was "designed to draw every individual citizen into [the EU]" and 
that its task was "nothing less than to enhance the democratic legitimacy of [the EU]" 
('Commentary', European Access (1994) no. 3, at p.7). 
38 Chapter Two supra, note 27. 
39 !bid, s.3 .4, p.27. 
4° Chapter One supra, note 86, at 356. 
41 /bid, at 355. 
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"the democratisation of international 'functional' bodies (on the basis perhaps of the 
creation of elected supervisory boards which are in part statistically representative of 
their constituencies) ... "42 
Candidates for election to such supervisory positions could conceivably be 
provided, not by political parties, but by independent international civil society 
NGOs, which, being "motivated by common values"43 which are nevertheless 
"contextually construed by reference to the needs, actual circumstances and 
cultural outlook"44 of the people involved therein, may already be "seen as 
representing the interests of their constituencies rather than imposing a 
conception of universal values."45 In other words, an international civil society 
NGO could represent, as a constituency, a particular public interest group or 
groups, as opposed to the traditional demographic constituency of an MEP, and 
could therefore contribute, as stated, to the democratic supervision of any 
international bodies established in order to carry out a particular function. A 
supervisory board composed entirely of MEPs could conceivably suffer from a 
lack of expertise, whereas the addition of at least some independent public 
interest group representatives, potentially having constituents in all the 
Member States, could not only provide expertise but also some reassurance that 
genuinely pan-European concerns were being addressed, given that current 
MEPs can only claim to represent constituents from one Member State. 
Cosmopolitan democracy also calls for "groups and individuals [to have] an 
effective means of suing political authorities for the enactment and 
enforcement of key rights ... "46 The theoretical capacity for civil society NGOs 
to bring litigation in the public interest would have to be realised: never again 
would it be possible for an organisation such as Greenpeace to lack standing to 
challenge the EU's funding of a nuclear power station,47 for example. The 
development of public interest litigation at EU level might even provide civil 
42 !bid 
43 Cullen and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 9. 
44/bid, quoting R. Falk, On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 1995, at p.l13. 
45 Cullen and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 9, emphasis added. 
46 Held, Chapter One supra, note 86, at 355. 
47 Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v 
Commission [ 1998] ECR 1-1651. 
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society NGOs with their most important potential role, given the extent to 
which the institutional changes required by the model of cosmopolitan 
democracy would address the need for public participation in decision-making, 
and the current lack of transparency. 
3.2. 6. Politically-Active Citizens. 
Cosmopolitan democracy aims to provide ordinary citizens with opportunities 
to participate in decision-making at all levels of governance, should they so 
desire, and encourages them to do so, in order to make all decision-making 
processes as open and democratic as possible. Multidimensional transparency 
would also ensure that citizens are kept informed. As part of the model of 
democratic autonomy upon which cosmopolitan democracy is based, Held 
anticipates the "[i]ntroduction of new democratic mechanisms from 'citizen 
juries' to 'voter feedback' to enhance the process of enlightened participation" 
in decision-making. 48 If, therefore, the EU were to adopt a suitably modified, 
'supranational' form of cosmopolitan democracy, this would entail the 
development not only of a thriving, diverse civil society, but also of politically 
aware, and potentially politically active, citizens. 
Ordinary persons holding the nationality of a Member State are 'Citizens of the 
Union' .49 A vast literature has accumulated concerning Union citizenship.50 It 
is beyond the scope of this thesis to dwell at length upon this concept and all 
the various critiques thereof: however, an overarching question is that of the 
role ofthe concept of citizenship within the Union. Erika Szyszczakjustifiably 
regards Union citizenship as a bundle of rights for individuals, the enjoyment 
48 Chapter One supra, note 86, at 324. 
49 At1icle 17 (ex 8) EC. 
50 See, e.g., C. Closa, 'The Concept of Citizenship in the Treaty on European Union' ( 1992) 29 
CMLRev 1137, and 'Citizenship of the Union and Nationality of Member States' (1995) 
32 CMLRev 487; H. Lardy, 'The Political Rights of Union Citizenship' (1996) 2 
European Public Law 611, and 'Citizenship and the Right to Vote' (1997) 17 OJLS 75; 
Bader, Chapter One supra, note 25; J. Shaw, 'Citizenship of the Union: Towards Post-
National Membership?' ( 1998) vol. 6 Collected courses of the Academy of European Lmv 
245; S. Fries and J. Shaw, 'Citizenship of the Union: First Steps in the European Court of 
Justice' (1998) 4 European Public Law 533, and P. Lehning, European Citizenship: 
Towards A European Identity? (200 I) 20 Lm11 and Philosophy 239. 
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of which could 'make Europe more relevant to its citizens' ,51 adding greater 
legitimacy to the polity, in line with at least part of the rationale for introducing 
Union citizenship in the first place.52 Furthermore, by tradition, citizenship 
defines the relationship between citizens and the polity in which they live, not 
just as a relationship based upon rights and duties: citizenship is based upon 
membership of a community, and membership of a community involves 
participation in that community.53 The idea that Union citizenship should 
somehow involve the participation by citizens in the shaping ofthe Union, and 
in Union decision-making processes, is clearly present in several critiques of 
Union citizenship54 and is endemic in the body of literature concerning the 
Union's formal, or democratic, legitimacy: 55 moreover, the idea that one should 
be able to participate in the political life of the community of which one is a 
citizen is evidently at the core of the modern concept of citizenship, as derived 
from the liberal democratic traditions ofthe Member States. 56 
Clearly, there is a firm belief that citizens should participate in political 
decision-making, particularly in a cosmopolitan model of democracy.57 
51 
'Making Europe More Relevant To Its Citizens: Effective Judicial Process' (1996) 21 ELRev 
351. 
52 C. Closa, 'The creation of the citizenship of the Union during the JGC on Political Union' 
(Typescript dated March 1992, University of Hull, Department of Politics) at p.2: the 
Belgian idea of a 'People's Europe' linked the concept of Union citizenship to the 
Union's quest for democratic legitimacy (Ciosa cites in support of this EU Doe. no. 1608, 
dated 29 March 1990). 
53 Shaw (1998) note 50 supra, at 255, quoting D. Held, 'Between State and Civil Society: 
Citizenship' in Citizenship, ed. G. Andrews, Lawrence and Wishart Ltd, London, 1991, at 
p.20 
54 E.g. Shaw, note 50 supra, esp. at 249: "Popular and political comment upon the development 
of the EU has also concentrated on the question of the role of the citizen in the 
government of 'Europe"' and at 256: "Participation raises the relationship between 
citizenship and questions of democracy and government. The EU, as is well known, has a 
number of acute difficulties in the sphere of democracy and the so-called democratic 
deficit, and a variety of possible solutions ... have been suggested, some of which include 
the enhancement of the status of citizenship"; see also A. Wiener and V. Dell a Sal a, 
'Constitution-making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy Gap in the 
EU?' ( 1997) 35 JCMS 595, at 604, and Bader, Chapter One supra, note 25, at 168. 
55 E.g. P. Craig, 'Democracy and Rule-making Within the EC: An Empirical and Normative 
Assessment' ( 1997) 3 European Law Journa/1 05, esp. at 120-1. 
56 See, e.g., Wiener and Dell a Sal a, note 54 supra at, 601-602, also Closa, note 52 supra, at p.1, 
and J. Weiler, 'European models: Polity, people and system' in Lawmaking in the 
European Union, cited at Chapter Two supra, note 64, at p.23. 
57 Per Britz and Schmidt, the current Community law principle of democracy, which derives 
from the constitutional traditions of the Member States, and from the amendment of 
Article 6 (ex F) TEU by the ToA, demands that law-making must be "subject to the 
control of the European peoples" (Chapter Two supra, note 7, at 62, see also ibid., at 
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Secondly, the general consensus appears to be that Union citizenship could add 
legitimacy to the Union, but only if the concept of Union citizenship is taken 
seriously, which necessitates the inclusion of the all-important dimension of 
participation in political decision-making as a dimension of Union 
citizenship.58 Wiener and Della Sala present citizenship as a three-dimensional 
concept: citizens' rights, being "the legal entitlements of an individual towards 
the community"; citizens' access to political participation; and citizens' sense 
of 'belonging' to the community. 59 These dimensions are interrelated, and this 
conceptualisation of citizenship allows Wiener and Della Sala to examine the 
concept of European citizenship as an aspect of EU constitution-building.60 
They consider that the difficulties encountered in the ratification of the TEU 
indicate that it is not enough for Member States to conclude an IGC with afait 
accompli agreement for acceptance, without revision, by national 
representative institutions and/or referendums: a participatory citizenship 
practice demands that citizens should be involved in defining "the terms of 
belonging" to the Union.61 The main problem, in Wiener and Della Sala's 
opinion, is that European citizens are becoming politically active, seeking 
58)." They observe that the CFI "does not consider the Council and the Commission to 
be vehicles of [democratic] legislation (ibid., at 65)." However, they recall that the 
Council and the Commission are 'indirectly' democratically legitimated, referring to the 
fact that all Member State governments are elected; that these governments then proceed 
to appoint, with the consent of the European Parliament, the Commission; and that the 
European Parliament controls the Commission (ibid., at 63). In their opinion, this gives 
the Commission and Council "the necessary democratic accountability for Community 
activities" (ibid.), but the participation of either the European Parliament or of adequately 
representative civil society NGOs in law-making is also necessary to provide 
'substantive' (social) legitimacy: such participation provides a means whereby "decision-
makers can recognise the interests of the people ... the participation of interest groups 
increases the representativity of state decisions and thereby the efficiency and legitimacy 
of the exercise of power" (ibid., at 67). 
58 E.g. Craig, note 55 supra, at 122: "Legitimacy, in terms of inputs and social acceptability, is 
likely to be improved both directly and indirectly through participation. The direct 
legitimating function flows from the fact that people are more likely to accept the 
resulting norms when they are involved in their formation, rather than simply having such 
acts thrust upon them. The indirect legitimating function follows from the connection 
between transparency and reason-giving ... and participation/consultation .. .Insofar as 
transparency and reason-giving are seen as ways of strengthening the Community's 
legitimacy, developments in this respect create pressures from people to be able to 
participate in the framing of the norms which are now more in the public domain." This 
complements Allott's view that democratisation strengthens civil society (note 3 supra, 
and text). 
59 Note 54 supra, at 602. 
60 Ibid., at 603. 
61 Ibid., at 609. 
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"ways to be part of the [EU] constitution-building process".62 However, 
citizens are encountering the problem of the EU's democratic deficit. The 
EU' s 'constitutional engineers', i.e. the Member States, are seeking "the right 
mix [of procedures and principles] to pass the procedural test for [the 
legitimacy of decision-making within] liberal democracies", but 
"constitution-building cannot simply create Europeans because it creates Europe. 
This must be part of a dynamic process that recognises cultural diversity from many 
different social, economic and political spaces, not all of which are defined by 
. ,63 
terntory. 
This perspective on the EU's constitutional requirements and EU citizenship is 
particularly useful. It embraces the idea that Union citizens should be able to 
participate in Union-level decision-making, and the idea that there should be a 
variety of ways in which citizens should be able to participate - socially and 
economically, as well as politically. It complements the idea that there should 
be a vibrant, diverse civil society, to represent constituencies based upon 
potentially transnational social, economic and cultural interests, as opposed to 
the traditional intra-national demographic constituency. It also, most 
importantly, reflects the idea that citizen participation in the constitution-
building process is required in order to reach a logical conclusion of the project 
of European integration: the creation of a single European people. It is not 
enough to keep Union citizens informed about the development of the Union: 
the right to participate in that development is also necessary. Cosmopolitan 
democracy, being multidimensionally-transparent, would empower those 
Union citizens wishing to be more politically active to participate in this most 
fundamental aspect of EU decision-making. 
3.2. 7. Conclusions. 
Civil society, already established within the Member States, is now developing 
at the international level, and is already active within the EU: meanwhile, 
62 !bid 
63 /bid 
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Union citizens are perceived to be actively seeking participation in the shaping 
of the Union's future. Cosmopolitan democracy requires international civil 
society to be strengthened, diversified and, above all, empowered: to represent 
public interests to decision-making bodies; to help hold those bodies to 
account; and to instigate legal proceedings in the public interest. Civil society 
also encourages and empowers ordinary citizens to become politically active. 
Given a thriving, diverse, transparent and accountable civil society, as well as 
cosmopolitan democracy, ordinary Union citizens would be able to participate 
in EU-Ievel decision-making in at least three ways: via elections, at all levels of 
government; via referendums, which could be particularly important in 
connection with the further development of the Union's constitution; and via 
participation in civil society NGOs, which would lobby the institutions on their 
behalf and, possibly, help to supervise the implementation of EU-Ievel policies 
on their behalf. Civil society lobbying and consultation could also be 
particularly important in determining the future development of the EU: it 
could, for example, help to make the next IGC much less secretive than the 
last.64 
Just as the concept of multidimensional transparency accompanies that of 
cosmopolitan democracy, so does the concept of civil society. Civil society 
has the potential to enhance public participation in decision-making, essential 
to both cosmopolitan democracy and multidimensional transparency. 
Therefore, if the Member States and Commission are truly serious about their 
efforts to improve the "openness of the decision-making process," and about 
transparency, they should be seeking to increase the extent to which the public 
may participate in decision-making, and seeking to encourage and facilitate 
64 Cf G. de Burca, 'The drafting of the European Union Charter of fundamental rights' (2001) 
26 ELRev 126, at 131-132. Although civil society was excluded from formal involvement in 
the drafting of the Charter, which was drafted by representatives of the Member State 
governments, the Commission, the European Parliament and national parliaments, civil society 
NGOs were nevertheless encouraged to provide views: "a number of well-attended hearings 
took place and a vast number of submissions and representations were made by a wide range of 
organisations and interests, thus testifying to the emergence and potential vibrancy of a 
European civil society" (ibid.). Furthermore, importantly, "it is as though this procedure 
represented a trial response to the major criticisms of the normal !GC procedure for amending 
the Treaties, in that the [conclusions of the Tampere European Council] stipulated a degree of 
openness, inclusiveness and transparency, which have been conspicuously absent from the !GC 
treaty revision processes of the past" (ibid.). These observations suggest that civil society 
NGOs could be similarly involved in future IGCs. 
109 
such participation wherever possible. The question of whether that is actually 
the case is discussed in section 3.3. 
3.3. The Commission's Approach to Transparency: Public Participation or 
Public Information? 
3.3.1. The Commission as the 'engine' of transparency. 
It is, as indicated, appropriate to focus attention upon the Commission, as the 
institution specifically charged to develop measures to improve public access 
to information by Declaration No. 17. Also, the Commission has the right of 
initiative where transparency-related Community legislation is concerned, and 
is influential in suggesting amendments to the Treaties during IGCs. Two 
questions must be addressed in connection with the Commission's approach to 
transparency. Is the Commission seeking to encourage public participation in 
decision-making, or at least recognising the importance of information as a 
means of holding the institutions to account? If the answer were to be 'no', it 
would seem that the Commission has failed to recognise the full potential value 
of the right of public access to information as a democratising and legitimating 
factor (as recapitulated infra). Secondly, has the Commission exclusively 
concerned itself with access to information, or is it also promoting the idea of 
greater public participation in EU-level decision-making, or any other ideas 
that seem to be compatible with the development of multidimensional 
transparency within the EU? 
3.3.2. Public access to information as a dimension of multidimensional 
transparency, revisited, in the context of attempting to legitimate the EU. 
It is important to bear in mind that a right of public access to information may 
serve democracy in two ways. Firstly, the right of citizens 
"to call public authorities to account. .. cannot be exercised effectively without access 
to information about what the public authorities are doing and why. Public access 
110 
enables citizens to scrutinise the activities of those exercising public authority and to 
make an independent evaluation ofthem."65 
Secondly, whereas citizens can scrutinise public authorities given ex post facto 
access to information concerning their activities, the provision a priori of 
information concerning proposed legislation and policies would naturally 
facilitate lobbying, aimed at influencing the outcome of the relevant decision-
making processes. Neither the provision of access to information available to 
the institutions, nor the provision of information detailing the institutions' 
forthcoming and proposed activities, should be confused with 'the provision of 
information', however. The latter is a vague phrase that could mean no more 
than the Commission, for example, issuing glossy, colourful pamphlets 
describing the EU and its activities in general terms. Such 'information' might 
merely be a form of propaganda, casting the EU and its institutions in a 
positive light, of little or no value in terms of either genuinely enhancing the 
institutions' accountability or of encouraging and facilitating public 
participation in decision-making. 66 
Without an effective means of calling the institutions to account, and without a 
right to participate in decision-making processes, no right of public access 
would have any significant potential to enhance the legitimacy of the Union. 
Information may be "the oxygen of democracy"67 but, to extend that particular 
metaphor, democratic processes involving elections and debates are 
democracy's 'lungs'. The Article 19 perspective insists that democracy does 
not function without information, but it could equally be argued that the 
oxygen of information, without the lungs of democratic processes, would just 
be an atmospheric phenomenon, and if democracy were to be metaphorically 
likened to 'intelligent life', any palaeontologist would readily confirm that even 
65 I. Harden, 'Citizenship and Information' (2001) 7 European Public Law 165, at 185. 
66 Such information might, however, conceivably direct the citizen's attention towards a means 
of acquiring more useful information. The European Parliament, being aware of the need 
for better communication between the Union and its citizens, has expressed its desire to 
avoid allowing a Community information/communication policy to become a vehicle for 
propaganda (E. Davies, 'Information and communication in the EU', European 
Information, (1998) no. 3, p.2, at pp.3-4.) 
67 Article /9 (Preface, The Public's Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information 
Legislation, Chapter One supra, note 56). 
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an oxygen-bearing atmosphere may be devoid of intelligent life. Likewise, 
information does not make a democracy. Moreover, from the discussion of 
transparency, democracy and legitimacy in Chapters One and Two supra, it 
follows that the EU needs not only multidimensional transparency, but also a 
model of democracy in which multidimensional transparency is an intrinsic 
element, in order to become legitimate. 
In short, information without democratisation will not necessarily generate 
social legitimacy, wherever democracy is associated with legitimacy. That 
conclusion is supported empirically by the Danish rejection of the TEU and the 
Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice. Important as the right of public access to 
information is, therefore, as both a dimension of multidimensional 
transparency and an essential pre-requisite of cosmopolitan democracy, the EU 
should be developing that right as part of, and in the context of, a process of 
democratisation, aiming to make the institutions publicly accountable, and to 
secure as much public participation in decision-making as possible. In a more 
democratic Union, the institutions should be more able to determine whether a 
proposal would have adequate public support if it were to be adopted. 
3.3.3. The Commission and transparency. 
Prior to the 1996 IGC, the Commission published an Opinion68 in which it 
clearly stated that: 
" ... the Union's activities must be accessible and comprehensible, so that those 
affected are in a position to obtain all the information they rcquirc."69 
This appears promising, at first glance: multidimensional transparency calls for 
accessible and comprehensible information. However, this brief quotation says 
nothing about the purpose(s) for which people might require the information 
they obtain. People affected by Union activities might require information 
68 Reinforcing political union and preparing for enlargement, Official Publications Unit, 
Brussels, 1996. 
69 /bid, paragraph 19, at p.12. 
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purely in order to find out how they have been affected by those activities, not 
in order to actually influence EU decision-making, or to hold an EU-Ievel 
decision-maker to account. 
The first sentence of paragraph 19 ofthe Commission's Opinion was in fact far 
less indicative of a multidimensionally-transparent approach towards the right 
of public access to information. It simply stated that: 
"What the Union does has to be understandable: democracy depends on this." 
The requirement for governmental decision-making processes to be 
understandable is only part of the first dimension of multidimensional 
transparency. Democracy certainly requires access to adequate quantities of 
comprehensible information, but the factor upon which any model of 
democracy most depends is the ability of the demos to participate in both law-
and policy-making. People might come to understand the somewhat arcane 
decision-making processes of the Union reasonably well, and yet still feel that 
they have no effective means of influencing those processes, such as they 
would expect to have in a democracy. 
The Commission also called, in paragraph 19 of its Opinion, for further 
development of the role of the European Parliament; for national parliaments to 
be more closely involved in EU affairs; for the EU to actually do less, so as to 
do it better; and for decision-making processes to be simplified and made more 
democratic. 'Making decision-making processes more democratic' simply 
involved making more use of the European Parliament, however, as was made 
clear in paragraphs 2 L and 22 of the Commission's Opinion: 70 there was no call 
for more direct citizen participation in EU decision-making, or for alternative 
forms of public participation to be developed. As noted earlier, the European 
Parliament is not without problems and should not be regarded as the sole 
repository of democracy within the Union. Merely increasing the Parliament's 
70 Note 68 supra, pp.I3-14. 
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involvement in decision-making will neither achieve cosmopolitan democracy 
nor multidimensional transparency. 
In fact, Mather suggests that the Parliament is the least likely of the three 
principal institutions (Commission, Council and Parliament) to achieve her 
three-dimensional concept of transparency. Its current transparency is limited 
by the sheer complexity of some of the decision-making procedures in which it 
participates, and by the use of 'trialogue' meetings between MEPs, the 
Commission and the Council Presidency, which meetings attempt to resolve 
disputes, but which normally take place in camera. Meetings of the individual 
political/national groups of MEPs are also closed. Mather also doubts that the 
Parliament is open to influence by a wide range of interest groups, because 
although more lobbying takes place now that the Parliament has more powers, 
MEPs are predominantly "white, male, middle-class, middle-aged-to-elderly 
professional people." Her conclusion is damning: the complexity of its 
decision-making processes makes the Parliament unable to supply even her 
first dimension of transparency (comprehensibility); the secrecy of group 
meetings in which MEPs formulate their policies limits its ability to provide 
the second dimension (access to the thinking behind decisions); and its 
composition raises questions about its commitment to the third dimension 
(public participation). "It should not therefore be assumed that the [European 
Parliament's] limited part in facilitating transparency arises solely from its own 
limited powers."71 
In its Report for the Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC, the Commission stated 
that: 
" ... the first challenge is obvious- to make Europe the business of every citizen. The 
emergence of open debate, covering all points of view on Europe, is in fact a real 
opportunity. Europe is no longer deciding its future behind closed doors. 
71 Chapter One supra, note I, at pp.I0-11. 
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That is why the Commission does not regard the Treaty's objective of a Community 
closer to the citizens as a mere empty formula, but as an overriding principle which 
guides its actions. 
The Commission will be listening to the views of ordinary men and women ... "72 
Although merely listening to citizens is not the same as pro-actively consulting, 
inviting and encouraging public debate, the reference to open debate is 
nevertheless more suggestive of multidimensional transparency than the 
aforementioned reference to the provision of comprehensible information. 
Unfortunately, however, the Commission is of course not the only decision-
making institution, nor is it the most important, and the regular reports of 
Statewatch73 suggest that the Council of Ministers does not pay much attention 
to civil society, to say nothing of ordinary men and women. 
Until very recently, in light of the foregoing vague and/or ambiguous 
pronouncements ofthe institution specifically charged with the development of 
transparency within the EU, it seemed that the Commission remained firmly 
committed to the Monnet-esque idea that ordinary people would come to 
support the Union if only the Union made more of an effort to explain its 
activities to them, and to show that it was taking action in areas of popular 
concern, such as unemployment.74 Certainly, there was no explicit, 
unequivocal commitment, in the quoted passages from Commission 
publications, to either the provision of information a priori or to active 
consultation of the public regarding the details of proposed legislation and 
policies. Again, per Mather, it seems that only the first dimension of 
transparency (access to comprehensible information) will be introduced if 
transparency is only regarded as a means to the particular end of popularising 
the EU instead of democratising it: 
72 Official Publications Unit, Brussels, 1995, at pp.3-4. If "Europe is no longer deciding its 
future behind closed doors", it is interesting to note that neither the Amsterdam nor the 
Nice !GC was open to the public. Both IGCs, moreover, presented the peoples of Europe 
with faits accomplis, although the Treaty of Nice, having been rejected by the people of 
Eire, seems unlikely to enter into force. 
73 http://www .statewatch .org/ secreteurope .html. 
74 Cf Mather, Chapter One supra, note I, at p.9: " ... what the EU's institutions mean by 
transparency does not match public understanding of the issue ... the EU institutions also 
have different ends in mind when they consider the purposes of transparency ... " 
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"if transparency exercises on the part of the EU institutions were never intended to 
achieve the goals of those outside the decision-making processes, it is unsurprising 
that popular dissatisfaction [with the Union] remains"75 
One potentially useful argument of the Commission's, however, was that the 
EU should do less, so as to do it better. This reflected the EU's newly declared 
commitment to proportionality and subsidiarity. As noted in Chapter Two 
supra, compliance with both principles could enhance the Union's legitimacy, 
and the concepts of proportionality, subsidiarity, multidimensional 
transparency and legitimacy are intertwined, if not actually related. Also on a 
much more positive note, in terms of promoting multidimensional 
transparency, the Commission recently published its White Paper on European 
Governance.76 The White Paper is arguably the first public communication in 
which the Commission has demonstrated any genuine understanding of the 
meaning of transparency. The Commission is now calling for: 
a broader debate on the future of Europe; 
immediate reform aimed at increasing accountability, openness and 
transparency, prior even to further modification of the Treaties; 
greater involvement of ordinary people and civil society; and 
further consultation regarding, and further consideration to be given to, the 
process of opening European decision-making up to citizens. 
Although still to an extent concerned with making the decision-making 
processes "easier to follow and understand,"77 the Commission is at least now 
proposing to establish minimum standards on consultation, suggesting that 
further participation of civil society NGOs in EU-level decision-making will be 
75 Chapter One supra, note I, at p.l 0. 
76 COM(200 I) 428, 25 July 200 I. 
77 Ibid.: see pp.4-5, and especially p.l 0: "The Institutions should work in a more open manner. 
Together with the Member States, they should actively communicate about what the EU 
does and the decisions it takes. They should use language that is accessible and 
understandable for the general public. This is of particular importance in order to improve 
the confidence in complex institutions." 
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facilitated, 78 and proposing to strictly respect the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality. Importantly, the Commission finally acknowledges that 
(emphasis added): 
"Democracy depends on people being able to take part in public debate. To do this, 
they must have access to reliable information on European issues and be able to 
scrutinise the policy process in its various stages. Major progress has been made in 
2001 with the adoption of new rules giving citizens greater access to Community 
documents." 79 
This is a major improvement upon the earlier Commission statement to the 
effect that democracy depends upon the EU's work being understandable: here, 
participation in public debate is clearly linked to the right of access to 
information. The White Paper sets out five principles of good governance,80 
said to reinforce the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality: 
openness (chiefly requiring the institutions to communicate more 
effectively about Union-level decision-making); 
greater participation, of citizens and civil society, from the inception of a 
policy to its implementation; 
accountability: both the institutions and civil society NGOs must assume 
responsibility for their actions at EU level, and explain to the public their 
role in decision-making; 
more effective policy-making: the EU must deliver timely policies based on 
past experience and an assessment of their future impact; and 
coherence: policies must be easily understood and must be developed in a 
manner that takes account of all the Union's objectives. 
78 /bid: see pp.4-5 and especially p.l 0: "The quality, relevance and effectiveness of EU 
policies depend on ensuring wide participation throughout the policy chain - from 
conception to implementation. Improved participation is likely to create more confidence 
in the end result and in the Institutions which deliver policies. Participation crucially 
depends on central governments following an inclusive approach when developing and 
implementing EU policies." 
79 /bid, at p.ll. 
80 !bid, at p.IO. 
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Were it not for the White Paper, it would be almost impossible to conclude that 
the Commission had been taking transparency seriously, 81 although its 
commitment to subsidiarity and proportionality, both dimensions of 
multidimensional transparency, had been made evident prior to the 1996 IGC. 
The White Paper is significant not only as evidence of the Commission's 
understanding of democracy as dependent upon public participation in 
decision-making and the provision of useful information, but also because 
many of its proposals are intended to be implemented without the need for 
Treaty amendments, if possible.82 The White Paper, moreover, seems to be 
principally concerned with public participation, proportionality and 
subsidiarity: the mere provision of information is still mentioned, showing that 
the Commission still believes that the public is not being sufficiently informed 
about EU policies, 83 but the various calls for "greater public scrutiny and 
debate", 84 "a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue", 85 "stimulating a 
public debate on the future of Europe and its policies"86 and a means of helping 
"citizens to hold their political leaders and the Institutions to account for the 
decisions that the Union takes"87 certainly imply the need for citizens to have 
adequate access to the information held by and available to the institutions. 
That is strongly reinforced by the passage quoted at note 79 supra. 
It may seem as though the Commission has begun to consider the right of 
access to information from the perspective of an institution committed to 
81 Cf Craig, Chapter Two supra, note 64, at 53-4): the Commission had very little to say on the 
subject of public participation in decision-making, despite having 'highlighted the need 
for a genuine policy to bring the Union nearer the citizen and strengthen his and her 
involvement and trust in the decision-making process' (Commission Report for the 
Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC, at paragraph 76, under the heading of transparency). 
Craig concludes (ibid.) that "[i]t is self-evident that people will not make much use of [a 
scheme inviting public comments on Commission proposals] when it is not readily known 
to them and when there is no framework within which to place such ad hoc participation." 
82 Cf p.8 of the White Paper, Chapter Two supra, note I: " ... in preparing for further 
institutional change, the Union must start the process of reform now. There is much that 
can be done to change the way the Union works under the existing Treaties." 
83 E.g. ibid. at p.ll: " ... the Institutions and Member States also need to communicate more 
actively with the general public on European issues ... ", and p.34: " ... the greater the 
participation in Eumpean policies of national and regional actors, the more they will be 
prepared to inform the public about those policies." 
84 Ibid., at p.33. 
85 Ibid., at p.l6. 
86 /bid, at p.30. 
87 Ibid., at p.33. 
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multidimensional transparency. However, there is no evidence to indicate, 
unequivocally, that the Commission is contemplating multidimensional 
transparency as described in Chapter One supra. The White Paper describes 
openness, access to information and public participation as principles of' good 
governance', but at no point does it explicitly connect all three principles with 
transparency. The word 'transparency' only appears twice in the entire 
document, once at p. 19 in connection with the transparency of the Union's 
food safety policy, and again at p. 27 in connection with the transparency of 
international organisations with which the EU is involved.88 Multidimensional 
transparency, as seen, expressly links access to information and public 
participation in decision-making, including the participation of civil society in 
decision-making. The role of civil society within the EU, as seen, is also 
discussed within the White Paper, but is not expressly linked to transparency 
either. 
Therefore, although the Commission seems to be taking transparency more 
seriously than ever before, it has apparently still to conceptualise transparency 
as multidimensional, encompassing several of its principles of good 
governance. The White Paper's welcome and positive approach to the issue of 
public participation in EU-Ievel decision-making seems to have been inspired 
more by the Irish rejection of the Treaty of Nice89 than by an abstract concept 
of transparency as public participation in decision-making. There is nothing to 
suggest that the Member States' and Commission's concept of transparency 
has evolved a great deal from that set out in Declaration No. 17, which 
specifically identified transparency with the provision of public access to the 
information available to the institutions. 'Openness' of the decision-making 
processes is still identified with public access to information concerning those 
processes.90 The White Paper proposes, at page 4, to provide "[u]p-to-date, on-
88 It seems rather presumptive on the part of the Commission to suggest, at p.27 of the White 
Paper, that the Union can improve the legitimacy and transparency of international 
organisations by 'strengthening its voice in multilateral negotiations', when its own 
legitimacy and transparency remain dubious. 
89 Referred to at p.3 of the White Paper. 
90 The right of public access to documents is apparently regarded as "the linchpin of the entire 
openness policy" of the Union: the quotation is from a conference paper given by Mary 
Preston (Head of Unit for "Citizen-oriented measures", Secretariat General, European 
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line information on preparation of policy through all stages of decision-
making", but that is merely information: it is not openness in the sense of 
opening decision-making processes to public participation. 
The only evolution that seems to have taken place is in terms of the perceived 
function of public access to information held by the institutions. Whereas the 
Commission originally regarded this as a means of increasing public awareness 
of the EU and its activities, the White Paper now acknowledges that such 
information is also necessary for public debate on the Union's future. The 
concept of transparency as public access to information remains at best two-
dimensional, however: information must be I) available, and 2) 
understandable. 
It will be recalled that, per Mather, public participation in decision-making is 
probably more correctly described as a function of transparency than as a 
dimension, although it is possible to regard participation as an intrinsic part of 
the 'transparency package' :91 this, of course, is the approach taken within this 
thesis. Meanwhile, the Member States' concept of transparency, according to 
Declaration No. 17, is an intrinsic part of what might be described as the EU's 
'popular legitimacy package': one of four measures introduced by the TEU to 
improve the legitimacy of the new European Union, including also 
subsidiarity; greater democracy, via the increased involvement of the European 
Parliament; and Union citizenship, a 'Community-building' measure.92 
Securing the legitimacy of government is not an intrinsic dimension of 
multidimensional transparency, but it can certainly be regarded as a function 
thereof, and as a function of cosmopolitan democracy, as suggested by Chapter 
Two supra. The securing of legitimacy in any democratic polity could be 
regarded as the principal function of multidimensional transparency: the roads 
Commission), entitled 'Openness and the European Union Institutions', Stockholm, 27/28 
June 1996, http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/Iegal/stockholm/en/preston.html#21. 
91 Chapter One supra, text at note 13. 
92 de Burca, Introduction supra, note 7, at 350. 
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explored by the pro-transparency commentators mentioned m Chapter One 
supra seem to lead in that direction.93 
The Member States and institutions must, if they are committed to securing 
legitimacy for the EU through the introduction of transparency, have regard to 
all the factors which may conceivably undermine the legitimacy of the Union's 
decision-making processes and ask how transparency might, logically, improve 
the situation. There is at least one potential legitimacy problem that the mere 
provision of a right of public access to information is unlikely to resolve. 
3.3.4. A caveat concerning corporatism, the Commission, and consultation. 
Cosmopolitan democracy calls for pluralism. Pluralism calls for the widest 
possible public participation in EU-Ievel decision-making, and for the widest 
possible right of access to the information available to the institutions, which 
conclusion follows from conceptualising transparency as multidimensional. 
One caveat that could apply to the scope of the consultation of civil society by 
the Commission, however, notwithstanding the fact that the participation of 
civil society in EU decision-making processes could facilitate the participation 
of ordinary citizens in those processes, particularly at EU level, where it could 
be difficult for ordinary citizens to make themselves heard,94 and 
notwithstanding the sentiments expressed within its White Paper, is the 
Commission's perceived tendency to favour corporatism, as opposed to 
pluralism. 
This tendency is ascribed to the Christian/Social Democratic political traditions 
of the six original Member States.95 Grant likens the social partnership 
arrangement obtaining under Articles 138 and 139 (ex 118a and 118b) EC to 
the model of 'tripartism' ,96 originating in the International Labour 
Organisation's conference structure, which involves two representatives from 
93 Another function is the (disputed) function of improving the quality and effectiveness of 
government, see Chapter One supra, text at note 67. 
94 Cf Chanan, Chapter Two supra, note 60. 
95 W. Grant, Pressure Groups, Politics and Democracy in Britain, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
Hemel Hempsted (Herts), 1995, at pp.l21-3. 
96 Ibid. 
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the government and one each from the management and labour sectors within 
each member state.97 Corporatism is believed to undermine democracy 
because it is biased towards larger, transnational organisations, especially large 
transnational business undertakings,98 which allows other interest groups to 
become marginalised.99 Furthermore, corporatism's establishment of closed 
policy-making communities might ultimately place a corporatist regime on the 
brink of a descent into fascism, according to one commentator. 100 
Although the concern that the Commission is more inclined to favour 
corporatism was specifically raised in connection with the EC social dialogue 
process, which the Commission oversees under Article 138 EC, 101 the spectre 
of a Commission which has somehow developed a propensity to invite 
opinions from certain organisations but not others, however similar those 
others may be in terms oftheir membership and interests, is also raised in other 
areas of law- and policy-making. The Commission's White Paper appears to 
be correct to highlight the need for civil society NGOs to improve their 
accountability 102 and representativity, 103 but the Commission itself might 
improve the representativity of NGOs simply by ensuring that as many NGOs 
representing the same class of 'constituents' are consulted as possible. 104 
97 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm. 
98 Ibid., at p.l24. 
99 A. Cawson, Corporatism and Political Theory, Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, at p.42. 
100 R. Harrison, Pluralism and Corporatism: The Political Evolution of Modern Democracies, 
George Alien and Unwin Ltd., London, 1980, at p.189. Per Obradovic ('Accountability 
of interest groups in the Union lawmaking process' in Craig and Harlow, Lawmaking in 
the European Union, Chapter Two supra, note 64, at p.367), a countervailing view is 
supplied by P. Hirst (Representative Democracy and its Limits, Polity Press, Cambridge, 
1990, p.7): corporatism is said to "enhance public influence over government.. .by mixing 
the state with civil society. [Hirst's] argument is that corporatist mechanisms of 
consultation and bargaining are a vital supplement to representative democracy." 
101 Grant, note 95 supra: see also Cullen and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 30. 
102 Cullen and Morrow, Chapter One supra, note 83, at 37: see also Obradovic, note 100 supra, 
at p.356: " ... accountability of the European corporatist groups is every bit as essential to 
a democracy as political accountability, and in large measure, accountability of the social 
partners is part of the larger framework of political accountability in the Union." 
103 Cf Britz and Schmidt, Chapter Two supra, note 7, at 67-68: "[i]n Community law, there 
exists no explicit provision requiring that the management and labour organisations 
participating in the legislative procedure under Articles 138-139 [EC] be representative. 
This requirement, however, can be distilled from a general demand for substantive 
[social] legitimacy." 
104 Cf Obradovic, note 100 supra, at pp.381-2: see also Case T-135/96, UEAPME v Council 
[ 1998] ECR 11-2335, paragraphs 85-90. 
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Even if corporatist decision-making is not a threat to democracy, 105 the 
potential lack of representativity of the groups involved threatens the 
legitimacy ofthe decisions reached. Therefore, unless steps are taken to ensure 
the adequate representativity of civil society NGOs, particularly where such 
NGOs can determine laws and policies instead of merely exerting an influence, 
the greater involvement of NGOs in EU-Ievel decision-making might 
conceivably undermine the Union's efforts to increase the legitimacy of its law 
and policy output. 
3.3.5. Conclusion: are the Member States and Commission taking transparency 
seriously? 
If legitimacy is weak in, for example, social policy law, because certain social 
partner organisations feel excluded from social policy- and law-making 
processes, the introduction of a right of public access would not seem to be an 
obvious solution to that particular problem. More extensive consultation of 
social partner organisations, and/or a requirement for social partner 
organisations to adequately demonstrate their capacity to represent all classes 
of labour/management likely to be affected by a particular proposal, might be 
called for instead. Fortunately, the Commission appears to be considering that 
possible solution. 1 06 However, that possible solution is not related to 
transparency in the White Paper. It can only logically be related to 
transparency if transparency is conceptualised as multidimensional, including 
public participation in decision-making as a dimension, and not merely equated 
with the one- or two-dimensional concept of public access to information. 
A multidimensional approach to transparency provides a theoretical framework 
which is not only capable of connecting the various discrete concepts of access 
to information, subsidiarity, citizenship and democracy, but which is also 
capable of demonstrating the full capacity of those discrete concepts to add 
105 Hirst, note I 00 supra. 
106 Cf p.4 of the White Paper: the Commission proposes to "[e]stablish partnership 
arrangements going beyond the minimum standards in selected areas committing the 
Commission to additional consultation in return for more guarantees of the openness and 
representativity of the organisations consulted." 
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democracy and legitimacy to all aspects of the European Union's governance. 
The Commission's White Paper, though welcome, is obviously not as radical 
as the idea that the EU should adapt itself to conform to the model of 
cosmopolitan democracy. That would guarantee subsidiarity, transparency and 
democracy, greatly enhance the concept of Union citizenship, and increase the 
potential for transparency to act as a legitimating factor, because, as discussed 
in Chapters One and Two supra, in cosmopolitan democracy, 'openness' 
explicitly refers to direct public participation in decision-making processes at 
all levels of governance, and to accountability. In the EU, democracy and 
accountability remain important for legitimacy. Therefore, although the White 
Paper creates the distinct impression that the Commission in particular is 
taking transparency more seriously than ever before, it is clear that neither the 
Member States nor the Commission are taking the concept of transparency as a 
legitimating factor as seriously as they might be, if only they had from the 
outset conceived of transparency as including public participation in decision-
making. The White Paper, instead of setting out five principles of 'openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence' 107 could instead 
have referred to three: (multidimensional) transparency, effectiveness and 
coherence. 
3.4. Conclusion: Refocusing upon Transparency as Public Access to 
Documents. 
In Chapter Three, the role of citizens and civil society in decision-making 
within a multidimensionally-transparent cosmopolitan democracy, and within 
the EU, was reviewed. The Commission was then found to have made 
interesting proposals to expand the role of citizens and civil society NGOs, 
which in practice could help to increase the transparency and accountability of 
the Union. It has called for a public debate on the EU and its future, and has 
even proposed to examine the transparency and accountability of civil society 
NGOs, so as to further improve the transparency of EU decision-making 
processes involving civil society. However, the fact that the Commission's 
107 White Paper, p.l 0. 
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proposals relate in practice to the concept of multidimensional transparency 
was found to be a coincidence: the Commission still regards both transparency 
and openness as the provision of access to information, as do the Member 
States. To be more precise, the EU concept of transparency remains the 
concept, at best two-dimensional, of a right of public access. 
Therefore, it seems that neither the Commission nor the Member States are 
taking the concept of transparency as seriously as they might. Consideration of 
multidimensional transparency leads to the conclusion that, whereas the White 
Paper is a significant step in the right direction, it does not go far enough in 
order to secure the legitimacy that the EU might obtain if only it were to 
embrace multidimensional transparency. Transparency as public participation 
in decision-making has far greater potential value as a legitimating factor than 
transparency as access to documents: meanwhile, the concept of 
multidimensional transparency incorporates three of the Commission's five 
principles of good governance- openness, participation and accountability108 -
within a single, coherent conceptual framework. 
However, having concluded that the EU concept of transparency is that of 
public access to documents, it is clear that, in a very important sense, the 
question set out in the title to Chapter Three has not yet been answered. For, 
although it seems true to say that the Commission and Member States are not 
taking the concept of transparency seriously by ignoring its multidimensional 
nature, nothing has been said regarding the extent to which the Commission 
and the Member States are taking their own concept of transparency, being 
transparency as public access to documents, seriously. 
The European Union is still in search of legitimacy, and the White Paper 
includes proposals relating to public participation and debate that not only 
require the right of public access, but which could also make that right quite 
effective in helping to secure more legitimacy. The Commission's approach to 
the right of public access within the White Paper is more like the approach that 
108 Text at note I 07 supra. 
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it would be expected to take if it were actually seeking to promote 
multidimensional transparency than was its former approach. In its Report for 
the Reflection Group on the 1996 IGC, the Commission all but characterised 
the right of public access as a right of access to officially approved propaganda. 
This again makes the White Paper a welcome development, because the right 
of public access only has some capacity to legitimate the Union if it is made 
available in conjunction with serious efforts to democratise the Union. 
However, the right must also be taken seriously, by the Member States, the 
Commission, and the other institutions, in order to be effective. 
Taking the right of public access seriously means according it the respect that it 
would be accorded in a multidimensionally-transparent regime. It must not 
only be regarded as a means of holding the institutions to public account, but 
also as an aid to participatory, deliberative democracy. It will be recalled that, 
at page 11, the White Paper stated that: 
"Major progress has been made in 200 I with the adoption of new rules giving citizens 
greater access to Community documents." 
This raises several questions. 109 For example, is the right of access to 
Community documents really supposed to help make the way in which the 
Union works more open, as the White Paper suggests? In other words, do 
citizens have access to documents relating to Titles V and VI TEU, as well as 
to matters arising under the EC Treaty? More important questions arise, as 
suggested, from considering the role of the right of public access in a 
multidimensionally-transparent regime. h the right of public access being 
taken sufficiently seriously? The EU and its institutions should surely be 
seeking to make themselves as legitimate as they possibly can through the 
109 Including a question that cannot be addressed in detail within the scope of this thesis, 
concerning the inclusivity of Union citizenship as discussed by, inter alia, Shaw (note 50 
supra) and Wiener and Della Sala (note 54 supra). If the right of public access is 
intended to bring the Union closer to its citizens, why are non-Union citizens able to 
exercise this right? A forthcoming article (R. Davis, 'Citizenship of the Union ... rights 
for all?' (2002) 27 EL Rev 121) concludes that the Union regards persons ordinarily 
resident in the Member States as citizens de facto, notwithstanding A11icle 17( I) EC, 
Union citizens de jure being persons holding the nationality of a Member State. 
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provision of access to information, if that is indeed the desire of the Member 
States. 
Therefore, it is also possible to ask whether these rules 'giving citizens greater 
access to Community documents' are capable of facilitating public 
participation in EU-level decision-making, should citizens seek access to those 
documents in order to take advantage of the opportunities for greater 
participation called for by the White Paper. Also, are the rules liberal, or are 
they riddled with exceptions that limit the scope of the right of public access 
beyond the limits that would be acceptable in a multidimensionally-transparent 
regime? What are those limits? To what extent, if any, does the right 
distinguish between physical documents and the information that the 
documents contain? Are the institutions welcoming applications for access to 
documents in their possession, or resisting attempts by members of the public 
and civil society to secure such access? Is there an adequate enforcement 
mechanism, to guarantee that the rules governing public access to documents 
will be upheld? Are there any schemes in place to review the operation of the 
rules, to suggest improvements, and to encourage ever more 'openness' in the 
sense of the provision of information concerning the Union and its decision-
making? 
Part One of this thesis has focussed upon the concept of multidimensional 
transparency, but it is now time to focus more exclusively upon the issue of the 
right of public access, from the perspective of a citizen interested in the 
capacity of this right to facilitate the development of multidimensional 
transparency within the European Union. As indicated in the Introduction, the 
abundance of questions raised above will be addressed in the course of the 
remaining Parts of this thesis. Part Two examines the provisions of substantive 
law governing the right of public access within the EU, starting, in Chapter 
Four infra, with the rights of access to the file and access to information 
concerning the environment. 
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PART TWO: THJE §UIB§T AN'HVJE !LAW GOVJERNJI:NG 
TRANSPARENCY A§ ACCJE§§ TO JI:NFORMATION [N THJE 
EUROPEAN UN:U:ON. 
CHAPTER FOUR. 
'Access to the File' and Access to JEnvironmenntal :U:Oformationn. 
4.1. Introduction. 
4.1.1. Two restricted rights of access to information and documents. 
Within the Community legal order, neither the right of access to the file, nor 
the right of public access to environmental information, are equivalent to the 
right of public access envisaged as a dimension of multidimensional 
transparency. The right of access to the file, as will be seen, is a right of 
defendants in proceedings of a judicial nature, and access is granted only to 
documents that could be used in their defence. The right of access to 
environmental information, obviously, does not concern access to information 
of all types. Nevertheless, no review of the provisions governing public access 
within the European Union would be complete without at least a brief overview 
of these two restricted rights, for the reasons outlined infra. 
4.1.2. Access to the File. 
Beers regards 'the' right of access to government-held information as divisible 
into four distinct rights: official access, party access, personal access, and 
public access. 1 Access to the file is the Community Courts' term for Beers' 
right of party access. 2 Per Harlow, "the access right originated and is best 
1 Chapter One supra, note 64, at p.178. 
2 As confirmed in Case T-65/96, Kish Glass & Co. Ltd v Commission [2000] ECR II-1885, 
paragraph 34: "[T]hird parties cannot claim to have a right of access to the file held by the 
Commission on the same basis as the undertakings under investigation." See also 
Harden, Chapter Three supra, note 65, at 183: "Public access is ... separate from legal 
rules and principles, such as the rights of the defence [see further il?fi·a], which require 
128 
developed" in EC competition law? The Commission investigates the 
commercial activities of individual undertakings and groups thereof, and may 
regulate those activities by Decision, which Decision might also impose 
financial penalties should (an) undertaking(s) be found to have infringed 
Community competition law.4 Under Article 230(4) (ex 173(4)) EC, 
undertakings may seek judicial review of such Decisions, being addressed to 
them. It is not uncommon for undertakings to do so, particularly when a 
financial penalty has been imposed. Both the undertaking(s) seeking judicial 
review and the CFI (or ECJ, on appeal) require access to information held by 
the Commission: the former in order to ensure 'equality of arms' and to 
effectively contest the Commission's Decision; the latter in order to ensure that 
the Commission has complied fully with the relevant provisions of competition 
law. 
The right to a fair trial/fair hearing set down in Article 6( I) ECHR depends 
upon rights of the defence, including access to the file. Article 220 (ex 164) 
EC requires the ECJ to "ensure that in the interpretation and application ofthis 
Treaty the law is observed." 'The law' in this context includes rights of the 
defence, being legal principles common to the Member States.5 The ECJ's 
failure to have due regard to such principles would constitute a failure to 
uphold the rule of law.6 Access to the file is therefore justified, inter alia, as a 
claim-right by its status as an essential prerequisite of the right to a fair 
trial/hearing, and by the need to observe the rule of law.7 
information and documents to be supplied to persons who have a special interest in 
receiving them." 
3 Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 291: see also M. Levitt, 'Access to the File: the 
Commission's administrative procedures in cases under Articles 85 and 86' (1997) 34 
CMLRev 1413, at 1415: " ... defendant undertakings in Commission competition 
proceedings have a positive and enforceable right of access to the Commission file ... " 
For a discussion of EC competition law see further, e.g. R. Whish, Competition Law 4th 
Edition, Butterworths, London, 2000. Levitt (op. cit., at 1420- 1424, describes 'the file', 
which is defined as "the totality of documents which might be relevant to the defence, 
wherever they may be located" (ibid., at 1421 ). 
4 Regulation No. 17 (OJ Sp. Ed. 1962, 204/62, p.87). 
5 Cf the opinion of Advocate General Warner in Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint v 
Commission [1974] ECR 1063, at 1089: "the right to be heard forms part of...'the law' 
referred to in Article 164 (now 220) (EC] ... of which, accordingly, it is the duty of this 
Court to ensure the observance." 
6 See, e.g. Case 4/73, Nold v Commission (1974] ECR 491, at paragraph 13. 
7 Harlow (Chapter One supra, note 8, at 287) states that access to the file "is grounded in, and 
has developed out of, the administrative lm1' procedural rights known ... as 'the rights of 
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The ECJ has insisted that legal persons have the right to examine documents 
used by the Commission when pursuing infringement proceedings under 
Regulation 17 and related legislation: 
" ... [T]he necessity to have regard to the rights of the defence is a fundamental 
principle of Community law ... Its observance requires inter alia that the undertaking 
concerned must have been enabled to express its views effectively on the documents 
used by the Commission to support its allegations of an intringement."8 
This paragraph is among the earliest specific references to the right of access to 
the file as a right of the defence,9 often cited in subsequent cases. 10 
It is not argued that access to the file is required in order for a state to function 
as a democracy: it does not concern public participation in law- and policy-
making. It is not, therefore, directly related to multidimensional transparency. 
Nevertheless, access to the file concerns both access to documents held by an 
institution, and, more importantly, access to justice in the event that those 
documents are withheld. It is not, therefore, entirely unlike the right of public 
access that constitutes a dimension of multidimensional transparency, and the 
. 
same Community Courts are called upon to protect both rights. Section 4.2 
will consider the standard of review by the Community Courts of alleged 
infringements of the right of access to the file, facilitating a comparison 
between the Courts' approach to such cases and their approach to the judicial 
review of refusals to grant public access, as analysed in Chapter Six infra. 
the defence"' (emphasis added). This analysis apparently suggests that the rights of the 
defence were developed in the context of E(E)C competition law, although they were in 
fact common to the legal traditions of the Member States (T. Tridimas, The General 
Principles of EC Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999, chapter 7, esp. at p.244, 
citing Case 32/62, A/vis v Council [1963] ECR 49). Harlow may therefore have 
understated the importance attached to the rights of the defence by the Community 
Courts, as general principles of EC law are constitutional in nature (cf Levitt, note 3 
supra, at 1429). 
8 Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-lndustrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR-3461, 
paragraph 7. 
9 Cf Case 85/76, Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR-461, paragraph 9: 
"Observance of the right to be heard in all proceedings in which sanctions ... may be 
imposed is a fundamental principle of Community law ... even if the proceedings in 
question are administrative .. " 
10 E.g. Case C-51/92 P, Hercules Chemicals NV v Commission [1999] ECR 1-4235, at 
paragraph 14. 
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Such a comparison should help to illustrate the Courts' attitude towards the 
multidimensional transparency-related right of public access, with which this 
thesis is primarily concerned. 
4.1.3. Access to Environmental Information. 
There is no convincing reason to regard the right of access to environmental 
information as a special case of the right of access to information.'' 
Nevertheless, the right of access to environmental information only is the 
subject of the Aarhus Convention. 12 This right has been explicitly linked to 
public participation in environmental decision-making, 13 suggesting that 
transparency in the context of environmental decision-making ts a 
multidimensional concept. Moreover, as discussed in section 4.3 infra, EEC 
legislation requiring the Member States to grant both public access to 
environmental information, and a right of public participation in environmental 
decision making, pre-dates by several years the entry into force of the ToA, 
which provided the earliest Treaty-based commitment to transparency in 
relation to all Union activities (Article 1 (ex A) TEU, as amended). It is 
therefore interesting to compare these provisions to the right of public access 
analysed in Chapter Five infra, given that, as Merrills argues, 14 adequate access 
to environmental information should be obtainable via the right of public 
access. 
11 Cf J. Merrills, 'Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection: An Overview' in 
Human Rights Approaches to Environmental Protection, eds. A. Boy le and M. Anderson, 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998, at p.9. The Opinion of Advocate General Fennelly in 
Case C-217/97 Commission v Germany [1999] ECR 1-5087 suggests (paragraph 24) that 
there is a distinction between access to information and access to environmental 
information: however, the Advocate General's reasoning is neither clear nor convincing. 
12 Full text available online at http://www.mem.dk/aarhus-conference/issues/public-
participation/ppartiklcr.htm. 
13 See further section 4.3 infra. 
14 Note 11 supra. 
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4.2. The Right of Access to the File in Community Law. 
4.2.1. Introduction. 
A complete, exhaustive examination of the extensive case law concerning the 
right of access to the file is beyond the scope of this thesis. A brief discussion 
based upon recent case law will suffice to illustrate the nature and scope of this 
right, for comparative purposes. Furthermore, the facts of the cases cited infra 
are largely irrelevant. It suffices to note that each undertaking/group of 
undertakings discussed had sought the annulment of a Commission Decision 
made under Regulation No. 17 or related legislation, and had alleged, inter 
alia, an infringement ofthe right ofaccess to the file. 15 
4.2.2. Characteristics ofthe right of access to thejile. 
The need for the Commission to respect the rights of the defence is regarded as 
an essential procedural requirement. Infringement of the rights of the defence, 
prior to the Commission's adoption of a Decision, therefore constitutes a 
breach of such a requirement: a ground for review under Article 230 (ex 173) 
EC. However, it is important to note that, if an infringement of the right of 
access to the file is established, this will not by itself result in the annulment of 
a contested Decision. The right of access to the file does not imply that 
undertakings should be granted access to any or all documents they might 
request from the Commission, or which the Commission has in its possession. 
It is only intended to ensure that an undertaking has adequate access to such 
documents as it might use in defending itself against any allegations the 
Commission might make. 
"Access to the file is not an end in itself, but is intended to protect the rights of the 
defence. Thus, the right of access to the file is inseparable from and dependent on the 
principle of the rights of the defence ... " 16 
15 I.e., access to all the documents upon which the Commission had based its Decision. 
16 Joined Cases T -25-26, 30-32, 34-39, 42-46, 48, 50-65, 68-7 I, 87-88, and I 03- I 04/95, 
Cimenteries CBR SA et al. v Commission [2000] 5 CMLR 204 (hereinafter 
'Cimenteries'), paragraph I 56. 
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This can also be illustrated with reference to BEUC. 17 The BEUC represents 
consumer interests at EU level. It wished to comment upon the Commission's 
investigation into the alleged 'dumping' of certain goods from the Far East. 18 
Having been denied access to the Commission's file concerning the anti-
dumping proceeding in casu, BEUC sought the annulment of the 
Commission's decision refusing access to the file, pleading an infringement of 
the right to a fair hearing. However, the ECJ observed that anti-dumping 
proceedings and anti-dumping duties 
" ... are not directed against practices attributable to consumers or organisations such 
as the BEUC ... The BEUC therefore wrongly complains that the Commission 
infringed its right to a fair hearing by refusing it access [to the file] ... neither the 
principle of the right to a fair hearing nor. .. the basic anti-dumping Regulation 
required the Commission to do so." 19 
The BEUC had no right of access to the file because, not being a defendant to 
the anti-dumping proceedings to which the file in question related, it did not 
require rights of the defence in connection with those proceedings. 
The CFI, with reference to earlier case law, has indicated that a plea alleging an 
infringement of the rights of the defence, consequent upon an infringement of 
the right of access to the file, will succeed if 
" ... the non-disclosure of the documents in question might have influenced the course 
of the procedure and the content of the decision to the applicant's detriment."20 
Elsewhere, the CFI has apparently rejected such a plea on the grounds that the 
applicants for annulment of the Decision against them had not demonstrated 
17 Case C-170/89, Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs v Commission [1991] ECR 
1-5709. 
18 
'Dumping' involves the importation of goods for retail within the EC at a price below the 
'normal' value of such goods, with which price EC-based manufacturers of such goods 
cannot compete. The Commission is authorised to protect the competitiveness of EC 
manufacturers by imposing an 'anti-dumping' import duty on the goods in question 
(Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2423/88, OJ 1998 L 209/1). 
19 Note 17 supra, paragraph 23. 
2° Case T-221195, Endemol Entertainment Holding BVv Commission [1999] ECR 11-1299. 
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that the file might have exonerated them,21 and on the grounds that a Decision 
would not have been any different if the Commission itself had not had access 
to the documents requested by the applicant undertaking. 22 
The ECJ, however, has clearly stated that an undertaking need not demonstrate 
that if it had had access to certain documents, the Commission's Decision 
would have been any different. The undertaking in question need only show 
that it might have used those documents in its defence. An infringement of the 
rights of the defence during the procedure leading to the adoption of a 
Commission Decision can, in principle, lead to the annulment of that Decision: 
it is not sufficient to remedy the infringement if access to the file was obtained 
during the course of the action for annulment itself. Nevertheless, if having 
obtained such belated access to the file, the applicant undertaking(s) cannot 
show that the documents obtained might have been used for the defence, the 
Community Courts will not accept a plea that the rights of the defence had 
been infringed by the Commission's failure to grant access to those documents 
at the appropriate time.23 
The right of access to the file during the procedure leading to the adoption of a 
Commission Decision is, as stated, a general principle of Community law. 
However, in the context of court proceedings, access to the file is governed 
exclusively by the EC Statute of the Court of Justice and the Rules of 
Procedure of the Court of First Instance.24 When the appellant undertaking in 
Baustahlgewebe25 submitted that the CFI should have ordered the production 
of Commission documents notwithstanding the fact that Baustahlgewebe had 
not demonstrated the relevance of those documents to its case, it was argued 
21 Joined Cases T -213/95 and T -18/96, Stichting Certificatie Kraanverhuurbedrijf & Federatie 
van Nederlandse Kraanverhuurbedrijven v Commission [ 1997] ECR 11-1739, paragraph 
220. 
22 Case T-5/97, lndustrie des Poudres Spheriques v Commission [2000] ECR 11-3755, at 
paragraph 233. 
23 Hercules Chemicals, note I 0 supra, paragraphs 77-81. See also Levitt, note 3 supra, at 
1416, footnote 13: "It is only if the non-disclosure of the documents ... could not have 
affected the rights of defence, in the sense that, if disclosed, they could not conceivably 
have assisted the undertaking's defence to the Commission's allegations, that a claim that 
the rights of defence have been infringed will be rejected ... " 
24 Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR 1-8417, at paragraph 
90. 
25 Note 24 supra. 
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that "a party and its advisers cannot appraise the importance of a document to 
that party's case until they are aware of its existence and content."26 The ECJ 
rejected this apparently cogent argument, observing that a party seeking the 
production of documents was indeed obliged to identify the documents it 
sought and to demonstrate their possible relevance to its case, and that 
Baustahlgewebe had not done so.27 
The Community Courts do not expect an undertaking to adduce evidence 
relating to documents that it has never actually seen, however, and of the very 
existence of which it is uncertain?8 However, the Courts are clearly not 
receptive to pleas which in essence amount to a. claim that granting access to 
the file or ordering the production of documents might possibly reveal 
something useful to the applicant undertaking. If an applicant undertaking is 
not aware of the existence and/or content of documents in the Commission's 
possession which might be relevant to its case, but nevertheless suspects (as 
Baustahlgewebe may have suspected) that unknown, undisclosed documents 
influenced the Commission's Decision, it would seem appropriate to plead a 
misuse of powers rather than an infringement of the right of access to the file. 
The Commission is supposed to base its Decision exclusively upon the 
contents of the file, access to which should be granted to the undertaking in 
question during the administrative procedure leading to the adoption of the 
Decision. Therefore, if the Commission were to allow other documents, not 
included in that file, to influence its Decision, it would have misused its 
powers. 
26 !bid, at paragraph 79. 
27 Ibid., at paragraphs 93-94. 
28 C.f Cimenteries, note 16 supra, at paragraph 161: "Applicants who have raised a plea 
alleging infringement of their rights of defence cannot be required to set out in their 
application detailed arguments or a consistent body of evidence to show that the outcome 
of the administrative procedure might have been different if they had had access to certain 
documents which were in fact never disclosed to them. Such an approach would in effect 
amount to requiring aprobatio diabolica ... " In any event, the Courts are strict regarding 
the burden of proof: per Levitt, note 3 supra, at 1420: " ... in any dispute as to whether 
there has been proper disclosure of documents by the Commission, the burden of proof is 
not on the defendant to demonstrate that the Commission withheld relevant documents 
which ought to have been disclosed. The duty is on the Commission to ensure that the 
defendant has access to all documents relating to the case." 
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Interestingly, the Commission is not obliged to disclose any documents that are 
not included in the file, even if they could be used by an undertaking in its 
defence. A failure on the Commission's part to disclose any such documents to 
an undertaking that actually requests access to them only constitutes an 
infringement of the rights of the defence if the undertaking could have used 
those documents in its defence.29 Again, however, in order to establish that 
fact before the Community Courts, an undertaking would need to be aware 
both of the existence and content of the documents in question. The Courts, as 
indicated, do not permit undertakings to mount 'fishing expeditions' in the 
hope of discovering any previously unseen documents that might be relevant to 
their respective cases. 
The right of access to the file is not unlimited. Access may be refused in order 
to protect the business secrets of other undertakings, although the Commission 
might be obliged to provide non-confidential summaries of any documents it 
withholds. Access may also be refused whenever information has been 
disclosed to the Commission in confidence, or whenever any documents 
requested are internal Commission documents.30 Any refusal to grant access to 
the file, in response to a request made after the Commission has adopted a 
Decision and notified the undertaking(s) to which it is addressed, cannot affect 
the legality of that Decision. The Decision closes the proceedings: nothing that 
transpires after the proceedings have closed can be regarded as an infringement 
of an essential procedural requirement.31 
In summary, an infringement of the right of access to the file can, in principle, 
only lead to the annulment of a Decision based upon that file if the applicant 
undertaking, knowing of the existence of documents which might be relevant 
to its case, can demonstrate that access to those documents had not been 
granted prior to the adoption of the Decision, and that the undisclosed 
documents in question could definitely have been used in its defence, even if 
the final Decision itself would probably have been the same. Of interest, as 
29 Cimenteries, note 16 supra, paragraph 3 83. 
30 Endemol, note 20 supra, paragraphs 66-67. 
31 Case T-229/94, Deutsche Bahn AG v Commission [1999] ECR 11-859, paragraphs 102-3; 
SCK and FNK, note 21 supra, at paragraphs 220-221. 
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will be seen in Chapter Five infra, is the fact that the partial disclosure of 
confidential documents may be required if it would be otherwise impossible to 
exercise the rights of the defence. 
4.2.3. The Cimenteries case and the standard of review of infringements of the 
right of access to the file by the Community Courts. 
Both Community Courts may occasionally encounter competition cases of 
enormous complexity, particularly when many cases are joined. One rather 
extreme example is Cimenteries,32 concerning a group of cement producers 
and trade associations who sought to contest Commission Decision 94/815/EC 
of 30 November 1994,33 which imposed fines in respect of infringements of 
Article 85 (now 81) EC. 
It was soon established that the Commission had not granted the necessary 
access to the file. 34 However, the CFI reiterated that: 
" ... the finding that the Commission did not give the applicants proper access to the 
investigation file during the administrative procedure cannot in itself lead to 
annulment of the contested decision as against the 39 applicants who submitted the 
corresponding line of argument."35 
It was, as indicated in section 4.2.2. supra, necessary for the CFI to determine 
whether the rights of the defence had been infringed as a result of the 
Commission's failure to grant access to the file. 36 To that end, the Court 
considered the question of whether any of the undisclosed material "might have 
contained exculpatory evidence."37 
32 Note 16 supra. 
33 OJ 1994 L 343/1. 
34 Cimenteries, note 16 supra, e.g. at paragraph 141. 
35 !bid, at paragraph 156. 
36 Ibid., paragraph 157. 
37 Ibid., paragraph 159. Cf. also paragraph 364: "The Court finds ... that some applicants have 
identified in their applications documents which were used against them in the contested 
decision but which were not available to them during the administrative procedure or 
from which they could not foresee the conclusions the Commission was going to draw. In 
accordance with settled case law, those incriminating documents must be excluded as 
evidence. Far from leading to the annulment of the entire decision, the exclusion of those 
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The CFI had so arranged matters that all thirty-nine applicants had been able to 
consult the original, non-confidential documents lodged by the Commission; to 
specify any document to which they had not had access and which could have 
assisted their defence; and to explain why the administrative procedure might 
have had a different outcome if they had had access to the document(s) in 
question. Each such document was to be annexed to the relevant pleadings, to 
which the Commission was able to lodge a response.38 
A lengthy and detailed examination followed, of the extent to which the 
undisclosed material might have influenced the outcome of the administrative 
proceedings leading to the contested Decision. The CFI noted during the 
course of this examination that a document can be regarded as incriminating 
only where the Commission uses it to support a finding of an infringement in 
which an undertaking has allegedly participated. If an applicant undertaking 
had merely been unable to express its views on a document used by the 
Commission, that would not in itself suffice to establish an infringement of the 
rights of the defence: the undertaking must show that the Commission had used 
such a 'new item of evidence' to support its allegation that the undertaking 
concerned had infringed Community competition law.39 This observation 
reflects the fact that an undertaking must have been able to use any undisclosed 
documents in its defence: it is not enough to note that there were undisclosed 
documents upon which the undertaking might have passed comment. 
It was held that certain documents had indeed been used illegally by the 
Commission because their non-disclosure infringed the rights of the defence of 
the applicants concerned.40 However, the CFI also stated that: 
documents is significant only in so far as the corresponding objection raised by the 
Commission could be proved only by reference to them ... " 
38 Ibid., paragraph 169. 
39 !bid, paragraph 284. 
40 E.g. ibid., at paragraphs 379 and 435. 
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"[t]he assessment of the consequences of that infringement will be carried out when 
the Court examines the substance of the claim that the contested decision is 
unlawful. "41 
This indicated that only certain specific provisions of the contested Decision 
were likely to be annulled as a result of this particular finding. 
The issue of access to the file was considered several times, in connection with 
the various pleas42 relating to infringements of an essential procedural 
requirement during the administration procedure, including not only 
infringement of the rights of the defence through failure to grant access to the 
file, but also a plea alleging that the statement of objections43 was imprecise 
and incomplete.44 For example, paragraphs Ill 0-1295 considered whether, in 
respect of several applicants, a failure to disclose certain incriminating 
documents in support of the allegations made against certain undertakings 
infringed the rights of the defence, in order to determine whether or not there 
had been a breach of the Commission's duty to give reasons for its Decisions 
(Article 190 EC, now 253). Paragraphs 2816-2967, 3105-3132, 3311-3342, 
3387-3395, 3985-4015, 44 75-4515, 4675-4693, and 5090-5113 considered the 
right of access to the file in connection with pleas alleging an infringement of: 
Articles 85(1) and 190 of the Treaty; the principle of equal treatment; the rights 
of the defence; and pleas alleging an abuse of process and a misuse of powers. 
These pleas were raised in connection with specific provisions of the 
Commission Decision, adding to the complexity of the case. 
Paragraph 44 75 simply reads as follows: 
"The arguments whereby the parties concerned allege infringement of their rights of 
defence when they were given access to the tile have to a large extent already been 
examined." 
41 Ibid., paragraph 3 79. 
42 There were 22 pleas in total. 
43 A pre-Decision notification of the allegations against (an) undertaking(s) subjected to an 
investigation by the Commission. 
44 Cimenteries, note 16 supra, at paragraph 86. 
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Nevertheless, the judges of the Fourth Chamber (Extended Composition) did 
not decline to examine these arguments further beyond that paragraph. 
Cimenteries is not only of interest because of the dicta therein concerning the 
right of access to the file, but also because it suggests that a most thorough 
judicial review took place. Although the judges scrutinised a very large 
number of documents, and considered at length the relevance thereof to the 
pleas submitted, it is not suggested that this fact, nor the fact that almost 5 
years elapsed between the registration of the case and the judgment, provides 
sufficient grounds to describe the review as 'thorough'. That conclusion is 
based upon other factors. 
Firstly, the Commission, in reaching Decisions under Regulation 17 and related 
legislation, enjoys a broad, though not unlimited, discretion.45 Secondly, EC 
competition law requires the Commission to make complex economic 
decisions. Thirdly, there are two types of judicial review: procedural and 
substantive. Substantive review approaches, more or less closely, a review of 
the merits of a decision: procedural review, on the other hand, determines that a 
decision was/was not adopted in accordance with the law. Fourthly, any 
unwillingness on the part of the Community Courts to carry out a substantive 
review of a particular type of decision tends to cause the adjective 'marginal' to 
be applied to its review of such decisions.46 The suggestion that a review is 
marginal would not imply that it had been thorough. However, fifthly, the 
right of access to the file is a procedural right, and, sixthly, according to 
Tridimas: 
"The case law now seems to accept that procedural and substantive scrutiny are in an 
inverse relationship. Where the Court exercises only marginal review on substantive 
45 See, e.g. paragraphs 45-47, Case C-449/98 P, International Express Carriers Conference v 
Commission, judgment of 17 May 2001, and paragraph 88, Case C-119/97 P, Union 
Fram;aise de /'Express and Others v Commission (2000] 4 CMLR 268. 
46 Cf Tridimas, note 7 supra, at p.95: "Although [the ECJ] is prepared to assess whether a 
measure is appropriate and necessary in view of all relevant circumstances and to 
scrutinise the way the institution concerned has exercised its discretion, where it comes to 
the adoption of legislative measures involving economic policy choices, it will defer to 
the expertise and the responsibility of the adopting institution exercising only 'marginal 
review' "(citing in support H. Schermers and D. Waelbroeck, Judicial Protection in the 
European Communities, 51h Edition, Kluwer Law International, Deventer, 1991, 
paragraphs 310-3). 
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grounds because the decision-making process involves complex technical evaluations 
and the Community institutions enjoy broad discretion, the need to ensure respect of 
process rights becomes all the more important."47 
These six factors combine to indicate that, although the Courts' review of the 
substance of any Commission Decision in the field of competition Jaw might 
be 'marginal', its review of the application of procedural rights will indeed be 
all the more thorough, as appears to have been the case in Cimenteries. These 
factors will be remembered when the standard of review by the Courts is 
discussed further, in Chapter Six infra, with regard to the right of pub I ic access. 
The CFI, when reviewing access to the file, certainly appears to consider the 
substantive issue of whether any failure to grant access to certain documents 
might conceivably have 'shed a different light upon' the facts relied upon by 
the Commission.48 So long as the CFI considers only whether or not any 
undisclosed documents might have been used in the defence, and does not 
dismiss a plea alleging the infringement of the rights of the defence on the 
grounds that the Commission's Decision would not have been any different 
had the documents actually been disclosed,49 there would seem to be nothing to 
suggest that the right of access to the file is not being taken seriously by the 
Community Courts. 
4.2.4. Conclusion. 
This section has illustrated the restricted nature of the right of access to the file: 
it is, as stated, not to be regarded as a general public right of access, but as a 
right of access to those documents which might be used by natural and legal 
persons in their defence. The right is effectively protected: partial access is 
required, to documents that cannot be disclosed in their entirety; and the 
Community Courts apparently take great care to establish whether or not the 
right was infringed, and if so, whether or not the infringement affected the 
47 Note 7 supra, at p.272. 
48 E.g. Cimenteries, note 16 supra, at paragraphs 44 78-4515, especially paragraphs 4480-4483, 
4485,4488,4490,4492,4495,4497,4499,4501,4504-4505,4508-4509,4511,4513 and 
4515. 
49 Note 23 supra and text. 
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ability of the undertaking(s) concerned to muster an effective defence. 
However, the CFI's dicta in Cimenteries clearly reiterate the fact that neither 
Community Court will accept an infringement of the right of access to the file 
simpliciter as a ground for annulment of a Commission Decision: the 
infringement must also have made it impossible for the applicant(s) for 
annulment to have exercised their rights of the defence. 
Cimenteries illustrates the thoroughness of the CFI's review, in a case in which 
the Commission had clearly failed to grant access to the file. Whenever that 
failure was found to have breached the rights of the defence of any of the 
undertakings involved, the provision of the contested Decision resulting from 
that stage of the Commission's administrative procedure was annulled. It 
remains to be seen whether the Community Courts regard the right of public 
access to documents held by the institutions as such a fundamental principle of 
Community law. The right of access to the file will be revisited in Chapter 
Five infra, wherein its scope and content will be compared to the right of 
public access to documents, and in Chapter Six infra, wherein the approach of 
the Community Courts towards both rights will be compared. 
4.3. Access to Environmental Information. 
4.3.1. Multidimensional transparency in the environmental sphere. 
Following a UK White Paper50 claiming that people will be "best placed to 
make their own consumer decisions and to exert pressure for change as 
consumers, investors, lobbyists and electors" if they are kept informed, four 
researchers sought to assess "the extent to which public access to certain 
sources of environmental information is likely to promote the notion of 
stewardship."51 The promotion of stewardship is viewed as the end to which 
50 
'This Common Inheritance' CM I200, HMSO, London, 1990. 
51 J. Rowan-Robinson, A. Ross, W. Walton and J. Rothnie, 'Public Access to Environmental 
Information: A Means to What End?' (1996) 8 Journal of Environmental Law 19, at 19: 
this title supports the conclusion that the right of access to information is instrumentally 
valuable (Chapter One supra, section 1.3.2.). 
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access to environmental information is the means. The provision of 
environmental information, according to the research: 
increases public confidence m government and industry regarding 
environmental action; 
better informs consumer choice (e.g. by encouraging 'green purchasing' 
and the assumption of personal responsibility for reducing waste); 
facilitates public scrutiny which will encourage industry to be more 
environmentally responsible; and 
facilitates public participation in policy formulation and decision-
making.52 
The researchers examined several sources of environmental information, 
including: local authority environmental health/planning boards; public 
registers (e.g. the Radioactive Substance Register); Scottish National Heritage; 
HM Industrial Pollution Inspectorate; Friends of the Earth; and White Papers. 
They concluded by observing that most people have 
"a passive rather than an active interest in the environment. .. [m]embers of the public 
seemed willing to involve themselves, to take some responsibility for dealing with 
problems on their doorstep. But most are not prepared to go much beyond this. 
People with a passive interest in the environment are unlikely to have much direct use 
for public registers or reports. They will tend to rely on secondary sources such as the 
media ... "53 
A degree of public reliance upon newspapers and television indicates that 
journalists, if not the general public, might find a right of access to 
environmental information useful. The researchers suggested that, "in order to 
involve the public in a stewardship role, other than for incidents on their 
doorstep," only the pro-active dissemination of information is likely to be 
effective: reliance upon members of the public seeking environmental 
information on their own initiative would be far less effective.54 Nevertheless, 
52 Ibid., at 20-21. 
53 !bid, at 38. 
54 Ibid., at 39. 
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the researchers supported the idea of developing opportunities for public 
participation in environmental decision-making, and suggested that the 
provision of environmental information would not only lead to a more 
environmentally-aware public, but also to the development of a public that 
would demand opportunities to use that information in decision-making. 55 
The latter suggestion, of course, supports the idea public access is 
instrumentally valuable, as discussed in Chapter One supra (section 1.3.2). It 
also supports the conclusion reached in Chapter Three supra (section 3.3.2), 
that the right of access to information is most useful if the information gained 
can be utilised in order to influence decision-making. Meanwhile, relevant 
Community legislation and the Aarhus Convention (see further section 4.3.3. 
infra) indicate that the Union and its Member States are perfectly capable of 
regarding transparency as multidimensional, at least insofar as transparency in 
the sphere of environmental law- and policy-making is concerned. 
4.3.2 Community Legislation. 
4.3.2.1. Introduction. 
Insofar as a Council Directive of the pre-TEU EEC may be regarded as the 
product of negotiations between all the Member States, two such Directives 
illustrate a commitment on the part of the Member States to a multidimensional 
form oftransparency in environmental matters: Directive 85/337/EEC,56 on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment ('environmental impact assessment'), which concerns the 
provision of information and a degree of public participation in decision-
making; and Directive 90/313/EEC,57 on the freedom of access to 
environmental information. Both Directives remain in force. 
55 !bid, at 40-42. 
56 OJ 1985 L 175/40, as amended by Council Directive 97/11/EC (OJ 1997 L 73/5). 
57 OJ 1990 L 158/56. 
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4.3.2.2. Directive 85/337. 
The Preamble acknowledges that members of the public may usefully 
contribute towards the decision-making process( es) preceding the granting, or 
refusal, of development consent for a project which might affect the 
environment. 58 However, the Directive does not apply to projects approved by 
the national legislature, "since [its] objectives ... including that of supplying 
information, are achieved through the legislative process".59 In light of this, 
Directive 85/337 cannot be said to have established comprehensive 
multidimensional transparency in environmental decision-making, but it 
constitutes a step in the right direction. 
Of the relevant substantive provisions, Article 2(3) provides that projects may 
exceptionally be exempted from the provisions of the Directive, without 
prejudice to Article 7, which requires a Member State to provide information 
concerning a project to another Member State, if that project is likely to 
significantly affect the environment within that other Member State, or if 
another Member State so requests. Article 5(3) prescribes the minimum 
information to be provided to the public, if a project is not exempted, 
including, for example, "a description of the measures envisaged in order to 
avoid, reduce and, if possible, remedy significant adverse effects" upon the 
environment. 
Article 6 is most relevant, in terms of multidimensional transparency, because 
it refers not only to access to information, but also to public consultation. 
However, this provision leaves much to the discretion of Member States: in 
particular, the ability to 'determine the public concerned'. Such discretion, of 
course, argues against the likelihood of the Directive having direct effect. 
Article 4(2) also gives the Member States discretion60 to decide, without 
58 As did points 14-16 ofthe European Parliament's Opinion (OJ 1982 C 66/87). 
59 Article 1(5), Directive 85/337, as amended. 
60 However, see J. Scott, EC Environmental Law, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., Harlow, 
Essex, 1998, at pp.l22-4: Article 4(2) obliges national courts, whenever called upon to 
decide whether the authorities of a Member State have exercised their discretion under 
that Article lawfully, to verify that all relevant considerations were taken into account: 
this at least makes Directive 85/337 justiciable before national courts. 
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prejudice to the Article 7 requirement to provide information to another 
Member State, whether certain categories of projects listed within Annex 11 to 
the Directive are to be assessed in consultation with the public. The 
determinations of the Member State's authorities under Article 4(2) must be 
published (Article 4(3)). 
Directive 85/337 at least obliges the Member States to disclose certain 
information to the public, either with a view to obtaining potentially useful 
input from ordinary people before deciding whether to grant development 
consent to a project, or in order to explain why a project has been exempted 
from the Directive's scheme. Article 8 provides that information gathered 
from, inter alia, any public consultation must be taken into consideration in 
deciding whether to grant developmental consent to a project that has not been 
exempted from the Directive's provisions. Under Article 10, however, the 
information that should normally be provided may be limited: basically, the 
Directive is without prejudice to any national regulations intended to safeguard 
'the public interest'. The question of what constitutes a legitimate public 
interest in secrecy will be discussed further in Chapter Five infra, section 5.3. 
With regard to the application of Directive 85/337, Greenpeace was denied 
locus standi to challenge a Commission grant for a developmental project in 
Spain.61 Upon appeal,62 the ECJ upheld the CFI's ruling, observing that the 
rights conferred by Directive 85/337, which Greenpeace had invoked in 
support of its attempt to secure locus standi,63 were adequately prot~cted by 
national courts.64 It has been argued that the Community has 'double 
standards', favouring access to the courts in order to challenge developmental 
projects, until somebody or some organisation attempts to bring proceedings 
61 Case T -585/93, Stichting Greenpeace Council et al. v Commission [1995] ECR ll-2205. 
62 Case C-321195 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council et al. v Commission [1998] ECR 1-1651. 
63 Ibid., paragraph 21: "the appellants submit that their arguments relating to individual 
concern are based essentially on their individual rights conferred by Directive 85/33 7, 
A11icles 6(2) and 8 of which provide for participation in the environmental impact 
assessment procedure in relation to certain projects Uudgment in Case C-431/92 
Commission v Germany [1995] ECR l-2189, paragraphs 37 to 40), and that they are 
singled out by virtue of those rights which are recognised and protected in Commission 
Decision C (91) 440." 
64 !bid, paragraphs 30-34. 
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for the same purpose against a Community institution, instead of the authorities 
of a Member State.65 Although it must be remembered that to Greenpeace, the 
central issue was not any failure to provide information, but the alleged 
unlawfulness of the Commission's grant, and that Directive 85/337 does not 
apply to the Commission, the case nevertheless gives some cause for concern. 
Access to justice, in order to protect all the rights conferred by a 
multidimensionally-transparent regime, of which public access is only one, is 
an essential feature of multidimensional transparency, as discussed in Chapter 
Two supra, sub-section 2.2.3.3. 
4.3.2.3. Directive 90/313. 
The I 01h recital to the preamble to the Commission Proposal66 specified that: 
" ... free access must be ensured even with regard to data supplied to the government 
by other persons where the government could legitimately demand transmission of 
that information or obtain it itself; whereas it must not be limited solely to persons 
who can prove a legitimate interest in the case ... " 
This principle was adhered to in the actual Directive, although the recital did 
not survive the final re-drafting process. Per Mary Preston,67 the lack of any 
requirement to provide reasons for seeking access to documents or information 
is the result of a Community-wide comparative study of national legislation 
concerning public access: a requirement for applicants to provide reasons for 
65 See further N. Gerard, 'Access to Justice on Environmental Matters - a case of Double 
Standards?' ( 1996) 8 Journal of Environmental Law 139, at 152-3. Scott, note 60 supra, 
at pp.l39-141, suggests that participation in the decision-making process plus evidence of 
a collective environmental interest ought to confer locus standi upon interest groups: cf 
also Gormley, Chapter Two supra, note 63 and text, although Gormley also indicates 
(ibid., at 53-4) that the ECJ did not wish to allow natural persons without locus standi to 
gain standing by forming an environmentalist group, of which there are already many in 
the EU, being wary of the prospect of opening the floodgates to proceedings brought by 
such groups. 
66 OJ 1998 C 355/5. 
67 Letter to the author dated 7 July 2000, reference SG .C.2/MEP D(2000) 545126, signed Mary 
Preston, Head of Unit, Directorate C (Co-ordination I!: Transparency and access to 
documents; grants; relations with interest groups) Secretariat-General of the European 
Commission. The letter confirms the similar observation of the Commission's 
Communication to the Council, Parliament and Economic and Social Committee on 
public access to documents held by the institutions (OJ 1993 C 156/05, at p.9, paragraph 
3). 
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seeking such access is the exception within those Member States that provide 
for public access. Whereas this does not adequately answer the question 'why 
are people not required to give reasons for seeking documents?', it appears to 
be the only answer available: most Member States simply do not require people 
to do so.68 As will be seen in Chapter Five infra, the Commission and Council 
have consistently adhered to the principle of not requiring reasons from 
applicants for public access. This is, perhaps, a matter of logic and/or 
administrative convenience: if, in principle, access to a given document is to be 
granted unless there are compelling reasons to withhold access, a person's 
actual reasons for requiring that document might be regarded as irrelevant. 
Article 2(a) defines information relating to the environment as "any available 
information in written, visual, aural or data-base form on the state of water, air, 
soil, fauna, flora, land and natural sites", activities affecting/likely to affect 
these, and measures designed to protect them. Article 3(1) provides for the 
right of access to environmental information itself. Article 3(2) provides that 
Member States may refuse access to information to protect: the confidentiality 
of public authority proceedings; international relations; defence; public 
security; court proceedings; investigations; commercial/industrial 
confidentiality; intellectual property; personal data; information provided to 
public authorities voluntarily; and "material, the disclosure of which would 
make it more likely that the environment to which such material related would 
be damaged'. Not only are none of these permitted exceptions mandatory, but 
also, under Article 3(2), partial access to documents must be granted if 
protected information can first be deleted. Article 4 requires a 
judicial/administrative review to be available, of any refusal to grant access to 
environmental information. 
68 Cf also Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 286: Council of Europe Recommendation No. 
R (81) 19 on public access states that access "shall not be refused on the grounds that the 
specit1c person has not a specific interest in the matter." This seems to indicate a pan-
European tradition of not requiring applicants for public access to state their reasons. 
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4.3.3. The Aarhus Convention ('the Convention'). 
4.3.3.1. Introduction 
This section briefly considers the Convention's history and its relevance to 
Community law. It then examines the substantive provisions concerning 
access to documents, public participation, and access to justice, enabling a 
comparison to be made between the Convention and the general provisions 
concerning access to documents held by the institutions, as discussed in 
Chapter Five infra. 
4.3.3.2. A Brief History. 
The Convention represents an attempt by the United Nations to secure a 
multinational commitment to environmental protection based upon the 
'precautionary principle'. The UN's explicit commitment to a global 
environmental policy is relatively new: in 1972, the Stockholm Declaration on 
the Human Environment, after noting the importance of the environment to our 
species, listed 26 principles concerning the impact of human activity upon the 
environment, including (no. 26) the principle that prompt agreement should be 
reached in order to secure the destruction of nuclear weapons. Although the 
precautionary principle was not specifically set out within the Stockholm 
Declaration, it seems to be implicit within the proclamation preceding the 
declaration of principles, paragraph 6 ofwhich proclamation states that: 
" .. A point has been reached in history when we must shape our actions throughout the 
world with a more prudent care for their environmental consequences. Through 
ignorance or indifference we can do massive and irreversible harm to the earthly 
environment on which our life and well-being depend ... "69 
Implicit in this is the idea that people must in future take care to avoid acting 
without due care and thought, in order to protect the environment. Principle 
69 Source: http://www.tufts.edu/departments/lletcher/multi/texts/STOCKHOLM-DECL.txt. 
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no. 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is more 
explicit: 
"In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."70 
The precautionary principle therefore requires some form of environmental 
impact assessment to be conducted, as a precaution against the possibility of 
future damage. 
Principle no. 10 of the Rio Declaration states that: 
"Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all concerned 
citizens ... each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the 
environment that is held by public authorities, including information on hazardous 
materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity to participate in 
decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public awareness and 
participation by making information widely available. Effective access to judicial and 
administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided." 
The Convention is the instrument designed to put the precautionary principle 
into effect, as its preamble indicates, although the principle is not explicitly 
referred to within the Convention. 
4.3.3.3. The Relevance of the Convention to the European Union. 
As at 31 December 200 I, the Convention is due to enter into force: Article 20 
having provided that it will do so on the ninetieth day following deposit ofthe 
sixteenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession. There 
are 40 signatory states, including the 15 Member States and the European 
Community, but only 17 ratifications, including Denmark (29 September 2000) 
70 Source: http://www.greenpeace.org/~intlaw/rio l.html. 
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and Italy ( I3 July 200 I) but no other Member States. 71 The European 
Community also has yet to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Convention. 
4.3.3.4. Relevant Convention provisions. 
Article I provides for the right of access to environmental information, the 
right to public participation in environmental decision-making, and the right to 
access to justice in environmental matters, which, in practice, means access to 
justice in the event that the first two rights are not granted. The Convention, 
therefore, provides for multidimensional transparency in environmental 
matters. 
Article 2 defines key terms within the Convention: a 'public authority' includes 
"the institutions of any regional economic integration organisation ... which is a 
Party to this Convention". Article 4 provides the substantive right of freedom 
of access to information, including non-mandatory exceptions, which must be 
interpreted restrictively (Article 4(4), and which may be invoked to protect 
interests similar to those set out in Article 3 of Directive 90/313, discussed 
above. Article 5 also requires States Party to the Convention to actively 
disseminate information to the public. Articles 6-8 concern procedures for 
public participation in environmental decision-making, and Article 9 provides 
for the right of access to justice. Recalling the Greenpeace case, 72 under Article 
9(2) such organisations as Greenpeace are automatically deemed to have locus 
standi to challenge the substantive and procedural legality of any decision 
subject to the provisions of Article 6, which concerns public participation in 
planning decisions. 
The fact that the Convention may in future be binding upon the institutions is 
particularly interesting, as these have not previously been bound by an external 
obligation to provide access to information or access to public participation in 
policy-making and legislative processes. Of course, whether the institutions 
will accept their Convention responsibilities wholeheartedly, in the spirit of 
71 Source: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ctreaty.htm. 
72 Notes 61-62 supra. 
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multidimensional transparency, remains to be seen, assuming that the 
Convention is ever ratified by the Community. Meanwhile, a good indication 
of the institutions' approach to Convention rules might be provided by 
considering their approach to their own self-imposed rules governing access to 
documents: such consideration will commence in Chapter Five, infra. 
4.4. Conclusion. 
This Chapter has, for the purpose of facilitating later comparisons, provided a 
brief overview of two 'species' of rights of access to information that are 
neither related to each other, nor directly related to the general right of public 
access contemplated as a dimension of multidimensional transparency. It has 
been argued that the Community Courts take the right of access to the file 
seriously, insisting upon partial access to documents where this is required in 
order to enable defendants to exercise their rights of the defence, although the 
Courts also take care to ensure that access to the file cannot be used as the basis 
for a 'fishing expedition' by undertakings seeking to escape the consequences 
of infringing Community law. It was further argued that both the Member 
States and the Union seem to be in favour of introducing multidimensional 
transparency to environmental decision-making processes: the Convention to 
which all Member States and the Commission are signatories introduces a 
fairly liberal regime of multidimensional transparency, involving access to 
information, to participation and to justice. 
It is worth remembering that the rights set out in the Convention would all be 
protected in by the right of public access in a multidimensionally-transparent 
regime. 73 Moreover, undertakings in the position of Baustahlgewebe might 
benefit from access to a public register of documents held by the institutions: if 
suspecting that the Commission has undisclosed documents in its possession 
which might be of use to them, they could request access to these using the 
general right of public access, having first identified the relevant documents 
from details in the register. In other words, multidimensional transparency 
73 Merrills, note 11 supra. 
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could supplement access to the file, enabling undertakings to 'go fishing' for 
useful documents, and it would certainly make specialised environmental 
transparency regimes redundant. It remains to be seen, in Chapter Five infra, 
whether the EU's provisions on public access to documents held by the 
institutions are as liberal as those of the Convention, insofar as they are 
comparable, and in Chapter Six infra, whether the Community Courts take the 
right of public access as seriously as they take the right of access to the file. 
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CHAPTER FIVE. 
The right of public access to documents heRd by the European Union's 
institutions. 
5.1. llntroduction. 
As noted in Chapter Three supra, the EU's concept of transparency is the right 
of public access. An effective and liberal right of public access is essential to 
multidimensional transparency, having potential to enhance the democratic 
nature and legitimacy1 of any regime. The EU claims to be founded upon the 
principle of democrac/ and official concern has been expressed regarding its 
legitimacy.3 However, in order to maximise its potential to democratise and 
legitimate the Union, public access within the EU legal order must actually 
fulfil the functions that make it essential to multidimensional transparency. It 
must provide access to the reasoning underlying decisions, in order to facilitate 
citizens' control of EU decision-makers and the prevention of corruption.4 It 
should also facilitate public participation in decision-making processes.5 
In Chapter One supra, it was observed that public access is instrumentally, but 
not intrinsically, valuable. Mather indicates that multidimensional 
transparency, by contrast, should be regarded as intrinsically valuable. She 
believes that only the public access dimension of multidimensional 
transparency will ever be introduced within the EU if transparency is only 
regarded as a means of popularising the Union, and strongly suggests that the 
Commission and Council think more about popularising the Union than 
1 As Preston (Chapter Three" supra, note 90) says, "[t]here is no better safeguard of the 
accuracy of information than the right of access to the documents themselves." In a 
democracy, accountability should be facilitated if citizens may verify the accuracy of 
government information, and the government's legitimacy should be enhanced if it offers 
citizens the opportunity to do so. 
2 Article 6 (ex F) TEU. 
3 The Commission White Paper, Chapter Two supra, note I. 
4 Cf D. Cmtin, 'Citizens' Fundamental Right of Access to EU Information: An Evolving 
Digital Passepartout?' (2000) 37 CMLRev 7, at 8. 
5 Cf Curtin, note 4 supra, at 7: "public access was considered [in, e.g., Sweden] an essential 
part of a citizens' freedom of information, and as a condition sine qua non for the will 
formation process so crucial in a democracy." 
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democratising it: an approach described as 'naYve',6 reflecting the belief that 
the EU will never acquire legitimacy unless it also provides the remaining 
dimensions of multidimensional transparency. As discussed in Chapter Three 
supra, however, the Commission's White Paper on Governance suggests that 
the Commission is beginning to think seriously about democratisation. It has 
at least agreed that public debates require the public to have access to reliable 
information concerning the various stages of the EU's policy-making 
processes. 7 
The Commission now appears to be approaching public access from the 
perspective of an institution seeking to provide the other dimensions of 
multidimensional transparency, notwithstanding the fact that, in reality, it does 
not appear to regard transparency as a multidimensional concept. The 
question, as noted in the conclusion to Chapter Three supra, is that of whether 
public access is actually being taken seriously within the EU, as a 
democratising and legitimising factor and a key component oftransparency. Is 
the first sentence of Declaration No. 178 simply rhetoric, or is the Union 
genuinely committed to maximising the potential of public access? 
This Chapter, by examining the rules governing public access within the EU, 
will begin to address the questions outlined in the conclusion to Chapter Three 
supra, concerning the Union's approach to public access. Do the public access 
rules facilitate the holding of the institutions to public account, and 
encourage/facilitate public participation in decision-making?; are they liberal, 
or limited?; do they distinguish between documents and the information 
contained therein?; are the institutions welcoming applications for public 
access?; is there an adequate enforcement mechanism, to guarantee that the 
rules will be upheld?; and finally, is the operation of the rules under review, by 
an institution seeking to make public access a more liberal and/or a more 
effective right, in terms of its potential to make the EU a more 
6 Mather, Chapter One supra, note I, at p.9, with reference to Lodge, Chapter Two supra, note 
13, at 350. 
7 Chapter Three supra, note 79 and text. 
8 
"The Conference considers that openness of the decision-making process strengthens the 
democratic nature of the institutions and the public's confidence in the administration." 
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multidimensionally-transparent and legitimate polity?9 The latter questions 
concerning remedies can only be adequately answered by examining the public 
access case law of the Community Courts and the public access decisions of 
the Ombudsman, which examination will take place, respectively, in Chapters 
Six and Seven infra. In this Chapter, section 5.2 considers the source of the 
right of public access within the EU legal order. Section 5.3 then seeks to 
identify the limits to public access that would be acceptable within a 
multidimensionally-transparent regime. Section 5.4 examines the provisions of 
the joint Commission and Council Code of Conduct governing public access 
(hereafter, 'the Code'), 10 comparing the restricted rights of access to 
information discussed in Chapter Four supra, and the acceptable limits to 
public access identified in section 5.3, with the Code. Section 5.5 then 
compares the rights discussed in Chapter Four supra, the acceptable limits 
identified in section 5.3, and the Code discussed in section 5.4, with the new 
Regulation (EC) No. I 049/2001 11 (hereafter, 'the Regulation') governing 
public access. Section 5.6 concludes this Chapter and Part Two of this thesis. 
5.2. The Right of Public Access within the EU Legal Order. 
5.2.1. Did the Code, Decisions 93/731 and 94/90 confer a right of public 
access, or regulate a general principle of Community law? 
As stated in Chapter One supra, section 1.3 .I, public access to Commission, 
Council and Parliament documents could now be regarded as a general 
9 The analysis in this Chapter of the EU right of public access also considers the system of 
public access required by the democratic principle, as envisaged by ECJ Judge 
Ragnemalm: rules should allow access to all documents, in principle; 'document' should 
include any retrievable information including tape-recordings; 'held by' shows that 
documents emanating from external authors should be included, not only those authored 
by an institution; necessary exceptions must be narrowly, precisely drafted; there should 
be no need for an applicant to state his/her reasons for public access (cf Chapter Four 
supra, notes 67-68 and text); it is essential to process requests tor public access as soon as 
possible; there should be a register of documents; and there must be efficient legal 
remedies against refusals to grant public access (H. Ragnemalm,'The Community Courts 
and Openness within the European Union' (1999) 2 Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 19, at 20-21 ). 
10 Decision 93/730/EC; OJ 1993 L 340/41: see Appendix A. 
11 OJ 200 I L 145/43: see Appendix C. 
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principle of Community law. 12 It is included in the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, identified as a solemn declaration of the rights requiring protection by 
the Community Courts as general principles of Community law. 13 However, 
both the Charter and Article 255 (ex 19Ia) EC are recent additions to the EU 
legal order: Article 255 was added by the ToA in 1996, the Charter was 
proclaimed in 2000, but the Code was adopted in I 993. Therefore, if the Code 
itself did not confer a general right of public access upon EU citizens, from 
whence, within the post-TEU-but-pre-ToA legal order, did that right originate? 
Was public access already a general principle of Community law? 
As Michael O'Neill observes, prior to the TEU, official/judicial interest in 
Community-level public access was scarce. 14 Evidently, public access was not 
then a general principle of Community law, although the ECJ had 
acknowledged a right of 'party access' to information15 to guarantee fair 
trials. 16 Equally clearly, Declaration No. I 7 contemplated public access within 
the EU: although the Member States called upon the Commission to report 
back to the Council concerning measures 'to improve' public access, it was 
actually necessary for the Commission to suggest measures providing for such 
access. Hence the Code. 
12 Curtin observes that the right derived from Article 255 (ex 191a) EC cannot lead to "general 
[Community] legislation on [public access]", because it only applies to those three 
institutions (note 4 supra, at 14, emphasis in original), therefore even the Charter may not 
be regarded as protecting a general principle of public access per se. See also Harden, 
Chapter Three supra, note 65, at 181: a provision applying to all EU institutions and 
bodies might have raised questions regarding the scope of Article 230 (ex 173) EC, 
having regard to the need for a judicial remedy in the event that public access is refused. 
This may have deterred the Member States from drafting such a provision, although the 
obvious solution would be to re-draft Article 230 also. 
13 Per Lenaerts and de Smijter, Chapter One supra, note 20. 
14 
'The Right of Access to Community-Held Documentation as a General Principle of EC Law' 
( 1998) 4 European Public Law 403, at 407-408: see also Ragnemalm, note 9 supra, at 21. 
15 Ibid., at 408 (reference to Case C-2/88, Zwartveld [1990] ECR 1-4405). 
16 As, of course, had the right of access to the tile discussed in Chapter Four supra: Zwartve/d 
concerned a request for Commission-held information, not submitted by a defendant, but 
by another par1y to a case, namely a Dutch investigating magistrate. 
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5.2.2. A Brief Introduction to the Code. 
Until 3 December 2001 (when the Regulation entered into force) access to 
documents held by the Commission and Council was governed by the Code. 17 
This, although jointly developed, was independently adopted by the Council 18 
and the Commission, 19 usmg their power to adopt their own Rules of 
Procedure.20 The Code might appear to have been a voluntary agreement 
concluded in order to fulfil the Commission's task, set by the second sentence 
of Declaration No. 17.21 However, as discussed in section 5.2.3. infra, the 
remaining institutions were obliged to adopt similar public access provisions in 
order to comply with the general principle of good administration, pending the 
adoption of general Community legislation governing public access. On the 
issue of whether the right of public access existed within the EU legal order 
independently of the Code, a dispute arises from the ECJ's judgment in the 
Netherlands' application for the annulment of Decision 93/731. 
5.2.3. Netherlands v Council. 22 
The Netherlands, supported by the European Parliament, sought the annulment 
of Council Decision 93/731, submitting that public access was too important to 
be left to any institution's internal Rules of Procedure; and that the Council had 
both exceeded its powers and relied incorrectly upon Article 151 (now 207) EC 
as the legal basis for Decision 93/731, if that Decision was indeed intended to 
confer upon Union citizens the right of public access to Council documents. 
The ECJ dismissed the application for annulment, finding that, in light of the 
"progressive affirmation of' public access evident in the domestic legislation 
17 Note 10 supra. 
18 Council Decision 93/731 EC, OJ 1993 L 340/43, amended by Council Decision 96/705 
Euratom, ECSC, EC, OJ 1996 L 325/19: see Appendix B. 
19 Commission Decision 94/90/ECSC, EC, Euratom, OJ 1994 L 46/58, which provides (Article 
I) that "[t]he code of conduct on public access to Commission documents ... is adopted." 
20 Article 207 (ex 151) EC (re the Council) and Article 218 (ex 162) EC (re the Commission). 
21 
"The Conference accordingly recommends that the Commission submit to the Council no 
later than 1993 a report on measures designed to improve public access to information 
available to the institutions." Curtin (note 4 supra, at 12) suggests that the ECJ regarded 
the Code as a voluntary measure: see further on that point section 5.2.3. infra. 
22 Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR 1-2169. 
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of most Member States, the Council had decided to amend its rules of internal 
organisation,23 and that 
"so long as the Community legislature has not adopted general rules on the right of 
public access ... the institutions must take measures [to provide public access] by virtue 
of their power of internal organisation, which authorises them to take appropriate 
measures in order to ensure their ... conformity with the interests of good 
administration ... "24 
This confirmed the Council's power "to adopt measures intended to deal with 
requests for access to documents in its possession" in the absence of 
Community legislation providing for public access.25 
The ECJ has been heavily criticised for not explicitly agreeing that public 
access is a fundamental human right/general principle of Community Iaw,26 yet 
the word 'must' in paragraph 39 arguably obliged all institutions to provide for 
public access to documents in their possession, pending the adoption of general 
Community legislation governing public access. As implied earlier, even ifthe 
Commission and Council had regarded the Code as a voluntary measure, the 
subsequent adoption of similar provisions by institutions and bodies such as the 
Committee of the Regions27 and the European Court of Auditors28 was 
required in the interests of good administration. The Ombudsman made the 
following pertinent observation: 
23 Ibid., paragraphs 34-6. 
24 Ibid., paragraph 39. 
25 Ibid., paragraph 40. 
26 Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 295; Oberg, Chapter One supra, note 41, at p.4, and 
note 44, at 314-5. The ECJ appears to have been slightly less heavily criticised by 
O'Neill, note 14 supra, at 411-2, and Curtin, note 4 supra, at 12, both of whom 
characterised its review of public access as 'minimalist'. The European Parliament's 
submission to the ECJ suggested that public access had been recognised as a human right 
in various international instruments: on that point, however, cf Verhoeven, Chapter One 
supra, note 51. Ragnemalm (note 9 supra, at 24) observes that Advocate General 
Tesauro "clearly established that the right of access to documents existed prior to 
... Decision 93/731" because "developments in the legal systems of the Member States" 
showed this to be "an essential feature of the democratic principle." However, the ECJ 
did not explicitly follow this Opinion. 
27 Decision 397DO 165(0 I), OJ 1997 L 351/70. 
28 Decision 18/97, OJ 1998 C 295/1. 
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"To me, it is difficult to understand why it should be mandatory [referring to 
paragraph 39 of the Netherlands judgment] ... to adopt measures to deal with requests 
for access to documents unless there is an underlying right of the citizen at stake ... "29 
It seemed as though the ECJ had agreed that there is a right to public access, 
but had failed to locate its source within the EU legal order. Per Oberg, the 
fact that the ECJ did not, in Netherlands, explicitly and unequivocally 
recognise public access as an independent general principle of Community law 
constitutes a 'missing link' in its reasoning. 
The ECJ regarded Decision 93/731 "as a 'measure intended to deal with 
requests for access to documents in its possession', adopted in the interests of 
good administration."30 Oberg continues: 
"If the Court denied the existence of a general right of access to documents in 
Community law in Netherlands v Council, the legal basis for such a right must be 
sought elsewhere, for example in the internal rules of the institutions."31 
Those internal rules are intended to organise the institutions' internal 
functioning in the interests of good administration, not to ensure protection for 
individuals,32 although an institution's failure to comply with its internal rules 
of procedure might constitute an essential procedural requirement, which could 
lead to the annulment of any decision adopted on the basis of those rules. 33 In 
Oberg's view, it follows from this reasoning that Decision 93/731 obviously 
does not confer the right of public access upon Union citizens, being a right 
intended to benefit individuals, because if that had been its intention, Decision 
93/731 would obviously have been adopted on the incorrect legal basis. 
Internal rules simply do not provide rights for individuals. Oberg concludes 
that there must already have been a general principle of public access in 
29 Speech cited in Chapter One supra, note 2. 
3° Chapter One supra, note 44, at 314, citing paragraph 39 of the Netherlands judgment, note 
22 supra. 
31 Ibid., at 314-5. 
32 Ibid., at 3 I 5 (reference to Case C-69/89, Nakajima v Council [ 1991] ECR-1 2069, paragraph 
49). 
33 Ibid. (reference to Case C-137/92 P, Commission v BASF and others [1994] ECR 1-2555, 
paragraphs 75 and 76). 
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Community law, constituting the source of this right at the time of the 
Netherlands judgment.34 
Oberg is evidently reluctant to see the "fundamental human right"35 of public 
access relegated in status to a principle of good administration, amenable to 
regulation by the internal rules of the institutions, hence his attack upon the 
ECJ for failing to unequivocally state that public access is a general principle 
of Community law, as are all the human rights common to the Member 
States.36 His reasoning, however, is illogical: public access could not already 
have been a general principle of Community law, otherwise the ECJ could not 
lawfully have denied the existence of a general right of public access in the 
Netherlands judgment, thereby inviting commentators to search for the source 
of that right within the internal rules of the institutions. Therefore, Oberg's 
conclusion is erroneous. Per Curt in, the ECJ: 
" ... did not elevate in this period the principle of public access to the status of an 
explicit "general principle" of Community law, presumably in line with its view of the 
highly specific and voluntary nature of the principle as assumed by certain 
institutions."37 
A logical conclusion is that the right of public access to Council documents 
was first conferred upon EU citizens by the Code, as adopted by Decision 
93/731.38 The Code also introduced the principle of granting the 'widest 
possible access to documents held by the institutions' .39 
34 Ibid. On Ragnemalm's analysis (note 9 supra, at 24), this is a reasonable conclusion, 
although Ragnemalm adds that "it is obvious that the precise content of such a general 
principle has not yet been clarified. The regimes that apply in the different Member 
States vary. Moreover ... there is no exact equivalent at national level to the activity of the 
Community institutions and the nature of the information in their possession" (ibid., at 
25). 
35 Chapter One supra, note 44, at 313. 
36 Cf also O'Neill, note 14 supra, at 411-412: The legal basis issue was only "a preliminary 
point from which the Netherlands Government launched its most salient argument that the 
Council wrongly categorised a fundamental right as a matter of internal 
organisation ... The Court proceeded to disregard the issue of the existence of such a 
fundamental right at the Community level. .. " 
37 Note 4 supra, at 12. Cf Ragnemalm, note 9 supra, at 24-25, who suggests that public access 
was at least an implicit general principle of Community law at this time. 
38 Cf the CFI in Case T-124/96, lnterporc !m- und Export GmbHv Commission [1998] ECR 
!1-231, at paragraph 46: "Decision 94/90 is a measure conferring on citizens a right of 
access to documents held by the Commission." Recalling that Decision 94/90 is exactly 
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The circumstances leading up to the adoption of the Code may explain why the 
ECJ refrained from recognising a general principle of public access. The Code 
was, perhaps, not entirely voluntary, the IGC having by Declaration No. 17 
called upon the Commission to consider public access. The Declaration also 
implied that the Member States were contemplating a right of public access 
developed by the Council on a proposal from the Commission. The Member 
States are of course the authors of the Treaties, and public access to EU 
documents is potentially a politically sensitive issue, given the strong tradition 
of public access in Scandinavian Member States and the much weaker 
'tradition' in the UK. The ECJ may therefore have decided that the Member 
States desired to have the rules governing public access at EU level developed 
by the Community legislature. That conclusion is supported by their 
subsequent express reservation of the task of developing the Article 255 right 
of public access to the Commission, Council and Parliament.40 
analogous to Decision 93/73 I insofar as both Decisions related to the same Code, 
Decision 93/731 must be regarded as conferring the same right on citizens in respect of 
Council-held documents. See also paragraph 38 of the Opinion of Advocate General 
Leger in Case C-353/99 P, Council v Heidi Hautala MEP, judgment of 6 December 2001: 
"Decision 93/731 .. .lays down the principle of public access to Council documents." 
39 Although Osterdahl has criticised this formulation as implying "a qualification of the rule of 
openness built into the very rule itself," by comparison to '"free access' under Article I 
and even 'right of access' under Article 2 of Chapter 2 of the Freedom of the Press Act 
which is the fundamental rule under the Swedish law on openness" (1. Osterdahl, 
'Openness v Secrecy: Public Access to Documents in Sweden and the EU' ( 1998) 23 
ELRev 336, at 346) it must be remembered that total FOI is apparently unattainable. So 
long as the Member States are threatened, by external and anti-democratic forces, which 
forces seek to seriously disrupt or to destroy the normal functioning of the liberal 
democratic societies therein, there will always be a need for some secrecy regarding the 
measures taken by the States to defend themselves against such threats. Therefore, a right 
to the 'widest possible' public access, as opposed to total FOI, is the most that can be 
expected, even in Sweden (cf L. Lustgarten and I. Leigh, In from the Cold: National 
Security and Parliamentmy Democracy, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, eh. I (pp.l-35); 
H. Burkert, 'A Functional Approach to the Legal Rules Governing Secrecy and 
Openness', in Proceedings of the Seventeenth Colloquy on European Law (Zaragoza, 21-
23 October 1987) on 'Secrecy and Openness: individuals, enterprises and public 
administrations', Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 1988, at p.l7; F. Rourke, Secrecy and 
Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy, Johns 1-Iopkins Press, Baltimore, 1996, at p.21; and 
Osterdahl, op. cif., at 353 ("[i]n general the content of the Swedish Secrecy Act 
corresponds with the rules on secrecy contained in the various instruments of Community 
secondary legislation"). 
40 R. Davis, 'The Court of Justice and the right of public access to Community-held 
documents' (2000) 25 EL Rev 303, at 308. See also Curtin (note 4 supra, at 14-15), who 
explains that, in light of the ToA amendments to the TEU, it is not possible to regard 
Article 255 EC as giving the institutions "total discretion" to decide that their own 
interests in maintaining secrecy "must prevail over the citizens' right of access to 
documents." Article I (ex A) TEU, as amended, now provides that decisions are to be 
162 
Had the ECJ derived public access as a general principle of Community law 
from the traditions of the Member States, this would have left it with the 
additional task of developing the rules required by that general principle.41 
This task could have been problematic. The Court's approach to public access 
might have been too liberal for some Member States but too illiberal for others, 
as well as being unsatisfactory to pro-transparency academics: 42 it would also 
have usurped a role clearly intended for the Community legislature. 
Furthermore, importantly, most Member States have constitutional or 
legislative rules governing public access, which is never regulated entirely by 
case law. The development of rules by case law could take time, depending 
upon the cases appealed to the ECJ. Alternatively, the prospect of having the 
ECJ develop public access rules might 'open the floodgates' to a spate of cases 
launched by persons ultimately seeking to have those rules amended or 
clarified. That might affect legal certainty: if the rules were constantly being 
challenged and changed, it could be difficult to keep citizens adequately 
informed about their right to access certain categories of document. More 
importantly, perhaps, a flood of public access appeal cases would only increase 
the Community Courts' notoriously heavy caseload. Leaving the institutions to 
develop public access prevented all but one of these potential problems- that 
ofthe ECJ's approach being criticised- from arising.43 
taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen. Union citizenship, 
meanwhile, supplements national citizenship (Article 17(1) (ex 8a( I)) EC). "The greatest 
possible level of openness must [therefore]. . . include the level of openness already 
achieved at the national level in any and all of the Member States .. . this status quo is the 
minimum level of openness which must be taken as acquired and to which the 
development of EU concrete rules and principles will have a supplemental function (ibid., 
emphasis added)." Basically, therefore, Article 255 EC should now be regarded as 
conferring a right intended to give citizens the widest possible access to documents of the 
Council, Commission and Parliament, notwithstanding its location within the EC Treaty 
as a 'provision common to the several institutions'. 
41 Cf O'Neill, note 14 supra, at 431. 
42 1-Iarlow (Chapter One supra, note 8, at 295) criticises the ECJ's judgment in Netherlands as 
its "choice of the narrow ground of individual right of access was to set the tone of future 
judicial review." Cf CUI"tin, note 4 supra, at 13: the Courts had not "explicitly 
acknowledged [public access] as a fundamental constitutional principle" facilitating 
citizens' access to the Union's political processes. 
43 Davis, note 40 supra, at 308. 
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Furthermore, it must be remembered that had the ECJ annulled Decision 
93/731, there would have been no rules governing public access to the 
institutions' documents. The ECJ was unlikely to have discovered a general 
principle of public access with which to replace the Code adopted by Decision 
93/731, given its anticipation of 'general legislation' governing public access. 
The academic criticism directed at the ECJ's approach in Netherlands seems to 
suggest, however, that notwithstanding the importance attached to public 
access, it would have been better to have had no right of public access at all 
than to have had the Code, because the Code did not confer a fundamental, 
constitutional right of public access upon EU citizens, constituting a failure, on 
the part of the institutions, to take transparency seriously. 
5.2.4. Conclusion. 
If public access to the documents of three institutions is a general principle of 
Community law today, that is because of various negotiations between the 
Member States qua Treaty authors and the Community legislature. It has not 
been developed as such by the ECJ .44 The ECJ has been heavily criticised 
because of this, although the Netherlands judgment promoted public access. 
Its refusal to annul Decision 93/731 gave Union citizens a right of access to 
Council documents.45 It obliged the remaining institutions to adopt similar 
measures in the interests of good administration, presumably because 
Declaration No. 17 indicated that the Member States themselves now 
considered good administration to require public access. This ruling remains 
important, in the absence of Community legislation governing public access to 
documents held by all EU institutions and bodies. 
Before the ToA, both the right and general principle governing public access 
were located within the Code adopted by Decisions 93/731 and 94/90. It is, 
therefore, now time to examine the substantive provisions of the Code and 
44 Cf Tridimas, Chapter Four supra, note 7, at p.221: in Community law, the right of public 
access is not the product of case law but of Community legislation, and although it was 
not initially regarded as fundamental in the EC legal order, "its constitutional status is 
gaining recognition." 
45 Davis, note 40 supra, at 309. 
164 
those Decisions in order to determine the extent to which these might be 
described as 'liberal'. Consideration must first be given to the extent to which 
public access might legitimately be restricted, in a regime aiming to secure for 
its citizens 'the widest possible access' to documents. This requires the 
identification of legitimate public interests in secrecy. If the Code's provisions 
allowed public access to be unduly restricted, it would follow that the Code 
was not as liberal as it might have been, which in turn implies that the 
Commission and Council had not been taking public access sufficiently 
seriously. 
5.3. Legitimate Public Interests in Secrecy. 
5. 3.1. What is a legitimate public interest in secrecy? 
Usually, the individual interest of an applicant for public access would be 
immaterial, in a multidimensionally-transparent regime, which would be 
expected to grant public access automatically upon request, unless the non-
disclosure of a document could be justified in the public interest. That appears 
to be the EU's approach to public access: see further sections 5.4 and 5.5 infra. 
Therefore it is necessary to identify (a) public interest(s) that might legitimately 
justify such non-disclosure: the legitimate public interest(s) in secrecy. 
Taking public access seriously requires the public interest in public access 
itself to be respected. A policy of automatic disclosure, unless the non-
disclosure of a given document can be justified in the public interest, implicitly 
acknowledges that there is at least one public interest in public access. 
Declaration No. 17 alludes to this by referring to the institutions' democratic 
nature. As discussed in Chapter One supra, there is a collective public interest 
in securing the democratic accountability of decision-makers, and there is a 
further collective public interest in securing democratic access to decision-
making procedures.46 As also implied in Chapter One supra,47 in order to be 
46 Cf Curt in and Meij ers, Chapter One supra, note 70 and text: see also notes 71-72 and text. 
See further Curtin, note 4 supra, at 13: public access is linked to the democratic principle 
by Declaration No. 17, as recognised by Advocate-General Tesauro in his Opinion in 
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legitimate, any public interest in secrecy must be capable of outweighing the 
public interest in public access, otherwise the right of public access could be 
unduly limited by unwarranted exceptions, based upon interests that could be 
sufficient to outweigh an individual citizen's specific interest in requesting 
public access, but not necessarily sufficient to outweigh the collective public 
interest of all citizens in public access. 
5. 3. 2. Examples of legitimate public interests in secrecy. 
Pressure group Article 19 has produced a list of public interests in secrecy, 
which it apparently regards as legitimate:48 
the public interest in law enforcement; 
the public interest in the maintenance of individual privacy;49 
the public interest in national security; 50 
the public interest in the protection of commercial and other confidentiality; 
the public interest in public and individual safety; and 
the public interest in the effectiveness and integrity of government 
decision-making processes. 51 
Netherlands v Council (note 22 supra), and should be regarded "as a fundamental right 
for citizens giving them timely and accurate access to the political process itself." 
47 Chapter One supra, notes 71-72 and text. 
48 Article 19, The Public's Right to Know: Principles on Freedom of Information Legislation, 
Chapter One supra, note 56: Principle 4. The public interests selected by Article 19 are 
likely to be regarded as legitimate in a multidimensionally-transparent regime. 
Unfortunately, however, Article 19 also states that the disclosure of documents could be 
refused in order to protect other "legitimate aims listed in the law" (ibid.), which not only 
resembles a 'catch-all' provision, but also offers no guidance concerning those "legitimate 
aims". 
49 The legitimacy of a public interest in individual privacy is supported by Birkinshaw (Chapter 
One supra, note 65, at pp.I6-17): individuals require privacy in order to function 
effectively within society, and without respect for individual privacy, society as a whole 
could become 'callous', 'captious' and 'unprincipled'. 
50 See further Lustgarten and Leigh, note 39 supra. Political and civil rights are intrinsic 
components of national security (ibid., at p.5). Any danger to the core values of 
democracy and respect for human rights is, therefore, a threat to the state (ibid., at pp.7-
8). The term 'national security' should be reserved for "matters that are as near as 
possible of universal and equivalent benefit to all citizens of the [democratic] state [which 
respects human rights)" (ibid., at p.27). 
51 This interest is discussed further in section 5.4 infra. 
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These interests, however, may not be invoked in order to justify 'blanket bans' 
upon public access. There is a tripartite proportionality test: 
non-disclosed documents must contain information relating to a legitimate 
public interest; and 
disclosure must threaten substantial harm to that interest; and 
such harm must outweigh the public interest in access to the document. 
Article 19 also states that, for example, if non-disclosure is justified in the 
interests of national security, that justification might cease to be valid if a 
"specific national security threat subsides."52 Exceptions to a policy of access 
to information/documents should be as narrow as possible: the content of a 
document should be considered carefully, in order to determine whether it is 
covered by an exception. Furthermore, although Article 19 implies that the 
listed public interests might normally legitimately override the public interest 
in access to information, it does not accept this as inevitable, specifying that 
there must always be a balancing of the interest in disclosure against the 
interest in maintaining secrecy. 53 Therefore, although not required to give any 
reasons for seeking access to documents held by the institutions, if a person or 
an NGO seeking access to an EU document does provide (a) reason(s), and the 
reason(s) provided outweigh(s), for example, the public interest in the 
protection of privacy, access should be granted. 
Unfortunately, as noted, Article 19 also seems to contemplate a 'catch-all' 
exception, to protect "legitimate aims listed in the law." This does not help to 
shed light upon the elusive concept of the legitimate public interest in 
52 Note 48 supra. 
53 On the balancing of interests, see further Lustgarten and Leigh, note 39 supra, at p. 9: action 
taken in the name of national security cannot be justified by weighing the needs of 
national security against a loss of individual liberty: such a loss must also be deducted 
from any supposed gain in national security. In the case of a collective constitutional 
right such as public access, the loss of the potential to publicly debate government policy, 
and thereby to hold the government to account, must therefore be set against any 
supposed increase in the extent to which democracy is being protected by keeping 
information secret. 
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secrecy.54 Examples of such aims might be those in Articles 4(4)(e) (the 
protection of intellectual property rights) and 4( 4)(h) (the protection of the 
environment to which information relates) of the Aarhus Convention (Chapter 
Four supra, section 4.3). Nevertheless, even the inclusion of a 'catch-all' 
provision in the list of legitimate public interests in secrecy need not 
necessarily undermine public access, so long as due deference is always paid to 
the importance of that right. Article 19' s approach to a legitimate pub! ic 
interest in secrecy emphasises that, whatever the law's aim, the protection of 
that aim must always be weighed carefully against the public interest in the 
disclosure of information/documents. Furthermore, "[r]estrictions whose aim it 
to protect governments from embarrassment or the exposure of wrongdoing 
can never be justified."55 
5.3.3. Conclusion. 
A legitimate public interest in the non-disclosure of documents has three 
characteristics. It must never be intended to shield governments from public 
criticism. It must be 'listed in the law', as are the public interests that may be 
protected, for example, under Article 1 0(2) ECHR. It must be such that it 
would be substantially harmed by the disclosure of information/documents to 
the public. If an interest is not so characterised, public access should be 
granted. Even if an interest has these characteristics, however, Article 19 
insists that public access should be granted whenever the benefit of public 
access outweighs the substantial harm caused to the interest in question. This 
approach to public access is to be expected of a regime that is truly committed 
to transparency. As indicated, these factors must be borne in mind when 
examining the substantive provisions governing public access, and when 
examining the attitude of the institutions and the Community Courts towards 
those provisions. 
54 
"Legitimate secrecy ... involves a paradox: much of the most sensitive information is either of 
no relevance whatever to policy and democratic debate, or is completely 
incomprehensible to any but a handful of technical experts- or both ... What ought to be 
revealed are dishonesty, false or misleading statements, unacknowledged policies, and 
deniable operations authorised or engaged in by policymakers at the highest level ... " 
(Lustgarten and Leigh, ibid., at pp.31-2). 
55 Note 48 supra: cf Lustgarten and Leigh, note 39 supra, discussed at note 54 supra. 
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5.4. The Code. 
5.4.1. The Code, Decision 93/731 and Decision 94/90. 
The Code retained the tradition, discussed in Chapter Four supra,56 of not 
requiring applicants for public access to provide reasons. Commission 
Decision 94/90 simply adopted the Code (Article I), adding only a few details 
concerning fees (Article 2(5)) and the consultation of documents (Article 2(6)), 
and adding that failure to reply within one month constituted an intention to 
refuse access, or, in the event of failure to reply to a confirmatory application 
(Article 2( 4)), a final refusal. Council Decision 93/73I, however, conferred the 
right of public access "under the conditions laid down in this Decision" 
(Article I (I)). The Decision implemented each individual principle of the 
Code, but in a different order. 
Originally, there were no substantive differences between the Code and the 
Decision.57 The operative provisions of Decision 93/73I were significantly 
amended by Decision 2000/527/EC,58 however. Article I(l) was amended as 
follows: 
"The public shall have access to Council documents, except for documents classified 
as TRES SECRET/TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIEL within the meaning 
of the Decision of the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of 27 July 2000 on measures for the protection 
of classified information applicable to the General Secretariat of the Council, on 
matters concerning the security and defence of the Union or of one or more of its 
Member States or on military or non-military crisis management, under the conditions 
laid down in this Decision. 
Where a request for access refers to a classi fled document within the meaning of the 
first subparagraph, the applicant shall be informed that the document does not fall 
within the scope of this Decision." 
56 Chapter Four supra, notes 67-68 and text. 
57 The minor amendments introduced by Decision 96/705 are not relevant to this thesis. 
58 OJ 2000 L 212/9. 
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This provision was castigated by both Statewatch and the House ofLords,59 not 
only because it automatically removed whole categories of documents from the 
scope of Decision 93/731, which, importantly, could have been protected 
adequately by the existing list of exceptions, but also because it pre-empted the 
adoption ofthe Regulation, discussed in section 5.4 infra. Moreover, although 
it was not necessary to consult the European Parliament in order to amend 
Decision 93/731, the fact that such a sweeping curtailment of the right of 
public access could be made unilaterally by the Council was also condemned. 
Article 2, which had echoed the Code (the first three indents of the paragraph 
headed 'Processing of initial applications') received an additional paragraph: 
"Without prejudice to Article 1(1), no Council document on matters concerning the 
security and defence of the Union or of one or more of its Member States or on 
military or non-military crisis management which enables conclusions to be drawn 
regarding the content of classified information from one of the sources referred to in 
paragraph 2 may be made available to the public except with the prior written consent 
of the author of the information in question. 
Where access to a document is refused pursuant to this paragraph, the applicant shall 
be informed thereof." 
In Article 4(1), 'the security and defence of the Union or of one or more of its 
Member States', and 'military or non-military crisis management,' were added 
to the list of public interest exceptions included within the Code. Decision 
2000/527, nicknamed 'the Solana Decision' after the Council's Secretary-
General, Javier Solana, was clearly illiberal, enabling the Council to withhold 
many documents from public scrutiny, notwithstanding the fact that they could 
have been adequately protected under existing public interest exemptions.60 
59 http://www.statewatch.org./news/2001/mar/03holrep.htm and the Eighth Report of the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, Session 2000-2001, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uklpa/ld20000 1/ldselect/ldeucom/31/310 1.htm. 
60 This regression towards secrecy might conceivably have represented an attempt to reverse 
judgments of the Community Courts/decisions of the Ombudsman favouring applicants 
for public access, according to evidence presented to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities: see Chapter One supra, note 30, paragraphs 
66, 96, 104, and 114, and especially paragraph 74, in which Professor Curtin, and Tony 
Bunyan of Stalewatch, suggest that those judgments had seriously inconvenienced the 
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Statewatch also observed that the Decision of 27 July 2000 to which the 
amended Article 1 (1) refers, requires documents to be classified according to 
the highest possible classification: 
"Where a number of items of information constitute a whole, that whole shall be 
classified at least as highly as its most highly classified constituent item"61 
Although illiberal, this does not preclude the grant of partial access to classified 
documents, however. 
The Solana Decision has now been superseded by the Regulation. Therefore, 
given the extent and thoroughness of the House of Lords' and Statewatch's 
published scrutiny and criticism thereof, the Solana Decision may be 
summarised as an obviously unwarranted and unjustifiable limitation upon 
public access. Its existence supports, however, any suspicion that the Council 
may be more concerned about maintaining secrecy than about granting public 
access,
62 
notwithstanding the rhetoric of its guidelines published on 28 June 
1999 aimed at improving transparency and the provision of information 
concerning EC activities.63 
Turning to the question of whether the Code was liberal prior to Decision 
2000/527, certain issues require particular consideration, such as: the definition 
of a 'document'; the list of exceptions to the right of public access; and the 
requirement, if any, to establish that the disclosure of a document would cause 
substantial harm to a protected interest. The time limits for the processing of 
applications are important, since a right of public access might not be useful to 
would-be lobbyists if many months pass before access is granted. However, 
institutions. The ECJ and CFI were, arguably, taking the self-imposed public access rules 
of the Commission and Council more seriously than those institutions: see further Chapter 
Six infra. 
61 Source: http://www.statewatch.org./news/dec00/06solana2.htm. 
62 For a source of such suspicions see, e.g., K. Armstrong, 'Citizenship of the Union? Lessons 
from Carve/ and The Guardian' (1996) 59 MLR 582, at 582-3. 
63 Bulletin Quotidien Europe No. 7496: "It is the Council's hope that the new provisions on 
openness and transparency contained in the Treaties will be reflected in genuine, 
perceptible changes in the daily practice of Community institutions." 
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prima facie, one month or two is reasonable: most Member States64 and the 
Aarhus Convention65 provide that access should be granted within a month 
unless circumstances, such as the bulk/complexity of the information sought, 
justify an extension of a further month. The charging of a reasonable fee for 
the provision of certain documentation is also standard practice.66 
Furthermore, the Code provided for a fully independent review of refusals to 
grant access, by either the CFI or the Ombudsman. 
The Code's definition of a 'document' as 'any written text whatever its 
medium' was narrower than the definition of 'information' in Article 2(a) of 
Directive 90/313 (see Chapter Four supra) which refers to "visual, aural and 
data-base information" as well as written texts. Likewise, the Aarhus 
Convention (Article 2(3)) refers to information in "written, visual, aural, 
electronic or any other material form." However, the Code permitted requests 
for access to electronically stored documents, which is particularly welcome in 
terms of facilitating public access. 67 A serious problem was the requirement 
that an application must be sent directly to a document's author. 
This 'authorship rule' immediately enabled the institutions to deny access to 
entire classes of documents: documents written by another institution, a natural 
or legal person, a Member State or another national/international body, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are indeed currently 'held by' the 
Commission and Council. There is no such rule in the right of access to the 
file: certain documentary evidence of anticompetitive behaviour contained 
within the Commission's file will have been supplied to it, not written by it. 
Moreover, in the context of access to the file, as discussed in Chapter Four 
supra, the Commission may be required to maintain the confidentiality of 
certain documents supplied to it, but may not be entitled to base its Decision 
upon those documents if it cannot at least prepare a non-confidential summary 
oftheir contents, so that the undertaking(s) being investigated may have access 
64 Based upon the Commission's comparative study of FOI within the Member States, annexed 
to Commission Communication 93/C I 56/05 (OJ I 993 C I 56/5): see OJ 1993 C 156/9. 
65 Article 4(2). 
66 OJ 1993 C 156/9; Article 4(8) of the Aarhus Convention. 
67 Curtin, note 4 supra, at I 0. 
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to the file. Access to internally-prepared Commission documents is likely to 
be refused simply because those documents are internal.68 This situation is 
almost the mirror image of that produced by the authorship rule in the Code. 
It can be concluded immediately that the public interest exceptions in the Code 
were less liberal than those in Directive 90/313, however, because Article 3(2) 
of the Directive provided that Member States 'may' allow access to 
information to be refused to protect the listed public interests (including 
national security), whereas the Commission and Council decided that they 
'shall' refuse information which 'could undermine' the similar public interests 
listed in the Code (including national security). There was no requirement to 
balance the listed public interests against the public interest in access to 
documents, nor any mention in the Code of a 'substantial harm test' as 
demanded by Article 19. The subject-matter of the mandatory exceptions was 
not remarkable, in light ofthe discussion in section 5.3 supra. The protection 
of monetary stability, for example, seems to be a legitimate aim of the 
Commission and Council. The discretionary exception for the confidentiality of 
the institutions' proceedings also corresponded to the pub I ic interest, 
recognised by Article 19, in the effectiveness and integrity of government 
decision-making processes. Statewatch, however, has condemned this 'space 
to think exception'. 
Tony Bunyan, Statewatch editor, said of the proposals for the Regulation: 
" ... the Commission wants to create the so-called "space to think" for officials (public 
servants) and permanently deny access to innumerable documents. The "space to 
think" for officials is apparently more important than the peoples' right to know ... But 
there is another problem with the "space to think" for officials, it would also give 
them the "space to act". Many of the documents hidden by this rule would concern 
the implementation of measures - the practice that flows from the policies."69 
68 Chapter Four supra, text at note 30. S. Kadelbach is apparently in the minority in endorsing 
the 'authorship rule', as a means of maintaining co-operation between the Member States 
and the EU: see 'Case Law' (2001) 38 CMLRev 179, at 189. 
69 
'Access to documents 'could fuel public discussion" in 'Essays for An Open Europe', 
Chapter One supra, note I 0. 
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The space to think exception is deemed, by the institutions, to be necessary, 
enabling them to formulate policies before those policies enter the public 
domain. There is a belief that policies developed under the spotlight of 
publicity will be poor.70 Given that Bunyan is satisfied with the Ombudsman 
in the latter's dealing with refusals by the Council to allow Statewatch access 
to certain documents/' it is somewhat surprising to find that he does not 
apparently agree with Mr Soderrnan's opinion regarding space to think. The 
Ombudsman considers that every administration must carry out internal 
preparatory work before presenting matters to the public, and that those 
involved in such preparatory work "should have the possibility of an informal 
exchange of ideas and criticism."72 However, as soon as an administration has 
formally adopted a draft text, or whenever a document containing the results of 
its thinking is "transmitted outside the boundaries ofthe organisational space in 
which it has been drafted", then that text/document "should be included in a 
public register."73 The Ombudsman is not, therefore, opposed to the notion of 
a space to think per se, as Bunyan appears to be: on the contrary, he favours 
allowing policy options to be formulated without interference from the public 
or the press. Statewatch seems to be in the minority, 74 with Article 19 having 
acknowledged as legitimate a similar interest in secrecy, and the Ombudsman's 
explicit endorsement of the space to think exception. The need for institutions 
to have some space to think will probably not disappear from the list of 
exceptions to any European level right of public access in the near future: the 
7
° Committee of Independent Experts, 2"d Report, vol. 2, chapter 7, paragraph 7 .6.6 
(http://www.europarl.eu.int/experts/pdf/rep2-2en.pdD. 
71 See http:l/v.'ww.statewatch.org./news/200 1/jul/ombuds.htm. 
72 Speech entitled 'Access to official documents and archives - the democratic aspect', 
delivered at Lund University, Sweden, 5 April 2001 (http://www.euro-
ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/200 1-04-0S.htm). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Notwithstanding the fact that similar arguments (including empirical observations) were put 
to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities by witnesses 
including the Bar European Group and the World Wide Fund for Nature, against the 
notion that the institutions needed 'space to think' (Chapter One supra, note 30, 
paragraphs 80-81 ). The Ombudsman's office cogently observed that "[f]or example, 
when a legal service produced an opinion for its institution on a matter, that opinion might 
go through several drafts. Nobody would want to see published the early drafts that were 
consigned to the wastepaper basket" (ibid., paragraph 82). That the necessary 'space to 
think' should only cover the production of an opinion/consultation 
document/communication, which would cease to be covered by the 'space to think' 
exception as soon as it was ready for internal publication, is not unreasonable, and 
accords with Swedish national practice (see paragraph 83 of the Select Committee 
Report, Chapter One supra, note 30). 
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Aarhus Convention recently reaffirmed that information could be withheld if 
its disclosure "would adversely affect the confidentiality of the proceedings of 
public authorities, where such confidentiality is provided for under national 
law" (Article 4(4)). 
One aspect of the Code with which Statewatch was more justifiably concerned 
was the institutions' ability to seek a 'fair solution' in order to comply with 
'repeat applications'. As will be seen in Chapter Seven, infra, the Council in 
particular seemed, so far as Statewatch was concerned, eager to treat any 
subsequent request for different documents concerning the same policy area as 
documents previously disclosed to the same applicant, as a 'repeat application'. 
As will be discussed in section 5.5 infra, Statewatch strongly opposed the 
incorporation ofthis aspect of the Code into the Regulation. 
To summarise, the chief problem areas of the Code were: the authorship rule; 
the mandatory nature of most of the exceptions; the absence of any harm test, 
to be applied before deciding whether documents should be withheld; and the 
meaning of a repeat application. After briefly examining the Council's 
provisions for making information available to the public without the need for 
anyone to apply for public access, attention will turn, in section 5.5 infra, to the 
question of whether the new Regulation addresses any ofthese problems. 
5.4.2. Improving Transparency? Council Decisions 2000/23/EC75 and 
2001 1320/EC. 76 
Decision 2000/23, without prejudice to Decision 93/731, sought to improve the 
public register of Council documents, available on line at http://ue.eu.int since I 
January 1999. Article I requires a list of provisional Council and COREPER 
agendas to be published in advance of meetings and updated to reflect any 
changes. Article 2 requires the public register of documents to include the 
document number and the subject matter of classified documents, unless such 
mention could undermine the public interests set out in the Code above 
75 OJ 2000 L 9/22. 
76 OJ 2001 L 111129. 
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(including, following amendment by the Solana Decision, the security and 
defence ofthe Union or one of its Member States, and military or non-military 
crisis management). No reference is to be made, however, to documents 
classified TRES SECRET/TOP SECRET, SECRET or CONFIDENTIEL 
within the public register, following the Solana Decision amendments. Articles 
3 and 4 concern, respectively, technical preparations for online publication and 
the date on which the Decision came into force, being I January 2000. 
Decision 2000/23 certainly improved the position for an ordinary European or 
an NGO wishing to know the agenda of a future Council meeting, but once 
again, the Solana amendments are unjustifiable: the public interest in defence 
and crisis management could already be protected by reference to public 
security simpliciter, and it should still be possible to outline the subject-matter 
of a confidential or classified document without compromising secrecy: even a 
simple statement that Document X concerns 'troop deployment' or 'Europol 
counter-terrorist investigations' would advise members of the public that they 
would be unlikely to obtain access to Document X. 
At first glance, Decision 20011320 appears welcome: it makes 'certain 
categories of documents available to the public'. The first recital of its 
Preamble, however, states that: 
"Transparency is an essential principle for the functioning of the institutions of the 
Community. Public access to documents is one of the instruments to apply [sic] this 
principle." 
Although describing transparency as essential, and, importantly, implying that 
public access is not actually being conflated with transparency, it can still be 
asked why transparency is regarded as essential to the Community institutions 
instead of the natural and legal persons affected by their decisions. 77 
77 Cf Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 290. This formulation would indicate an 
instrumentalist, i.e. administration-centred, approach towards public access. 
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Decision 2001/320 applies only to non-classified Council documents (Article 
1 (1 )) and allows the Member States to ask that documents originating from a 
Member State be withheld unless prior agreement to their disclosure is given 
Article 1 (2). Article 3( 1) calls upon the General Secretariat to make available, 
immediately after the final version has been distributed to Councii/COREPER 
members: documents made public by agreement of the author; provisional 
agendas of Council meetings; and any text intended to be published in the 
Official Journal. Article 3(2) provides likewise for COREPER meetings, and 
information excluding Legal Service opinions and contributions. Article 4(1) 
requires certain legislative documents to be publicly available: cover notes and 
copies of letters concerning legislative acts addressed to the Council by other 
institutions or, subject to Article I (2), the Member States; notes submitted to 
the Council and COREPER for approval and the drafts to which they refer; and 
decisions adopted by the Council during the Article 251 (ex 189b) EC 
legislative procedure, including joint texts approved by the Conciliation 
Committee. Article 4(2) requires the publication of documents drawn up 
before the coming into force of Decision 20011320 (i.e. 1 May 200 I) provided 
they are not covered by exemptions in Article 4(1) of Decision 93/731. 
Decision 2001/320 purports to add transparency, albeit for the benefit of the 
Council itself and not citizens, although it actually accomplishes nothing 
beyond, perhaps, speeding up the public access process slightly. All the 
documents to which it refers are either intended for publication, or already 
available under the provisions of Decision 93/731. Decision 2000/23, prior to 
the Solana amendments, seems to have been more useful insofar as it enables a 
member of the public or an NGO to find out when the Council or COREPER 
are due to meet, and at least a broad idea of the subject-matter of that meeting, 
which could assist potential lobbyists. 
5.5. The Regulation. 
No attempt will be made here to analyse the proposals and drafts preceding the 
Regulation. These have been thoroughly criticised elsewhere, for example by 
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the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities78 and 
Statewatch.79 To discuss such criticism now seems redundant in light of the 
adoption of a final text. Moreover, this thesis has nothing original to add to the 
criticisms already published,80 all of which convey the same basic message: the 
proposals and drafts were considered to be too illiberal. 81 
In Chapter Three supra, it was observed that the provision of public 
participation in decision-making has not been established as an aspect of the 
Union's concept of transparency. The Regulation represents, perhaps, a step 
towards the explicit recognition of the fact that public participation should be 
regarded as a component of transparency, as suggested by recital no. 2 of the 
Preamble, linking openness, as public access, to participation in decision-
making, to accountability in a democratic system, and to the strengthening of 
the democratic principle set down by Article 6 TEU. 
One problem is, although transparency as public access helps to empower 
citizens wishing to participate in decision-making, it is not necessarily clear by 
what means, if any, citizens might so participate at EU level. The Regulation 
offers no guidance, and the Member States and institutions still equate 
openness with public access. Therefore, the Preamble invites ordinary 
European citizens to criticise the continuing lack of (an) easily-
78 161h Report, Chapter One supra, note 30. 
79 See http://www.statewatch.org./secret/observatory.htm. 
80 The author is also aware, through membership of the European Freedom of Information List, 
of the existence of at least one academic thesis in which such criticisms have been 
analysed in depth, submitted by Mr Achim Serge. EFIL is an e-mail facility owned and 
operated by Ulf Oberg (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/EFIL ): its members, mostly based 
within the Member States, share views and exchange information concerning 
transparency-related issues. 
81 A further concern arises from the direct applicability of the Regulation. The preamble 
indicates that the Regulation is not intended to amend national public access legislation, 
but that, "by virtue of the principle of loyal cooperation which governs relations between 
the institutions and the Member States, Member States should take care not to hamper the 
proper application of this Regulation and should respect the security rules of the 
institutions." Public access is a constitutional right in certain Member States (e.g. 
Sweden), and certain Member States have accepted the supremacy of Community law 
upon condition that their national constitutional rights shall receive equivalent protection 
under both Community and national law (e.g. Germany: see Craig and de Burca, Chapter 
One supra, note 6, at pp.268-276). It is not inconceivable that the supremacy of EC law 
may once more be at issue, in the event that information held concurrently by a Member 
State and an institution were to be disclosed under national, constitutional, public access 
rules, when the institution has or would have refused to grant access to the same 
information under the Regulation. 
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comprehensible, well-publicised and readily-accessible method(s) by which 
they might use information gained via the right of public access to participate 
in EU-level decision-making: citizens might therefore continue to regard the 
Union as an illegitimate source of law. Having suggested the desirability of 
democratic participation at EU level, the institutions should open their 
decision-making processes to public input, as far as possible, and should ensure 
that citizens are fully informed oftheir opportunity/opportunities to participate, 
much as the Member States are required to do in respect of environmental 
decision-making processes, per Directive 85/337, as discussed in Chapter Four 
supra. An approach to transparency concentrating upon public access at the 
expense of public participation could only leave citizens wondering how to 
utilise any information they might succeed in gathering from the institutions' 
files. 
Although the Regulation preserves the principle of granting the widest possible 
access to documents (Article I), it was immediately perceived to be less liberal 
than the Code because, unlike the Code, Article 2(1) does not actually grant the 
right of access to 'the public'. 82 In practice, as noted by the House of Lords 
Select Committee, this does not make much difference, but it is an important 
principle: public access implies a right for all, not just those ordinarily resident 
within the EU.83 Article 2(3) is welcome, however: it abolishes the 
problematic 'authorship rule'. Article 3 provides key definitions. The 
definition of a document now includes visual and aural recordings, making it 
wider than the previous definition employed by the Code and bringing the 
Regulation into line with the Aarhus Convention. 
Article 4 lists exceptions. It appears slightly more liberal than the Code 
because although there are still mandatory exemptions in respect of five public 
interests (Article 4(1 )), Article 4(2) accepts that there may be an overriding 
public interest in the disclosure of certain documents to which access under the 
Code would invariably have been denied. There is also provision for granting 
partial access to documents (Article 4(6)). However, institutions are not 
82 See Chapter One supra, note 30. 
83 Ibid. 
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required to conduct a 'substantial harm' test,84 unless the disclosure of 
documents might 'seriously undermine' an institution's decision-making 
procedures (Article 4(3)). 85 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine how an 
applicant for public access might possibly argue that there can be an overriding 
public interest in the disclosure of a document that s/he has either never seen,86 
or of the existence of which s/he might be unaware, so as to convince the 
Community Courts or the Ombudsman that a institution had manifestly erred in 
its judgment regarding the relative weight to assign to the competing public 
interests. At least the Regulation has changed 'could undermine' to 'would 
undermine', and it has been acknowledged that public interest exceptions need 
not necessarily apply to any document forever (Article 4(7)). Nevertheless, the 
Regulation is disappointingly like the Code, insofar as it emphasises the 
circumstances in which public access 'shall be refused'. The presumption of 
secrecy would be more unequivocally reversed if, for example, Article 4(2) 
were to state that access to a document 'shall be granted, unless there is an 
overriding public interest in the protection of commercial interests, etc', and 
Article 4(3) were to state that access 'shall be granted unless there is an 
overriding public interest in the protection of the confidentiality of the 
institutions' decision-making processes.' 
The Regulation is more liberal than the Code is in its lack of any reference to 
'repeat' or 'repetitive' applications for public access. The original proposals 
would have enabled an institution to find a 'fair solution' to a 'repetitive' 
application. This was condemned by Statewatch because almost all its 
applications for public access concern documents relating to Title VI TEU and 
84 Not surprisingly, this was also criticised by the Select Committee, esp. at paragraphs I 01-2, 
ibid. The belief expressed therein is that all exceptions to the right of public access 
should be discretionary. 
85 As analysed by !an Harden of the Ombudsman's Office for the benefit of EFIL members 
(note 80 supra), Article 4(3) protects the institutions' 'space to think' by distinguishing 
between the circumstances in which an institution has not reached any decision yet and 
those in which a decision has been adopted. It applies to both incoming documents and 
documents drawn up for internal use when no decision has been adopted (paragraph I) 
but only to documents containing opinions for internal use as part of the preliminary 
deliberations after a decision has been adopted. In both cases disclosure must 'seriously 
undermine' the relevant institution's decision-making process and access must be granted 
if there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
86 Recalling the argument of the plaintiffs in Joined Cases T-213/95 and T-18/96, SCK & FNK 
v Commission, discussed in section 4.3.2., Chapter Four supra, cited at note 21. 
180 
could therefore have been regarded as 'repetitive', the Council having 
previously attempted to deny access to Statewatch's 'repeat' applications under 
the Code.87 Article 6(3) only provides that a fair solution may be sought in the 
event of an application for a very long document or for a very large number of 
documents. 
Articles 7 and 8 reduce the time limits for the processing of applications from 
one month to 15 days, and the extension period in exceptional circumstances is 
likewise reduced from one month to 15 days. This is an improvement, if the 
applicant for public access seeks to influence a decision-making process on the 
basis of the document sought, s/he/it will have more of an opportunity to do so 
if the document is provided promptly. This development also suggests that the 
institutions may after all be contemplating the public wishing to participate in 
decision-making, although the withholding of internal consultation documents 
unless there is an overriding public interest in their disclosure (Article 4(3)) 
suggests otherwise. Article 4(3) tends to support Statewatch's suggestion that 
the institutions wish to exclude civil society from the early stages of policy 
formation. 88 
Article 5 obliges Member States to consult the institution concerned before 
granting access to any document in their possession originating from an 
institution, if there is any doubt regarding whether or not that document should 
be disclosed, so that the Member State will not adopt a decision that may 
jeopardise the attainment of the Regulation's objectives.89 The applicant's 
request may be referred to the institution instead. This seems potentially 
problematic, following Curtin's pre-Regulation analysis of the nature of public 
access in the post-ToA Union: 
87 See paragraph 13 7, 161h Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities (Chapter One supra, note 30): Statewatch described the reference to 
'repetitive applications' as "a thinly disguised attempt to by-pass the European 
Ombudsman's ruling in the Statewatch complaint [discussed in Chapter Seven infra]", 
whilst Steve Peers is also quoted as describing this draft as "an attempt to prevent diligent 
researchers, such as myself and organisations such as Statewatch, from making more than 
a handful of applications a year." 
88 I bid, paragraphs 7 8-79. 
89 Including the need to handle applications for access to 'sensitive' documents (discussed 
infra) carefully and to have regard to the exemptions in Article 4: see Article 9(5). 
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"It follows [from the analysis of the ToA] ... that if access would be granted under 
national law to EU documents then EU law cannot deprive them of such access. This 
is a kind of reverse principle of supremacy in the interests of citizens."90 
Article 5 seems to suggest that the institutions have not fully accepted the idea 
that supremacy within the EU should be accorded to national laws governing 
public access, just as it is not accorded to national laws governing, for example, 
the free movement of workers.91 One obvious concern is that it would be 
unconstitutional in certain Member States, such as Sweden, to refuse access to 
documents held by national authorities merely because those documents 
emanated from EU institutions. Moreover, that would conflict with the ToA's 
obligation to provide "the greatest possible level of openness" which "must in 
any event include the level of openness already achieved at the national level in 
any and all of the Member States."92 In short, so long as the EU still does not 
guarantee and protect public access to at least the same extent as it is 
guaranteed and protected in Sweden,93 and if the institutions have not 
recognised the 'reverse' principle of supremacy discussed by Curtin, a problem 
could arise if an institution were to seek to curtail national public access rules 
by requesting, upon consultation from a Member State, the non-disclosure of 
any document that would previously have been disclosed to citizens of that 
Member State under national law. This problem may be unlikely to 
90 Note 4 supra, at 26. 
91 Cf Tridimas, Chapter Four supra, note 7, at pp.213-214, who implies that the ECJ, if 
considering a right as a general principle drawn from the constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, need not opt for the maximalist protection that may be granted by any one 
Member State's constitution, nor tor the minimalist protection of the 'lowest common 
denominator' position, but should accord that right, e.g. public access, a suitable 
weighting to meet the requirements of overall Community policy. 
92 Curtin, note 4 supra, at 15 (emphasis in original). This analysis of the ToA may be 
somewhat optimistic. Article I TEU, as amended, only provides that 'decisions must be 
taken as openly as possible', not that any decisions so taken must in turn achieve the 
greatest possible level of transparency: meanwhile, Article 255 (ex 191 a) EC provides 
only tor a right of public access to be granted subject to such principles and conditions as 
may be defined by the Parliament and Council, not for a right subject to any general 
principle of granting the widest possible access to documents. 
93 Of course, if the EU were to adopt the maximalist protection granted by any one of the 
Member States, that, too, would eliminate the potential for Union citizens of that Member 
State to have potentially wider public access rights than Union citizens of any other 
Member State. 
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materialise,94 but theoretically the possibility of an institution-Member State 
conflict of opinion exists.95 
Article 9 is particularly unwelcome. The Ombudsman, however, believes that 
it is not illiberal: 
"Applications for access to sensitive documents are dealt with under basically the same 
conditions as for non-sensitive documents in relation to exceptions and procedures, 
including the possibility of recourse to the Court or the Ombudsman if an application is 
refused. The differences of treatment are as follows: 
- if access to a document is refused, reasons must be given in a manner which does not 
harm the interests protected by the exceptions. 
- initial and confirmatory applications are to be handled within the institutions only by 
persons with the necessary security clearance to enable them to have knowledge of the 
documents. 
-the originator of the document, not the institution which holds it, makes the final decision 
on whether one or more of the exceptions applies (Art 9 (3)). 
"Sensitivity" is not therefore a separate category of exception and public access cannot be 
refused merely on the grounds that a document is sensitive: one or more of the exceptions 
must be invoked and the applicant has the right to challenge refusal of access to a sensitive 
document before the Court or the Ombudsman."96 
It remains difficult to see how access to a particular document may be 
requested if a potential applicant is unaware of its existence after consulting the 
public register. Moreover, a decision to classify a document as 'sensitive' 
would not be amenable to judicial review: not being addressed to a natural or 
legal person, that particular decision would not be of direct and individual 
concern to any such person,97 even assuming that a person who had never seen 
a document could marshal an argument to the effect that it had been incorrectly 
classified, and that the Community Courts would then be able to substitute 
their own classification for that adopted by the institutions (see further Chapter 
94 Olle Abrahamsson, Director-General for Legal Affairs at the Swedish Ministry of Justice as 
at 25 April 200 I, opined on that date that Swedish authorities would continue to make 
independent decisions on public access and that, following consultation under Article 5, 
the institution's reply would be 'advisory', preserving Sweden's national autonomy on 
public access (source: UlfOberg, owner of EFIL (note 80 supra)). 
95 See further note 81 supra. 
96 Paragraph 5.3 of the Ombudsman's speech, Chapter One supra, note 2. 
97 C.f Gormley, Chapter Two supra, note 63. 
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Six infra). The Ombudsman might not be able to inspect the document in 
question either (see further Chapter Seven infra), and, most importantly of all, 
may not have jurisdiction to find maladministration in respect of any decision 
taken by the originator of a 'sensitive' document, whose decision regarding 
whether or not to release that document or to include it in the public register is, 
as the Ombudsman observes, final, under the terms of Article 9(3). It follows 
from Article 9(1) that the document's originator may not be an EU institution 
or body: Article 9(3) could, therefore, also preclude the jurisdiction of the CFI 
to review the originator's decision either to classify a document as sensitive, or 
to refuse to consent to its release. The only (inadequate) consolation in respect 
of this apparent 'loophole' in the Regulation is provided by Article 17(1), 
which will at least allow citizens to see how many 'sensitive' documents are 
being excluded from the public register each year, and by Article 9(7), which 
allows the Commission and Council to at least inform the Parliament regarding 
sensitive documents. 
Article 1 0(3) provides that documents may be transcribed into Braille, large 
print, or tape, for the benefit of blind or partially sighted applicants. Article 11 
provides for a public register of documents in electronic form, which is 
particularly useful, enabling applicants to sufficiently identify the documents 
they seek in order to comply with Article 6(1 ). Article 12 calls for as many 
documents as possible to be made directly accessible by electronic means; 
Article 14 calls upon the institutions to inform the public of their rights under 
the Regulation, with the co-operation of the Member States; and Article 15 
calls upon the institutions to develop good administrative practices in 
connection with public access and to share best practices. The remaining 
provisions do not appear to significantly affect the substantive operation of the 
right of public access. 
5.6. Conclusion. 
This Chapter has identified, in section 5.2, the Union citizens' right of public 
access to Commission and Council documents as a right originally conferred 
by Decisions 93/731 and 94/90, and now conferred by the Regulation, although 
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the concept of public access to the Commission's, Council's and Parliament's 
documents may have attained the status of a general principle of Community 
law. The right of access to documents held by other institutions and bodies is 
still required by virtue of the ECJ's judgment in Netherlands: public access is 
required by the principle of good administration.98 
Although its approach is criticised for failing to take adequate consideration of 
the importance of public access as essential to the collective constitutional right 
of citizens to participate in democratic decision-making processes, the ECJ 
nevertheless promoted a right of public access to documents held by most EU 
institutions/bodies. Moreover, the fact that this appeared to be an individual, 
procedural, administrative right, as opposed to a fundamental, collective, 
constitutional citizens' right, was ultimately the fault of the Member States, not 
the ECJ, insofar as the Member States made it clear that the Community 
legislature was to develop public access.99 It remains to be seen, in Chapter 
Six infra, whether the Community Courts ever explicitly linked public access 
to the democratic principle, and/or sought to interpret the Code with a view to 
facilitating public access to EU decision-making processes, as would be 
expected of the courts in a multidimensionally-transparent regime. 
In sections 5.4 and 5.5, respectively, the substantive provisions of Decisions 
93/731 and 94/90, and of the Regulation, were examined in light of the idea of 
a legitimate public interest in secrecy, as identified in section 5.3. Where 
possible, the right of access to the file, and the rights of access to 
environmental information discussed in Chapter Four supra, were compared to 
the Code and Regulation. On balance, the Regulation makes some significant, 
liberalising improvements to the provisions of the Code, such as might enable 
98 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (Chapter One supra, 
note 30, at paragraph 94) concluded that Article 308 (ex 235) EC might have been added 
to Atticle 255 (ex 191a) EC as an additional legal basis for the Regulation, enabling the 
Regulation to cover public access to documents held by the EU institutions/bodies not 
specitied in Article 255. Instead, a non-binding Joint Declaration of the European 
Parliament and Council dated 30 May 200 I (OJ 200 I Ll73/5) was issued, calling upon 
such institutions/bodies to adopt internal rules based upon the Regulation. 
99 Cf J-larlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 295-296: the fact that the Community legislature 
was left to develop public access rules constitutes "a barrier against the installation of a 
constitutional right to transparency, constraining the Ombudsman and inhibiting the 
jurisprudence of the Community courts." 
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the right of public access to be of use to citizens seeking access to decision-
making processes. However, all those improvements could be seriously 
undermined by the continuing emphasis upon mandatory exemptions, not all of 
which require the institutions to conduct a 'substantial harm' test, and by the 
possibility that, by virtue of Article 9(3), the institutions might be able to refuse 
access to documents deemed to be 'sensitive' by parties whose decisions to so 
classify those documents and/or to refuse to consent to their release would fall 
outside the jurisdiction of the Community Courts and the Ombudsman. 
Having concluded that the EU's current provisions governing public access are 
not as liberal as they might be, it follows that they will not be as helpful in 
enabling citizens to hold the institutions to public account as they might be, 
especially since decisions to classify documents as 'sensitive' may be difficult 
to challenge. Nor will the rules encourage/facilitate public participation in 
decision-making as much as they might, if only they were clearly drafted with 
potential lobbyists in mind, instead of being aimed at citizens who have 
apparently been conceptualised as passive consumers of information. Perhaps 
the Commission's White Paper, discussed in Part One, will encourage the 
institutions to regard citizens as potential participants in the political process. 
The Regulation distinguishes between documents and the information 
contained therein, but the wide range of mandatory exceptions hardly suggests 
that the institutions welcome applications for public access: the 'Solana 
Decision' preceding the entry into force of the Regulation suggests the 
complete opposite, casting doubt upon the sincerity of the Council's own call 
for genuine changes in the practices of the institutions, to give effect to the 
principle of transparency. 100 As indicated in the introduction to this Chapter, 
the question of the adequacy of the enforcement mechanisms provided by the 
public access rules, the Courts and the Ombudsman, can only be assessed after 
examining their approach to public access complaints. It is clear that the 
operation of the rules is subject to judicial review, and to review by the 
Ombudsman, but it remains to be seen whether the Courts and Ombudsman are 
100 Note 63 supra. 
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trying to increase the potential of public access to make the EU a more 
multidimensionally-transparent and legitimate polity. 
To conclude Part Two of this thesis, therefore, the substantive law governing 
public access in the EU does not indicate that the institutions responsible for 
conferring the right of public access regard that right as an essential ingredient 
of transparency as public participation in decision-making processes. The 
preamble to the Regulation implies that public access is part of a 
multidimensional concept of transparency involving citizen participation in 
decision-making and greater accountability for the institutions, 101 but its 
substantive provisions, particularly Articles 4 and 9, do not live up to that 
rhetoric, nor do they live up to the principle of providing the widest possible 
public access as interpreted by Curtin with reference to the Treaties. 102 There 
remains much scope for public access to be refused according to a list of 
mandatory exceptions. 103 This is not the approach to be expected of a regime 
taking a multidimensional approach to transparency, ensuring accountability 
and facilitating public participation in decision-making. Clearly, neither the 
institutions nor the Member States have been taking public access sufficiently 
seriously. 104 
In Part Three, the adequacy of judicial review by the Courts (Chapter Six) and 
of 'quasi-judicial review' by the Ombudsman (Chapter Seven), as remedies for 
the institutions' reluctance to grant public access, will be examined. Further 
indications of the institutions' various attitudes towards public access will 
101 Cf also Curtin, note 4 supra, at 16: the "effective reversal" of the presumption in favour of 
secrecy, so that it is now a presumption in favour of openness, "can be considered as one 
of the very important consequences of the inclusion of a Treaty-based right [to public 
access] in the Treaty of Amsterdam." 
102 Note 40 supra. 
103 As Harlow said of the mandatory exceptions included within the original Code, which the 
Regulation barely improves upon, "[i]t is in fact quite hard to think of any document 
which could pass these rigorous tests. Ex abundanti cautela ... the two institutions 
[Commission and Council] receive an additional, discretionary power to refuse access in 
order to protect [their] interest in the confidentiality of [their] proceedings" (Chapter One 
supra, note 8, at 289). 
104 Declaration No. 35 annexed to the Final Act of Amsterdam is a good indicator of some 
Member States' attitude towards public access in the EU: "The Conference agrees that the 
principles and conditions referred to in Article 255( I) [EC] will allow a Member State to 
request the Commission or the Council not to communicate to third parties a document 
originating from that State without its prior agreement." 
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emerge from consideration of the Courts' case law and the Ombudsman's 
decisions. An alternative remedy will be examined in the final Chapter, which 
might, perhaps, help to circumvent the multiple mandatory exceptions in 
Article 4 of the Regulation and might also close the potential loophole in 
Article 9. The institutions, as seen, have improved their public access regime 
slightly, but they remain disappointingly predisposed towards secrecy. It may 
be possible to encourage them to become less secretive, by introducing an 
adequate remedy for citizens to whom public access has been denied. 
188 
PART THREE: REMEDIES IN THE EVENT OF AN EU 
INSTITUTION'§ REFUSAL TO GRANT ACCE§§ TO DOCUMENT§. 
CHAPTER §IX. 
Judicial Review by the Community Courts. 
6.1. Introduction. 
In Chapter Five supra, section 5.2.3., it was noted that the ECJ was heavily 
criticised for its approach towards transparency as public access, following the 
Netherlands judgment. 1 This Chapter will further consider the approach of the 
Community Courts, seeking to assess the adequacy of judicial review as a 
remedy should the institutions refuse to grant public access. Can judicial 
review successfully overcome the obstacles to public access laid down by the 
Code and Regulation, such as the mandatory exemptions discussed in Chapter 
Five supra, in order to secure for citizens a liberal right of public access 
capable of facilitating accountability and public participation in decision-
making processes, which functions make public access essential to 
multidimensional transparency? Section 6.2 will argue that there is a single 
criticism underlying every critique of the Courts' attitude towards public 
access: this Chapter will seek to determine whether, and to what extent, that 
criticism can be justified. 
Section 6.3 begins the process of addressing the criticism of the Courts by 
considering the powers of the Courts in public access cases. Section 6.4 
examines the duty to give reasons, which, as will be seen by reference to the 
case law examined in section 6.5, is frequently invoked by applicants seeking 
the annulment of decisions refusing public access. Section 6.6 provides an 
overview of the public access cases, having regard to: the standard of review; 
the Courts' approach to the duty to give reasons; their use/development of any 
principles that might be regarded as having a liberalising effect upon the EU 
1 Case C-58/94 Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR 1-2169. 
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public access rules; the contrast between the Courts' attitude towards the 
institutions in public access cases and access to the file cases (see Chapter Four 
supra); and, finally, asking whether public access has now been explicitly 
linked to the democratic principles upon which the European Union is said to 
be founded. Are the Courts still treating public access as a voluntarily granted, 
administrative, procedural right, or as an important constitutional right of all 
persons, natural and legal, who are subject to EU law? In short, does their 
approach to public access now resemble that which would be expected from 
the courts of a multidimensionally-transparent regime? In conclusion, section 
6.7 returns to the question of the adequacy of judicial review as a remedy in 
public access cases. 
6.2. One Basic Criticism of the Community Courts. 
The chief criticism of the ECJ remams, as discussed in Chapter Five supra, 
section 5.2.3., that it initially regarded public access as a matter for the 
institutions' internal functioning: a voluntary principle of administrative law, 
not a fundamental, collective constitutional right. This has apparently led it, 
and encouraged the CFI, to conduct a 'marginal' review of refusals to grant 
public access, which 
"avoids the need to examine in detail the reasons why access has been refused ... and ... 
enables the Court[s] to ignore various requests to perform an in camera examination 
of the documents ... requested. Even though the decisions refusing access were 
annulled in the majority of cases, the annulment was based in virtually all ... cases on 
the breach of the duty ... to give reasons when denying access to a given document. "2 
2 Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 12, emphasis in original. There may be good reasons 
for avoiding in camera examinations, however, as illustrated by the Department of Justice 
of the United States of America's Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2000 (see 
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/litigation.htm#camera), citing (at footnote 276) Armstrong v 
Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1996) at 580: "First, [limited in 
camera review] makes it less likely that sensitive information will be disclosed. Second, 
ifthere is an unauthorized disclosure, having reduced the number of people with access to 
the information makes it easier to pinpoint the source of the leak." Cf Case T -111/00, 
British American Tobacco International (Investments) Ltd (BAT) v Commission, judgment 
of 10 October 2001, discussed in section 6.5 infra. 
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It will be argued, in section 6.6 infra, that in concentrating upon the duty to 
give reasons, the Courts have nevertheless made it difficult in practice for the 
institutions to withhold public access, under the rules of the Code that they 
themselves adopted. Recent case law also suggests that the CFI is willing to 
inspect documents to which access has been refused, as will be seen in section 
6.5 infra. 
The ECJ's apparent failure to attach sufficient importance to public access ab 
initio has evidently overshadowed the positive practical achievements of both 
Community Courts, which have normally upheld the right of public access by 
annulling most decisions refusing access? Criticism of the CFI followed the 
first case concerning Council Decision 93/731,4 in which the CFI ruled in the 
applicant's favour, but was said to have left the Council in control of the flow 
of information to citizens. Furthermore, the CFI was said to have ignored the 
applicant's status as a Union citizen. Instead, the issue was "fundamentally an 
inter-institutional one."5 
This conclusion follows from Armstrong's argument that the Court was 
reviewing the implementation of rules adopted by the Council itself, without 
public input or debate, which rules the Council could easily change in order to 
circumvent the effects of an annulment of a decision refusing public access. 
However, it must be remembered that John Carve! had sought the annulment of 
a decision adopted under Decision 93/731. He had not sought the annulment of 
Decision 93/731 itself, nor submitted that Decision 93/731 should only have 
been adopted after public consultation and a public debate. 
It seems that Armstrong's criticism is, in essence, a further criticism of the 
ECJ's refusal to annul Decision 93/731 in the first place, on the grounds 
advanced by the Netherlands, that such a fundamental right cannot be left to 
3 Davis, Chapter Five supra, note 40, at 309, recalling especially that the refusal to annul 
Decision 93/731 allowed the public to enjoy a right of access to Council documents that 
they would not otherwise have had, and that the ECJ required the other institutions to 
develop public access rules. 
4 Case T-194/94, John Carve/ and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v Council [1995] ECR 11-2767, 
discussed in section 6.5 infra. 
5 Armstrong, Chapter Five supra, note 62, at 588. 
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the internal rules of the institutions, but should be provided by legislation 
produced in consultation with citizens and civil society. Basically, therefore, it 
can be concluded that the Community Courts stand accused of being 
insufficiently interested in public access, to the detriment of applicants for such 
access, because they have failed to recognise that public access is an important, 
collective constitutional right of citizens in a democracy. It is necessary to 
consider the powers and limitations of the Community Courts in the context of 
judicial review proceedings, in order to address this criticism. 
6.3. On Judicial Review in Public Access Cases. 6 
Whenever an application for public access is denied, the applicant may seek the 
annulment of the decision refusing access, 7 which decision alone is addressed 
to him/her/it.8 Decisions 93/731 and 94/90 were not open to challenge by 
natural or legal persons, who would not, per Article 230 (ex 173) EC, be 
directly or individually concerned by a Decision applying to 'the public' .9 
Furthermore, Article 231 (ex 174) EC provides that: 
"If the action [for annulment] is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare the 
act concerned to be void ... " 
That is the sole remedy available to applicants seeking judicial review by the 
Community Courts. It is not possible, under the EC Treaty, for the ECJ or CFI 
to substitute its own decision for a decision that has been annulled, so as to 
order the production of documents, even if the Court considered that the benefit 
of public access would outweigh the harm caused to a protected interest. It is 
not the fault of the Courts that they cannot even order an institution to 
6 For a more detailed account of judicial review, see, e.g. Craig and de Burca, Chapter One 
supra, note 6, at pp.453-514. 
7 Paragraph 4, Article 230 (ex 173) EC: "Any natural or legal person may ... institute 
proceedings against a decision addressed to that person ... " (emphasis added). 
8 Remembering that legal persons can seek public access. 
9 See further Gormley, Chapter Two supra, note 63, on the problems faced by applicants 
seeking locus standi to challenge decisions that are not of direct and individual concern to 
them. Although the Courts have interpreted 'direct and individual concern' rather 
restrictively (Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co v Commission [1963] ECR 95), it is ultimately 
the fault of the Member States qua Treaty authors that non-privileged applicants must 
demonstrate that decisions are of direct and individual concern to them. 
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reconsider its refusal to grant public access: there is no Community law 
equivalent of the mandatory order (formerly mandamus) available to English 
courts carrying out a judicial review. 10 It therefore seems unreasonable to 
criticise the Courts for remaining within the limits of their powers. 
Finally, the grounds for review are strictly limited to those found within Article 
230, of which an 'infringement of an essential procedural requirement,' such as 
the duty to give reasons, is evidently regarded as one of the most appropriate 
grounds in public access cases: applicants frequently plead that the institutions 
have failed to provide adequate reasons. 11 If the Courts find that a given 
decision may be annulled for want of adequate reasons, without it being 
necessary to consider any further pleas that may have been submitted, this does 
not necessarily indicate that the Courts are conducting a marginal review in 
public access cases, as will be argued in the following section. 
6.4. The Duty to Give Reasons. 
A plea alleging an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, arising 
from a failure to give adequate reasons, is one of two pleas most likely to result 
in the annulment of a decision refusing public access. The other is a plea 
alleging an infringement of the provisions of the public access rules 
themselves, which requires no further explanation, 12 only illustration. Martin 
Shapiro has argued that the requirement to give reasons can permit judges "to 
match their own policy analyses against those of the [decision-makers]", 
enabling them to conduct a substantive judicial review .13 If a legal system 
10 Nor can the Courts order an institution to declassify a 'sensitive' document, which limits 
their ability to counter the potential effect of Article 9 of the Regulation, discussed in 
Chapter Five supra, section 5.5. 
11 See further section 6.5 infra. Shapiro notes that the ECJ has consistently regarded the duty 
to give reasons under Article 190 (now 253) EC as an essential procedural requirement 
(M. Shapiro, 'The Giving Reasons Requirement' [1992] University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 179, at 197): see also Joined Cases C-9/95, C-23/95 and C-156/95 Belgium and 
Germany v Commission [1997] ECR 1-645, paragraph 44, and Joined Cases C-71/95, C-
155/95, C-27l/95 Belgium and Germany v Commission [1997] ECR 1-687, paragraph 53. 
12 Other than to note that the principle patere legem quam ipse fecisti is observed within 
Community law: the institutions are bound to comply with the rules that they have made 
for themselves. 
13 Note 11 supra, at I 84. 
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requires that reasons be given in order that the court may review decisions, as 
is the case in Community law, 14 then, per Shapiro: 
"Judges begin to say to agencies, "You must give us enough reasons to enable us to 
tell whether you have acted reasonably or arbitrarily and capriciously." As this 
dynamic unfolds, giving reasons moves from a mild and self-enforcing restraint on 
administrative discretion to a quite severe, judicially enforced set of procedural and 
substantive restraints ... it has in the American context." 15 
In a formal sense, that which Shapiro describes as 'giving reasons review' is 
procedural, not substantive. Judges inform decision-makers that they have 
overlooked an essential procedural requirement by not providing adequate 
reasons. "The emphasis is, of course, on the 'given', not on the 'adequate' -
that is, on the failure to perform a required action, not on the badness of the 
action performed." 16 Nevertheless, judges obtain a powerful policy veto: 
"The judge says, "I reject your [decision] because you have not offered good reasons 
for it. Resubmit [it] with a better set ofreasons ... I reserve the right to reject [it] again 
if the second set of reasons are no better than the first." In this situation, most prudent 
[decision-makers] will recognise the need to change the substance of their [decision] 
rather than simply change the rhetoric of the reasons. The agency's change in the 
[decision], however, will be seen as 'voluntary'."17 
Importantly, Shapiro concludes that Article 190 (now 253) EC can be invoked 
in order to achieve greater transparency in EU-Ievel decision-making. 18 Given 
that public access itself has that aim, for the Courts to base their review of 
public access decisions upon the duty to give reasons in Community law does 
not seem illogical. 
It is well established that Community law requires reasons to be given for any 
decision or act: 
14 See further section 6.4 infra. 
15 Note 11 supra, at 184-5. 
16 Ibid., at 187-88. 
17 Ibid. Cf also J. Usher, General Principles of EC Law, Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 
Harlow, Essex, 1998, at p.115: "the statement of reasons has become an extremely 
important element in the development ofjudicial control over individual decisions ... " 
18 Note 11 supra, at 201. 
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whenever Article 253 (ex 190) EC specifically applies; and/or 
in order to enable natural and legal persons to exercise the rights of the 
defence; and/or 
whenever the general principle of good administration so requires: a 'catch-
all' provision. 
An alleged infringement of the duty to give reasons may be contrasted with an 
alleged failure to grant access to the file. The latter plea, as concluded in 
Chapter Four supra, does not normally result in the annulment of a contested 
decision, and the Community Courts, moreover, seem quite reluctant to allow it 
to succeed, although the Cimenteries case 19 discussed in Chapter Four supra, 
section 4.2.3, indicates that they take the right of access to the file seriously. 
Judge Christopher Bellamy of the CFI has suggested that an institution's 
failure to comply with the duty to give reasons, however, has for all practical 
purposes become a ground of review in Article 230 proceedings,20 supporting 
Shapiro's conclusion that this duty provides a powerful tool for substantive 
judicial review.21 The Community Courts would be conducting a marginal 
review if they were to merely verify that a statement of reasons accompanied a 
refusal to grant access to a document. However, as they consider the reasons 
and sometimes find them inadequate to explain the refusal, the standard of 
review is more rigorous: such a review could not only lead to the annulment of 
the decision refusing access, but may oblige the institution concerned to 
reverse its decision, if it were unable to produce more cogent reasons for 
withholding the document(s) in question. 
Although the right of public access was originally characterised by the ECJ as a 
requirement of the general principle of good administration,22 which also 
19 Chapter Four supra, note 16. 
20 Public Lecture entitled 'The Court of First Instance: Perspectives for the Future,' delivered at 
the University of Durham, 26 November 1998. See also Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 
8, at 287: the duty to give reasons has acquired 'constitutional' status, and Shapiro, note 
11 supra, at 198. 
21 Notes 16-17 supra and text. 
22 Note I supra, paragraph 39. 
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requires the giving of reasons,23 the duty to give reasons for refusing public 
access arises under Article 253 (ex 190) EC, as confinned by the cases 
discussed in section 6.5 infra. Of this duty, Shapiro notes that: 
"The ECJ has repeatedly held that the nature and extent of the reasons that must be 
given depend on the nature and circumstances or context of the particular action 
taken ... The ECJ tends to demand only general reasons for major legislation and to 
demand more detailed reasons for more circumscribed decisions."24 
'More circumscribed decisions' include decisions refusing public access. It is 
now necessary to examine the public access case law. If the duty to give 
reasons makes it difficult in practice for an institution to refuse public access, 
this would do much to undermine the argument that the Courts have no interest 
in upholding the right to public access. 
6.5. The Public Access Cases. 
6.5.1. Cases in which the applicant(s) for annulment of a refusal to grant 
public access was/were at least partially successful. 
In Carve/, the eponymous journalist requested COREPER reports and Council 
minutes concerning social affairs, justice and agricultural policy. The Council 
refused access, invoking Article 4(2) of Decision 93/731 protecting the 
confidentiality of its proceedings. Kenneth Campbell suggests that this 
constitutes evidence ofthe Council's 
"presumption of secrecy in relation to its own deliberations ... a stance ... at marked 
variance with the philosophy for access proposed by the Commission ... "25 
because Article 4(2) of the Decision provided that the Council may refuse 
access to documents in order to protect its confidentiality: it was not expected 
to do so automatically. 
23 At least, in the absence of specific legislation: see Usher, note 21 supra, at pp.ll5-116. 
24 Note 11 supra, at 198. 
25 
'Access to European Community Official Information' ( 1997) 46 JCLQ 174, at 178. 
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The CFI held that, as the exception used the discretionary 'may' instead of the 
mandatory 'shall', the Council was required to 
"genuinely balance the interests of the citizen in gaining access to its documents 
against any interests of its own in maintaining the confidentiality of its 
deliberations. "26 
The Council had not demonstrated that such a balancing of interests had been 
undertaken. The idea that it might conceivably have done so by providing a 
detailed statement of reasons is implied.27 The decision refusing access was 
annulled. One potential problem arising from this judgment is that applicants 
for public access need not provide reasons for requesting access, in order that a 
balancing of the actual interests involved might take place.28 If access to a 
given document were refused, but the institution concerned would have 
accorded more weight to the applicant's interest had that interest actually been 
declared, then access might have been granted. However, a strict policy, on the 
part of the institutions, of invoking the discretionary exemption for the 
protection of their procedural confidentiality only in order to protect their 
legitimate 'space to think' 29 should keep to a minimum the number of 
occasions upon which an applicant might risk having insufficient weight 
accorded to his/her undeclared interest. 
WWF30 concerned the Commission's refusal to grant public access under 
Decision 94/90. WWF believed that it would infringe Community 
environmental law, and constitute a misuse of structural funds, to use such 
funds to finance a visitors' centre in Eire's Burren National Park. The 
Commission, after investigating, dismissed that complaint. WWF then 
requested access to documents held by Directorates-General XI (Environment) 
and XVI (Regional Policies), concerning the project's funding. DG XI's 
26 Note 4 supra, paragraph 68. 
27 See Case T -I 05/95 World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) UK v Commission [1997] ECR 11-
313, discussed infra. 
28 See BAT, note 2 supra, discussed infra. 
29 See Chapter Five supra, section 5.4 
30 Note 27 supra. 
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refused to grant access, invoking the mandatory exemption for protection of the 
public interest in investigations of alleged infringements of Community law, 
and the discretionary exemption for the protection of the Commission's 
confidentiality. DG XVI invoked only the discretionary exemption. The 
Secretary-General refused the confirmatory application citing the reasons 
provided by DG's XI and XVI. WWF pleaded an infringement of Article 190 
(now 253) EC. 
The CFI upheld this plea. The Commission could not rely upon the possibility 
of opening infringement proceedings against a Member State in order to justify 
a refusal to grant public access. It should have given some indication, at least 
by reference to categories of documents, of the subject-matter of those 
documents, and noted whether they related to potential infringement 
proceedings involving inspections and investigations.31 It was not required to 
provide, in respect of each document sought, 'imperative reasons' for invoking 
the public interest exception: this would jeopardise the essential function of 
that exception by requiring the disclosure of the contents of the documents in 
question.32 The contested decision did not fulfil those requirements, however, 
nor did it explain how the disclosure of the documents requested might 
adversely affect the confidentiality of the Commission's proceedings. Neither 
WWF nor the CFI could verify that the Commission had balanced its interests 
in confidentiality against the interests of WWF. The statement of reasons was, 
therefore, inadequate,33 and the decision refusing access was annulled. The 
WWF judgment also held that the exceptions to the general principle34 of 
granting the widest possible access to Commission-held documents must be 
interpreted strictly, in order not to frustrate that principle;35 and that the 
Commission could rely concurrently upon a mandatory public interest 
31 !bid, paragraphs 64 and 74. 
32 !bid, paragraph 65. 
33 This supports the contention that the Council might have demonstrated a balancing of its 
interests against John Carvel's by providing a more detailed statement of reasons: see 
note 27 supra and text. 
34 Recalling that this 'general principle' then derived from the Code and Decision 94/90 itself. 
35 Note 27 supra, paragraph 56. This reasoning is well established in case law, as illustrated by 
the Opinion of Advocate-General Leger in Case C-353/99P, Council v Heidi Hautala, 
delivered on I 0 July 200 I, at paragraph I 06, citing a list of consistent authorities 
beginning with Case 4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491. 
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exception and the discretionary exemption for the protection of its 
confidentiality.36 
Interporc i 7 demonstrates a formulaic approach. Paragraphs 1-8 cover, more 
concisely, the same ground covered by paragraphs 1-13 of Carve/ and 
paragraphs I -9 of WWF, tracing the legal history of public access from 
Declaration No. 17 through to the adoption of the Code and the relevant 
(Commission or Council) Decision, the provisions of which are also outlined. 
Interporc imported Argentinean beef free of levies under a special quota 
arrangement, but an import duty was levied following the Commission's and 
Germany's discovery that certain certificates authenticating the beefs origins 
had been falsified. Interporc sought recovery of that duty claiming it had acted 
in good faith, and in its bid to recover payment, requested public access to ten 
categories of Commission-held documents concerning Argentinean beef 
imports. Initially, access to certain documents was refused in order to protect 
the public interest in international relations; to others, because the request had 
to be directed to the relevant Member State/Argentinean authorities as their 
authors; to others, in order to protect the public interest in inspections and 
investigations, and to protect individual privacy; the remaining documents 
were withheld in order to protect the confidentiality of the Commission's 
proceedings.38 The confirmatory application was refused in order to protect the 
public interest in court proceedings, 39 because all the documents concerned 
another Commission Decision that had become the subject-matter of another 
action for annulment brought by Interporc.40 
Interporc sought both the annulment of the decision refusing access and 
declaratory relief, submitting that it would have deprived Decision 94/90 of 
effect if the Commission had been allowed, "in a subsequent administrative 
proceeding", to rely upon different grounds to justify the non-disclosure of 
documents following the annulment of its initial refusal to grant public access, 
36 Note 27 supra, paragraph 61. 
37 Case T-124/96, lnterporc !m- und Export GmbH v Commission [1998] ECR II-231. 
38 !bid, paragraphs 13-15. 
39 I bid, paragraph 18. 
40 I.e. Case T-50/96, Primex Produkte Import und Export and Others v Commission [1998) 
ECR II-3773, to which the Secretary-General's Decision referred. 
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as this would have required the applicant to instigate further judicial review 
proceedings.41 The CFI ruled the head of claim seeking declaratory relief 
inadmissible, observing that, as noted in section 6.3 supra, it may not issue 
instructions to the institutions under Article 173 (now 230) EC.42 
The CFI considered the alleged infringements of Article 190 (now 253) and 
Decision 94/90 concurrently.43 It recalled, citing WWF, that the contested 
decision did not explain why all the documents requested, some of which were 
several years old, were covered by the exception for the protection of the 
public interest in court proceedings. The statement of reasons was therefore 
inadequate, and the decision refusing access was annulled.44 This judgment is 
noteworthy because the CFI also called upon the Commission to examine 'each 
document requested',45 although it only had to supply reasons in respect of 
each category of documents requested. 
Svenska46 might have inspired Article 5, Regulation No. 1049/2001, discussed 
in Chapter Five supra, section 5.5. The applicant journalists' union sought to 
compare Sweden's approach, to documents concerning the institutions' 
activities, to that of the Council. Twenty documents were requested from both 
Swedish authorities and the Council. The former granted access to eighteen: 
the latter, to two. The applicants sought the annulment of the Council's 
refusal to provide the remaining documents. A crucial question concerned the 
CFI's jurisdiction. The documents concerned activities relating to Title VI 
TEU. France and the UK observed that the Court lacked jurisdiction over Title 
VI, although the UK had accepted that Decision 93/731 itself applied to Title 
VI documents, upon which point France disagreed.47 This attempt to confine 
the right of public access to documents concerning Community activities was, 
however, unsuccessful. Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands had submitted 
that although the Court could not review the legality of any Title VI 
41 Note 37 supra, paragraph 59. 
42 Ibid., paragraph 61. 
43 Ibid., paragraph 26. 
44 Ibid., paragraphs 55-57. 
45 Ibid., paragraph 52: see, e.g. Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 33. 
46 Case T-174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR ll-2289. 
47 Ibid., paragraphs 70-72. 
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documents, it could review decisions refusing access to those documents.48 
The Court agreed, finding that its assessment of the legality of the contested 
decision derived from its Article 173 (now 230) jurisdiction to review the 
legality of Council decisions pursuant to Decision 93/731: moreover, the 
contested refusal itself drew the applicants' attention to their right to seek 
judicial review. Title VI activities might, however, fall within the scope of an 
exception provided for under Decision 93/731.49 
This highly significant judgment therefore clarified the scope of Decision 
93/731, and, by implication, Decision 94/90: the Community Courts could 
review decisions refusing public access even to documents concerning the 
intergovernmental pillars of the Union. The CFI also held that Decision 
93/731 was intended to give effect to the principle set down by the Code, of 
granting the widest possible access to information, with a view to strengthening 
the democratic character of the Council.50 This suggests that the CFI was 
beginning to characterise public access as a democratic right. The Council's 
decision infringed Article 190 (now 253) and was therefore annulled: it did not 
specify whether access to certain documents was being refused only in order to 
protect its confidentiality, therefore neither the applicant nor the CFI could 
verify that it had genuinely balanced the interests involved, as required by the 
Carve! judgment. 51 
In Rothmans52 the CFI held that the Commission could not classify the 
Customs Code Committee- a 'comitology' committee established in order to 
oversee delegated legislation adopted by the Commission on the Council's 
behalf53 - as 'another Community institution within the meaning of the Code of 
Conduct', to which the request for access to its minutes should have been 
48 Ibid., paragraphs 74-75. 
49 Ibid., paragraphs 85-87. See also paragraphs 118-120, in which the CFI observed that the 
Council itself did not regard all Title VI documents as being automatically covered by the 
exception to protect the public interest in public security. 
50 Ibid., paragraph 66. 
51 Ibid., paragraph 114, recalling also paragraph 61 of WWF, and paragraphs 124-125. 
52 Case T-188/97, Rothmans International BV v Commission [I 999) ECR 11-2463. 
53 On comitology and comitology committees, see, e.g., Craig and de Burca, Chapter One 
supra, note 6, at pp.l38-40. 
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submitted.54 The applicant's plea alleging an infringement of the duty to give 
reasons was summarily dismissed because the citing of the 'authorship rule' 
was sufficiently clear. 55 However, denying access to documents of a 
comitology committee under this rule would have unduly narrowed the scope 
of the principle of granting the widest possible access to documents. 
Therefore, the Commission had infringed Decision 94/90.56 
The exceptionally significant Hautala judgment57 confirmed the Courts' 
jurisdiction to review decisions refusing access to documents concerning Title 
V TEU, the Common Foreign and Security Policy.58 It is most noteworthy for 
paragraphs 77-88 of the judgment, however, concerning the applicant MEP's 
plea that the Council had infringed Article 4( I), Decision 93/731, by refusing 
to grant partial access to documents that were otherwise covered by an 
exemption. The CFI recalled the Netherlands judgment, ruling that, in the 
absence of specific Community legislation governing public access, Decision 
93/731 neither required the Council to grant, nor prevented it from deciding to 
grant, partial access to documents. The Code underlying the Decision recalled 
Declaration No. 17, and laid down the general principle of granting the widest 
possible public access to Commission and Council documents. As the ECJ had 
observed in the Netherlands judgment, at paragraph 35, Declaration No. 17 
connects public access to the democratic nature of the institutions. As also 
noted by Advocate General Tesauro at paragraph 19 of his Opinion in 
Netherlands, 59 the basis for the right to public access 
"should be sought in the democratic principle, which constitutes one of the 
cornerstones of the Community edifice, as enshrined now in the Preamble to the 
Maastricht Treaty and Article F [TEU, now, after amendment, Article 6] of the 
Common Provisions." 
The CFI proceeded to note that the: 
54 Rothmans, note 52 supra, paragraph 59: the refusal to grant access was annulled for this 
reason (ibid, paragraph 64). 
55 Ibid., paragraphs 36-38. 
56 Ibid., paragraphs 54-63. 
57 Case T-14/98, Heidi Hautala MEP v Council [1999] ECR 11-2489, discussed further in 
section 6.5 infra. 
58 !bid, paragraph 42. 
59 [1996] ECR 1-2171. 
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" ... principle of proportionality requires that 'derogations remain within the limits of 
what is appropriate and necessary for achieving the aim in view' ."60 
The Council's aim, of protecting the public interest with regard to international 
relations, could be achieved by the removal of any potentially harmful passages 
from documents prior to their disclosure. The principle of proportionality 
would allow the Council to balance the interest in public access to the censored 
documents against the administrative burden imposed by the need to censor 
them, enabling it to safeguard the interests of good administration. The 
Council was therefore obliged to consider granting partial access to any 
information that was not covered by any exceptions. The Council's belief that 
public access did not apply to the information contained within documents was 
an error of law vitiating its decision refusing partial access, which was duly 
annulled. 
lnterporc 11'1 is significant for three reasons. It confirmed that an undertaking 
granted access to the file could request access to further documents under 
Decision 94/90;62 that a refusal to grant public access upon receipt of a 
confirmatory application was not unlawful simply because it referred to 
grounds not discussed in the initial refusal, which followed because the 
institution's Secretary-General was required to thoroughly review the initial 
application; and that the exemption for the protection of court proceedings 
covered only documents specifically drawn up for the purpose of those 
proceedings.63 Critics might take issue with paragraph 66 of Jnterporc //: the 
CFI observed that Declaration No. 17 does not "have the force of a rule of law 
of a higher order" than Decision 94/90. However, the act of requiring the 
60 Case 222/84 Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651, 
paragraph 38 
61 Case T -92/98, Jnterporc !m- und Export GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR 11-3521: a follow-
up to Jnterporc I, still concerning Commission documents relating to the import of 
Argentinean beef. 
62 Ibid., paragraphs 38-49. 
63 Ibid., paragraphs 54-57; see also Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 185. Interporc 
had sought access to documents which had not been produced to it following Jnterporc I, 
successfully pleading that the Commission had infringed Decision 94/90 in denying 
access to documents not already disclosed in accordance with the rights of the defence 
(note 61 supra, paragraphs 38-49). However, its plea alleging an infringement of the duty 
to give reasons when certain documents were withheld under the 'authorship rule' was 
dismissed (ibid., paragraphs 77-79). 
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'authorship rule' to be construed as narrowly as possible demonstrates respect 
for the principle of granting the widest possible access to documents, 
notwithstanding the fact that this principle was evidently deemed to arise from 
Decision 94/90 itself, instead of being an independent general principle of 
Community law. 
Kuijer64 challenged the CFI to consider directly a plea alleging the breach of a 
fundamental principle of Community law requiring public access to documents 
held by the institutions. The CFI did not do so. The contested refusal to grant 
access to Commission documents concerning asylum and immigration matters 
was annulled because the statement of reasons was inadequate65 and because 
the Council had refused to grant partial public access.66 The CFI deemed it 
unnecessary to consider the applicant's third plea: the contested decision could 
be annulled on the basis of the first two.67 This judgment is, of course, liable to 
attract the same criticism levelled against the judgment in Netherlands, since 
the CFI refused to comment on the existence of an independent general 
principle of Community law concerning public access. However, the third plea 
was based upon a misunderstanding of the law: the only general principle of 
public access in the EU legal order at this time was that originally conferred by 
the Code, as noted in Chapter Five supra, section 5.2. 
In .IT's Corporation,68 the CFI partially annulled a refusal to grant access to 
four categories of documents concerning trade missions in Bangladesh: the 
statement of reasons did not show that the Commission had determined that the 
disclosure of certain documents was likely to undermine the public interest in 
inspections and investigations.69 Whereas the Code stated that disclosure shall 
(or may) be refused if it could undermine a public interest, or the institution's 
confidentiality, the institutions were evidently required to decide whether 
64 Case T-188/98, A/do Kuijer v Council [2000] ECR 11-1959. 
65 ibid., paragraphs 45-48. 
66 ibid., paragraphs 54-61. 
67 ibid., paragraph 61. The CFI had also decided Hautala without ruling on this same plea 
(note 57 supra, paragraph 89). 
68 Case T-123/99, JT's Corporation Ltd. v Commission [2000] ECR 11-3269. 
69 ibid., paragraph 64, citing Svenska, note 46 supra, paragraph 112. 
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disclosure was likely to undermine such an interest. That, arguably, is a 
slightly stricter 'harm test', imposed by the CFI. 
In BAT/0 the applicant sought minutes of the Committee on Excise Duties 
concerning tobacco taxation, which was ultimately refused because their 
disclosure could have undermined the Commission's confidentiality. The CFI, 
in a significant development, ordered production of the documents at issue/ 1 
observing that it must, without substituting its own assessment for the 
Commission's, "ascertain whether the Commission has indeed struck a balance 
between the interests at stake without overstepping the boundaries of its power 
of assessment."72 It also observed that the Commission knew about the 
applicant's actual interest in seeking the minutes in question: BAT sought to 
oppose the EC classification, for taxation purposes, of a new product called 
'expanded tobacco'. That knowledge was held to be relevant to the balancing 
exercise that the Commission was required to undertake.73 The CFI found that 
the minutes concerned discussions which had been terminated by the time the 
applicant submitted its request for access, as a result of which the "disclosure 
ofthe identities of the delegations referred to therein could no longer inhibit the 
Member States from ... expressing their respective positions regarding the tax 
treatment of expanded tobacco." Therefore, the Commission's decision was 
vitiated by a manifest error of assessment, and was duly annulled. 74 
70 Note 2 supra. 
71 Although the CFI had previously ordered, and obtained, the production of confidential 
Commission-held documents in the context of court proceedings: see Case T -145/98, 
ADT Project Gesellschaft v Commission [1999) ECR 11-2627, BAT is the first public 
access case in which such an order has been made (see also the press release, No. 50/01 of 
I 0 October 2001, http://curia.eu.int/en/cp/info/index.htm). 
72 Note 2 supra, paragraph 41. 
73 Ibid., paragraphs 44-45. This is significant in light of the fact, noted earlier, that one 
problem with the Carve/ judgment is that it only required the institutions to balance their 
interests in confidentiality against a general public interest in public access. 
74 Ibid., paragraphs 56-58. 
205 
6.5.2. Cases in which the applicant(s) for annulment of a decision refusing 
public access was/were wholly unsuccessful. 
In Carlsen75 the applicants sought an injunction ordering the Council to release 
certain documents, to which access had been refused under Decision 93/731, to 
both the Danish Supreme Court and the parties in a case pending before that 
court, on condition that the documents were not to be publicly disclosed.76 
Access to the opinions of the Council's legal services was refused, invoking 
three 'public interests': the maintenance of legal certainty; the stability of EC 
law; and the Council's ability to obtain independent legal advice. The 
applicants pleaded an inadequate statement of reasons and an infringement of 
Decision 93/731. CFI President Saggio found that the Council, having 
expressly stated the public interests that might be harmed by the disclosure of 
the documents sought, had provided an adequate statement of reasons. 77 Judge 
Saggio's ruling clearly showed that, in his opinion, 'the public interest' was not 
confined to the five categories specified within Article 4, Decision 93/731.78 
He decided that the protection of the public interest "in the stability of 
Community law" justified a refusal to disclose the opinions of the Council's 
legal services. 79 
Curtin observes that, firstly, the public interests relied upon by the Council 
were indeed not specified in Decision 93/731, which does not present the 'five 
cases set out in brackets' as being of secondary importance with respect to the 
public interest contemplated by Judge Saggio.80 Only if the list of public 
interests protected by the Decision had been preceded by words such as 
75 Case T-61 0/97 R, Hanne Norup Carlsen and Others v Council [1998] ECR 11-485. 
76 The two documents concerned the views of the Council's and the Commission's Legal 
Services regarding the legal basis of Directive 79/409 (OJ 1979 L I 03/1 ), a measure 
concerned with the conservation of wild birds. The case before the Danish court 
concerned the constitutionality of Denmark's accession to the Communities. 
77 Note 75 supra, paragraphs 38-42. 
78 Ibid., paragraphs 46-48. 
79 Ibid., paragraphs 46, 48-50. 
8° Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 33. The institutions may in future attempt to deny access to 
documents drawn up by their Legal Services on the basis of Article 4(3) of Regulation 
I 049/200 I, which provides that documents for internal use shall not be disclosed if such 
disclosure could seriously undermine the institution's decision-making processes, unless 
there is an overriding public interest in the disclosure of the documents concerned. It is to 
be hoped that the CFI will be far less sympathetic (to the institutions) in such cases than 
was Judge Saggio in Carlsen. 
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'including' or 'for example' might the President's interpretation of that list as 
non-exhaustive have been credible. Moreover, the Commission does not 
automatically refuse access to documents originating from its own legal 
services, but examines each on a case-by-case basis. There seems to be no 
reason for the Council to behave differently. 81 
Carlsen demonstrates a lack of regard for transparency on the part of the CFI's 
President, and supports Campbell's contention that the Council welcomes 
public access less than the Commission.82 Judge Saggio, in an approach 
wholly inconsistent with subsequent public access cases, endorsed reasons that 
did not explain the Council's refusal to grant public access in light ofthe clear 
wording of Decision 93/731. The Council, by invoking a novel public interest 
not specified within the Decision, may have been seeking to disguise a desire 
to maintain the confidentiality of its proceedings: the discretionary exception 
protecting its confidentiality would have required a balancing exercise, 
whereas the exception protecting public interests is mandatory, and so would 
not.83 However, there is one respect in which Carlsen might be regarded as 
'good law'. 
Access to the file in Community law is, as discussed in Chapter Four supra, 
based upon the rule of law: people should have all the information necessary in 
order to secure a fair trial, but there is no reason to grant any further access to 
documentation once that requirement has been fulfilled. Access to the file 
cannot, therefore, be relied upon in order to obtain access to documents that are 
not immediately pertinent to a person's defence. The philosophy underlying 
public access, however, per the Code and Regulation, and as implicitly 
81 Ibid., at 33. Carlsen might have allowed the Commission to impose, with impunity, a 
'blanket ban' upon the disclosure of documents prepared by its own Legal Services. In 
Case T-44/97, Ghignone and Others v Council, judgment of 8 November 2000, 
paragraphs 47-48, the CFI apparently confirmed the notion, inherent in Carlsen, that legal 
privilege automatically attaches to legal advice from the legal services of the institutions. 
82 Note 25 supra and text. 
83 Cf Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 33. The need for the Courts to strictly scrutinise 
the invocation of mandatory exemptions becomes even more acute in the absence of a 
Community law requirement to balance interests under such an exemption (ibid., at 35}, 
which absence was confirmed recently in Case T-204/99, 01/i Mattila v Council and 
Commission, judgment of 12 July 2001, discussed infra. 
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acknowledged by the CFI in the opening paragraphs of all public access cases84 
citing Declaration No. 17, is 'the democratic principle'. This principle requires 
that people should have the widest possible access to all types of information, 
without giving reasons. It would not normally make sense for applicants for 
public access to refer to access to the file cases. Judge Saggio correctly 
dismissed the plea based upon access to the file case law in Carlsen. 85 As will 
be seen in section 6.6.2. infra, however, there is perhaps one set of 
circumstances in which applicants for public access might usefully reason by 
analogy to the right of access to the file. 
In Van der Wa/, 86 the applicant sought access to the Commission's responses to 
various questions, submitted by national courts, concerning competition law. 
This was refused: to disclose such 'legal analyses', it was claimed, might 
undermine the cooperation between the Commission and national courts, which 
would 'obviously' not appreciate the disclosure of answers to questions 
concerning pending cases.87 The Commission therefore invoked the public 
interest in court proceedings. The CFI addressed separately the pleas alleging 
infringement of Decision 94/90 and breach of the duty to give reasons. 
Paragraphs 41-43 of the judgment resemble paragraphs 46-53 of Interporc I, 
the only difference is that the duty to give reasons when relying upon an 
exception is not mentioned in van der Wal in connection with the plea alleging 
infringement of Decision 94/90. The Commission was nevertheless required to 
show that it had considered whether disclosure of the documents sought: 
"is in fact likely to undermine one of the facets of public interest protected by the first 
category of exception."88 
The CFI rejected the first plea, concluding that the Commission could rely 
upon the exception for the protection of court proceedings in order to protect its 
84 Excluding Car/sen, note 75 supra. 
85 Paragraphs 51-52 of the judgment, note 75 supra. Cf Harden, Chapter Three supra, note 65, 
at 183, concluding that public access is entirely separate from access to the file, and 
Ragnemalm, Chapter Five supra, note 9, at 20: respect for access to the file "can never be 
a substitute for the general right of citizens to check the acts of their public authorities." 
86 Case T-83/96, van der Wa/ v Commission [1998] ECR 11-545. 
87 /bid, paragraph 15. 
88 !bid, paragraph 43. 
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relationship with national courts, since Article 6 ECHR required that those 
courts be left free to apply their own Rules of Procedure in adopting decisions 
concerning the publication of information. This ruling was overturned by the 
ECJ upon appeal, 89 in a manner consistent with the principle of proportionality: 
the ECJ discovered a less restrictive approach to public access that nevertheless 
protected the autonomy of national courts.90 The CFI's incidental finding, that 
the applicant for public access had not claimed that the documents sought 
merely reproduced information that would be "otherwise available" under 
Decision 94/90,91 gave some cause for concern. It seemed almost as though the 
CFI had forgotten that an applicant was not required to justify his/her/its 
request for public access under the Code. Such an error of law might have 
been submitted as a further ground for appeal to the ECJ.92 However, 
Kadelbach considers that the CFI had genuinely been attempting to balance the 
interests of parties to litigation with the public interest in openness of the 
Commission's replies to national courts: although it had interpreted the 
exception based upon the public interest in court proceedings too broadly, this 
error may have been excusable, since third party rights had never been at issue 
in previous public access cases.93 
The CFI also dismissed the second plea,94 in a manner that might appear 
disappointingly marginal following Interporc I. The Commission supplied 
reasons, therefore it fulfilled its Article 190 (now 253) duty. However, it must 
be remembered that the CFI had already examined the Commission's reasons 
89 Joined Cases C-174/98 P and C-189/98 P, Netherlands and van der Wa/ v Commission, 
judgment of January 11, 2000. The ECJ found (at paragraphs 17-18) that the CFI had 
misconstrued the requirements of Article 6 ECHR. It also found (at paragraphs 25-28) 
that, whereas national law might oblige the Commission to withhold its replies to a 
national coutt, the Commission was obliged to consult the national court concerned in 
order to ascertain that fact. It went on to invoke Article 54 of the EC Statute of the Court 
of Justice in order to annul the Commission's refusal to grant access to the documents 
sought (paragraphs 31-33). Importantly, Advocate-General Cosmas explicitly referred, at 
paragraph 76 of his Opinion, to 'the' principle of transparency, as expressed by the right 
of public access and regulated by Decision 94/90. Critics may be disappointed that the 
ECJ did not address that point, but a possible explanation for its failure to do so has 
already been discussed in Chapter Five supra, section 5 .2.3: see also Davis, Chapter Five 
supra, note 40. 
90 Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 190. 
91 Note 86 supra, paragraph 52. 
92 Davis, Chapter Five supra, note 40, at 307. 
93 Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 186. 
94 Van der Wal, note 86 supra, paragraph 71. 
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in detail, in connection with the plea alleging infringement of Decision 94/90, 
and, although it had erred in law, it would have been inconsistent, having 
dismissed the first plea, to have upheld the second, requiring the Commission 
to produce better reasons for its decision. Moreover, had the CFI considered 
both pleas concurrently, as in Interporc I, its judgment would not have 
differed: its error was, as noted, not due to its failure to respect the principle of 
granting the widest possible access to documents, but to its conclusion that the 
Commission could rely upon the exception in respect of court proceedings in 
light of Article 6 ECHR. 
The unsuccessful applicant in Bavarian Lager95 sought access to the 
Commission's file concerning Article 226 (ex 169) EC proceedings against the 
UK, which proceedings concerned agreements to purchase imported beer. The 
Commission's refusal had invoked the mandatory exception for the protection 
of the public interest in inspections and investigations. The applicant in 
Denkavi/6 was also unsuccessful. The Commission had again invoked the 
public interest in inspections and investigations: this time, its proceedings 
concerned measures taken to combat swine fever within the Netherlands. It 
seems that the CFI is quite willing to defer to the Commission when the 
Commission invokes the public interest in inspections and investigations. 
In JT's Corporation, discussed above, the CFI held that the Commission was 
nevertheless required to consider whether each individual document requested 
was actually covered by that particular exception, and in Bavarian Lager it 
emphasised that this exception did not automatically cover every document 
relating to the Commission's investigations.97 Harlow, however, justifiably 
wonders why the need to protect the proper conduct of infringement procedures 
justifies the withholding, in the public interest, of access to preparatory 
documents concerning investigations under Article 169 (now 226) EC in the 
95 Case T-309/97, The Bavarian Lager Company Ltd. v Commission [1999] ECR 11-3217. 
96 Case T-20/99, Denkavit Nederland BV v Commission [2000] ECR 11-3011. 
97 Note 95 supra, paragraph 41. Only documents which might lead in future to an infringement 
proceeding against a Member State are covered. See also Harden, Chapter Three supra, 
note 65, at 179. 
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first place.98 If Article 226 proceedings reach the judicial stage, the resulting 
judgment of the ECJ is made public. If such proceedings are halted or 
suspended before a reasoned opinion is delivered to the Member State under 
investigation, however, it appears that any citizens or undertakings concerned 
by the conduct of that Member State may already learn why the Commission 
has not decided to pursue Article 226 proceedings, via a complaint to the 
Ombudsman, whose decisions are also made public.99 It is not, therefore, 
entirely clear why the public interest demands that Commission documents 
concerning Article 226 investigations, even during the preparatory stages, 
should invariably be kept secret. 100 
The applicant in Mattila 101 inventively submitted eight pleas when seeking the 
annulment of a decision refusing access to documents concerning EU-Russian 
relations. These were: 1) manifest error of assessment in interpreting the 
protection of international relations; 2) breach of the principle of 
proportionality by not granting or considering partial access; 3) failure to 
consider each individual document; 4) failure to state reasons; 5) failure to take 
account of the applicant's private interest in seeking the documents; 6) 
violation of the principle of independent review (review by COREPER I of 
COREPER Il's refusal to grant access not being deemed independent); 7) 
misuse of powers; and 8) the institution's failure to cooperate by rejecting the 
request for lack of precision without making any effort to locate the documents 
requested. 102 
The CFI declared pleas 6)-8) to be inadmissible according to its Rules of 
Procedure. This has no direct bearing on public access, the CFI being best 
placed to interpret its Rules of Procedure. Pleas 1)-4) were dismissed, after due 
98 Chapter One supra, note 8, at 29, referring to paragraph 41 of the Bavarian Lager judgment. 
Per 1-larlow, this judgment is symptomatic of an 'instrumentalist approach', in which the 
executive, i.e. the Commission, is accorded priority as representative of the public 
interest. 
99 E.g. the decisions in Complaints 1554/99/ME and 227/2000/ME against the Commission 
(http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.intldecision/en/991554.htm). 
100 See further the discussion of Case T-191/99, David Petrie and Others v Commission, 
judgment of 11 December 2001, infra. 
101 Note 83 supra. 
102 Ibid., paragraphs 28-30. 
211 
consideration. Plea 5) was deemed 'irrelevant', the CFI noting that it follows 
from the very refusal to grant access that the applicant has an interest in the 
annulment of that refusal, and that the Council and Commission had only to 
balance interests when considering access to documents concerning their 
deliberations, which was not the case in Mattila. 103 Arguably, that is a 
perfectly correct interpretation of the Code: again, the fundamental criticism 
that might be levelled at the CFI in this case is that its judgment is based 
entirely upon that Code. 
In Petrie, 104 the applicants sought access to documents concerning the 
Commission's investigation into an alleged breach of Community law, 
concerning Italy's practice of issuing short-term contracts to teachers of foreign 
languages, including Mr Petrie. The applicants, believing that the Commission 
had not been made aware of the true situation, sought to examine its file. 105 
Access was refused on the grounds that certain specified documents originated 
with Italian authorities, to whom the request for access should be made: access 
to the remaining documents was refused as their disclosure might adversely 
affect the public interest in investigations and investigations, and in court 
proceedings. 106 The applicants submitted that the decision refusing access 
infringed Article 255(1) EC and Article I (2) TEU. 107 The CFI held, justifiably, 
that neither Article fulfilled the van Gend criteria for direct applicability, so as 
to render Decision 94/90 inoperative. 108 More controversially, perhaps, the 
CFI also held that Article 255 could not be used as a guide to interpreting 
Decision 94/90 'in advance of a determination by the Community legislature of 
the principles and limits to govern application of the article.' 109 However, as 
the Court subsequently reiterated that the objective of the Decision is to give 
effect to the principle of granting 'the widest possible access' to documents, 110 
103 Ibid., paragraphs I 06-108. 
104 Note 100 supra. 
105 Ibid., paragraph 15. 
106 Ibid., paragraph 17. 
107 Ibid., paragraph 28. 
108 Ibid., paragraphs 34-36 (reference to Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse 
Administratie der Belastingen [1963) ECR I). 
109 Ibid., paragraph 37. An EFIL member has observed, informally, that this approach confuses 
direct effect with the principle of interpretation. 
110 Ibid., paragraph 64. 
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which formula does not appear in Article 255, this finding arguably did not 
adversely affect the Court's interpretation of Decision 94/90. 
The Court, also justifiably, dismissed the plea alleging a failure to give reasons: 
the reasons supplied were sufficient to inform the parties and to enable the 
Court to carry out its review. 111 The disappointing aspect of that review, 
however, is the CFI's dismissal of the plea alleging an infringement of 
Decision 94/90, on the grounds that some of the documents concerned Article 
226 proceedings, which obliged the Commission to maintain their 
confidentiality. 112 As the Commission itself observed, when contesting the 
admissibility of the application for annulment, the parties were already in 
possession of some of the requested documents and aware of the contents of 
others. 113 The Court's finding that those documents nevertheless required 
confidential treatment therefore seems inconsistent with reality: its reasoning 
remains unconvincing, and is suggestive of an unwarranted degree of deference 
to the Commission. However, although it was perhaps disappointing to note 
that the Court was clearly unmoved by the fact that the applicants had a 
genuine interest in the alleged infringement under investigation, 114 the Court 
could ignore that interest because the Commission was not obliged by Decision 
94/90 to balance the interests of applicants for public access, assuming that 
those interests are known, against the public interests protected by the 
mandatory exceptions. 
111 Ibid., paragraphs 73-81. 
112 Ibid., paragraphs 67-69. 
113 Ibid., paragraph 24. 
114 Ibid., paragraph 70. The Commission has voluntarily adopted a code of conduct giving 
procedural rights to individuals whose complaints might serve as the foundation of an 
Article 226 investigation, including a right to comment on the Commission's initial 
position before any formal decision is taken to close the file without issuing a reasoned 
opinion (decision of 13 October 1997 in the Ombudsman's own-initiative inquiry 
303/97/PD, http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decisionlen/970303 .htm, esp. paragraph 
I 0). In light of this, pragmatically speaking, individual complainants might well be 
regarded as parties during the pre-contentious stage of Article 226 proceedings, contrary 
to the CFI's bald statement to the effect that individuals cannot claim a right to be heard 
under the principle audi alteram partem during such proceedings. The latter analysis 
would improve transparency under Article 226: by contrast, the Court's view is that all 
information relating to Article 226 proceedings must always be kept confidential, 
notwithstanding the valuable role of the public in providing the Commission with 
information concerning possible infringements of Community law. 
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6.6. Are the Community Courts interested in public access? 
6. 6.1. An overview of the cases discussed in section 6. 5 supra. 
The case law provides some indication of the practical value of judicial review 
as a remedy for refusals to grant public access. Access was finally refused in 
JF's Corporation by decision dated 11 March 1999. The application for 
annulment of that decision was lodged on 21 May 1999 and the judgment was 
handed down on 12 October 2000, almost eighteen months later. Successful 
applicants for the annulment of a decision refusing access must submit a fresh 
application and the Commission must adopt a fresh decision: 115 a further two 
months might therefore elapse before access would finally be granted. This 
delay is far from ideal, particularly as Article 4(2) of the Aarhus Convention 
confirms the belief that information should be disclosed as soon as possible, 
and in any event, after not more than two months. The ideal independent 
review of a refusal to grant public access would be able to reach a final 
conclusion promptly. 116 
The public access case law also illuminates the attitude of the institutions, 
particularly the Council, which appealed, unsuccessfully, against the Hautala 
judgment. 117 The jurisprudence suggests that the institutions have sought to 
interpret the exceptions in their public access rules as widely as possible, in 
order to preserve as much secrecy as possible, or to have invoked mandatory 
exemptions in a bid to avoid balancing their interests in confidentiality. 118 The 
Commission was said to have given a low priority to FOI in the cases discussed 
by Kadelbach, 119 supporting the overall conclusion of Chapter Five supra, that 
the institutions have not taken public access sufficiently seriously. 
115 Cf Ragnemalm, Chapter Five supra, note 9, at 28; Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 
290. 
116 Ragnemalm, Chapter Five supra, note 9, at 21, calls for efficient legal remedies against 
refusals to grant public access and adds that there should ultimately be an appeal to a 
court of law, but one can ask whether that would be truly efficient in terms of the time 
taken and potential cost. 
117 Case C-353/99 P, Council v Hautala and Others, judgment of 6 December 200 I: see section 
6.6.2. infra. 
118 Curtin, see note 83 supra and text. 
119 Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 193. 
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Having regard to the attitude of the Member States, applicants for public access 
have been supported by the Netherlands, 120 Sweden, 121 Denmark122 and 
Finland, 123 whilst the secretive institutions have been supported by France,124 
Spain 125 and the UK. 126 This also supports the conclusion of Chapter Five 
supra, section 5.2, that public access is too politically sensitive an issue to be 
left to the Community Courts. The Member States apparently have widely 
differing attitudes towards the right, 127 although they are also fickle: in the 
appeal against the Hautala judgment, France and the UK intervened to support 
Heidi Hautala. 
Having also concluded in Chapter Five supra, section 5.2, that the ECJ may 
originally have declined to develop public access rules because the Member 
States clearly entrusted the Community institutions with the task of doing so, 
the case law nevertheless illustrates that both Community Courts frequently 
sought to interpret the institutions' rules in order to ensure that the general 
principle of granting the widest possible public access to documents, as set 
down by the Code, was not unduly frustrated. In the course of annulling 
refusals to grant public access for want of adequate reasons, the CFI held that 
the institutions had to balance their interest in confidentiality against the 
interests of the applicant for public access, 128 under the Code, and must 
adequately explain why documents are protected by (a) mandatory 
exception(s), albeit without disclosing the content of the documents in 
question. 129 Were it not for the stringency ofthe requirement to give reasons in 
120 Van der Wal, note 86 supra, Netherlands and van der Wal, note 89 supra, Svenska, note 46 
supra. 
121 Svenska, note 46 supra, Rothmans, note 52 supra, Hauta/a, note 57 supra. 
122 Svenska, note 46 supra. 
123 Hautala, note 57 supra. 
124 Svenska, note 46 supra, Hautala, note 57 supra. 
125 Council v Hautala and Others, note 117 supra. 
126 Svenska, note 46 supra. 
127 Cf Tridimas, Chapter Four supra, note 7, at p.224. Cf also 1-larlow, Chapter One supra, 
note 8, at 30 I. 
128 WWF, note 27 supra, lnte1porc I, note 37 supra, Svenska, note 46 supra, Kuijer, note 64 
supra, and BAT, note 2 supra. 
129 WWF, note 27 supra, JT's Corporation, note 68 supra, van der Wal, note 86 supra. 
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public access cases, the institutions would have been able to withhold access to 
documents far more easily. 130 
The CFI has, unfortunately, been inconsistent. Carlsen contrasts markedly 
with the other cases discussed in section 6.5 supra, even those in which the 
application for annulment was dismissed. Judge Saggio neither considered the 
principle of granting the widest possible access to documents, nor the need to 
interpret exceptions to that principle as narrowly as possible. 131 Hopefully, 
such an illiberal ruling will never be repeated, 132 particularly since the 
applicants involved had sought information to facilitate their participation in a 
political process. 133 In van der Wal, the CFI abandoned the pro-transparency 
approach that had led it to impose additional duties upon the institutions: to 
inspect individual documents; 134 to assess the likelihood of harm being caused 
to a protected interest; 135 to balance interests; 136 and to grant partial access to 
documents. 137 Thankfully, the ECJ upon appeal obliged the Commission to 
actually ask a national court, if in doubt, whether national law required the 
answers to the questions submitted by that national court to remain 
unpublished, before invoking the public interest in court proceedings. 138 
Neither Bavarian Lager, nor Denkavit, nor, especially, Petrie, convincingly 
explains why access to documents relating to possible Article 226 proceedings 
should be withheld in the public interest. 
Nevertheless, it must be remembered that the CFI applied the Code to 
documents concerning the intergovernmental pillars of the EU. 139 In public 
access cases, the institution refusing access is consistently required to justify its 
position. A failure to comply with the duty to give reasons will result in the 
130 Even Harlow appears to concede that the CFI's public access jurisprudence is placing 
increasing emphasis upon the control of the institutions (Chapter One supra, note 8, at 
290). 
131 Rothmans, note 52 supra, re the 'authorship rule'. 
132 Notwithstanding Ghignone, note 8 I supra. 
133 Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 194. 
134 Interporc I, note 37 supra. 
135 Intetporc I!, note 61 supra. 
136 Cm1'el, note 4 supra. 
137 Hautala, note 57 supra. 
138 Netherlands and van der Wal, note 89 supra. 
139 Svenska, note 46 supra, and Hautala, note 57 supra. 
216 
annulment of a decision to refuse public access. 140 The judgments in the 
majority of public access cases do not support the idea that the Community 
Courts have no interest in public access, 141 nor, in BAT, did the CFI decline to 
review documents itself in order to conclude that the Commission had 
manifestly erred in its assessment thereof. It is to be hoped that the Courts will 
take a similarly pro-transparency approach to the provisions of the Regulation, 
when called upon to interpret these. 
The fact that neither Court has unequivocally recognised a general principle of 
public access independent of that set out in the Code of Conduct may, in light 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as discussed in Chapter One supra, 
section 1.3, be a moot issue: Regulation No. 1049/2001 should certainly be 
interpreted with a view to ensuring that the widest possible public access to 
documents is granted by the institutions, since public access has been solemnly 
proclaimed to be a fundamental Union citizens' right. Importantly, in answer 
to the Courts' critics, it is difficult to imagine the extent to which an expressly 
acknowledged independent general principle of public access would have made 
any practical difference to even the van der Wal judgment, in which the CFI's 
error lay in its finding that Article 6 ECHR required the Commission to 
withhold access to its replies to the questions posed by national courts. 142 
However, further consideration must be given to this issue in light of the 
Hautala judgments, which are pro-transparency as public access, yet 
disappointingly equivocal regarding the importance attached by the CFI and 
the ECJ to public access as a fundamental right derived from the democratic 
principle. 
14° Cf a failure to grant access to the file, as discussed in Chapter Four supra, section 4.2 
141 Cf Tridimas, Chapter Four supra, note 7, at p.224: the Courts have 'given teeth' to the right 
of public access. 
142 Davis, Chapter Five supra, note 40, at 307. 
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6.6.2. Hautala: recognising public access as a general principle of Community 
law? 
The CFI's judgment apparently represents the 'high water mark' of its 
approach to public access to date. 143 The CFI invoked the general principle of 
proportionality in reviewing the substance of the Council's decision refusing 
access, asking whether the Council was taking the minimum action required in 
order to secure its aim of protecting the public interest with regard to 
international relations! 44 That is not indicative of a 'marginal' review! 45 
Furthermore, the CFI came very close indeed, at first glance, to expressly 
recognising public access as a general principle of Community law: 146 it clearly 
stated that: 
" ... Decision 93/731 must be interpreted in light of the principle of the right to 
. ,r. . d h . . I f . I' " 147 mJormatwn an t e prmc1p eo proport1ona 1ty. 
As noted in Chapter One supra, section 1.2, multidimensional transparency 
calls for a right to information and, as discussed in Chapter Two supra, sub-
section 2.2.3.2., also requires decisions to be proportionate, which could help 
to ensure that decisions are accepted as legitimate. By apparently recognising a 
right to information as a consequence of the democratic principle, and by 
requiring public access decisions to be adopted according to the principle of 
143 Even Harlow describes it as "a bold decision" (Chapter One supra, note 8, at 302). That 
public access is not yet recognised by the Courts as an EU constitutional right is agreed 
by Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 67, at 188. 
144 Note 57 supra, paragraph 85. 
145 Cf Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 12-13, indicating that the CFI "went further" in 
Hautala than it had previously done, in terms of the standard of its review. 
146 Cf Ragnemalm, Chapter Five supra, note 9, at 26-27, who suggests that the CFI recognised 
a principle of transparency implemented by Decision 93/731 in Carve/, which pre-dated 
the ECJ's judgment in Netherlands, although in the subsequent WWF judgment it was 
clear that this principle emanated from the Code. Ragnemalm's suggestion that lnterporc 
I "indicates a somewhat less ambiguous recognition of the existence of a general principle 
of access to documents held by Community institutions" is difficult to accept: the very 
wording of the 'general principle' recognised by the CFI in that case is identical to that 
found within the Code, indicating that this general principle did not exist independently of 
the Code, and as Ragnemalm also notes, the later van der Wal judgment shows that the 
CFI still regarded the Code as the basis tor the principle of public access. Kadelbach, 
Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 187, discussing post-Hautala cases, maintains that neither 
Community Court has recognised a general principle of public access independent of the 
Code. 
147 Note 57 supra, paragraph 87 (emphasis added). 
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proportionality, the CFI seemed to have adopted the approach towards public 
access that would be expected of a court in a multidimensionally-transparent 
regime. The ECJ upheld the CFI's judgment upon appeal, endorsing the CFI's 
interpretation of Decision 93/731 and the application of the principle of 
proportionality, 148 but without finding it necessary to address the question of 
whether the CFI had incorrectly based its judgment upon the existence of a 
'principle of the right to information' .149 
However, the CFI also held in Hautala that the Council could avoid granting 
partial access to documents if doing so would generate an unreasonable amount 
of administrative work and the benefit of granting partial access would be 
outweighed by the fact that no useful information would be provided to the 
applicant, in order to safeguard the public interest in good administration. 150 
Curtin has severely criticised the priority accorded to the principle of good 
administration over the right to information, arguing that both the principles of 
good administration and proportionality favour granting partial access to 
otherwise exempted documents in the first place. 151 
This judgment might have been less problematic had public access been 
accepted by the academic community as a requirement of the principle of good 
administration, as it was originally characterised by the ECJ in the Netherlands 
judgment. Even if public access had been expressly recognised as a general 
principle of Community law, however, it would seem pointless to oblige the 
Council to disclose fragmentary scraps of text that would scarcely benefit an 
applicant for public access, in practical terms. Whereas priority should be 
accorded to the principle of granting public access, there is a line to be drawn 
between providing partial access to a document and providing access to a few 
innocuous sentences that might not even connect to form a coherent paragraph: 
the former might be useful, the latter would not be. The judgment is more 
problematic for not emphasising the need to prioritise public access than for its 
148 Note 117 supra, paragraphs 21-30. 
149 Ibid., paragraph 31. 
150 Note 57 supra, paragraph 86. 
151 Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 17-18. 
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implicit acknowledgement of the fact that a suitably censored text might be 
virtually unreadable. 
The status of the general principle of good administration should not be 
underestimated, Tridimas having submitted that general principles of EC law 
have the same normative status as the Treaties, being constitutional principles 
derived from the rule of law. 152 Viewed from that perspective, public access as 
a constitutional principle might legitimately be balanced against good 
administration as a constitutional principle. 153 However, the CFI should have 
made it expressly clear that the latter principle should only be invoked if the 
nature of a document were such that any censoring of the original text would, 
literally, render the document unreadable. 
In Hautala, the applicant might perhaps have reasoned by analogy to access to 
the file cases. In access to the file, the Commission is obliged to produce non-
confidential summaries of documents upon which it is relying. Requiring the 
Council to produce a non-confidential summary of documents that are non-
disclosable under the public access rules might be a practical alternative to 
requiring it to censor documents, and the resulting summary should be 
sufficiently coherent to be of at least some use to the applicant. 
In conclusion, although the case law does not support the contention that the 
Community Courts have no interest in public access, 154 the CFI in particular 
has not consistently applied itself to the task of securing the most liberal 
interpretation possible of the public access rules, particularly with regard to the 
exceptions covering the public interest in investigations, inspections and court 
proceedings. Judicial review could therefore be made more effective if the 
152 Chapter Four supra, note 7, at p.33: but cf 1-Iarlow who implies that the duty to give 
reasons, viewed as a principle of good administration, lacks 'constitutional' status 
(Chapter One supra, note 8, at 287). 
153 Cf also Tridimas, Chapter Four supra, note 7, at pp.213-214: as discussed in Chapter Five 
supra, note 91, the ECJ could determine the appropriate weighting to accord to public 
access in accordance with Community policy. Having said that, however, if the EC is as 
committed to transparency as the Treaties imply, priority should be accorded to public 
access in most circumstances. 
154 Cf Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 194, concluding that even Bavarian Lager 
shows evidence that openness of decision-making in the EU is becoming a reality, thanks 
to the Community Courts. 
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Courts were to adopt and maintain a more unequivocally pro-transparency 
attitude. 155 One problem with regard to the effectiveness of judicial review as a 
remedy might be its essentially reactive nature: not only does it take place only 
upon the lodging of an application, but also the Courts may only consider the 
pleas submitted to them. Even if they are then 'pro-active' in seeking to 
narrow the scope of exceptions, they have no capacity, for example, to consider 
the possibility of requiring the production of a non-confidential summary of 
any document that could not otherwise be disclosed, unless specifically asked 
to do so. Judicial review by the Community Courts also takes a long time: too 
long, perhaps, to be of much use to applicants seeking to participate in 
decision-making. Finally, judicial review is potentially expensive, particularly 
since success is not guaranteed, as the case law illustrates. 
6.7. Conclusion. 
This Chapter has argued that the Community Courts stand accused of taking no 
interest in public access. However, notwithstanding the fact that they could not 
have sought to develop public access as a constitutional right without usurping 
the role of the Community legislature, this criticism cannot be accepted. In 
most public access cases, as noted, it would be difficult to see how the express 
recognition of an independent right of public access in Community law would 
have altered the outcome of the CFI's judgments. Considering the Courts' 
limited powers under Article 230 EC, which prevent them from substituting 
their own judgment for that of the institutions in public access and as regards 
the classifications of documents, and given the extent to which the CFI in 
particular has widened the scope of public access through, inter alia, insisting 
upon the provision of detailed statements of reasons for refusals to grant public 
access, enabling it to conduct a substantive review in the guise of a more 
limited procedural review, it seems that the real problem has been the CFI's 
inconsistent approach. It appears to have been far more consistent in its 
155 Cf Shaw, Chapter Three supra, note 50, at 325: "[i]t is difficult to escape the conclusion, 
despite the wording adopted by the Court of Justice, that the EU has not adopted a rights-
based approach to the question of transparency." 
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approach to access to the file. Moreover, as discussed earlier, 156 the Courts' 
positive influence on public access has apparently met with a negative reaction 
from the other institutions, which highlights the extent to which the Courts 
have undermined their attempts to preserve secrecy. 
The CFI should be particularly wary when reviewing the invocation of 
mandatory exceptions: as indicated, it has not explained why documents 
relating to Article 226 proceedings can justifiably be withheld in the public 
interest, although the Commission is apparently able and willing to explain its 
position to complainants who might be further aggrieved by its decision not to 
open an investigation. Otherwise, the remedy of judicial review will not help 
applicants to overcome such obstacles to public access. However, the Courts, 
as noted in section 6.3, are unable to remove those obstacles under Article 230: 
Regulation No. I 049/200 I cannot be challenged by natural or legal persons, to 
whom the Regulation would not be of direct and individual concern.157 
Furthermore, although the Courts still fall short of demonstrating the approach 
to be expected of the courts in a multidimensionally-transparent regime, the 
Member States, acting collectively in the Council, have evidently been taking 
transparency far less seriously than the CFI. The attitude of Spain, France and 
the UK towards public access appears dubious, notwithstanding the volte-face 
of the latter two States in the Hautala appeal. 
As concluded in section 6.6, judicial review is a basically reactive, time 
consuming and potentially expensive remedy, and it would be so even were the 
Courts to have acknowledged the existence of a fundamental right to public 
access in EC law ab initio. It could be improved upon by the Courts 
themselves, by adopting a more consistent pro-transparency approach, and by 
the Member States, in re-writing the Treaties so as to widen the Courts' 
powers, perhaps allowing them to order the disclosure of documents. The 
latter seems unlikely to happen, however. Judicial review is not the only 
remedy in the event of an institution's refusal to grant public access. Might the 
156 Chapter Five supra, note 60. 
157 See note 9 supra. 
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possibility of complaining to the Ombudsman be a better alternative? Chapter 
Seven will now consider that issue. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN. 
Quasi-Judicial Review by the European Ombudsman. 
7.1. Introduction. 
Few have done more to promote multidimensional transparency within the EU 
than the first, and current, Ombudsman: Mr Jacob Soderman. The 
Ombudsman frequently emphasises the importance of transparency, including 
public access, 1 and, as discussed in section 7.2 infra, has sought to increase his 
capacity to provide a remedy whenever citizens' complaints concern an 
institution's refusal to grant public access ('public access complaints'). 
Section 7.2 will briefly illustrate the Ombudsman's interest in transparency, as 
evidenced through his own initiative inquiries, speeches, and Annual Reports 
to the European Parliament. Section 7.3 considers the Ombudsman's powers 
with regard to complaints. Section 7.4 will explain the term 'quasi-judicial 
review' before sampling the Ombudsman's decisions in public access 
complaints, illustrating quasi-judicial review, and paying particular attention to 
decisions which have positively influenced, or which might have so influenced, 
the law concerning public access to the institutions' documents. Section 7.5 
considers criticisms of the Ombudsman's approach to transparency and public 
access complaints. In conclusion, section 7.6 assesses the effectiveness of the 
Ombudsman as a remedy, by comparison to the Community Courts. 
1 Occasionally, the Ombudsman's tendency to speak frankly attracts criticism. Commission 
President Prodi complained to the European Parliament after Mr Soderman publicly 
expressed strong disapproval of the Commission's proposed draft for Regulation No. 
I 049/200 I. (http://www.euopen.com/debate/soderpro/prodi l.pdD. Arguably, Mr Prodi 
should also be criticised for complaining that an independent EU official, genuinely 
concerned about transparency, had made his opinion public: such an attitude is not 
consistent with democracy. 
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7.2. The Ombudsman and Multidimensional Transparency. 
Mr Soderman's curriculum vitae2 suggests that his background has predisposed 
him towards FOI.3 He has had six years' experience as Parliamentary 
Ombudsman of Finland;4 has held government office, subject to Finland's 
public access rules; and has received the European Information Association 
Award for Achievement in European Information in 1996. He has also 
published extensively concerning the concept of an Ombudsman, and has 
proposed the following amendment to the Statute of the Ombudsman, seeking 
to strengthen his official right of access to documents: 
"The Community institutions and bodies shall be obliged to supply the Ombudsman 
with any information that he has requested of them and to allow him to inspect and 
take copies of any document or the contents of any data medium. They shall give 
access to documents originating in a Member State and classed as secret by law or 
regulation only where that Member State has given its prior agreement."5 
At present, the Ombudsman may be refused access to documents "on duly 
substantiated grounds of secrecy". 6 
Mr Soderman became European Ombudsman in 1995. In June 1996 he 
demonstrated his interest in public access by commencing his first own 
2 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/cv/en/default.htm. 
3 See Chapter One supra, note 2 and subsequent text. The Ombudsman made clear his 
commitment to multidimensional transparency in a speech entitled 'The role and impact 
of the European Ombudsman in access to documentation and the transparency of 
decision-making', Maastricht, 18-19 September 1997, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/pdti'en/eipa en.pdf. 
4 The Republic of Finland has a strong tradition of public access. Its Constitution, as revised in 
1999, provides that: " ... Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are 
public, unless their publication has for compelling reasons been specifically restricted by 
an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents and recordings" 
(http://www .om. fi/constitution/3 340.htm). 
5 Proposed amendment to Article 3(2) of the Statute of the Ombudsman (Decision 
94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom, OJ 1994 L 113/15: see Appendix D), based upon Article 
138e (now 195) EC: see section 2.7.3 of the Ombudsman's Annual Report for 2000, OJ 
200 I C 218/3. The Ombudsman has adopted a decision implementing the Statute: see 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/lbasis/en/provis.htm. Articles 6, 7 and 8 concern, 
respectively, the circumstances in which the Ombudsman will close a case with a 
reasoned decision; a critical remark; and a draft recommendation to the European 
Parliament (see further section 7.4 irifra). 
6 Article 3(2) of the Statute of the Ombudsman, note 5 supra. 
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initiative inquiry ('the inquiry') into the rules governing public access to 
documents held by EU institutions and bodies, excluding the Council and 
Commission, which already adopted such rules. Per the Ombudsman, public 
access rules: 
" ... can promote transparency and good relations between citizens and the Community 
institutions and bodies in three ways: 
the process of adopting rules requires the institution or body to examine, for each class 
of documents, whether confidentiality is necessary or not ... this process itself may help 
encourage a higher degree of openness; 
if rules are adopted and made publicly available, people who request documents can 
know what their rights are. The rules themselves can also be subject to public scrutiny and 
debate; 
clear rules can promote good administration, by helping officials deal accurately and 
promptly with public requests for documents."7 
The Ombudsman sought to determine whether other EU institutions and bodies 
had adopted such rules. He did not ask "whether the rules themselves are the 
right ones to ensure the degree of transparency that European citizens 
increasingly expect ofthe Union". However, he added that: 
" ... the Commission and Council rules are quite limited compared to the rules 
governing some national administrations. In particular, they do not require registers of 
documents to be published. Nor do they give any right of access to documents held by 
one body, but originating in another."8 
These observations clearly indicate that the Ombudsman found the Code 
disappointing.9 In the decision concluding the inquiry, 10 the Ombudsman 
7 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/317764.htm. With regard to the 
Ombudsman's second point, that public access rules may be subject to public scrutiny and 
debate, cf Statewatch's criticism of the secrecy surrounding the adoption of Regulation 
No. 1049/2001 (Chapter Five supra, note 79). 
8 Ibid. 
9 Cf Harlow, Chapter One supra, note 8, at 297, who has not perceived any criticism of the 
Code emanating from the Ombudsman. 
10 Note 7 supra. This inquiry was subsequently followed up by three further own initiative 
inquiries into the public access provisions (if any) of the Community Plant Variety Office, 
the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work, Europol, and the European Central 
Bank. The Ombudsman's inquiries revealed that, in his opinion, satisfactory provision 
had been made for public access: in the case of Europol, however, this followed the 
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recalled that the ECJ's judgment in Netherlands 11 evidently required all 
Community institutions and bodies to "take appropriate measures" to provide 
for public access, as a requirement of good administration. The Ombudsman 
concluded that "failure to adopt and to make easily available to the public rules 
governing public access to documents constitutes an instance of 
maladministration." 12 
The Ombudsman therefore observed the positive, practical effect of the 
Netherlands judgment: as discussed in Chapter Five supra, although accused of 
lacking interest in public access, the ECJ nevertheless obliged all Community 
institutions and bodies to make provision for a right of public access. The 
Ombudsman based a special report on the inquiry, addressed to the President of 
the European Parliament on 15 December 1997, stating that: 
"Consistency and equal treatment of citizens require that when [the Regulation due to 
be adopted under Article 255 (ex 19la) EC] becomes part of Community law, the 
general principles and limits which it lays down should be applied throughout the 
C . d . . . ,13 ommumty a mm1stratwn. 
This evidently reflects concern that Article 255 (ex 19la) EC applies only to 
the Council, Commission and European Parliament. The Ombudsman 
welcomed, in the conclusion to the special report, the "positive and co-
operative spirit" of the institutions and bodies investigated during the inquiry. 
The special report also described the fact that most of those institutions and 
bodies had modelled their public access rules on the Code adopted by the 
Commission and Council as 'quite proper': 14 notwithstanding the 
submission of draft recommendations by the Ombudsman. (The decisions closing these 
enquiries, are available, respectively, at 
http://www .euro-ombudsman .eu.int/decision/en/99oi I cpvo .htm, 
http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/99oi I eashaw .htm, 
http://www. euro-om budsman. eu .i nt/decision/en/99oi 1 europo l.htm, 
and http://vv\vw .euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/99oi 1 ecb.htm.) 
11 Case C-58/94, Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR I-2169, paragraph 39. 
12 Note 7 supra. 
13 Report 616/PUBAC/F /IJH of 15 December I 997, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/special/pdfi'en/9706 I 6.pdt~ section 3, p. 7. 
14 Ibid., section 3, p.6. Also, in the decision closing the inquiry (note 7 supra), the 
Ombudsman stated that most of the institutions and bodies investigated intended "to 
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Ombudsman's earlier reservations concerning the Code. 15 The Ombudsman 
added, however, that the Parliament might wish to investigate the question of 
whether those rules ensured "the degree of transparency that European citizens 
expect of the Union." 16 
The inquiry apparently succeeded in prompting other Community institutions 
and bodies, such as the European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal 
Products, 17 to adopt public access rules, and in establishing a good working 
relationship between those institutions/bodies and the Ombudsman. One 
further point of interest is Mr Soderman's tendency to speak of 'citizens' in 
connection with transparency, although the Commission's and Council's Code 
of Conduct conferred the right of public access upon 'the public', and 
Regulation No. I 049/200 I confers this right upon all natural and legal persons 
ordinarily resident/registered within the Union, whether legally-defined Union 
citizens or not. The Ombudsman was established in order to increase the 
Union's legitimacy and to bring the Union closer to its citizens, 18 which might 
explain the tendency to regard all actual and potential complainants as 
citizens. 19 Armstrong's criticism of the CFI in Carve! 20 cannot therefore also 
be directed against the Ombudsman, to whom all complainants are clearly 
regarded as Union citizens. 
The Ombudsman has expressed reservations regarding the Union's emphasis 
upon transparency as public access: 
follow the good example set by the Council and Commission in adopting rules governing 
public access" (emphasis added). 
15 Note 8 supra and text. 
16 Section 3, p.7 of the Special Report, note l3 supra. Cf again Harlow, Chapter One supra, 
note 8, at 297, who contends that the Ombudsman "did not point out to the Committee of 
Petitions that the [Parliament] might be able to" question the content of the various 
institutions' and other bodies' public access rules. 
17 http://www.emea.eu.int/. 
18 R. Davis, 'Quasi-Judicial Review: The European Ombudsman As An Alternative To The 
European Courts' [2000] I Web Journal of Current Legal Issues, 
http:/ /webj cli .ncl.ac.uk/2000/issue I /davis I.html. 
19 Article I of the Ombudsman's decision implementing the Statute (note 5 supra) officially 
defines a citizen as 'any natural or legal person who lodges a complaint'. 
2
° Chapter Six supra, note 5 and text. 
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"The general report [on the theme of "the Citizen, the Administration and Community 
law"] has a section about transparency, but it contains detailed discussion of only one 
aspect of the subject: public access to documents. In the working sessions, discussion 
ranged more widely. Many participants emphasised the need for legislative 
21 procedures to be more transparent ... " 
Public access is clearly not the only transparency-related issue of concern to 
the Ombudsman: 
"Many of the complaints made to the Ombudsman during the first mandate have 
alleged lack of transparency. Three main subjects have been raised: the Article 226 
(formerly Article 169) procedure; recruitment competitions for Community officials; 
and access to documents."22 
In conclusion, multidimensional transparency within the Union evidently has a 
proactive champion in Mr Soderman, who, it seems, is both more able and 
more willing to criticise the institutions' approach to transparency than are the 
Community Courts. It remains to be seen whether the Ombudsman's powers 
to address public access complaints allow the Ombudsman to provide an 
effective alternative remedy to judicial review. 23 
21 Report to the final plenary session of the 1998 FIDE Congress 
Stockholm, Sweden, June 6, 1998, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/enlfidel.htm (emphasis added). See also 
'Fundamental rights and the administration in the Europe of tomorrow', 8 March 2001, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/200 l-03-08.htm. Cf also Chapter One 
supra, note 2 and text. 
22 
'Transparency in the Community Institutions', Luxembourg, 19 October 1999, 
http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.intlspeeches/enlcfi 1 O.htm. 
23 Citizens refused public access must be advised, under Article 8(3), Regulation No. 
I 049/200 I, of their entitlement to institute court proceedings and/or to complain to the 
Ombudsman, implying that they may do both. However, the Ombudsman may not 
investigate matters sub judice or res judicata (Article I (3) of the Statute, note 5 supra), 
and complaints submitted to the Ombudsman "shall not affect time limits for appeals in 
administrative or judicial proceedings" (Article 2(6) of the Statute, note 5 supra). 
Therefore, complainants must decide whether or not to seek the annulment of a decision 
refusing public access within two months, per Article 230 (ex 173) EC, or risk losing the 
right to do so, and, having chosen to seek judicial review, they will be unable to complain 
to the Ombudsman whilst the matter is sub judice, or, thereafter, to complain about either 
the CFI 's conduct of the review or its judgment (per Article 2( I) of the Statute, note 5 
supra, and A1ticle 195 (ex 138e) EC, the Ombudsman may not investigate complaints 
concerning the Community Courts acting in their judicial role). Conversely, it seems 
virtually impossible to apply for judicial review of the Ombudsman's decision. The 
applicant in Case T -I 03/99, Associazione del/a cantine sociali venete v European 
Ombudsman and European Parliament [2000] ECR 11-4165, asked the Ombudsman to 
intervene in a public access complaint. One year after the submission to the Ombudsman 
of the applicant's observations concerning the Commission's initial response to the 
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7.3. Powers of the Ombudsmann in Public Access CompBaints. 
Before examining the public access complaints submitted to the Ombudsman 
in section 7.4 irifra, it is useful to note the Ombudsman's definition of 
maladministration: 
"Maladministration occurs when a public body fails to act in accordance with a rule or 
principle which is binding upon it."24 
It is also desirable, as indicated, to examine the Ombudsman's powers. Article 
3 of the Ombudsman's Statute25 indicates that, unlike the Community Courts, 
the Ombudsman is charged to find a friendly solution, between the complainant 
and the institution/body complained of, 'as far as possible'. The Ombudsman, 
it must be remembered, has no automatic right of access to all documents, nor 
any power to annul a decision refusing public access, nor any power to order 
the disclosure of documents. It has been argued, however, that in view of the 
Ombudsman's role in bringing Europe closer to its citizens, and in view of the 
Ombudsman's power to explicitly recommend the disclosure of documents, 
which the CFI cannot do, the Ombudsman might not be unduly hindered by his 
lack of coercive powers. An institution must consider its position carefully 
before continuing to refuse public access once the Ombudsman has 
recommended that access be granted. The institution concerned would be 
reinforcing its public image as unduly secretive, and to ignore the Ombudsman 
would undermine the very purpose of appointing an Ombudsman with a view 
complaint, the applicant urged the Ombudsman to adopt a decision. Two months later, 
the applicant instituted proceedings under Article 232 (ex 175) EC challenging the 
Ombudsman's apparent failure to act. The CFI held that the Ombudsman is not a 
Community institution within the meaning of Article 232 (paragraph 46). Furthermore, a 
'decision' of the Ombudsman, drawing the attention of both Parliament and the institution 
complained of to an instance of maladministration, in accordance with Article 195 (ex 
138e) EC, was not a reviewable act, capable of producing legal effects affecting third 
parties, for the purposes of Article 230 (ex 173) EC. Article 195 only requires that the 
complainant "shall be informed of' the Ombudsman's findings. Therefore, the 
Ombudsman's failure to adopt a decision could not be challenged via Article 232 
(paragraphs 49-51 ). A complaint to the Ombudsman and an application to the CFI for 
annulment of a decision refusing public access should be regarded as mutually exclusive 
alternative remedies. 
24 Section 2.2.1, Annual Report for 2000, note 5 supra. 
25 Note 5 supra. 
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to bringing the Union closer to its citizens?6 The decisions examined in 
section 7.4 infra indicate that the Ombudsman is often successful in prompting 
a recalcitrant Council to disclose documents. 
If citizens wish to complain about the substantive public access rules, they are, 
as noted in Chapter Six supra, section 6.3, unable to challenge such measures 
as Decision 93/731 via an application for annulment, the provisions of which 
are neither of direct nor individual concern to individual citizens. The absence 
of direct and individual concern would not prevent the Ombudsman from 
investigating such a complaint, however,27 although the Ombudsman will only 
investigate complaints in which there is a prima facie suggestion that 
maladministration has occurred. It appears doubtful, following the 
Ombudsman's own initiative inquiry into public access, that the Ombudsman 
would find that the act of adopting rules resembling those in Decision 93/731 
constituted an act of maladministration. The only principle binding upon all 
EU institutions and bodies as a result of the Netherlands judgment is a 
requirement to adopt some rules providing for public access pending the 
adoption of general legislation. The ECJ did not specify that such rules must 
be as liberal as those adopted by the most liberal Member States. Furthermore, 
since the Ombudsman, although critical of the Code underlying Decision 
93/731, nevertheless welcomed the adoption of similar public access rules by 
other EU institutions and bodies, it seems that citizens will almost certainly be 
unable to challenge the substantive content of such similar rules by 
complaining to the Ombudsman, because there would be no prima facie 
maladm inistration. 
7.4. The Public Access Complaints. 
7. 4.1. Quasi-Judicial Review. 
Although the Ombudsman is not a judge and his principal task is to mediate in 
order to find a friendly solution to instances of maladministration, he may 
26 Davis, note 18 supra. 
27 Harden, Chapter Three supra, note 65, at 170: "actio popularis complaints to the 
Ombudsman are possible." 
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nevertheless close an inquiry into a complaint by adopting a decision which 
bears remarkable similarity to a judgment of the CFI, indicating that the 
Ombudsman has conducted that inquiry as though he were a single-judge 
chamber of that Court. Basically, whenever the Ombudsman's methodological 
approach resembles that of the CFI, he may be said to have conducted a quasi-
judicial review.28 The merit of a quasi-judicial approach is perhaps most 
evident whenever maladministration is not found. The resulting decision 
should satisfy the complainant that the complaint, although in effect dismissed 
as unfounded, has been thoroughly investigated and considered.29 Quasi-
judicial review is illustrated in sub-section 7.4.2.2. infra. 
7.4.2. The Ombudsman's decisions. 
7.4.2.1. Introduction. 
A search of the Ombudsman's online database30 as at 31 December 2001 
reveals 31 decisions relating to public access: approximately twice the number 
of judgments in the CFI's case law. The author's attention has been drawn to 
three further relevant decisions via EFIL. 31 These 34 decisions may 
conveniently be grouped into the categories used within the Ombudsman's 
database, i.e.: 
no maladministration found; 
dropped by the complainant; 
settled by the institution; 
friendly solution; 
critical remark; 
draft recommendation accepted by the institution; and 
other. 
28 Davis, note 18 supra: see also Harden, Chapter Three supra, note 65, at 179. 
29 Davis, note 18 supra. It should be noted that complainants are always reminded that the ECJ 
is the highest authority regarding the interpretation of Community law, whenever the 
Ombudsman's has considered the application of Community law and/or an institution's 
exercise of its powers under the Treaties. 
30 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/default.htm. 
31 Chapter Five supra, note 80. 
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According to the Ombudsman, there have been no public access complaints 
within the 'other' category, as at 31 December 2001. One complaint was 
dropped by the complainant and is, therefore, not worth examining.32 
Complaints settled by the institution, of which there is also only one,33 are 
worth considering if the Ombudsman was clearly influential in achieving the 
settlement. It is possible that the Ombudsman's inquiry into this complaint 
prompted the European Parliament to act, since it did not supply the 
information requested by the complainant until after the Ombudsman's inquiry 
had begun, although there is nothing to suggest that it was not going to do so 
anyway, since in order to supply the information requested, quite detailed 
research into the terms of an unwritten agreement concerning the recruitment 
and the remuneration of auxiliary agents was required. 
Four categories of complaint therefore remain to be examined. In light of the 
Ombudsman's definition of maladministration,34 decisions of the Ombudsman 
must observe binding legal principles emerging from the public access case law 
of the Community Courts, whereas the Courts are not obliged to take into 
consideration decisions of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman's decisions 
therefore have less potential than judgments of the Courts to develop 
Community public access law. Therefore, only the most significant and/or 
representative decisions will be considered within this sub-section. 
7.4.2.2. 'No Maladministration Found.' 
No maladministration was found in fifteen public access complaints.35 This is 
worth noting, since the total cost of a complaint to the Ombudsman may be no 
32 Decision in Complaint 819/2000/IJH, against the Commission, 
http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/000819 .htm 
33 Decision in Complaint 216/2000/(XD)LBD, against the European Parliament, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/000216.htm: the complainant is identified 
as 'Mr G.' 
34 Note 24 supra and text. 
35 Decisions in Complaints 1087/10.12.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH against the Council; 
614/97/PD against the Council; 620/97/PD against the Commission; 59/98/0V against the 
Commission and Parliament; 306/98/PD against the Commission; OI/1/99/IJI-I as regards 
the Community Plant Variety Office; OI/1/99/IJH as regards the European Agency for 
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more than that of a couple of postage stamps, 36 to those unable or unwilling to 
submit a complaint electronically. If the complainant in each of those fifteen 
complaints, almost half the total submitted, had opted to seek the annulment of 
the refusal to grant public access, s/he/it would probably have been 
unsuccessful, and would therefore have had to pay the costs of the Court and 
the defendant institution(s). 
The decision in Complaint 1087/10.12.96/STATEWATCHIUK/IJH 
('Complaint I 087') against the Council was the last in a series of complaints 
lodged in 1996 by Statewatch, concerning the Council's refusal to grant access 
to twenty-three documents. The Secretariat-General of the Council had 
responded to the original application for access citing Article 3(2) of Decision 
931731, according to which the Council37 would attempt to find a 'fair solution' 
to repeat applications, or to applications for very large documents. According 
to the Council, the complainant's request constituted a repeat application for 
very large documents. The provision of sixteen documents from the twenty-
three requested was regarded as a fair solution by the Council. The Secretary-
General's response to a confirmatory request for access to the remaining seven 
documents invoked Article 4(2) of Decision 931731, stating that the Council 
had carefully balanced its interest in the confidentiality of its proceedings 
against the applicant's interests in obtaining access, and had decided that: three 
documents were still under discussion or had been very recently adopted; two 
contained details ofthe Member States' positions concerning the budget of the 
EU's police service 'Europol'; and two contained detailed opinions of the 
Council's legal services, concerning Europol. Therefore, access to all seven 
documents would be withheld. 
Safety and Health at Work; 01/1/99/IJH as regards the European Central Bank; 
939/99/ME against the Commission; 148/2000/(IJH)JMA against the Commission; 
158/2000/PB against the Commission; 327/2000/PB against the Council; 814/2000/PB 
against the Commission, 202/2001/0V against Europol, and 943/2001/GG against the 
Commission. (NB. All decisions discussed in this Chapter are accessible via 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/default.htm.) 
36 There are normally two communications per complaint: following the initial complaint, the 
complainant is normally invited to submit further observations to the Ombudsman, 
concerning the response of the institution complained of. 
37 In practice, the relevant Departments of the Secretariat-General. 
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Statewatch submitted that the Council's treatment of its request for documents 
was unfair and potentially unlawful, in that the Council was not entitled to 
apply the fair solution provision to the request for the first sixteen documents. 
This aspect of the complaint was found to have constituted mal administration, 
to which the Ombudsman responded by closing the decision with a critical 
remark, identical to that made as a response to the earlier complaints submitted 
by Statewatch. For these reasons, this aspect of Complaint 1087/96 will be 
discussed further in section 7.4.2.4. infra. Complaint 1087/96 also submitted, 
however, that the Council was not entitled to refuse access to the remaining 
seven documents under Article 4(2) simply because those documents had either 
been recently adopted or contained detailed views of the Member States. The 
Ombudsman was able to inspect the documents as part of his inquiry into the 
complaint. He reasoned as follows: 
"3.2 ... The complainant claims that, in applying Article 4 (2), the Council is not entitled to 
refuse access to documents on the grounds that they have been recently adopted, or that 
they include the views of Member States. The Ombudsman is not aware of any legal rule 
or principle which would require the Council, when balancing the interests under Article 4 
(2), to exclude either of these elements from consideration. 
3.3 The Ombudsman's inspection of documents confirmed that the contents of the 
documents in question correspond to the reasons given by the Council. 
3.4 There appears therefore to be no maladministration by the Council in relation to this 
38 
aspect of the case." 
This decision is set out in a manner resembling a judgment of the CFI, 
presenting in order the facts, the arguments of the parties, and the 
Ombudsman's findings. However, it is an extremely disappointing example of 
quasi-judicial review, from a pro-transparency perspective. The net result of 
the Ombudsman's inquiry is that the Council was found to be telling the truth 
about the seven documents m question; therefore there was no 
maladministration. Although the Ombudsman's definition of 
38 http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu.intldecision/en/961 087 .htm (emphasis added). 
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maladministration39 was duly observed, the principle of granting the widest 
possible access to documents should have been regarded as binding upon the 
Council in light of its Code of Conduct. According to that principle, to which 
the Ombudsman did not refer, the Council's interest in maintaining the 
confidentiality of its proceedings is, as the Ombudsman himself has observed 
elsewhere, an interest in allowing the various internal departments of the 
Council to protect their 'space to think'.40 Once a document has been 
communicated to other departments, that consideration should no longer 
apply.41 Therefore, the Ombudsman's conclusion that the Council was entitled 
to refuse public access in order to protect its confidentiality simply because the 
requested documents had been recently adopted seems not only dubious, but 
contradictory of his later opinion concerning the 'space to think'. 
Decisions 620/97/PD and 306/98/PD concerned the Commission's refusal to 
grant access to a document relating to the Commission's investigation of an 
alleged infringement of Community state aid law by Sweden. The 
complainant, 'Mr L.', represented the Swedish newspaper Viisterbottens-
Kuriren. The Commission's refusal stated that the Swedish authorities 
themselves had labelled the information supplied to it, for investigative 
purposes, as 'Secret'. The public interest in inspections and investigations was 
also invoked. This reasoning, the complainant claimed, did not explain the 
Commission's decision to refuse access.42 The Ombudsman sought the 
Commission's opinion concerning the complaint, and invited the complainants 
to submit observations concerning the Commission's response, in accordance 
with the standard inquiry procedure. He also inspected the document in 
question, finding that, with the exception of one page, the document contained 
nothing that was either secret or prejudicial to the conduct of the Commission's 
investigations. Prima facie, therefore, the decision to refuse access to the 
entire document constituted maladministration. The Ombudsman sought a 
friendly solution, upon which the Commission agreed to release the document, 
39 Note 24 supra and text. 
4
° Chapter Five supra, note 72 and text. 
41 Cf Chapter Five supra, text at note 73. 
42 Cf Harlow's opinion on the exclusion of documents under this exception, Chapter Six supra, 
note 98 and text. 
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with the exception of the one page in respect of which secrecy was justified. 
The complainant maintained that access to that page should be granted, in 
response to which the Ombudsman stated that: 
"l.I. .. Under Community law as it presently stands, the Commission appears to be 
entitled to refuse access to the evaluation part of the report. Therefore, the 
Commission does not appear to have failed to comply with any rule or principle 
b. d" . ,43 m mg upon 1t. 
This decision illustrates another thorough quasi-judicial review, during which 
the Ombudsman inspected the document to which access had been refused in 
order to support his conclusion that there was no maladministration. The 
complainant may not have been satisfied with this outcome, but may at least be 
reassured that the Ombudsman addressed the complaint fully in light of the 
current law. However, the Ombudsman's conclusion that the Commission 
"appears to be entitled to refuse access" to the disputed page, does not suggest 
that the Ombudsman necessarily believe~ that the Commission should have 
been entitled to do so. 
The complaint to which decision 614/97/PD relates ('Complaint 614/97') does 
not concern public access per se, but an alleged lack of transparency on the part 
of the Council. The complainant 'Mrs E.' had suggested that the Council 
should set up a "centralised judgment registry database" in order to "improve 
the operation of the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters."44 The Council, 
after due discussion, declined to implement this proposal. The complainant 
alleged, inter alia, that the Council had not kept her "sufficiently informed of 
its discussions on the proposals submitted," resulting in a lack oftransparency. 
The Ombudsman's investigation revealed that the complainant had never 
formally requested access to Council documents. The complainant then asked 
the Ombudsman to investigate the grounds for the Council's rejection of her 
proposal. The Ombudsman reasoned that, firstly, the Council had addressed 
the substance of the complainant's grievances; secondly, "there is no legal 
43 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/970620.htm. 
44 http://www .euro-ombudsman.cu. int/decision/en/970614.htm. 
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entitlement for the citizen to set in motion a legislative procedure"; and thirdly, 
that after discussion within the Council, the reasons for the rejection of the 
proposal by the majority had been disclosed to the complainant. Therefore, 
there had been no maladministration.45 
The decision in Complaint 59/98/0V against the Commission and European 
Parliament ('Complaint 59/98') concerned an alleged lack of transparency 
regarding access to the Register of Interests of Commission Members and the 
Register of Interests of MEPs. The Ombudsman found no maladministration 
with regard to the Commission's grant of access to the Register of Interests of 
Commission Members, because although the complainant 'Mr S.' was 
dissatisfied with the actual contents of that Register, the Commission had fully 
responded to his request by providing a copy of it: no further details 
concerning the Register had actually been requested. However, it is worth 
noting that the Commission was described as having granted access to the 
Register only as a result of the Ombudsman's intervention: this seems to be an 
example of the phenomenon to which Heede has referred in observing that the 
Ombudsman need not often engage in active mediation, as the mere act of 
lodging a complaint often prompts an institution to resolve the 
maladministration complained of by way of a friendly solution.46 This 
demonstrates the effectiveness of the Ombudsman remedy, notwithstanding the 
Ombudsman's lack of coercive powers. With regard to the complaint against 
the European Parliament, the Ombudsman criticised the availability of public 
access to the Register of MEPs' Interests, but having observed that the 
Parliament was already in the process of ensuring that this document was more 
widely available, concluded that "no further remark by the Ombudsman on this 
issue seems to be necessary." Evidently, the Ombudsman might otherwise 
have closed this case with a critical remark. 
The most interesting feature of decisions in which no maladministration was 
found is that they are often set out in a similar style to judgments of the CFI, 
45 Ibid. 
46 K. Heede, 'Enhancing the Accountability of Community Institutions and Bodies: The Role 
ofthe European Ombudsman' (1997) 3 European Public Lmv 587, at 597. 
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presenting a statement of facts, arguments ofthe parties, and the Ombudsman's 
findings, including a discussion of the relevant law. This format, combined 
with the fact that the Ombudsman will inspect documents if possible and 
desirable in order to reach a conclusion, should reassure complainants that the 
Ombudsman will consider their complaints thoroughly. However, it would 
have been still more reassuring in the case of Complaint I 087/96, discussed 
above, had the Ombudsman referred to the principle of granting the widest 
possible access, and considered whether the Council's refusal to grant access to 
recently-adopted decisions was indeed necessary in order to protect the 
confidentiality of Council proceedings. Moreover, the Ombudsman should 
have explicitly considered, in Complaint 1087/96, the fact that it is a matter of 
settled case-law that exceptions to a right or principle in Community law must 
be construed as narrowly as possible.47 
7.4.2.3. 'Friendly Solution'. 
A friendly solution was found in the case of the complaint ('Complaint 
I 045/96') against the Commission to which decision 
1045/21.11.96/BH/IRLIJMA related. 48 Complaint 1045/96 concerned a 
request for documents relating to the Commission's policy on poverty and 
social exclusion within the Union, and to 'migrant organisations' funded by the 
Commission. The Commission informed the Ombudsman that although one 
document had been supplied, another was not actually a Commission document 
because it had been compiled by the Member States. The complainant, an 
anonymous citizen known as 'Mr H', advised the Ombudsman that the 
information contained therein had been partially translated by the Commission, 
that the resulting document had been circulated in the guise of a Commission 
document, and that it was, as a result of this, regarded as a Commission 
document by the Irish Department of Social Welfare. The complainant also 
emphasised that the Commission's reasoning, based upon the 'authorship 
47 See Chapter Six supra, note 35 and text. 
48 http://www .euro-ombudsmun.eu.inUdecision/en/961 045.htm. 
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rule' ,49 "could have negative consequences for transparency in the European 
Union."50 
The Ombudsman inspected the document, and suggested, by way of a friendly 
solution, that the Commission ought to grant access to it. The Commission 
reaffirmed that the document was not regarded as a Commission document, but 
nevertheless agreed to ask the Member States for permission to disclose it. 
Permission was obtained, and the resulting grant of access to the document 
satisfied the complainant. This decision highlights the Ombudsman's positive 
influence as a mediator, as well as the fact that the Ombudsman can succeed 
through persuasion in ensuring that public access is granted notwithstanding 
his lack of coercive power to actually order such access. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that this is the only public access complaint in 
which the Ombudsman clearly achieved a friendly solution. As noted in 
section 7.3 supra, the Ombudsman is obliged to seek a friendly solution 
wherever possible. However, an attempt to find a friendly solution might, 
perhaps, not be the most appropriate response to a public access complaint, 
given the degree of importance attached to the right of public access by 
potential complainants. A refusal to grant public access would simply not be 
comparable to, for example, the Commission's refusal to pay monies allegedly 
owed under the (disputed) terms of a contract: 51 complainants might be 
prepared to compromise when a disputed contract is at issue, but not when an 
important collective constitutional right, often regarded as fundamental, 52 is at 
stake. It will be remembered that although the Ombudsman had sought a 
friendly solution in the complaint to which decisions 620/97/PD and 
306/98/PD related, as discussed above, his success in securing public access to 
all but one page of the document sought did not actually satisfy the 
complainant, who had to be content with the Ombudsman's assurance that the 
Commission was entitled to withhold access to that page under current 
49 Discussed in Chapter Five supra, section 5.4.1. 
50 Note 48 supra. 
51 See, e.g. decision 485/97/VK/OY, 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/970485.htm. 
52 As discussed in Chapter One supra, section 1.3 
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Community law. That complaint cannot, therefore, be regarded as having been 
resolved by a friendly solution. As yet, however, there have been too few 
public access cases to analyse statistically, in order to enable one to conclude 
that a public access complaint is significantly less likely to result in a friendly 
solution than other types of complaints alleging maladministration. 
7.4.2.4. 'Critical Remark'. 
Inquiries into four complaints submitted by Statewatch in 1996 were closed 
with a critical remark. This is the second most severe 'coercive' power that the 
Ombudsman may exercise, indicating to both the institution concerned and the 
citizen that the Ombudsman considers the maladministration found to be 
particularly serious. The critical remark is, essentially, intended to 'shame' the 
institution to which it is directed into taking action to bring the 
maladministration to an end, although a critical remark may also be made 
following the achievement of a friendly solution, perhaps as a warning against 
the repetition of the action complained of. 53 Critical remarks therefore have 
some potential to develop EU public access law, insofar as they may encourage 
the institutions to adopt a more liberal approach to public access. 
It will be recalled that part of Complaint I 087/96, discussed above, also 
attracted a critical remark from the Ombudsman. The same critical remark had 
been made earlier in decision 1053/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH 
('Complaint 1053/96).54 The Statewatch complaints are particularly significant 
because the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to investigate complaints regarding the 
Council's refusal to grant access to documents concerning Title VI TEU was at 
issue.55 The decision in Complaint 1053/96 has been selected for discussion, 
as representative ofthe decisions within the 'critical remark' category. 56 
53 As in the decision in Complaint I 056/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/JJH, 
http://www .euro-ombudsman.eu. int/decision/en/961 056.htm. 
54 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decisionlen/961 053 .htm. 
55 The Ombudsman's jurisdiction over Title VI matters was subsequently established by Article 
41(1) (ex K.I3(1)}TEU, as amended by the ToA. 
56 In addition to the decision in Complaint I 053/96, critical remarks were also made in the 
decisions concerning Complaints I 056/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/JJH, 
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The complaint, which took some 20 months to resolve instead of the 
Ombudsman's more usual 9-12 months,57 was closely monitored by 
Statewatch, whose bulletin of November-December 199658 detailed the facts 
behind the complaint. Statewatch editor Tony Bunyan had requested access to 
Council minutes concerning Justice and Home Affairs meetings, in which 
Statewatch is particularly interested. Fourteen meetings were listed in an 
attempt to prevent the Council refusing access on the grounds that the request 
had been 'imprecise'. The Council deemed the request to be a 'repeat 
application for a very large number of documents', in respect of which it 
intended to seek a 'fair solution'. 
However, the documents in question had never been requested before, and 
Article 3(2) Decision 93/731 only provided for a 'fair solution' to repeat 
applications or to applications for very large documents, not to applications for 
a very large number of documents. Mr Bunyan discovered that, in reviewing 
the operation of Decision 93/731, the Council appeared to have been troubled 
by the fact that a single applicant (himself) had requested more than a third of 
the total number of documents requested to date (i.e. 1995), and by the fact that 
the requests concerned Title VI TEU. The Council was, it seemed, actively 
seeking to limit the number of applications for access from such groups as 
Statewatch: it was interpreting 'repeat application' as 'an application similar to 
a previous application' and the phrase 'very large documents' to mean 'a large 
number of documents' .59 
1057/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH, and 1087/10.12.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH 
against the Council; 506/97/JMA against the Commission; 634/97/PD against the 
Council; 985/99/IP against the Parliament, and 374/2000/ADB against the Commission. 
57 It is not clear, from the text of the decision, why the inquiry took so long. The Council, 
according to Statewatch, was completely intransigent, which may have precluded any 
attempt to negotiate a friendly solution. Alternatively, as the CFI had still to give 
judgment concerning the applicability of Decision 93/731 to Title VI TEU (see Case T-
174/95, Svenska Journalistforbundet v Council [1998] ECR 11-2289, Chapter Six supra, 
note 46 and text), it is conceivable that the Ombudsman had been awaiting confirmation 
of his opinion concerning that issue from the CFI. The final decision in this complaint 
was not adopted until 28 July 1998, after the Svenska judgment of 17 June. 
58 Vol. 6 no. I. 
59 Hence the concern of Statewatch regarding the proposals for Regulation No. I 049/200 I, as 
discussed in Chapter Five supra, section 5.5. 
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Complaint 1053/96 therefore sought to challenge the Council's reliance upon 
Article 3(2) of Decision 93/731 in order to withhold access to the minutes 
requested. The Council had denied, at first, that the Ombudsman had 
jurisdiction to investigate this complaint as the documents in question 
concerned Title VI TEU. However, even before the landmark judgment of the 
CFI in Svenska,60 which confirmed that Decision 93/731 applied to documents 
held by the institutions irrespective of the 'pillar' of the Union to which those 
documents related, the Ombudsman observed that some of the documents in 
the first public access case, Carve/,61 concerned 'third pillar' issues, and that 
the CFI's jurisdiction had not been contested. Therefore, the Ombudsman 
believed that he had jurisdiction to investigate this complaint.62 The 
Ombudsman fully supported Statewatch's position and closed the inquiry with 
a critical remark to that effect, before reminding the complainant that the ECJ 
is the highest authority concerning the interpretation of Community law: 
"3.6 ... The term "repeat applications" in Article 3 (2) does not include applications by 
the same person for different documents, nor is the Article to be interpreted so as to 
bring all applications for a very large number of documents within its scope."63 
As noted, the Ombudsman's opinion concerning his jurisdiction eventually 
won the support of a majority of Member States, leading to the amendment of 
Article K.13 (now 41) TEU by the ToA. It seems that the Council was 
prepared to listen to the Ombudsman, although its responses to the 
complainant's observations support the conclusion that the Council does not 
welcome public access to its documents.64 
60 Note 57 supra. 
61 Case T-194/94, John Carve/ and Guardian Newspapers Ltd v Council [1995] ECR 11-2767. 
62 Annual Report of the Ombudsman for 1997 (completed 20 April 1998), OJ 1998 C380/l, 
section 2.2.1. 
63 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/961 053 .htm (original emphasis). 
64 Complaint 916/2000/GG (http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/000916.htm) 
concerned the Council's apparent complete disregard of the Ombudsman's earlier 
decision in Complaint I 056/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH ('Complaint 1 056/96'), 
which also suggests that the Council was determined not to grant access to the documents 
concerned despite the Ombudsman's critical remark to the effect that it should do so. 
Statewatch had submitted a further request for the documents immediately after the 
Ombudsman had issued the decision in Complaint 1056/96. However, in an argument 
worthy of the fictional Sir Humphrey Appleby of the BBC television comedy series,' Yes, 
Minister', the Council reasoned that because it never actually registered nor 
systematically filed draft agendas to its meetings, it did not actually 'hold' such 
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7.4.2.5. 'Draft Recommendation'. 
The Ombudsman's highest 'coercive' power is the issue of a draft 
recommendation. An instance of maladministration resulting in a draft 
recommendation is reported to the European Parliament in accordance with 
Article 3(7) of the Ombudsman's Statute. The Parliament may then apply 
political pressure to the institution concerned in an attempt to secure its 
compliance with the recommendation. Draft recommendations will affect the 
administration of Community public access rules, if they are accepted by the 
institution to which they are directed. A recent example of an inquiry into a 
public access complaint that was concluded with a draft recommendation, of 
which the author is aware of eight others,65 is that into the complaint to which 
decision 917/2000/GG relates ('Complaint 917/2000').66 
Complaint 917/2000 was submitted by Statewatch. Statewatch had learned of 
the existence of certain documents, described as 'room documents, non-papers, 
meetings documents, and sans numero documents', which had either been 
circulated to Council members or their representatives, in advance of Council 
meetings concerning justice and home affairs, or presented during such 
meetings. The complainant observed that the Council not only failed to 
systematically record the existence of such documents, in a manner that would 
facilitate their identification and location in the event that a citizen might wish 
to apply for access to them, but also that, per Council instructions, no further 
mention of such documents was to be made on provisional agendas and in 
documents detailing the outcomes of Council proceedings. Confidential, 
restreint, sans numero and 'non-paper' documents, moreover, were not to be 
documents within the meaning of Article I(2), Decision 93/73 I. The Council also 
claimed that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to enquire into the legality of its actions: 
cf the definition of maladministration (text at note 24 supra), which makes it clear that 
maladministration would be committed by an institution failing to observe the law. Not 
surprisingly, these arguments were not accepted by the Ombudsman: a dratl 
recommendation was issued to the effect that the documents sought should be disclosed. 
65 Decisions in Complaints I055/25.11.96/STATEWATCH/UK/IJH against the Council; 
633/97/PD against the Commission; OI/1 /99/IJH as regards Europol; 713/98/(IJH)/GG, 
27 I /2000(1Jl-I)JMA and 277 /2000/(IJH)JMA against the Commission, and 9 I 6/2000/GG 
and I 542/2000/(PB)SM against the Council. 
66 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/en/0009 I 7 .htm. 
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included in the Council's online public register. Statewatch complained about 
the Council's failure to grant public access to several such documents in 
particular, and about its failure to maintain a record of all such documents. 
The Ombudsman dismissed as unfounded the Council's belief that the 
provisions of Decision 93/731 permitted a distinction to be drawn between 
preparatory documents which nevertheless have a quality of 'finality', and 
preparatory documents which are merely 'transitory and preliminary' in nature. 
Whereas the Council was not automatically obliged to grant access to all such 
documents, citizens should nevertheless be able to determine which documents 
had been placed before it. The Council's approach to Statewatch's request for 
public access to particular preparatory documents therefore constituted 
maladministration. The Council had also claimed that a requirement to register 
every paper circulated to its members, or their representatives, would unduly 
burden its General Secretariat. The Ombudsman regarded the second aspect of 
Statewatch's complaint as raising two distinct questions: that of whether access 
had to be granted to a particular list of documents and that of whether the 
Council is obliged to maintain such a list. As Statewatch could not prove that 
the Council had actually listed its 'non-papers', etc. in a documentary form, 
there could be no maladministration in the Council's failure to grant access to 
such a list. However, in light of the fundamental importance of public access, 
the Council was, in the Ombudsman's opinion, obliged to accept the additional 
administrative work entailed by the inclusion of all such documents in a 
publicly-accessible register. 
The Ombudsman issued two draft recommendations. The disclosure of the 
specific documents requested by Statewatch was recommended, unless the 
Council could invoke any of the exceptions listed in Article 4 of Decision 
93/731. The Council was also recommended to maintain a list or register of all 
the documents put before it and to make that list/register publicly available. As 
is customary when delivering a draft recommendation, the Ombudsman added 
the following formula: 
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"In accordance with Article 3 (6) of the Statute of the Ombudsman, the Council shall 
send a detailed opinion by [in this instance] 3 I May 200 I. The detailed opinion could 
consist of acceptance of the Ombudsman's decision and a description of the measures 
taken to implement the draft recommendations." 
On 30 November 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Special Report to the 
European Parliament, pursuant to Article 3(7) of the Ombudsman's Statute.67 
The Council, in its detailed opinion, had accepted the second draft 
recommendation that it should maintain a public register of all documents put 
before its members, but submitted that there was no value in maintaining a 
record of documents whose content was "subsequently reflected in a document 
which appears on the public register or [which] has proven to have no use 
whatsoever during the [decision-making] process. On the other hand, to 
establish and keep a complete register of all those papers [original emphasis] 
would impose a heavy administrative burden ... and thereby, on balance, go 
clearly against the principle of good administration." The Council added that it 
considered the first draft recommendation to have already been implemented. 
The Ombudsman did not accept that the Council had complied with the first 
draft recommendation, and asked the European Parliament to adopt that 
recommendation as a resolution. He also observed that the Council's 
continuing intention to exempt 'ephemeral' documents of a 'limited useful life' 
from a public register was difficult to accept: such documents had not been 
objectively defined; even if their content was subsequently reflected in a 
published document, citizens might be interested in knowing who first made a 
particular proposal; and citizens might also wish to know about proposals that 
had been rejected, i.e. 'found to be of no use whatsoever', to use the Council's 
phrase. Article 1I (2), Regulation No. I 049/200 I, drew no distinction between 
documents on the basis oftheir 'useful life', therefore the Ombudsman believes 
that the Regulation has now created a legal duty to establish and maintain a 
public register of all documents placed before the Council, as recommended. 
In light of this interpretation of the Regulation, the Ombudsman felt no need to 
renew his second draft recommendation, which related to the now-superseded 
67 http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/speciallpdf/en/000917 .pdf. 
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Decision 93/731. He nevertheless sought the views of the European Parliament 
concerning this issue, possibly doubting that the Council would even now 
consider itself obliged to register every document placed before its members. 
The Ombudsman's second recommendation would have affected the 
interpretation of Article 1 (2) of Decision 93/731: documents 'held' by the 
Council would need only to have been 'considered' by the Council. It is to be 
hoped that the Council will accept the Ombudsman's interpretation of Article 
11 (2), Regulation No. 1049/2001. Furthermore, were the Council to add all 
'non-papers', etc. to its public register, enabling citizens to identify those in 
which they might be interested, this recommendation would also have a 
positive impact upon the Council's practice concerning transparency. The 
most worrying aspect of Complaint 917/2000 is that it suggests determination 
on the Council's part to deliberate as secretly as possible. The Council is the 
Union's legislature under Titles V and VI TEU: as such it is of course 
responsible for measures capable of affecting civil liberties within each 
Member State, hence the interest of Statewatch in monitoring its activities. As 
the Commission has called for greater openness and participation in its White 
Paper on European Governance,68 the Member States might wish to consider 
that the openness of legislative proceedings is increasingly regarded as 
important in a modern democracy, and might adapt their attitude towards 
Council proceedings accordingly. 
7.5. Criticisms of the Ombudsman's approach to transparency and public 
access. 
It is not clear whether Harlow is impliedly criticising the Ombudsman for 
categorising access to information as a principle of good administration instead 
of a fundamental constitutional right.69 Arguably, however, it was the ECJ's 
characterisation of public access as a requirement of good administration in the 
Netherlands judgment that brought public access clearly and unequivocally 
within the Ombudsman's remit in the first place. Moreover, this thesis has 
68 Chapter Two supra, note I. 
69 Chapter One supra, note 8, at 296. 
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already noted that the Ombudsman attaches fundamental importance to 
multidimensional transparency, as, apparently, does Harlow herself.70 
However, she criticises the Ombudsman's own initiative inquiry into public 
access as demonstrating a "slippage from this constitutional high ground to the 
narrower concept of access."71 Having regard to the passages quoted from the 
Ombudsman's Special Report in section 7.2 supra, it seems that Harlow's 
research into the Ombudsman's attitude towards the substance of the 
institutions' public access rules is incomplete. The Ombudsman expressed 
reservations, and urged the Parliament to investigate the substantive provisions 
of the Code. Harlow seems not to dispute the Ombudsman's claim that the 
mere existence of public access rules in the EU is important for the reasons set 
out above: 72 she even adds that decisions adopted under the public access rules 
of agencies and bodies which are not specifically mentioned within Article 230 
EC might nevertheless be reviewable by the Community Courts, if such 
decisions affect third party rights. 73 The latter issue is, however, reserved for 
further discussion in Chapter Eight infra: it suffices to note here that the 
Ombudsman could justify his decision to investigate the existence of public 
access rules, as opposed to examining the substance of those rules. 
Harlow's harshest criticism is that the Ombudsman, in reviewing public access 
complaints, "has stuck strictly to the letter of the law, upholding every decision 
which falls within the Codes."74 The Ombudsman has diligently sought to 
secure public access, bearing in mind that it may be difficult to secure a 
friendly solution, as discussed in sub-section 7.4.2.3. supra. He has also 
sought to prevent the institutions from relying upon a too-broad interpretation 
of the exceptions to the public access rules. Harlow's criticism obscures this 
fact, whereas a thorough review of the public access complaints indicates that, 
even when maladministration was not found, the Ombudsman was prepared to 
issue critical remarks if necessary to promote better transparency-related 
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., at 297. 
72 Note 7 supra and text. 
73 Chapter One supra, note 8, at 297, referring to Case 294/83, Parti eco/ogiste 'Les Verts' v 
European Parliament [1986] ECR 1045, which case is discussed in Chapter Eight infra. 
74 Ibid., at 298. 
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practices m future. 75 The only complaint in which the Ombudsman might, 
perhaps, have been more proactive was Complaint 1 087/96, as noted in sub-
section 7.4.2.2. supra. Harlow concludes that the Ombudsman is not dynamic, 
yet she acknowledges that "his intervention seems to stimulate settlement,"76 
which is important to complainants and has been particularly pleasing to 
Statewatch.77 Moreover, further research suggests that the Ombudsman, as 
implied at the outset of this Chapter, is one of the most dynamic campaigners 
on behalf of transparency and more liberal public access rules within the EU.78 
Curtin, for example, observes that the Ombudsman's role "can be particularly 
crucial in cases of maladministration or embedded institutional practices" 
affecting public access. 79 
7.6. Conclusion. 
This Chapter has attempted to illustrate the current Ombudsman's efforts to 
promote both multidimensional transparency within the EU and the 
development of liberal public access rules. The Ombudsman has consistently 
emphasised the importance of transparency and public access in Annual 
Reports and speeches, and has attempted to promote transparency by 
conducting own initiative inquiries and making draft recommendations and/or 
critical remarks, which have also been made as a result of inquiries into 
complaints. Although his powers are non-coercive and his decisions non-
binding, the Ombudsman offers a cheap, but thorough, authoritative and 
75 E.g. Complaint 59/98, discussed in sub-section 7.4.2.1. supra. 
76 Chapter One supra, note 8, at 298. 
77 Per reports concerning Statewatch's complaints to the Ombudsman, Chapter Three supra, 
note 73. 
78 See, for example, Harden, Chapter Three supra, note 65, at 174, observing that Article 22 of 
the Ombudsman's model Code of Good Administrative Behaviour 
(http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/recommen/pdt/en/code 1 en.pdf) requires oflicials to 
provide members of the public with the information that they request; and ibid., at 177, 
noting that the Council established a public register of its documents (Decision 
2000/23/EC, OJ 2000 L 9/22, discussed in Chapter Five supra, section 5.4) following the 
Ombudsman's draft recommendation in Complaint 633/97/PD 
(http://wwvv.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/970633.htm#Targetl) to the effect that 
the Commission should keep a public register of its documents. Finally, ibid., at 180-181, 
Harden considers that the institutions and bodies investigated by the Ombudsman adopted 
public access rules as a result of his own initiative inquiries, and notes that Article 23 of 
the Code of Good Administrative Behaviour provides for officials to give access to 
documents in accordance with the applicable rules. 
79 Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 11. 
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frequently effective alternative to the Community Courts. Subject to a finding 
that maladministration has occurred, the Ombudsman often succeeds in 
securing for the complainant access to the requested documents, as noted by 
Statewatch in connection with Complaint 916/2000. The Ombudsman remedy 
is particularly useful for aggrieved citizens to whom a transparency-related 
decision may not be of direct and individual concern.8° Furthermore, the 
Ombudsman, unlike the Courts, may explicitly recommend that public access 
be granted.81 The current Ombudsman has been somewhat more consistent 
than the CFI in his approach to public access. Whereas the decision in 
Complaint 1087/96 was disappointing, in later decisions the Ombudsman, 
having followed the Courts' lead by explicitly referring to the principle of 
granting the widest possible access to documents and the need to construe all 
exceptions to that right as strictly as possible, has invariably sought to narrow 
the scope of any exceptions being relied upon by the institution wishing to 
maintain secrecy. 
Nevertheless, some problems have also been highlighted within this Chapter. 
The Ombudsman's willingness to inspect documents to which public access 
has been refused, in order to verify that they have been lawfully withheld, has 
been noted, for example in connection with Complaint 1087/96 and decisions 
620/97/PD and 306/98/PD. However, the factor that could hinder the 
Ombudsman most is the possibility that documents may be withheld from 
his/her82 own investigative scrutiny. Whereas access should only be refused to 
him/her on 'duly substantiated grounds of secrecy', there is no guarantee that 
the Council's idea of a duly substantiated ground of secrecy would conform to 
that of the Ombudsman: it is theoretically possible for the Council to deny the 
Ombudsman access to documents that ought, at least, to be disclosed to 
him/her, even if not to the applicant for access. Without an unlimited right of 
official access to documents,83 in order to conduct an independent review of a 
public access decision, the Ombudsman might simply be unable to reassure 
complainants that any refusal to grant public access is justified. 
80 Harden: see note 27 supra and text. 
81 Davis, note 18 supra. 
82 Recognising that a future Ombudsman might be female. 
83 See further Beers, Chapter One supra, note 64. 
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The Ombudsman remedy also takes time. If documents were urgently required 
in order to try to influence decision-making processes, it would certainly be 
faster to seek a quasi-judicial review by the Ombudsman than to apply for 
judicial review by the CFI. The Ombudsman usually takes halfthe time of the 
Court, or less, to reach a decision. However, if the Ombudsman were able to 
inspect documents and to order their disclosure, if appropriate, instead of being 
expected to seek a friendly solution wherever possible, which necessitates a 
sometimes lengthy dialogue between the complainant and the institution 
concerned, the remedy might be faster still. 
There are two further problems, which have not been highlighted by reference 
to the Ombudsman's 'case law'. Firstly, the Ombudsman must deal with 
maladministration, not merely public access complaints. Of the complaints 
referred to in the Ombudsman's Annual Report for 2000, public access and 
transparency-related complaints together formed the single largest category of 
complaint, but nevertheless accounted for only 28% of the total number of 
complaints. Furthermore, whilst the present Ombudsman is very pro-active as 
regards transparency, it is possible that a future Ombudsman might have 
different priorities, and it is certain that even the present Ombudsman cannot 
devote his entire energies to the pursuit of greater transparency within the 
Union. Secondly, the Ombudsman's workload has trebled since 1996 and is 
already such that it has not been possible to undertake a systematic check in 
order to determine the rate of institutional compliance with the Ombudsman's 
critical remarks. 84 
Following this conclusion, it is possible to draw more general conclusions 
concerning both remedies for refusals to grant public access, based upon the 
discussion in Chapter Six supra and this Chapter. On the whole, both the 
Community Courts and Ombudsman have sought to curb the apparent tendency 
of the institutions to apply the public access rules with a view to refusing 
84 
'The effectiveness of the Ombudsman in the oversight of the administrative conduct of 
government', 7th International Ombudsman Institute Conference, Durban, South Africa, 
30 October - 3 November 2000, 
http://www .eUI·o-ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/enldurban l.htm. 
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access, by merely invoking (an) exception(s) without explaining adequately 
why that/those exception(s) apply to given documents. Both the Courts and 
Ombudsman have demanded comprehensive statements of reasons for a 
decision refusing public access. However, if public access is refused on the 
grounds that the rules provide for requests to be referred to the author of a 
document, a plea alleging insufficient reasons will not then be entertained,85 
and if a provision of the public access rules themselves proves to be a 
particular obstacle to public access, it seems that neither the Courts nor the 
Ombudsman might be of use to ordinary Europeans. The Courts would not 
find public access rules to be of direct and individual concern to applicants for 
public access, and the Ombudsman, having both welcomed the adoption of 
rules similar to the Commission's and Council's Code of Conduct86 and 
dismissed concerns about Article 9 of Regulation No. 1049/200 I ,87 appears 
unlikely to find any maladministration in the adoption of such rules. 
Furthermore, because neither the Community Courts nor the Ombudsman may 
order the disclosure of documents following, respectively, the annulment of an 
institution's decision refusing public access or any finding of 
maladministration in such a decision, neither remedy can guarantee that access 
will actually be granted to a complainant. Also, neither the Courts nor the 
Ombudsman might be able to challenge a particular decision to classify a 
document as 'sensitive'. That decision may have been adopted by an 
institution or body outside their respective jurisdictions. Alternatively, such a 
decision would not be of direct and individual concern to an applicant for 
judicial review, whereas although the Ombudsman may, unlike the Courts, 
investigate a complaint that would be classified as an actio popularis, slhe may 
nevertheless be unable to inspect the document in question in order to 
determine whether it had been classified properly. As seen, the latter problem 
could conceivably be removed by amending the Ombudsman's Statute in order 
85 E.g. Case T-188/97, Rothmans International BV v Commission [1999] ECR 11-2463, 
paragraphs 36-38, as discussed in Chapter Six supra, note 52 and subsequent text. 
86 Note 7 supra. 
87 Chapter Five supra, note 96 and text. 
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to grant official access to all documents, 88 but the Ombudsman would remain 
unable to order the reclassification of a 'sensitive' document. 
It has been further noted that both the Ombudsman and the Courts may take a 
long time to address public access complaints, which is not consistent with the 
idea that requests for public access should be considered promptly, within two 
months at most,89 and which could be problematic if access is sought by an 
applicant desiring information in order to try to influence decision-making 
processes taking place in the meantime, given that, as stated, there is no 
guarantee that access will be granted as a result of pursuing either remedy. In 
Chapter Eight infra, these actual and potential limitations of the existing 
remedies will be considered further, with a view to suggesting a more effective 
means of securing the liberal approach to public access that would be expected 
by citizens of a multidimensionally-transparent polity. 
88 Note 5 supra and text. 
89 Cf Regulation No. 1049/2001, Articles 7 and 8. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Would! the establishment of an Information Tribune for the European 
Union help to secure for Union citizens a liberal right of public access to 
documents held by the institutions, and thereby help to improve 
multidimensional transparency in EU decision-making? 
8.1. Introduction. 
Thus far in Part Three, it has been concluded that the remedies currently 
available to citizens to whom public access is denied have a limited capacity to 
provide an effective means of redress. There is no means whereby an 
aggrieved citizen or NGO might secure, promptly, an order for the disclosure 
of a document in the event that an institution cannot justify its non-disclosure 
with reference to a legitimate public interest in secrecy. Both the Courts and 
the Ombudsman have had limited success in transforming the EU-Ievel culture 
of secrecy.' Although the Member States and institutions equate transparency 
with public access, the evidence analysed thus far within this thesis suggests 
that they have neither embraced a public access culture at EU level nor sought 
to provide a truly effective method of policing the application of the Union's 
public access rules. 
Therefore, if the Commission genuinely desires to improve the Union's 
democratic nature and legitimacy,2 both of which might be enhanced by the 
introduction of multidimensional transparency, it might consider 
recommending the appointment of a new official, empowered to supervise the 
application of the Union's public access rules; to order the disclosure of 
documents the non-disclosure of which cannot be justified by reference to any 
legitimate public interest in secrecy, protected by law; and to encourage the 
liberalisation of the rules governing public access. As noted, the adoption of 
public access rules employing existing remedies has failed to radically 
1 Cf the Council's adoption of the 'Sol ana Decision', Chapter Five supra, section 5.4.1., and 
the adoption of Articles 4 and 9 of Regulation No. 1049/200 I, discussed in Chapter Five 
supra, section 5.5. 
2 Cf its White Paper, Chapter Two supra, note I. 
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transform the Union's culture into a culture of openness. Such a cultural 
change must take place if the Union is ever to be transformed into a 
multidimensionally-transparent polity. A cultural change must also take place 
if the Commission's White Paper proposals are to succeed in democratising the 
Union, by ensuring the greater participation in decision-making of citizens and 
civil society NGOs who are sufficiently well informed to participate 
effectively. The appointment of a dedicated official might, perhaps, succeed in 
promoting such a change. 
Within this final Chapter, section 8.2 will briefly discuss the origin of the title 
of 'Information Tribune' and the role contemplated for such an official at 
national level. Section 8.3 will discuss the adaptability of the national 
Information Tribune to meet the needs of citizens of the Union, and will 
consider the powers that the European Information Tribune (ElT) would or 
might require in order to promote multidimensional transparency at EU level. 
Section 8.4 will consider the extent to which the Treaties would require 
modification in order to establish an ElT with appropriate powers, and to 
ensure that those powers could not be abused. Section 8.5 will further discuss 
and evaluate the arguments for and against the appointment of such a powerful 
official. Section 8.6 will then present the overall conclusions of this Chapter, 
by way of conclusion to Part Three of this thesis. 
8.2. The Concept of an Information Tribune. 
An Information Tribune was mooted by Leigh and Lustgarten3 in order to 
secure greater public accountability of the United Kingdom's government. The 
title 'Tribune' indicates that this official would be accountable to, and would 
report directly to, the public, being completely independent of the government, 
including the national Parliament.4 Leigh and Lustgarten's Tribune was 
evidently a species of Ombudsman for the benefit of members of the United 
Kingdom's Parliament. A UK MP might complain to the Tribune when 
seeking to challenge any apparent failure of UK Ministers or civil servants to 
3 Leigh and Lustgarten, Chapter One supra, note 69, at 715. 
4 Ibid. 
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respond to his/her requests for information, in order to facilitate the ability of 
UK MPs to hold the government to public account. However, the Tribune 
would also have addressed complaints concerning requests for government-
held information submitted by members of the general public; supervised the 
operation of any FOI legislation; offered help and advice to the government 
concerning FOI; and exercised virtually unlimited powers of investigation in 
the quest for public accountability of the government, including the right of 
access to classified documents and the power to interview any government 
official or employee, serving or retired, in private if need be. It was anticipated 
that the Information Tribune would, through the exercise of these powers, have 
helped "to stimulate the growth of politically knowledgeable and increasingly 
sophisticated citizens" within the UK.5 
8.3. An Information Tribune for the EU? 
8.3.1. The role of an EfT. 
Prima facie, it seems that the national Information Tribune discussed above 
might be adapted in order to produce a new European official, to promote 
public access, multidimensional transparency, and political awareness among 
Union citizens. The ElT would report directly to the public concerning the 
FOI-related activities and general transparency of the institutions, unlike the 
Ombudsman, whose reports, although invariably published, are submitted to 
the European Parliament. S/he would also investigate any complaints from 
MEPs, European Parliamentary Committees, or the European Parliament itself, 
concerning any apparent failure on the part of a Union official or institution to 
respond adequately to questions, or to supply information required for the 
purposes of any debate.6 S/he would respond to all transparency-related 
complaints from members of the public and NGOs, including public access 
complaints, being armed with greater powers than those of the Ombudsman 
(see section 8.3.2. infra). Finally, s/he would continually supervise the 
5 Ibid. 
6 This could be especially important in light of suspicions to the effect that the Council is not 
properly consulting the Parliament regarding matters relating to Title VI TEU (D. 
O'Keeffe, 'Recasting the Third Pillar' (1995) 32 CMLRev 893, at 904). 
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implementation and operation of Regulation No. 1049/2001, and the public 
access provisions adopted by other institutions and bodies following the 
Netherlands judgment/ with a view to recommending appropriate amendments 
to those rules in a bid to secure the widest possible access to documents for 
Union citizens. 
8.3.2. The powers of the EfT. 
8.3 .2.1. Introduction. 
In order to promote multidimensional transparency at EU level and to secure a 
liberal right of public access for European citizens, the ElT would, naturally, 
require suitable powers, such as those of the national Information Tribune 
proposed by Leigh and Lustgarten: see section 8.2 supra. Actual or potential 
problems, arising from the granting of a particular power to the ElT, will be 
identified in this section for further discussion in sections 8.4 and 8.5 infra. 
8.3.2.2. The right to initiate investigations on his/her own initiative. 
This important power, currently enjoyed by the Ombudsman under Article 195 
(ex 138e) EC, gives the Ombudsman an advantage over the Community Courts 
insofar as s/he need not wait for a complaint to be lodged before investigating 
the conduct of the Union's institutions and bodies, but can be pro-active. It 
would be essential for the ElT to be able to continually supervise the 
application of public access rules even if no complaints have been submitted. 
Otherwise, the ElT could not make certain that those rules were consistently 
being applied with a view to granting public access, rather than with a view to 
withholding as many documents as possible by invoking as many exceptions as 
possible. 
Moreover, if the ElT suspected malpractice, but had not received any 
complaint, the lack of a power to nevertheless proceed with an investigation 
7 Case C-58/64, Netherlands v Council [1996] ECR 1-2169. 
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would seriously undermine his/her role as the EU's new guardian of 
transparency as public access, and consequently undermine his/her ability to 
promote multidimensional transparency. Citizens require official information 
in order to participate in governmental decision-making, therefore, unless that 
information is flowing as freely as possible, any consultation procedures open 
to citizens might be less effective than they would have been had the citizens 
been fully informed. The granting of this power to the EIT would present no 
substantial difficulties. The mere fact that the Ombudsman already has this 
power does not preclude the possibility of establishing an EIT with a power of 
own-initiative inquiry: see further section 8.5 infra. 
8.3 .2.3. The right of official access to all documents. 
No document could be withheld from the official scrutiny of the EIT, who 
would determine, objectively and in strict accordance with the law, whether an 
institution would be justified in withholding a given document from anyone 
requesting access to it.8 There seems to be little danger in allowing the EIT to 
verify, independently, that the document in question contains truly sensitive 
information, given that, firstly, most such information is likely to be highly 
technical and therefore virtually incomprehensible to a non-expert,9 and 
secondly, the EIT would be strictly bound never to reveal genuinely sensitive 
information. The Ombudsman, as noted, could be granted a similar unlimited 
right of official access to documents: 10 as also noted in Chapter Seven supra, 
the fact that documents may currently be withheld from him/her could 
seriously hinder the Ombudsman's ability to provide a remedy in public access 
complaints. This power would help the EIT to both secure public access for 
citizens following specific complaints, and to ensure that the greatest possible 
8 This contrasts with the national Information Tribune proposed by Leigh and Lustgarten 
(Chapter One supra, note 69, at 715), from whose remit "the technical specifications of 
military equipment, matters of national security ... and certain activities and policies 
requiring short-term secrecy in dealing with foreign governments or companies, are 
illustrations of matters that might. .. be excluded ... or ... certified as being properly kept 
secret for a limited period." The European Information Tribune would require access to 
all documents if only to verify, independently, that they do indeed concern such matters 
and therefore cannot be disclosed to the public. 
9 See Lustgarten and Leigh, Chapter Five supra, note 39, discussed at note 54. 
1° Chapter Seven supra, note 5 and text. 
258 
quantity of information would be made available to the public automatically, 
when used in conjunction with his/her further powers, discussed infra. 
The cause of multidimensional transparency would be promoted were the ElT 
empowered to ensure the free flow of information. More informative EU 
institutions and bodies could be easier to hold to account, and better-informed 
EU citizens would be more able to participate in decision-making processes, 
subject, of course, to the establishment of appropriate mechanisms enabling 
citizens to hold the institutions to account and to participate in decision-
making. The ElT could not single-handedly transform the EU's various 
systems of governance into those of Held's cosmopolitan democracy, but s/he 
could certainly encourage the development of a culture of openness at EU level 
that might increase the institutions' and Member States' receptivity to the 
concept of multidimensional transparency in governance. In order to 
encourage the development of a culture of openness, however, s/he would need 
to be able to dissuade the institutions from keeping documents secret without 
justification, which means that s/he must be able to inspect all currently 
classified documents. 
The requirement that the ElT should not disclose certain information 
him/herself would not seem to be problematic: the Ombudsman is required by 
Article 3(2) of the Ombudsman's Statute to maintain the confidentiality of any 
classified documents that might be disclosed to him/her. Alternatively, since 
the ElT is supposed to determine whether or not information could be disclosed 
in the public interest, the requirement imposed could be that s/he must maintain 
confidentiality in respect of classified information whenever s/he decided 
him/herself that a legitimate public interest in secrecy would be substantially 
harmed thereby, and that the harm caused would outweigh the public interest in 
the disclosure of the information in question. This, however, might be 
problematic. There could be a dispute between the ElT and the originator of a 
document concerning the balancing of public interests in its disclosure. The 
Member States would probably insist upon the document's originator having a 
right to obtain judicial review of any decision of the ElT, before agreeing to 
allow the ElT to both inspect classified documents and to independently decide 
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whether or not their contents should be subsequently disclosed: see further sub-
section 8.3.2.4. infra. 
8.3.2.4. The right to order the disclosure of documents in the public interest. 
This power, clearly, would transcend those of the existing remedies. Having 
decided that the non-disclosure of any document could not be justified by 
reference to a legitimate public interest in secrecy, 11 protected by law, the ElT 
would be able to order its disclosure. Without such a power, the EfT's ability 
to ensure the greatest possible flow of information to the public would be no 
different to that of the Ombudsman. The problem, as stated in section 8.3.2.3., 
would be that the originating or holding institution/body might dispute the 
EIT's conclusion that the document should be disclosed. Some provision for 
judicial review of the EIT's decisions would almost certainly be demanded 
before the Member States and institutions would agree to give the EIT such a 
power, requiring detailed consideration to be given to the necessary Treaty 
amendments (see further section 8.4 infra) and to the potential value of 
establishing an EIT in the first place (see further section 8.5 infra). 
By way of an additional safeguard, the EU's public access rules, which would 
require amendment in order to take account of the EIT's role, could, if 
necessary, set down strictly limited categories of documents the disclosure of 
which could not be ordered by the ElT under any circumstances. 12 That would 
preclude any possibility of the EIT making an error of judgment and ordering 
the disclosure of a document that genuinely should have been withheld. The 
breadth of any such exemptions would ultimately be judged by citizens of the 
Union: if the EU truly wishes to be regarded as open and accessible to its 
citizens, it should exempt as few documents as possible from the EIT's remit. 
The EIT could always report to the public in the most general terms that, in 
his/her opinion, certain documents were being exempted from disclosure for no 
11 Chapter Five supra, section 5.3. 
12 C/ Section 88(2) of the Freedom of Information Act (Queensland) 1992, which restricts the 
ability of the Queensland information Commissioner to order the disclosure of certain 
documents. 
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particularly good reason, prompting a call for the adoption of narrower 
exemptions. 
8.3.2.5. The right to question officials, whether serving or retired. 
The national Information Tribune proposed by Leigh and Lustgarten 13 would 
require this power in order to be able to present UK citizens with full 
information concerning the traditionally "closely guarded secrets of the 
Executive", 14 the UK Parliament having been deemed inadequate to secure the 
public accountability of government, 15 and traditional FOI legislation having 
also been found wanting, because much information relating to foreign and 
defence policies is traditionally exempted from its provisions. 16 The right to 
question officials would help the national Tribune to establish that information 
was being/had been wrongfully withheld from somebody/some persons 
ordinarily entitled to receive it, whether a UK MP, aUK Parliamentary Select 
Committee, or the general public. 
The EIT's chief task, as indicated in section 8.3.1. supra, would similarly be to 
ensure that ordinary Europeans might acquire the fullest possible information 
regarding all areas of EU activity, and to ensure that MEPs are adequately 
informed about the activities of the Council and Commission, enabling the 
European Parliament to be in the best possible position to exercise its 
consultative or legislative role. Interviews with the ElT could be held in 
camera and in the absence of any superior officials, in order to protect potential 
'whistleblowers' who might reveal evidence of any unlawful withholding of 
information from a person or persons entitled to receive it. 
13 Chapter One supra, note 69, at 715 (discussed in section 8.2 supra). 
14 Ibid. 
IS /bid, at 697. 
16 Ibid., at 714: the traditional FOI exemptions would have prevented the public from gaining 
access to much of the material required in order to bring to light the UK's 'Arms for Iraq' 
scandal, the subject-matter of the 'Scott Report' analysed by Leigh and Lustgarten. 
Judicial control of the UK administration has also been described as "reactive, 
intermittent and erratic almost to the point of randomness" (Lustgarten and Leigh, 
Chapter Five supra, note 39, at p.16), prompting Lustgarten and Leigh to observe that 
public law principles must become part of "the ethos of good public administration" in 
order to be effective (ibid.). An ElT would certainly be able to ensure that this was true 
of the principle of granting the widest possible public access to documents. 
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The use of the term 'whistleblower' and the contemplation of a power to 
conduct interviews in camera also suggests that the EIT might have a role to 
play in identifying instances of fraud and corruption within the EU. The 
Ombudsman is to some extent an authorised whistleblower: per Article 4(2) of 
the Ombudsman's Statute! 7 if s/he, in the course of his/her inquiries into 
alleged maladministration, learns of facts which s/he considers might relate to 
criminal law, s/he must notify the Community institution having authority over 
the official or servant concerned, 18 and may also inform that institution "of the 
facts calling into question the conduct of a member of their staff from a 
disciplinary point of view". The EIT might be placed under a similar 
obligation: his/her questions relating to the suspected non-disclosure of 
information might at least indirectly reveal evidence of fraud or criminal 
activity. One of the functions of transparency is to reduce to a minimum the 
opportunities for those in government to engage in fraud or criminal activity, 19 
therefore it would not be illogical to empower and oblige the EIT to notify the 
appropriate authorities of any such nefarious activity that might come to his/her 
notice. In light of the Ombudsman's Statute, there seems to be no theoretical 
reason why the EIT might not be so empowered and obliged to act: a more 
pressing issue might be whether the EIT would be superfluous to requirements 
in the EU's fight against fraud and corruption (see further section 8.5 infra). 
8.3.2.6. The right to descend upon an institution or body without warning in 
order to inspect files, including computer-based files. 
This power would again help the EIT to determine that no information was 
being unlawfully withheld, either from EU officials or from citizens. Its use 
might also uncover evidence of fraudulent or criminal activity within an EU 
17 Decision 94/262/ECSC, EC, Euratom, OJ 1994 L 113/15. 
18 Which may then apply the second paragraph of Article 18 of the Protocol on the Privileges 
and lmmunities of the European Communities. 
19 Cf Article 19: "[b]ad government needs secrecy to survive. [Secrecy] allows inefficiency, 
wastefulness and corruption to thrive" (http://www.article 19.org/, available via an internal 
link entitled "Access to Information".) See also the Ombudsman, 'The struggle for 
openness in the European Union', 21 March 2001, http://www.euro-
ombudsman.eu.inUspeeches/en/200 l-03-2l.htm. 
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institution or body, which further raises the prospect of the ElT having some 
role to play in the EU's battle against corruption. Although such a police-like 
power appears rather draconian in light ofthe Ombudsman's task of securing a 
friendly solution to maladministration whenever possible, it would assist the 
ElT in his/her task of changing the culture of the Union from one of secrecy to 
one of openness. Where institutions and bodies might not yield readily to 
persuasion that openness and public scrutiny will not adversely affect their 
operations, the EIT's ability to scrutinise those operations on behalf of the 
public at any time and without warning would oblige them to start coming to 
terms with transparency. Furthermore, the knowledge that the ElT might 
materialise at any moment may dissuade officials from establishing a new 
culture of secrecy by hiding behind an apparently open fa9ade: the ElT would 
be in a position to discover the file behind the file or the minutes of the meeting 
behind the meeting.20 
This purely investigative power could, by way of a safeguard, be subject to a 
commitment on the EIT's part to maintain the confidentiality of any 
unannounced inspection or investigation until such time as s/he has decided 
which details, if any, may be revealed in the public interest. The institutions 
and bodies investigated might consider it invariably contrary to the Community 
interest to have details of any internal malpractices uncovered by the ElT made 
public, but that argument carries no weight in light of the very public 
resignation of the Santer Commission. That resignation followed the first 
report of the Committee of Independent Experts established by the European 
Parliament in January 1999 to investigate the Commission's handling of fraud, 
mismanagement and nepotism: Commissioners Cresson, Pinheiro and Wulf-
Mathies were considered guilty of nepotism and various instances of 
mismanagement were uncovered, including the misappropriation of funds? 1 
As the Ombudsman stated: 
"Some people believe that an open administration is not effective. They believe that open 
methods of working reduce efficiency. This argument has sounded much less convincing 
2
° Cf Birkinshaw, Chapter One supra, note 65 and text. 
21 As discussed in D. Skiadas, The European Court of Auditors, Kogan Page, 2000, pp.67-74. 
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since the fall of the Santer Commission. It was lack of transparency that brought down that 
Commission. To all those who argue against openness, I have one question to ask. Was it 
really effective that the European Union was without a fully working Commission for half 
a year?',22 
It seems to be more in the Community interest to expose fraud and corruption, 
and to demonstrate that such nefarious activities are not tolerated, than to allow 
people to suspect that Community officials are above the law. The European 
Union did not collapse following the publicity accorded to the Santer 
Commission scandal. There seems to be no reason why the ElT should not be 
given far-reaching investigative powers. 
8.3.2.7. The power to order the re-classification of any documents inspected 
which s/he deems to have been incorrectly classified. 
The prior classification of documents involves determining whether or not a 
given document is going to be publicly available when it is produced, without 
waiting until somebody requests access to it. 23 The Ombudsman describes 
prior classification as "the key to good administration of the rules on public 
access" because the adoption of such a system would mean "that requests for 
access to documents can be dealt with promptly."24 Upon receipt of a request 
for public access, the relevant official might know immediately whether or not 
access could be granted, or at least the precise exception(s) to the public access 
rules that would have been invoked in order to justify the non-disclosure of that 
document, and thus be in a position to respond very quickly to the applicant. 
However, as the Ombudsman also observed: 
"To ensure that a system of prior classification works properly to guarantee the 
citizen's right of access to documents, two additional elements are essential. First, 
there must be a public register of all documents, including also those which are not in 
the public domain. Second, citizens must have the right to seek an independent 
review, by the courts or the Ombudsman."25 
22 Speech at note 19 supra. 
23 Cf the Ombudsman, speech cited at Chapter Seven supra, note 22. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
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An independent review of the classification of documents seems essential if 
any system of prior classification is not to be open to abuse. However, a 
decision to classify a document would not be of direct or individual concern to 
a citizen, and the Ombudsman might be unable to inspect that document 
him/herself, in order to review the operation of the system of prior 
classification effectively. The EIT would be able to supervise the 
implementation of prior classification rules and, if necessary, to override an 
institution's classification of documents in order to prevent them from being 
'over-classified'.26 The possibility that much of the information contained 
within specific documents might be over-classified within the EU arises from 
its current classification policy, as discussed in Chapter Five supra, section 
5.4.1.27 
Michael Kirby J. believes that the over-classification of documents is a 
perfectly foreseeable phenomenon in any culture which 
"asks not why should the individual have the information sought, but rather why the 
individual should not- at least where the information concerns the government of that 
individual's country ... "28 
Since the EIT's remit would be to change this culture at EU level by promoting 
public access and transparency, s/he should be able to order the partial 
disclosure of the non-confidential portions of classified documents, whenever 
such partial access would provide genuinely useful information to an applicant 
for public access. The ElT would be able to inspect a document and to decide, 
independently, whether the effort involved in deleting confidential portions 
thereof would outweigh the benefit to be gained by the partial disclosure 
26 I.e., classified as 'Top Secret' when 'Confidential' would suffice to protect any relevant 
legitimate public interest(s) in secrecy, or 'Confidential' when the public interest in 
disclosure would nevertheless outweigh any possible harm to any legitimate public 
interest in secrecy. 
27 Cf also Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, at 23: the Commission and Council have granted 
access to some documents classified 'Secret', 'Restricted' and 'Confidential', but it is 
very difficult for citizens to know that such documents exist in the first place. 
28 
'Freedom of Information: The Seven Deadly Sins' [1998] EHRLR 245, at 253. Cf the 
attitude of the institutions towards public access as depicted in Chapters Five, Six and 
Seven supra. 
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thereof, in order to determine whether the Council would be justified in 
invoking the principles of proportionality and of good administration in order 
to deny partial access to that document.29 The power to order the disclosure or 
partial disclosure of classified documents could, as discussed in sub-section 
8.3.2.4. supra, be granted subject to certain specific, narrow exemptions and to 
judicial review by the Community Courts.30 However, without a power to 
order the re- or de-classification of documents the contents of which simply do 
not warrant the classification accorded to them, the EIT's ability to police the 
application of a system of prior classification would be virtually non-existent. 
S/he would only be able to promote the free flow of information and to produce 
a culture of transparency with powers to enforce the principle of granting the 
widest possible public access to documents. 
8.4. Establishing the KIT. 
8. 4.1. Independent institutional status. 
As indicated, above all, the ElT must be independent. S/he will represent 
ordinary Europeans in his/her own right. Perhaps the best model for the ElT is 
not the Ombudsman, who reports to the European Parliament, but the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA), an independent institution31 charged with controlling 
the financial management of the Union's executive;32 with holding those 
responsible for the Union's financial management to public account;33 and with 
promoting the transparency of the Union's financial management.34 Basically, 
the ElT would function with respect to the flow of information within the EU 
as the ECA functions with respect to the flow of public funds. 
29 Cf Case T-14/98, Heidi Hauta/a MEP v Council [1999] ECR 11-2489, paragraph 86, 
discussed in Chapter Six supra, section 6.6.2. 
30 In Eire, decisions of the Irish Information Commissioner are amenable to judicial review on 
a point of law (Freedom of Information Act (Eire) 1997, s.42). 
31 Article 7(1) (ex 4(1)) EC, as amended; Article 5 (ex E) TEU, as amended. 
32 This term is understood to be appropriate insofar as the Commission and Council both 
exercise functions analogous to those of the national executive in a Member State. 
33 Skiadas, note 21 supra, at pp.l-2. 
34 Ibid., at pp.88-89: the ECA raises public awareness of the Union's management of public 
funds and can thereby help to stimulate public debate. 
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8.4.2. Necessary Treaty Amendments. 
To give the ElT independent institutional status, Article 7(1) (ex 4(1)) EC 
would require amendment by adding 'an Information Tribune' to the list of 
institutions named therein: Article 5 (ex E) TEU would likewise require the 
addition of 'the Information Tribune', to make it clear that the EIT's remit 
extends to Titles V, VI and VII TEU. A new Section 6 within Part Five, Title 
I, Chapter 1 EC would also be required. The basic Article establishing the EIT 
might read as follows: 35 
SECTION 6 THE INFORMATION TRIBUNE 
"Article 248a 
The Information Tribune shall promote transparency in decision-making and public 
access to information held by the Community institutions. To that end he shall ensure 
that no official of any Community institution, agency or other body withholds any 
information from any official of another Community institution, agency or body who 
is authorised to receive that information, or to whom the disclosure of that information 
is required by law, and shall ensure that no information held by the various 
Community institutions, agencies and bodies is withheld without lawful justification 
from any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a Member 
State. He shall also advise officials concerning the proper administration of any 
legislation or other rules governing public access to documents held by the various 
Community institutions and bodies, and shall advise and assist members of the public 
wishing to obtain access to such documents." 
The selection, appointment and dismissal ofthe EIT also require consideration. 
Members of the ECA must be independent, neither seeking nor taking 
instructions from any institution, body or government. They may not engage in 
any other occupation during their term of office, gainful or not. This suggests 
that the criteria for selecting the Ombudsman would be suitable for selecting 
the EIT.36 The European Parliament must be consulted regarding the 
appointment of ECA members, who are then appointed by the Council acting 
unanimously. They can only be replaced upon retirement, resignation or a 
35 Recalling that 'he' includes 'she' and that, by virtue of Article 5 TEU, the term 'Community 
institution/agency/body' in effect means 'EU institution/agency/body'. 
36 Cf Article 6(2) of the Ombudsman's Statute, annexed to this thesis. 
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ruling from the ECJ to the effect that they are no longer qualified to perform 
their duties. 37 
The ElT would probably have to be appointed in the same way as an ECA 
member, otherwise the Member States are unlikely to agree to establish an ElT: 
they would doubtless wish to have as much control over his/her appointment as 
possible. With regard to his/her dismissal, however, the analogy with the ECA 
becomes problematic. Only the ECA itself may ask the ECJ to dismiss an ECA 
member. This helps to guarantee the ECA's independence,38 but it would 
obviously be impractical to expect the EIT to ask the ECJ to remove him/her 
from office. A further unanimous Council decision, following consultation 
with the European Parliament, might be required in order to request the ECJ to 
dismiss the EIT. Alternatively, a corrupt or incompetent ElT could be removed 
if the European Parliament were to adopt, by an absolute majority of its 
members, a resolution requesting the ECJ to dismiss him/her. This could be 
preferable because, as illustrated by recent complaints to the Ombudsman,39 the 
Council remains a secretive institution and is therefore the most likely target of 
criticism from the ElT, therefore the Council should not, perhaps, be free to 
judge the EIT's conduct. Furthermore, the EIT's accountability to the 
European citizens would suggest that the Parliament, as the sole institution 
whose members are also directly elected and able to receive petitions from 
citizens,40 should have more control over the EIT's dismissal than the 
indirectly elected Council. The requirement for an absolute majority would 
ensure that the decision to request the EIT's dismissal could not be taken 
lightly, and the ultimate decision regarding his/her dismissal would, in any 
event, lie with the ECJ. Article 248b might, therefore, read as follows: 
"Article 248b 
I. The Information Tribune shall be appointed for a term of five years by the Council, 
acting unanimously after consulting the European Parliament. He shall be eligible for 
reappointment. 
37 Article 24 7 (ex 188b) EC. 
38 Article 247(7) (ex 188b(7) EC: see also Skiadas, note 21 supra, at pp.7-9. 
39 E.g. complaints 916/2000 and 917/2000 submitted by Statewatch: see Chapter Seven supra, 
section 7 .4.2.4. 
40 Article 194 (ex 138d) EC. 
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2. The Information Tribune shall be chosen from among persons who are Union 
citizens, have full civil and political rights, offer every guarantee of independence, and 
meet the conditions required for the exercise of the highest judicial office in their 
country or have the acknowledged competence and experience to undertake the duties 
of the Information Tribune. 
3. The Information Tribune shall, in the general interest of the Community, be 
completely independent in the performance of his duties. He shall neither seek nor 
take instructions from any government or from any other body. He shall refrain from 
any actions incompatible with his duties. 
4. The Information Tribune may not, during his term of office, engage in any other 
occupation, whether gainful or not. When entering upon his duties he shall give a 
solemn undertaking before the Court of Justice that, both during and after his term of 
office, he shall respect the obligations arising therefrom and in particular his duty to 
refrain from disclosing any lawfully classified information. 
5. Apart from normal replacement, or death, the duties of the Information Tribune 
shall end when he resigns, or is compulsorily retired by a ruling of the Court of Justice 
pursuant to paragraph 6. In the event of early cessation of duties, a successor shall be 
appointed within three months of the office falling vacant for the remainder of the 
current five-year term. 
6. The Information Tribune may be deprived of his office or of his right to a pension 
or other benefits in its stead only if the Court of Justice, at the request of the European 
Parliament acting by an absolute majority of its members, finds that he no longer 
fulfils the requisite conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office. 
7. The Information Tribune shall have the same rank in terms of remuneration, 
allowances and pension as a judge at the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. 
Articles 12 to 15 and Article 18 of the Protocol on the Privileges and I mm unities of 
the European Communities shall apply to the Information Tribune and to the officials 
and servants of his secretariat." 
The EIT's investigative powers, power to receive complaints and power to 
order the re-classification or disclosure of documents in the public interest, as 
discussed in section 8.3 supra, would also require elaboration within the 
Treaty: 
"Article 248c 
I. The Information Tribune shall supervise, investigate and audit the implementation 
of all rules governing the inter-institutional transfer of information, the classification 
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of documents by the Community institutions and the granting of public access to 
documents held by the Community institutions, agencies and other bodies. 
The Information Tribune may in addition receive complaints from any natural or legal 
person residing or having its registered office in a Member State concerning any 
refusal on the part of any institution, agency or other body established pursuant to this 
Treaty to disclose information. He shall inform the complainant of any decision 
addressed to the institution or body complained of as a result of his inquiries. 
The Information Tribune shall report annually to the public on the outcome of his 
inquiries and shall provide a statement of assurance as to the legality and regularity of 
the implementation of the aforementioned rules, which shall be published in the 
Official Journal of the European Communities. 
2. The Information Tribune shall examine whether all information has been disclosed 
and all documents classified in a lawful and regular manner and whether the principle 
of granting the widest possible access to documents held by Community institutions 
and bodies has been upheld. In doing so, he shall report in particular on any cases of 
irregularity. 
3. The Information Tribune's investigations may, if necessary, be carried out 
without notice in the institutions and bodies of the Community. The Tribune may 
question, in private, any official of the Community institutions or bodies, whether 
serving or retired, if he has reasonable grounds to suspect that information has been 
unlawfully withheld from another official authorised to receive that information or to 
whom its disclosure is required by law, or reasonable grounds to suspect that 
information has been unlawfully withheld from the public, and if such questioning is 
necessary in order to determine the existence of any irregularity. All Community 
institutions and bodies shall forward to the Information Tribune, or shall permit him to 
have sight of upon demand, any information, computer files, or documents necessary 
to carry out his task. 
4. If, in the course of inquiries, he learns of facts which he considers might relate to 
criminal law, the Information Tribune shall immediately notify, if appropriate, the 
Community institution with authority over the official or servant concerned, which 
may apply the second paragraph of Article 18 of the Protocol on the Privileges and 
I mm unities of the European Communities. The Information Tribune may also inform 
the Community institution or body concerned of the facts calling into question the 
conduct of a member of their staff from a disciplinary point of view. 
5.a. The Information Tribune may order any information found to have been 
unlawfully withheld by a Community institution or body to be disclosed to any 
official authorised to receive that information or to whom the disclosure of that 
information is required by law. He may himself disclose such information to the 
appropriate official. 
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b. The Information Tribune may order the re-classification of any document if the 
public interest(s) protected by its current classification would be sufficiently protected 
by a lower form of classification, unless the document in question is exempted from 
this provision under the terms of a Regulation adopted pursuant to Article 255. 
c. The Information Tribune may order that a document be declassified and/or 
disclosed to the public if the public interest(s) protected by its current classification 
are not sufficient to justify the classification/non-disclosure of that document, unless 
the document in question is exempted from this provision under the terms of a 
Regulation adopted pursuant to Article 255. 
d. The Information Tribune may not under any circumstances himself disclose 
information to the public if that information is not already available to the public. 
6. The Information Tribune shall draw up an annual report of his activities, which 
shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Communities. Having 
regard to the rules governing the inter-institutional transfer of information, the 
classification of documents and the granting of public access to documents, he shall 
recommend such amendments to those rules as appear to him desirable 41 in order to 
ensure that decisions are taken as openly as possible and in order to ensure that the 
widest possible access to documents held by the Community institutions and bodies is 
granted." 
The need to subject the decisions of the EIT to judicial review could cause the 
greatest difficulties, although none are insuperable. The ECA's function is 
purely supervisory and its decisions are not binding,42 whereas the EIT, in 
order to be effective, would require the power to issue a Decision, within the 
meaning of Article 249 (ex 189) EC, to the effect that 'Document X' should be 
re-classified or even disclosed. Therefore Article 249 would require 
amendment to that effect. An extra sentence could be inserted after the first 
sentence: 
"The Information Tribune shall take decisions or make recommendations." 
41 The substantive content of Regulation No. 1049/2001 is subject to a form of review: Article 
17 provides that the Commission shall make any appropriate proposals for its amendment 
by 31 January 2004. However, a review by the Commission does not appear to be a fully 
independent review of the type that would be desirable in a multidimensionally-
transparent regime: the Commission does not represent ordinary Europeans, and, to judge 
from the discussion of its draft proposals for Regulation No. 1049/2001 (see Chapter Five 
supra, note 60), it could be equally as likely to recommend changes aimed at preserving 
secrecy as to recommend changes aimed at encouraging openness. 
42 Skiadas, note 21 supra, at p.6. 
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Article 230 (ex 173) EC would then require amendment. As this issue presents 
certain complexities, the following section is devoted to the extent to which 
Article 230 would have to be amended in order to accommodate an ElT 
capable of issuing legally binding decisions. 
8.4.3. The need to amend Article 230. 
The ElT would, as seen, have various prerogatives in order to carry out his/her 
supervisory/investigative role, including the power to descend without notice 
upon another institution and demand official access to its files and the power to 
order the disclosure of documents in the public interest. The ECA is able to 
bring proceedings against other institutions in order to protect its rights of 
audit,43 therefore the ElT could be added to the list of institutions able to bring 
proceedings for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives. The need for the 
ECA to be able to protect its rights of audit is emphasised by Skiadas, who 
notes that the need for an effective audit within the EU will not be satisfied if 
"the auditor cannot impose the measures necessary for the conduct of a sound 
financial management on the auditees".44 Likewise, the ElT would be in a very 
weak position unless s/he could impose measures required in the interests of 
securing the greatest possible flow of information to the public. S/he must 
therefore be able to seek judicial review of, for example, a Council Decision to 
the effect that Document X falls within the category of documents exempted 
from the EIT's powers to order its disclosure, under the terms of any applicable 
Regulation. 
The fact that only certain institutions45 and decisions46 are subject to judicial 
review according to the strict terms of the first paragraph of Article 230 would 
43 Article 230 (ex 173) EC, paragraph 3: see Skiadas, note 21 supra, at p.87. 
44 Ibid., at p.86. 
45 The European Central Bank is listed as a potential defendant, although not an institution per 
Article 7( I) EC. 
46 A decision of the European Parliament refusing public access to a document is, of course, 
intended to produce legal effects vis-a-vis third parties, and is therefore reviewable. A 
decision of the Parliament to classify 'Document X' as 'Top Secret', assuming the 
existence of a system of prior classification of documents according to which the 
Parliament would be authorised to so classify documents, would have the legal effect of 
preventing third parties from gaining lawful access to that document or from disclosing it 
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not unduly impair the EIT's functioning, for several reasons. Firstly, 
information-related decisions of the institutions most likely to withhold 
information and/or to give rise to complaints regarding the withholding of 
access to documents would be reviewable. Secondly, information-related 
decisions of the institutions responsible for EU policy-making and legislation, 
the information held by which is most likely to be of public interest, are 
reviewable. Thirdly, according to the strict wording of Article 230 the ECA 
would be unable to bring proceedings in order to protect its prerogatives 
against any institutions and bodies not named as potential defendants, yet this 
does not prevent the ECA from functioning effectively. Finally, the ElT would 
remain able to issue binding Decisions, within the meaning of Article 249 as it 
would have been amended, ordering other institutions and bodies to disclose 
documents in their possession. 
Having discussed the capacity of the ElT to apply for judicial review, it is 
necessary to consider his/her amenability to judicial review in applications 
lodged by other institutions, bodies and natural and legal persons. It might be 
advisable to amend paragraph 1 of Article 230 to allow the ECJ to review the 
legality of 'acts adopted by the Information Tribune', in order to preclude 
doubt as to the admissibility of an application submitted, for example, by the 
Council in response to a Decision of the ElT ordering it to re-classify a 'Secret' 
document as 'Confidential', in which case it would not be clear that the 
document itself should be disclosed to third parties. This would certainly cause 
the ElT to become a potential defendant in applications for review lodged by 
the Commission and Council, although it is less clear that the other named 
institutions, including the Parliament, would be able to apply for judicial 
review of the EIT's decisions for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives.47 
to others in the event that they themselves were authorised to see it: on that reasoning, 
such a decision would be binding upon and capable of affecting the legal interests of 
another party (cf Case 60/81, International Business Machines Corporation v 
Commission [1981] ECR 2639, at paragraph 9) and so should be deemed to be reviewable 
upon an application lodged by the EIT in order to protect his/her prerogatives, although it 
would not be of direct and individual concern to any natural or legal person. 
47 The right of the European Parliament to be consulted and/or to otherwise participate in 
legislative proceedings is clearly a prerogative that can be protected by an application for 
judicial review, as is evident from any application lodged by the Parliament in order to 
challenge the legal basis for adoption of a Council Regulation or Directive (e.g. Case C-
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Furthermore, at present, under the strict terms of Article 230, a natural or legal 
person refused access to a document held by the European Investment Bank, or 
another body not specifically mentioned as a potential defendant within Article 
230, might be unable to seek judicial review of such a refusal. It might be 
argued that a 'decision' refusing public access adopted by an institution not 
named within Article 249 would not constitute a decision within the meaning 
of that Article and therefore would not be a reviewable act.48 S/he/it might 
certainly complain to the Ombudsman and, presuming the establishment of an 
ElT, to the ElT. However, if the ElT were to order the disclosure of the 
document in question, that Decision would be binding within the meaning of 
Article 249, as that Article would have been amended. Unless the 
institution/body to which that Decision was addressed could unquestionably 
apply for judicial review thereof, it might therefore be possible for the ElT to 
abuse his/her powers vis-a-vis that institution/body. 
The problem of subjecting all decisions of the ElT to judicial review might, 
perhaps, require the approach taken by the ECJ in Les Verts.49 There, a 
decision of the European Parliament was held to be a reviewable act 
notwithstanding the fact that the Parliament was neither expressly mentioned 
within Article 189 (now 249) EC nor listed as a potential defendant or potential 
plaintiff in Article 173 (now 230) EC. The ECJ found that it would be 
'contrary to the spirit of the Treaty expressed in Article 164' (now 220) EC to 
allow measures adopted by the Parliament to 'encroach' upon the powers of 
189/97, Parliament v Council [1999] ECR I-4741, paragraphs 11, 15, 16 and 17). The 
Parliament might be granted power, under a hypothetical Regulation establishing a system 
for the prior classification of documents held by the institutions, to order certain 
documents to be classified, and such an order might be binding under the terms of that 
Regulation on anyone granted official access to that document (at least, unless and until 
the ElT were to order its re-classification or disclosure). It is not certain whether such a 
power, arising under secondary legislation, would be regarded as a 'prerogative' of the 
Parliament: only if it were, would the Parliament be able to challenge decisions of the ElT 
ordering it to re-classify or disclose the document in question, unless Article 230 were 
further amended as discussed infra. 
48 However, this argument is unlikely to be accepted: see Case 294/83, Parti ecologiste 'Les 
Verts' v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1045, discussed infra, and cf Harlow, Chapter 
One supra, note 8, at 297, who notes with reference to that case that agencies and bodies 
not mentioned in the relevant Treaty articles might be reviewable if their decisions affect 
third party rights. 
49 Note 48 supra. 
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Member States or other institutions, or to exceed the limits of the powers 
conferred upon the Parliament by the Treaties, without the possibility of review 
by the Court. It was therefore concluded that an action for annulment might lie 
against acts of the European Parliament intended to have legal effects vis-a-vis 
third parties.50 This approach would, as Harlow suggests,51 allow natural and 
legal persons to seek the review of decisions refusing public access to 
documents, addressed to them by institutions and bodies not named in Article 
230. 
Importantly, the Parliament had argued that it ought to have a reciprocal 
capacity to challenge acts of the Commission and Council, which at the time it 
did not, under the strict terms of Article 173 (now 230).52 However, Advocate 
General Mancini had stated that, in his opinion, the Parliament would be able 
to do so in order to protect its prerogatives, 53 even though it was not named as a 
potential applicant for judicial review. The ECJ, at least implicitly, concurred 
with the Advocate General's view that the action in the instant case should be 
declared admissible notwithstanding the Parliament's arguments. Therefore, 
on the basis of the Les Verts judgment, so long as a decision of the ElT would 
be regarded as encroaching upon the prerogatives of another institution or body 
by ordering that institution/body to re-classifY or to disclose documents in its 
possession, there is reason to suppose that the institution/body in question 
would be able to seek judicial review of that decision in order to uphold the 
rule of law. 
In order to avoid any doubt, however, particularly concerning the issue of 
whether an institution's capacity to make decisions regarding the classification 
or disclosure of documents could be described as a 'prerogative', given that 
such decisions might be contested by, or overridden by decisions of, the ElT, 
Article 230 could be amended by the insertion of a new paragraph 4: 
50 Ibid., paragraphs 20-25. 
51 See note 48 supra. 
52 Note 48 supra, paragraph 22. 
53 Ibid., paragraph 7 of the Advocate-General's Opinion, at 1349. 
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"The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction under the same conditions in actions 
brought by any Community institution or body for the purpose of reviewing the 
legality of decisions of the Information Tribune." 
This would make it clear that all decisions of the ElT would always be subject 
to review by the ECJ and thereby provide a powerful safeguard against the 
possibility of the ElT abusing his/her considerable powers. 
8.4.4. The need to amend Regulation No. 1049/2001. 
Not only this Regulation, but also all public access rules allowing recourse to 
the Community Courts and/or Ombudsman would have to be amended in order 
to recognise the ElT as the new remedy for public access complaints. In order 
to justify the EIT's existence (see further section 8.5 infra), the ElT would be 
expected to relieve both the CFI and Ombudsman of the responsibility of 
processing public access complaints, leaving the former free to cope with the 
remainder of its caseload and the latter free to investigate other forms of 
maladministration. The amendments required would be straightforward, e.g. 
Article 8(3) of the Regulation might be amended as follows: 
"Failure by the institution to reply within the prescribed time limit shall be considered 
as a negative reply and entitle the applicant to make a complaint to the Information 
Tribune, or to institute court proceedings against the institution in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the EC Treaty, or to complain to the European Ombudsman." 
The Community Courts might not agree to the idea that the existence of the 
ElT could or should be seen as ousting the possibility of direct judicial review: 
however, the EIT's power to order disclosure should make him/her a far more 
attractive possibility than the CFI or the Ombudsman. Putting the Ombudsman 
in third place might help to dissuade people from continuing to submit public 
access complaints to the Ombudsman. 
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8.4.5. Conclusion. 
Establishing an ElT as an independent EU institution, empowered to address 
binding decisions to the other institutions in matters falling within his/her 
remit, would place him/her in the strongest possible position from which to 
supervise the implementation of FOI rules, the classification of documents and 
the inter-institutional flow of information required by various Treaty 
provisions.54 By adopting appropriate Treaty amendments the ElT could be 
given the power to protect his/her prerogatives before the ECJ and would also 
be indisputably subject to judicial review, to prevent him/her from abusing 
his/her powers. The most critical question is, however, that of whether it 
would actually be worth establishing an ElT. 
8.5. Is an ElT necessary? 
8.5.1. The EfT.· pros and cons. 
On the positive side, the ElT would, as seen, have strong powers to maintain 
the flow of information between the institutions and to the European public. 
This can only help to promote transparency. The ElT is intended to continually 
supervise the implementation of public access rules and any prior classification 
of documents by the institutions, thereby reducing the potential for complaints 
to arise concerning refusals to grant public access. S/he would be exclusively 
devoted to FOI and transparency, and would not be a purely reactive remedy.55 
It is also anticipated that the ElT would reach a conclusion regarding the 
justifiability of any refusal to disclose (a) document(s) far more quickly than 
the Ombudsman does at present. The ElT would not be required to pursue a 
friendly solution: s/he would simply examine the document(s) and decide 
whether the institution had made a manifest error of assessment or had 
misinterpreted the applicable rules, and if so, would be able to order full or 
54 E.g. Article 300(3) (ex 228(3)) EC calling for the assent of the European Parliament: for a 
meaningful debate to take place MEPs must be in possession of all the relevant facts 
concerning the decision to which they are being asked to give assent. 
55 The Ombudsman is not purely reactive, but s/he cannot devote all his/her time to the 
supervision of the implementation of public access rules within the EU. 
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partial disclosure of the document(s). The complainant would then be 
informed that disclosure had been ordered, and would only have to wait for the 
document(s) to be produced. 
On the negative side, however, the institution concerned might, instead of 
granting immediate public access, seek judicial review of the EIT's order. 
From the perspective of the institutions, this is a necessary safeguard against 
decisions of an ElT who might have manifestly erred him/herself in deciding 
that a document could be disclosed in the public interest. From the perspective 
of the applicant for access to that document, however, it could be a 
disadvantage: the applicant would have to wait for the ECJ to either uphold or 
annul the order of the ElT, in which case s/he/it might feel that s/he/it might 
just as well have applied for judicial review ofthe institution's refusal to grant 
access directly, especially if it had requested documents in order to gain 
information necessary to help him/her/it to influence decision-making 
procedures in progress. By the time the judgment of the ECJ was handed 
down, even if the EIT's order was upheld, the document's disclosure might be 
too late to be of use. 
In light of the present position, however, the latter argument is weak. Firstly, it 
seems that few applications for public access are made by persons seeking to 
influence the decision-making process.56 Secondly, such applicants might 
currently have to wait, not only for the CFI to finish reviewing the initial 
decision refusing access, but for the ECJ to finish hearing the institution's 
appeal against the CFI's annulment of that decision, and would still have no 
guarantee that the institution concerned would actually hand over the document 
in question: as seen, an institution might simply re-evaluate its refusal and 
produce a lawful statement of reasons for not disclosing the document in 
question, which neither Court might have examined. At least if the EIT had 
issued a binding order that the document should be disclosed, if that order were 
to be upheld following review by the ECJ, it will follow that the document in 
question will be disclosed. Thirdly, the ECJ could be, and in the interests of 
56 Cf Kadelbach, Chapter Five supra, note 68, at 194. 
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transparency should be, as circumspect in dealing with public access decisions 
made by the EIT as is the High Court of Ireland with regard to decisions of the 
Irish Information Commissioner:57 meanwhile, frequent challenges to the EIT's 
decisions would cast grave doubt in the public mind regarding the institutions' 
commitment to transparency. Overall, a complaint to the EIT should still 
provide a speedier route to guaranteed public access, or at least a faster route to 
the production of a conclusive decision refusing public access, than the present 
system. For that reason, it would be worth establishing an EIT: also, the mere 
fact that his/her decisions were amenable to judicial review would not prevent 
him/her from exercising a general supervisory role, making recommendations, 
and reporting directly to the public concerning the institutions' attitude towards 
public access and transparency. 
However, as noted in section 8.3.2 supra, there is a prima facie degree of 
overlap between the powers/role of the ElT and the present powers/role of the 
Ombudsman, the ECA and the European anti-fraud office, OLAF.58 Insofar as 
the EIT's resemblance to the ECA and OLAF is concerned, it should be 
apparent that both institutions have different primary objectives. The fact that 
the EIT might conceivably assist the ECA and OLAF in uncovering financial 
fraud and mismanagement does not alter the fact that the audit remains the 
primary function of the ECA and that the fight against fraud remains the 
primary function of OLAF: the EIT's primary function is to identify and correct 
problems in the implementation of EU rules governing public access and the 
prior classification of documents. An EIT, if established solely to combat 
fraud, would doubtless be deemed superfluous to requirements, but neither the 
ECA nor OLAF could fulfil the primary functions of the EIT, and there is no 
reason why the ElT should not be able to assist the ECA and OLAF if 
circumstances so allow. Both the EIT and the Ombudsman, however, are 
concerned with public access to information and the good administration ofthe 
rules governing this, therefore further discussion of this potential overlap is 
warranted in order to show why an EIT is preferable to the Ombudsman. 
57 The Irish Information Commissioner's web site indicates that, since 21 April 1998, few 
decisions have been challenged. 
58 The Office europeen de lutte antifraude. 
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8. 5. 2. EfT or Ombudsman? 
The Ombudsman firmly opposes the appointment of an EIT, observing, in 
connection with a proposed "Information Supervisor" to "deal with appeals and 
carry out some advisory tasks", that the Courts have had to deal with on 
average two public access cases per year and the Ombudsman on average some 
five public access complaints per year. Also, the Ombudsman believes that the 
adoption of prior classification of documents would make the operation of the 
rules governing public access "prompt and efficient". In his view the expense 
involved in establishing a new official, especially one that would "duplicate" 
the role of the Ombudsman in dealing with citizens' complaints, could not be 
justified. 59 
In this speech, the Ombudsman is, for once, minimising the importance of 
transparency, by observing that relatively few public access complaints have 
been made. More importantly, the Ombudsman is entirely mistaken in 
believing that the EIT would duplicate the Ombudsman's role. As seen, the 
ElT would be able to order the production of documents, which the 
Ombudsman cannot, and would have no difficulty in demanding official access 
to documents him/herself, unlike the Ombudsman.60 The EIT would be 
exclusively devoted to FOI and transparency. S/he would not have to seek a 
friendly solution to complaints. Citizens would eventually cease to complain 
to the Ombudsman about FOI, given a powerful EIT able to deal with their 
complaints promptly and effectively: the Ombudsman would be free to deal 
with other areas of maladministration. The argument that the cost of an ElT 
might not be justifiable, in light of the number of complaints actually lodged by 
the public and civil society NGOs, overlooks the fact that it is not necessarily 
desirable to rely upon ordinary people and NGOs to expose problems within 
the EU by complaining. A pro-active ElT able to make frequent random 
inspections as part of his/her ongoing supervisory role, which role the 
59 Speech of 18 September 2000, cited at Chapter One supra, note 67. 
6° Cf the Ombudsman's admission that he has not always been permitted to inspect documents 
without threatening to seek assistance from the European Parliament (http://www.euro-
ombudsman.eu.int/speeches/en/200 I-03-05.htm). 
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Ombudsman does not exercise, could potentially uncover problems that would 
be unlikely to prompt public complaints. 
Most importantly, perhaps, the Ombudsman's optimistic assumption that prior 
classification will automatically result in a prompt and efficient public access 
service is questionable in a culture having, as noted, a tendency to over-classify 
documents in a bid to preserve secrecy. The institutions simply cannot be 
trusted to operate prior classification with a view to increasing transparency 
and public access, without independent supervision. Evidence of the 
institutions' continuing antipathy towards transparency comes from the 
Ombudsman himself, having noted that the Council's involvement in crisis 
management has resulted in the Council according absolute priority to military 
security61 and that the Commission's attitude towards data protection will 
result in more documents becoming confidential than ever before.62 
Compelling evidence of the failure of public access rules alone to change a 
culture of secrecy comes from other jurisdictions,63 in particular, Australia. 
The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) has suggested, in light ofthe 
Australian experience of FOI, that in the absence of a person/organisation 
having general responsibility for constantly monitoring the administration of 
Australian's FOI Act, able to identify and address problems and provide 
61 Cf L~stgarten and Leigh, Chapter Five supra, note 39, at pp.21-22: the traditional Member 
State interpretation of 'national security' can result in the undesirable imposition of 
penalties upon persons holding views deemed unacceptable to those in public office; the 
arbitrary conduct of government, without adequate public debate; and a potential loss of 
public accountability. To protect against such consequences, an ElT could encourage 
officials to change their thinking regarding the nature of the public interest in national 
security, and to recognise that national security concerns the protection of civil and 
political rights (cj ibid., at p.5), being "matters that go to the heart of the character of the 
state and society" (cj ibid., at p.27). 
62 Speech cited at note 19 supra. 
63 Eire, Canada and the Australian states of Queensland and Western Australia have 
Information Commissioners. That of Canada is a mediator, lacking power to order the 
disclosure of documents: see http://infoweb.magi.com/-accessca/oic.html. In 
Queensland the Information Commissioner has decision-making powers subject to 
judicial review: see http://www.slq.qld.gov.au/infocomm/. Western Australia's 
Commissioner is accountable to the state parliament and is like an Ombudsman, although 
s/he is charged with recommending legislative/administrative changes to promote the 
objects of FOI legislation (s.111(4) of the Western Australia State Freedom of 
Information Act 1992, and see http://www.foi.wa.gov.au/). Eire's Information 
Commissioner is described as an Ombudsman, but, as noted, has decision-making powers 
subject to judicial review: see http://www.irlgov.ie/oic. 
281 
assistance to the public concerning FOI, "the preventative [of secrecy] value of 
legislation of this character would be lost, in a concentration of effort in simply 
responding to individual claims".64 The main thrust of the ALRC's argument 
is, therefore, the need for constant supervision of the operation of FOI 
legislation. It will be noted that the ALRC did not find its own Ombudsman to 
offer an adequate solution to this problem. Where a culture of secrecy once 
existed, old habits die hard, as the ALRC also observed. Australian FOI 
legislation had been in force for some 14 years when it reported, in 1996, that: 
"Submissions and consultations indicate that the starting point for some agencies 
is ... along the lines of deciding immediately that the document will not be disclosed 
and then scanning the exemption provisions to find a way of justifying their refusal to 
disclose the information."65 
The ALRC's perceived solution to this problem was, in part, to reinforce the 
demand for cultural change by explaining the purpose of FOI legislation more 
fully, 66 but also to introduce an 'FOI Commissioner' to oversee the 
administration of FOI legislation; to promote public understanding of the FOI 
Act; to combat the culture of secrecy and "promote a fundamental change in 
the way public servants are permitted and expected to deal with information 
held by the government." Importantly, the proposed Commissioner "should 
also convey the message that the privacy of officers and of members of the 
public can be protected within a culture of openness",67 which should dissuade 
officials from seeking to hide behind an apparently transparent fa9ade. Clearly, 
the ALRC does not believe that the expense involved in establishing an ElT-
64 Point 6.2 of the ALRC Report, 
http://www .austl i i. edu .au/au/other/alrc/pu bl icatio ns/reports/77 I A L R C7 7Ch6. htm I# AL RC 
77Ch6. 
65 Point 4.2 of the ALRC's Report, 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/77/ALRC77Ch4.htmi#ALRC 
77Ch4. 
66 Ibid., Recommendation I: amend the object clause of the FOI Act "to explain that the 
purpose of the Act is to provide a right of access which will enable people to participate 
in the policy, accountability and decision making processes of government; open the 
government's activities to scrutiny, discussion, comment and review; increase the 
accountability of the Executive; and [to show] that Parliament's intention in providing 
that right is to underpin Australian's constitutionally guaranteed representative 
democracy." 
67 Ibid., point 4.14. 
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like official alongside the existing Australian Ombudsman and Attorney-
General's Department would be unjustifiable. 
Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Seven supra, the Ombudsman may take up to 
twelve months to conclude an inquiry into a public access complaint: evidence 
from the Queensland Information Commissioner's experience suggests that six 
months is an optimum time for dealing with such complaints,68 although the 
Commissioner's Report proceeds to show that some applications have still 
taken over 36 months to process. It must be noted, however, that the 
Queensland Commissioner's role resembles that of an Ombudsman insofar as 
s/he must enter into a dialogue/negotiation process, unlike the ElT envisaged 
above. Moreover, the Queensland Commissioner's Report highlights an 
increase in the number of applications and the existence of a backlog in 
processing them. Bearing in mind that the Information Commissioner's sole 
responsibility is to deal with complaints regarding refusals to grant access to 
information/documents and that the Queensland office has clearly been 
struggling to cope, it is conceivable that the Ombudsman, whose remit, as 
noted, is not confined to the processing of one category of complaint, could 
eventually find his office struggling to cope with complaints regarding alleged 
refusals to comply with any European FOI legislation.69 At the very least, the 
Ombudsman would be unable to deal with such complaints within anything 
approaching six months of their lodgement.70 Evidence from the ALRC 
highlights the need for its proposed Information Commissioner to publicise 
Australia's FOI legislation.71 Such publicity could result in an increase in the 
number of FOI-related complaints. If the Ombudsman were to promote public 
awareness of the rules governing public access in the EU, there could also be 
more complaints arising within the EU, to add to the Ombudsman's burden: the 
68 ih Annual Report, Executive Summary, http://wv;w.slq.qld.gov.au/infocomm/ar9899.html. 
The Irish Information Commissioner seeks to dispose of applications within four months, 
so far as is reasonably practicable (see further http://www.irlgov.ie/oic/2136 3c2.htm). 
69 The number of complaints submitted to the Ombudsman concerning all types of 
maladministration had increased threefold by 2000: see the speech cited at Chapter Seven 
supra, note 84. 
70 The decision in Complaint 634/97/PD, concluded by a critical remark recommending the 
granting of access to the documents requested, took over seventeen months to address. 
The Ombudsman apologised for the delay: see 
http://www.euro-ombudsman.eu.int/decision/en/970634.htm. 
71 Point 6. IO of the ALRC Report, note 64 supra. 
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ElT could both promote public awareness of those rules and assume the burden 
of complaints. 
However, given that the establishment of the ElT would require further 
expenditure and a not inconsiderable revision of the Treaties, it could be much 
simpler, in the Member States' collective opinion, to strengthen the 
Ombudsman, although this would not indicate as great a commitment to 
transparency on the part of the Member States as the establishment of an ElT. 
Theoretically, the Ombudsman's Statute could be revised to provide a right of 
access to all documents, and a right to question officials without those officials 
having any restriction upon their capacity to answer. 72 There is also a 
precedent, in Eire, of an Ombudsman who is simultaneously an Information 
Commissioner. The Irish Information Commissioner, Mr Kevin Murphy, has 
also been the Irish Ombudsman and Chairman of the Public Offices 
Commission since 1994.73 Appointing Mr Soderman to the post of ElT would 
certainly save the expense in providing for another official, plus office, statf 
and salary, and would preclude any possibility of the ElT duplicating the 
Ombudsman's role. Mr Soderman's experience of dealing with public access 
complaints could be an advantage: whereas the ElT might become more expert 
in FOI-related issues than the Ombudsman in time, s/he may not initially have 
the current Ombudsman's transparency-related expertise. The most important 
need, however, would be to increase the Ombudsman's powers: the most up-to-
date concept of an Information Commissioner invariably has greater powers 
72 
" ... the stipulation [in Article 3 of the Ombudsman's Statute] that officials and other servants 
of Community institutions and bodies "shall speak on behalf of and in accordance with 
instructions from their administrations and shall continue to be bound by their duty of 
professional secrecy" is in my view unacceptable. In 1999, the European Commission 
interpreted this paragraph in such a way as to conclude that a Commissioner, as a Member 
of the institution, does not have an obligation to testify at the request of the Ombudsman. 
I believe that Commissioners should testify, when necessary, to the Ombudsman." 
(Speech to the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, Brussels, 5 March 2001 (Rapporteur: 
Almeida Garrett): 'Modification of Article 3 of the Ombudsman's Statute: Remarks by the 
European Ombudsman, Jacob Si:iderman,' 
http:/ /www.euro-om budsman.eu.int/speeches/en/200 1-03-05 .htm). 
73 The Irish Information Commissioner has the following powers and purposes (website cited at 
note 63 supra): to review FOI requests and make binding decisions where necessary, 
subject to an appeal on a point of law; to supervise compliance of public bodies with the 
Irish FOI Act; to encourage voluntary publications beyond the Irish FOI Act's minimum 
requirements; to publish information on the practical operation of the Act; and to prepare 
an Annual Report. 
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than those of the Ombudsman, including the power to order the disclosure of 
documents and to re-classify improperly classified documents. 74 The chief 
difference between the Ombudsman and the Irish Information Commissioner 
is, of course, the power to make binding decisions regarding the disclosure of 
documents. 
It must be remembered, however, that a strengthened Ombudsman would lack 
independent institutional status and would not report directly to European 
citizens. The ethos of the Ombudsman as a source of friendly solutions might 
suffer ifs/he were to be granted the power to issue binding decisions regarding 
the disclosure of information. Moreover, if the Ombudsman were so 
empowered, Article 230 should still be amended to enable those decisions to be 
challenged by way of judicial review. The Treaties would still require revision, 
therefore, and it might seem equally easy, or equally difficult, to amend them 
in order to accommodate an ElT instead. If the Ombudsman were not so 
empowered, then s/he could, obviously, never fulfil the EIT's role as the 
citizens' primary remedy in the event of an institution's refusal to grant public 
access. 
Furthermore, the ALRC duly considered the possibility of allowing an existing 
officiallagency to assume the role of the proposed Australian Information 
Commissioner. The conclusion was that no existing official/agency could do 
so: the Attorney-General was insufficiently independent; the Ombudsman 
should not become involved in policy development, but should concentrate 
upon maintaining the integrity of government; the Auditor-General would have 
the same difficulties as the Australian Ombudsman; the Australian Archives 
are not independent; parliamentary committees cannot constantly monitor FOI 
74 Data from http://www.privacyinternational.org/issues/foia/foia-survey.html shows that, in 
Hungary (a prime example of a highly secretive (ex-Soviet Bloc) regime now embracing 
the principle of open government}, the Parliamentary Commissioner for Data Protection 
and Freedom of Information oversees the operation of Act LXIII of 1992 on the 
Protection of Personal Data and the Publicity of Data of Public Interest. According the 
survey, the Commissioner is an Ombudsman for both data protection and FOI. 
Importantly, under the Hungarian Secrecy Act of I995, the Commissioner is entitled to 
change the classification of state and official secrets as well. This example, together with 
that of the Irish Information Commissioner, demonstrates that the most up-to-date concept 
of an Information Commissioner is indeed that of an official having power to intervene in 
the decision-making of public bodies. 
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and are subject to political pressure; the Privacy Commissioner was deemed to 
be concerned with an entirely separate issue to that of FOI; and the Chief 
Information Officer was not concerned with meeting public demands for 
information.75 The most obvious disadvantage of appointing the current 
Ombudsman to the post of ElT is that he is already too busy to systematically 
check the compliance ofthe institutions with any critical remarks that he might 
make.76 It is not unreasonable, therefore, to ask how the Ombudsman could be 
expected to systematically and continually monitor their compliance with FOI 
legislation. If they are truly committed to transparency, therefore, the Member 
States should consider carefully the Australian experience of FOI legislation 
and appoint a dedicated new official, sufficiently independent and sufficiently 
empowered to promote transparency and public access to 
documents/information, particularly since the prospective Member State of 
Hungary, a far less well-established democracy than any current Member State, 
has now appointed a similar official to help re-enforce its democratic nature 
through the supervision of the public access component of multidimensional 
transparency. 77 
8.6. Conclusion. 
In this final Chapter, it has been argued that an independent ElT could be 
established, having the powers enumerated in section 8.3, by amending the 
Treaties and applicable legislation, perhaps as suggested in section 8.4. As 
seen in section 8.5, the fact that the ElT might occasionally assist the ECA and 
OLAF should not dissuade the Member States from appointing a separate 
official to oversee FOI and transparency within the EU: certainly, neither the 
ECA nor OLAF could devote themselves to the EIT's task. The Ombudsman 
could not fulfil the role of the ElT without greatly enhanced powers, which 
would change the Ombudsman's ethos. Moreover, the Ombudsman is 
concerned with the integrity with all aspects of the EU's administration: his/her 
workload is also such that s/he could not be exclusively concerned with FOI 
75 Point 6.29 of the Report, note 64 supra. 
76 Speech cited at Chapter Seven supra, note 84. 
77 http://www.obh.hu/adatved/indexek/index.htm. 
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and would not be able to systematically and continually monitor the 
administration of EU public access/prior classification rules. 
If the Member States and EU institutions are serious about the need for 
transparency, particularly transparency as public access, then the institutions 
should be compelled to obey the applicable rules, without compromise, and to 
apply those rules with a view to granting the widest possible public access, not 
with a view to maintaining secrecy. An ElT is the ideal official to ensure 
compliance with the rules through the adoption of binding decisions. S/he 
would transcend the capacity of the existing remedies discussed in Chapters 
Six and Seven supra, to guarantee public access, and would be more than just a 
remedy: s/he would supervise and control the transparency-related activities of 
all EU institutions and bodies, including those not covered by Regulation No. 
I 049/200 I; 78 and identify and correct problems before complaints from the 
public could arise, or in circumstances where complaints from the general 
public would be unlikely to arise. For example, an MEP might complain to the 
ElT if the Council or Commission failed to respond fully and frankly to a call 
for information the receipt of which is a prerogative of the European 
Parliament. The EIT would facilitate the flow of information between the 
institutions, and to the public. Institutions and bodies would be able to seek 
judicial review of Decisions addressed to them by the EIT. There is now an 
adequate body of jurisprudence concerning public access to enable the ElT to 
interpret the relevant rules, and, provided that the ECJ is as circumspect with 
the ElT as is the Irish High Court with the Irish Information Commissioner, the 
annulment of decisions of the EIT should be the exception rather than the 
norm. 
The expense of financing another institution should not deter the Member 
States from proving their commitment to transparency by establishing an EIT. 
The EIT would also recommend liberalising amendments to the law; educate 
both EU officials and citizens regarding public access and transparency; and, 
above all, work to overcome the EU's culture of secrecy, thereby preparing the 
78 Cf Curtin, Chapter Five supra, note 4, who asks, at 27, who is controlling the other agencies 
and bodies not mentioned in Article 255 EC and the decisions they are taking. 
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way for greater receptivity, on the part ofthe Member States, to the adoption of 
a far more multidimensionally-transparent system of governance, in which 
officials were comfortable with the idea of working under public scrutiny and 
more willing to critically analyse the efficacy and democratic nature of their 
decision-making processes, with a view to increasing transparency further. 
By reporting directly to the public on the development and implementation of 
transparency within the Union, the ElT could help to bring the Union closer to 
its citizens and thereby help in resolving its perceived problem of illegitimacy, 
as discussed in Chapter Two supra. States Party to the Aarhus Convention, 
discussed in Chapter Four supra, are required under Article 9(1) to ensure that 
there is an alternative remedy to judicial review in the event of a refusal to 
grant access to environmental information, the final decision of which must be 
binding on the public authority holding that information. Therefore, should the 
Convention become part of Community law, this provision also supports the 
establishment of an ElT as an alternative to the existing Ombudsman. 
A final point to emphasise is the importance of the EIT's approach to public 
access rules. Whenever an institution's refusal to grant public access is 
brought to the attention of the Courts or the Ombudsman, the criticism to the 
effect that a marginal review is undertaken79 reflects the fact that the Courts 
and Ombudsman focus upon ensuring the maintenance of the rule of law. They 
are prepared to argue that the institutions have not interpreted the rules 
correctly in light of the principle of granting the widest possible access to 
documents, but they do not consider whether the widest possible access to 
documents should actually be greater than the widest possible access permitted 
under the current public access rules, with a view to increasing the potential of 
those rules to enhance democratic participation in decision-making. The ElT 
would consider not only the requirements of the rule of law when investigating 
complaints, but also the requirements of democracy, and would recommend 
79 Chapter Six supra, note 2 and text: Chapter Seven supra, note 74 and text. 
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changes to the rules with those requirements in mind.80 In light of these 
conclusions, the question asked in the title ofthis Chapter must be answered in 
the affirmative: the existing barely adequate remedies do not demonstrate as 
high a level of commitment to transparency in the form of public access to 
documents held by the institutions, as would the establishment of an ElT duly 
empowered to enforce the underlying principles of public access. 
80 The rule of law and democracy are not mutually exclusive issues, of course: the Ombudsman 
has argued that open decision-making promotes the rule of law by, inter alia, eliminating 
the potential for "political fixing or bias" (speech cited at note 19 supra). 
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CONCLUSION: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF TRANSPARENCY 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION. 
In Part One of this thesis, it was argued that transparency is multidimensional, 
requiring governmental decision-making processes to be open to public scrutiny 
and public input. The multidimensional concept of transparency discussed in 
Chapter One has potential to legitimate the European Union, as illustrated in 
Chapter Two, but the Member States and institutions still tend to equate 
transparency with the right of public access to documents, as noted in Chapter 
Three. That fact, as noted, explains the emphasis within this thesis upon the 
substantive rules governing, and the remedies applicable to, public access to 
documents. However, the Commission's White Paper1 now acknowledges that 
such access is essential to democracy and that democracy also involves public 
participation in decision-making processes.2 This suggests that the Commission is 
beginning to accept that public access rules should facilitate both the holding of 
institutions to public account and public participation in decision-making. The 
question therefore arose, in the conclusion to Part One, of whether the EU' s public 
access rules are sufficiently liberal to facilitate the development of an informed 
European public, fully empowered to participate in the more democratic and 
transparent decision-making processes that the Commission apparently wishes to 
establish. The establishment of such processes would in practice constitute an 
important step along the road to multidimensionally-transparent governance within 
the European Union. 
In Part Two, it was concluded that the Union's rules governing public access are 
not as useful as they might be, in terms of facilitating public accountability and 
public participation in decision-making. Per Article 4(1) of Regulation No. 
1049/2001, certain mandatory exemptions permit secretive institutions to refuse 
access to certain documents without conducting a 'harm test' and without 
1 Chapter Two supra, note 1. 
2 Chapter Three supra, note 79 and text. 
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balancing the public interests at stake, unlike the Aarhus Convention, which only 
provides that access to environmental information may be refused in order to 
protect the public interests listed in Articles 4(3)(c) and 4(4). It also follows from 
Articles 9(3) and 17(1) of the Regulation that certain documents may not be 
included in the new public register. It could be virtually impossible for an 
ordinary European to even begin to challenge any refusal to grant public access to 
such documents: s/he would be unable sufficiently to identify them in order to 
request access to them in the first place, per the requirements of Article 6(1) of the 
Regulation. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Member States and 
institutions employ attractive rhetoric whenever referring to transparency and 
openness, such as Recital 2 of the Preamble to Regulation No. 1049/2001, linking 
openness to public participation in decision-making, accountability and legitimacy, 
yet in practice, when put to the test, they seek to prevent a potentially large number 
of documents from being subjected to any form of public scrutiny, for up to thirty 
years under Article 4(7) of the Regulation. 
Attention therefore turned to the remedies provided for refusals to grant public 
access to documents, in order to determine whether or not the Community Courts 
and the European Ombudsman were adequate to secure for citizens adequate 
public access to documents, for the purposes of engaging in the multidimensional 
transparency-related activities of holding the institutions to account and 
participating in decision-making processes, despite the existence of less than 
liberal public access rules and despite the institutions' apparent reluctance to grant 
such access. That reluctance, already apparent from Chapter Five,3 became more 
evident as the cases and complaints referred to in Chapters Six and Seven, 
respectively, were analysed. In Part Three, it was concluded that these remedies, 
while not entirely deserving of some of the harsh criticism levelled against them 
regarding the standard of review employed,4 were nevertheless unable to effect a 
major cultural change in the EU, to create a climate in which officials actively seek 
3 See in particular Chapter Five supra, notes 60 and 87. 
4 Chapter Six supra, note 2 and text: Chapter Seven supra, note 72 and text. 
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to provide the widest possible public access to documents instead of looking to 
invoke as many exceptions as possible in order to maintain secrecy. The current 
remedies are also quite time-consuming; judicial review is potentially expensive; 
and there is no guarantee that access to the requested document will actually be 
granted even if a complaint is upheld. Nor do the Courts or Ombudsman 
guarantee the production of a conclusive decision to the effect that the document in 
question cannot be disclosed, if that happens to be the case: it is currently always 
open to the institution to refuse access on other grounds, and a review of that 
further refusal might then be required. The Courts and Ombudsman do not 
independently review the implementation of the EU's public access provisions 
with a view to suggesting liberalising amendments thereto. 
The suggested solution to these problems is to establish a European Information 
Tribune, modelled upon the national Information Tribune proposed by Leigh and 
Lustgarten,5 in order not only to enforce the principle of granting the widest 
possible public access to documents, but also to suggest liberalising amendments 
to the applicable rules, and to continually scrutinise both the flow of information 
from the institutions to the public and the inter-institutional flow of information 
required by the Treaties and any relevant inter-institutional agreements, in order to 
ensure that the existing decision-making processes of the Union are and remain as 
open as possible. The European Parliament cannot effectively debate matters of 
potential concern to citizens unless MEPs are in possession of all the relevant 
information, just as citizens themselves cannot participate in any transparent 
decision-making procedures that might be established pursuant to the 
Commission's White Paper initiative6 without adequate knowledge of the issues at 
stake. 
The ElT cannot, as noted in Chapter Eight supra, single-handedly effect the 
establishment of a multidimensionally-transparent system of governance within 
5 See Chapter Eight supra, note 3 and text. 
6 See further Chapter Three supra, section 3.3.3. 
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the EU. In such a system, as discussed within Chapter Two supra, particularly 
section 2.2.3, the interrelationship between the "four themes" of citizenship, 
democracy, subsidiarity and transparency, which, as discussed by de Burca,7 are 
not only interrelated but also crucial to the Union's legitimacy, would become 
apparent: well-informed citizens could participate in democratic, open and 
transparent decision-making processes and could hold the institutions to account 
should they, inter alia, fail to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. However, 
the EIT could, by obliging the institutions and Member States to work under the 
full spotlight of public scrutiny and to think in terms of keeping the public 
informed as opposed to maintaining secrecy at all costs, help to transform the 
Union's culture of secrecy into a culture of openness, in which the idea of 
establishing a coherent multidimensionally-transparent system of governance as a 
means of resolving the Union's legitimacy crisis might finally take root: piecemeal 
reforms, which have apparently had little success to date in light of the White 
Paper,8 might finally be abandoned in favour of a 'root-and-branch' reconstruction 
of the Union's decision-making processes. 
If the institutions and Member States are as serious about the relationship between 
democracy, legitimacy and the limited concept of transparency as public access to 
documents as their rhetoric would suggest,9 they should be prepared to establish an 
EIT in any event, in order to ensure, at least, that the right of public access to 
documents is taken seriously within the EU legal order. If they are as serious 
about bringing the Union closer to its citizens as their rhetoric would suggest, 10 
they should be prepared to establish an official to scrutinise the flow of 
information within the Union on the citizens' behalf. Ideally, if they are serious 
about the Union's quest for legitimacy, they should admit at the outset that 
transparency means much more than mere access to information and adapt their 
policies accordingly. However, the establishment of a powerful EIT to oversee the 
7 Introduction, supra, note 7, at 350. 
8 See Chapter Two supra, note I . 
9 E.g. Declaration No. 17, annexed to the Final Act of the Maastricht Treaty. 
10 E.g. Article I (ex A) TEU. 
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administration of that particular dimension of multidimensional transparency could 
only be a step in the right direction. 
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APPENDICES. 
Appendix A: The Commission and Council Code of Conduct on public access 
to documents. 
"General principle 
The public will have the widest possible access to documents held by the 
Commission and the Council. 'Document' means any written text, whatever its 
medium, which contains existing data and which is held by the Council or the 
Commission. 
Processing of initial applications 
An application for access to a document will have to be made in writing, in a 
sufficiently precise manner; it will have to contain information that will enable the 
document or documents concerned to be identified. 
Where necessary, the institution concerned will ask the applicant for further 
details. 
Where the document held by an institution was written by a natural or legal 
person, a Member State, another Community institution or body or any other 
national or international body, the application must be sent direct to the author. 
In consultation with the applicants, the institution concerned will find a fair 
solution to comply with repeat applications and/or those which relate to very large 
documents. 
The applicant will have access to documents either by consulting them on the spot 
or by having a copy sent at his own expense; the fee will not exceed a reasonable 
sum. 
The institution concerned be able to stipulate that a person to whom a document is 
released will not be allowed to reproduce or circulate the said document for 
commercial purposes through direct sale without its prior authorisation. 
Within one month the relevant departments of the institution concerned will 
inform the applicant either that his application has been approved or that they 
intend to advise the institution to reject it. 
Processing of confirmatory applications 
Where the relevant departments of the institution concerned intend to advise the 
institution to reject an application, they will inform the applicant thereof and tell 
him that he has one month to make a confirmatory application to the institution for 
that position to be reconsidered, failing which he will be deemed to have 
withdrawn his original application. 
If a confirmatory application is submitted, and if the institution concerned decides 
to refuse to release that document, that decision, which must be made within a 
month of submission of the confirmatory application, will be notified in writing to 
the applicant as soon as possible. The grounds for the decision must be given, and 
the decision must indicate the means of redress that area available under judicial 
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proceedings and complaints to the ombudsman under the conditions specified in, 
respectively, Articles 173 [now 230] and 138e [now 195] EC. 
Exceptions 
The institutions will refuse access to any documents whose disclosure could 
undermine: 
the protection of the public interest (public security, international 
relations, monetary stability, court proceedings, inspections and 
investigations), 
the protection of the individual and of privacy, 
the protection of commercial and industrial secrecy, 
the protection of the Community's financial interests, 
the protection of confidentiality as requested by the natural or legal 
persons that supplied the information or as required by the legislation 
of the Member State that supplied the information. 
They may also refuse access in order to project the institution's interest in the 
confidentiality of its proceedings ... " 
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Appendix B: Selected provisions of Council Decision 931731. 
Article 1 
1. The public shall have access to Council documents under the conditions laid 
down in this Decision. 
2. 'Council document' means any written text, whatever its medium, containing 
existing data and held by the Council, subject to Article 2(2). 
Article 2 
2. Where the requested document was written by a natural or legal person, a 
Member State, another Community institution or body, or any other national or 
international body, the application must not be sent to the Council, but direct to the 
author. 
Article 4. 
1. Access to a Council document shall not be granted where its disclosure could 
undermine: 
the protection of. .. [see Annex D] 
2. Access to a Council document may be refused in order to protect the 
confidentiality of the Council's proceedings." 
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Appendlix C : Selected! provisions of Regulation No. 1049/2001. 
" ... Whereas ... 
(2) Openness enables citizens to participate more closely in the decision-making 
process and guarantees that the administration enjoys greater legitimacy and is 
more effective and more accountable to the citizen in a democratic system. 
Openness contributes to strengthening the principles of democracy and respect for 
fundamental rights as laid down in Article 6 of the EU Treaty and in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union .... 
Article 2 
3. This Regulation shall apply to all documents held by an institution: that is to 
say, documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession, in all areas of 
activity of the European Union ... 
Article 3 
For the purpose of this Regulation: 
(a) 'document' shall mean any content whatever its medium (written on paper or 
stored in electronic form or as a sound, visual or audiovisual recording) concerning 
a matter relating to the policies, activities and decisions falling within the 
institution's sphere of responsibility ... 
Article 4 
1. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of: 
(a) the public interest as regards: 
public security, 
defence and military matters, 
international relations, 
the financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community or a 
Member State. 
(b) privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with 
Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data. 
2. The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would 
undermine the protection of: 
commercial interests of a natural or legal person, including intellectual 
property, 
court proceedings and legal advice, 
the purpose of inspections, investigations and audits, 
unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure. 
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3. Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for internal use or received by 
an institution, which relates to a matter where the decision has not been taken by 
the institution, shall be refused if disclosure of the document would seriously 
undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an overriding 
public interest in disclosure. 
Access to a document containing opinions for internal use as part of deliberations 
and preliminary consultations within the institution concerned shall be refused 
even after the decision has been taken if disclosure of the document would 
seriously undermine the institution's decision-making process, unless there is an 
overriding public interest in disclosure. 
4. As regard third-party documents, the institution shall consult the third party with 
a view to assessing whether an exception in paragraph 1 or 2 is applicable, unless 
it is clear that the document shall or shall not be disclosed. 
5. A Member State may request the institution not to disclose a document 
originating from that Member State without its prior agreement. 
6. If only parts of the requested document are covered by any of the exceptions, 
the remaining parts of the document shall be released. 
7. The exceptions as laid down in paragraphs 1 to 3 shall only apply for the period 
during which protection is justified on the basis of the content of the document. 
The exceptions may apply for a maximum period of 30 years. In the case of 
documents covered by the exceptions relating to privacy or commercial interests 
and in the case of sensitive documents, the exceptions may, if necessary, continue 
to apply after this period. 
Article 5 
Where a Member State receives a request for a document in its possession, 
originating from an institution, unless it is clear that the document shall or shall not 
be disclosed, the Member State shall consult with the institution concerned in 
order to take a decision that does not jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of 
this Regulation. 
The Member State may instead refer the request to the institution. 
Article 9 
1. Sensitive documents are documents ongmating from the institutions or the 
agencies established by them, from Member States, third countries or International 
Organisations, classified as 'TRES SECRET/TOP SECRET', 'SECRET' or 
'cONFIDENTIEL' in accordance with the rules of the institution concerned, which 
protect essential interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member 
States in the areas covered by Article 4(l)(a), notably public security, defence and 
military matters. 
2. Applications for access to sensitive documents ... shall be handled only by those 
persons who have a right to acquaint themselves with those documents. These 
persons shall also ... assess which references to sensitive documents could be made 
in the public register. 
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3. Sensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with the 
consent ofthe originator. 
4. An institution which decides to refuse access to a sensitive document shall give 
the reasons for its decision in a manner which does not harm the interests protected 
in Article 4. 
5. Member States shall take appropriate measures to ensure that when handling 
applications for sensitive documents the principles in this Article and Article 4 are 
respected. 
6. The rules of the institutions concerning sensitive documents shall be made 
public. 
7. The Commission and Council shall inform the European Parliament regarding 
sensitive documents in accordance with arrangements agreed between the 
institutions ... " 
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Appendix D: §elected provisions of the Statute of the European Ombudsman. 
Article 3 
1. The Ombudsman shall, on his own initiative or following a complaint, conduct 
all the enquiries which he considers justified to clarify any suspected 
maladministration in the activities of Community institutions and bodies. He 
shall inform the institution or body concerned of such action, which may submit 
any useful comment to him. 
2. The Community institutions and bodies shall be obliged to supply the 
Ombudsman with any information he has requested of them and give him access to 
the files concerned. They may refuse only on duly substantiated grounds of 
secrecy. 
They shall give access to documents originating in a Member State and classed as 
secret by law or regulation only where that Member State has given its prior 
agreement. 
They shall give access to other documents originating in a Member State after 
having informed the Member State concerned. 
In both cases, in accordance with Article 4, the Ombudsman may not divulge the 
content of such documents. 
Officials and other servants of Community institutions and bodies must testify at 
the request of the Ombudsman; they shall speak on behalf of and in accordance 
with instructions from their administrations and shall continue to be bound by their 
duty of professional secrecy. 
3. The Member States' authorities shall be obliged to provide the Ombudsman, 
whenever he may so request, via the Permanent Representations of the Member 
States to the European Communities, with any information that may help to clarify 
instances of maladministration by Community institutions or bodies unless such 
information is covered by laws or regulations on secrecy or by provisions 
preventing its being communicated. Nonetheless, in the latter case, the Member 
State concerned may allow the Ombudsman to have this information provided that 
he undertakes not to divulge it. 
4. If the assistance which he requests is not forthcoming, the Ombudsman shall 
inform the European Parliament, which shall make appropriate representations. 
5. As far as possible, the Ombudsman shall seek a solution with the institution or 
body concerned to eliminate the instance of maladministration and satisfy the 
complaint. 
6. If the Ombudsman finds there has been maladministration, he shall inform the 
institution or body concerned, where appropriate making draft recommendations. 
The institution or body so informed shall send the Ombudsman a detailed opinion 
within three months. 
7. The Ombudsman shall then send a report to the European Parliament and to the 
institution or body concerned. He may make recommendations in his report. The 
person lodging the complaint shall be informed by the Ombudsman of the outcome 
of the inquiries, of the opinion expressed by the institution or body concerned and 
of any recommendations made by the Ombudsman. 
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8. At the end of each annual sessiOn the Ombudsman shall submit to the 
European Parliament a report on the outcome of his inquiries. 
Article 6 
2. The Ombudsman shall be chosen from among persons who are Union citizens, 
have full civil and political rights, offer every guarantee of independence, and 
meet the conditions required for the exercise of the highest judicial office in their 
country or have the acknowledged competence and experience to undertake the 
duties of Ombudsman. 
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